Early Signals: Sahel States' Reported Exit from ECOWAS and Emerging Effects on Cross-Border Trade and Human Mobility

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August 26-27, 2025| Accra, Ghana

Samuel Botchway |DIWA / Research Fellow

Julia Duodu |DIWA / Research Associate

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• Prof. Charles Amoatey, DIWA-GIMPA
• Mr. Richard Otoo, DIWA-GIMPA
• Samuel Botchway, DIWA-GIMPA
• Julia Duodu, DIWA-GIMPA

TEAM MEMBERS

What we will be discussing:

The effects of the reported exit of the junta-led states from ECOWAS on human mobility and cross-border trade, drawing from the Ghana-Burkina Faso experiences.

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• ECOWAS (1975) was established to foster economic and political integration and serve as a "borderless region" (ECOWAS n.d.; Adeniran 2012).

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• Free Movement Protocol (1979): The “borderless region” agenda led to the adoption of the Free Movement Protocol to support free movement of persons, right to residency, and establishment (Olaniyi 2021; ECOWAS 2019).

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• Achievements: Enhanced trade, mobility, and multi-sectoral growth across member states.

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• Challenges:
• Diverse monetary systems, inadequate funding
• Insecurity and political instability, including coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), Niger (2023) (OECD 2022; African Union 2022).

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• ECOWAS Response: Sanctions on junta-led regimes criticized as inadequate against terrorism threats (Balima 2024).

MOTIVATION & BACKGROUND

AES Formed: September 2023 via Liptako-Gourma Charter for defense, sovereignty, and development.

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AES Aim: "The AES is committed to defending our people’s dignity and territorial integrity against imperialist ambitions." – Confederation of Sahel States (2024)

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Exit Process: Announced Jan 28, 2024; Confederation of Sahel States formed July 6, 2024.

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Reasons: ECOWAS drift from pan-Africanism, foreign influence (e.g., France), failure to combat terrorism (Bloomfield 2024).

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AES Initiatives: New passport (no ECOWAS logo), stabilization fund, regional bank, import levy (Sanusi 2025).

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Implications: Potential disruptions to trade, mobility, and regional security

MOTIVATION & BACKGROUND

The study provides empirical insights into the nascent effects of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) formation and ECOWAS exit announcement.

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The study contributes to understanding the "lag" between political announcements and practical effects in regional economic communities.

Highlights how landlocked geography (e.g., Burkina Faso's reliance on Ghanaian ports) sustains continuity despite geopolitical shifts.

CAPTION OR PHOTO CREDIT: RIGHT HERE

SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS

The study set out to;

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• Investigate the effects of the reported exit of the junta-led states from ECOWAS for human mobility and cross-border trade drawing from the Ghana-Burkina Faso experiences.

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• Provide insights into how ECOWAS and member states can adapt to the new political realities and ensure continued socio-economic stability in the sub-region.

STUDY OBJECTIVES

• Immigration officers (Ghana-Burkina Faso)
• Customs officials (Ghana-Burkina Faso)
• Passengers who ply the Ghana-Burkina Faso border
• Traders and truck drivers

TARGET POPULATION

CAPTION OR PHOTO CREDIT: RIGHT HERE

• Approach: Primarily qualitative.
• Phase 1: Interviews with Ghana officials (Immigration: Border Management, International Relations, Migration Bureau; Customs Division)
• Phase 2: Fieldwork at Paga (major border) and Kulungugu (minor border):

Participants: Immigration Officers (2), Customs Officers (2), Traders (7), Truck Drivers (6), Passengers (6), Burkinabe Officials (3)

• Selection Criteria: Participants with pre/post-2023 border experience, thus those who had interfaced with the border before and after the reported withdrawal.
• Data: Migration flows (2020-2024) from GIS; Trade (import & export) statistics from ECOTIS
• Data collection period: 1^st – 27^th November 2024.
• Analysis: Thematic analysis for interviews; trend analysis for data
• Challenge: Cautious/diplomatic responses from Burkinabe officials due to government stance

METHODOLOGY

CAPTION OR PHOTO CREDIT: RIGHT HERE

METHODOLOGY: FIELD PICTURES

• While formal trade and border protocols remain largely intact, economic fluctuations and security concerns continue shaping trade and mobility trends.
• Informal trade persists despite rising costs due to currency instability.
• The introduction of the Burkinabe passport marks a key shift in travel regulations, signaling broader changes in regional movement dynamics.

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OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

 Attempted coups, successful coups and unconstitutional change of government in the West African region in the 2020’s

Source: ACCORD, 2023

• Trade protocols remain unchanged; no new tariffs or directives on Burkinabe goods.
• Reason: Burkina Faso’s landlocked status depends on Ghana’s ports and trade routes.
• Fluctuations driven by seasonal factors (farming cycles and festive periods) and insecurities.
• Evidenced in:

"We have not yet gotten any directive from the government to treat Burkinabe goods differently... Even if they are going through industrial processes, they don't pay duties."

Customs Official 2 (Interview, Kulungugu Border, November 22, 2024).

"They don’t have a seaport [...] whether they like it or not, they cannot act in isolation... They are landlocked countries." Customs Official 1 (Interview, Paga Border, November 21, 2024)

Results: Institutional continuity in formal trade

Burkina Faso’s total exports to Ghana grew by ~60% from $52.8 million in 2022 to $84.3 million in 2024, with a significant jump in 2023 ($81.7 million) followed by a slight increase in 2024, indicating stronger trade ties.

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Agriculture dominates (~60% of 2024 exports), with Edible Vegetables (25,483 in 2024) and Oil Seeds (15,436) leading.

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Cotton’s sharp decline ($1.43m in 2022 to $2,000 in 2024) suggests policy or market shifts.

Source: ECOWAS Trade Information System, 2025

Results: Formal trade statistics

Total imports doubled from $264.3M in 2020 to $573.5M in 2024, with mineral fuels driving growth (from $139.5M to $408.0M).

Source: ECOWAS Trade Information System, 2025

Results: Formal trade statistics

Paga:

• Upward Trajectory: Net weight increased steadily from 145.70 million kg in 2021 to 422.84 million kg in 2024, a ~190% rise over three years.

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• The surge in 2024 indicates a significant recovery and surge in trade activity.

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Kulungugu:

• Net weight peaked at 11.98 million kg in 2022 but dropped to 6.33 million kg in 2024, a ~47% decline from its peak.

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• The drop aligns with insurgencies and the Bawku conflict, with ethnic clashes (Kusasi vs. Mamprusi) and jihadist threats near the Ghana-Burkina Faso border disrupting trade

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Source: Ghana Customs, 2025

Results: Formal trade statistics

• Periodic insurgency (terrorists) attacks on trucks bearing goods are motivated by a detestation of customs officials’ mobilization of funds for the government (Burkina Faso).
• This necessitates military escort of goods were which accounts for the delay in the transportation and delivery of goods as well as the drop in transits and imports.
• The Bawku ethnic conflict between the Mamprusis and Kusasis in Ghana was cited as one of the core factors responsible for the drop in trade volumes and human mobility (evident in trade stats. trends)

“…people will not go and bring goods because they feel that they are likely to encounter tougher problems; people are killed at Bawku periodically. Just last week, the military were escorting goods,…they sandwiched the vehicle, shot and killed the driver in the car and they brought them here. So, you think somebody would like to come here again?[...] So you see that both the conflict at Burkina and here (Bawku) and even their withdrawal could be a problem to us… We used to get a lot of onions, but these days, there is nothing.” Customs Official 2 (Interview, Kulungugu Border, November 21, 2024).

Results Cont’d: Trade, insurgencies, and ethnic conflicts

• Truck drivers on both sides of the Ghana-Burkina Faso border reported minimal changes to border protocols and processing since the announcement of the AES exit.
• Some drivers also observed minor delays at the Burkina Faso borders especially during the discharge of administrative procedures by their customs officials (Douane).
• Evidenced in:

"Even after they announced their exit, nothing has changed. Once you show the laissez-passer, you are allowed to pass." Truck Driver 1 (Interview, Paga Border, November 22, 2024).

“Delays usually happen when they are checking the laissez-passer or completing other administrative procedures." Truck driver (Interview, Paga Border, November 22, 2024).

Results Cont’d: Border procedures and movement

• Laissez-passer fees increased sharply (XOF 2,000 to 32,000 / GHS 800).
• Currency volatility (CFA vs. Cedi) raises import costs, especially for informal traders (e.g. livestock).
• Increased extortion and document demands (e.g., Ghana Card) on Burkinabe side.
• Evidenced in:

"[…] However, in terms of observed changes the only thing I have noticed is that the Laissez-passer we buy to get through Burkina Faso used to be XOF 2,000 but it has been increased to XOF 32,000 since the new military ruler came. The equivalent is now GHS 800.00." Truck Driver 5, Ghanaian (Interview, Kulungugu Border, November 21, 2024)

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"In recent months, Burkinabe police have been harassing us more than before. When we get there, they ask for unnecessary documents that they never used to ask for, such as the Ghana Card. In some cases, they even demand to see my mate’s (bus conductor’s) Ghana Card, and if he doesn’t have it, they insist that we pay XOF 2,000 before they let us pass. When we ask why we need to pay, they get angry and make the process more difficult for us." Truck Driver 4, Ghanaian (Interview, Paga Border, November 22, 2024).

Results Cont’d: Rising costs and constraints

• The informal traders interviewed submitted that they have not witnessed significant changes in their ability to carry out cross-border business activities post-Burkina Faso-ECOWAS withdrawal.
• Thus, the importation and transportation of goods from Burkina Faso continue business as usual without significant delays, new official tariffs, and administrative barriers.
• Evidenced in:

“I have been trading through this border for 15 years, and nothing has changed since last year. The only thing we worry about is the cost of goods, but that has nothing to do with new border rules.” Livestock Trader (Interview, Paga Border, November 22, 2024).

“There has been no change. We import or go for the goods from Burkina Faso. In going for the goods, we don’t experience any disturbance.” Fishmonger (Interview, Paga Border, November 22, 2024).

Results Cont’d: Informal trade continuity amidst withdrawal

• Burkina Faso’s departure from ECOWAS has not had any conspicuous effect on human mobility across the border:
• New AES-Burkinabe passports (few) spotted at the two border posts; No visa restrictions imposed on nationals from Burkina Faso entering and leaving Ghana.
• Passengers continue to use traditional forms of identification such as biometric passports and vaccination certificates or cards.
• However, beneath the business-as-usual situation is an uneven mobility landscape, evidenced in an increase in checkpoints within Burkina Faso.
• Partly attributed to counter-terrorism efforts; slowed down travel times.

“[…] So, basically nothing has changed. If the traffic is low, it has nothing to do with the announcement […] You know, because of the jihadist and terrorist activities in the Sahel region, which includes Burkina Faso, traffic generally is slow because going beyond Ougadougou, I understand is very difficult and you need escort. So in terms of human flow and traffic, it is not as many as it used to be in the past.” Immigration Official (Interview, Paga Border, November 22, 2024).

"The new passport lacks ECOWAS symbols; we don’t endorse it without a visa, but many use old IDs instead." – Immigration Official, Kulungugu (Nov 21, 2024).

Source:

Newsaero, 2025

Results Cont’d: Human mobility and the withdrawal

Results Cont’d: Human mobility and the withdrawal

Paga border sees rising mobility (Burkinabe surge due to insecurity)

Results Cont’d: Human mobility and the withdrawal

Insights:

Overall, human mobility along the Paga border, being the preferred and busier transit route has not changed significantly across the assessment period.

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On the other hand, the mobility trend at Kulungugu (less busy route) has been modified by the Bawku conflict and insurgencies.

Uncertainty & Mobility Restrictions

• Exit of Burkina Faso from ECOWAS may enforce visa requirements for Burkinabés.
• Could disrupt daily socio-economic activities (trade, schooling, food purchases, family visits).

Security Implications

• The adoption of strict visa protocols likely to push travellers to unapproved routes, which shift with seasons.
• Heightened risks of criminality, smuggling, and confrontations at borders.

Operational Challenges

• Border agencies anticipate increased workload: more visa applications, need for extra staff/resources.
• Unclear directives on handling new Burkina Faso passports without ECOWAS emblem, leading to operational uncertainties.

Diplomatic Uncertainty: No clear guidance from ECOWAS/Ghana government, risk of diplomatic impasse.

Key Concern from Border Officials “If visas are enforced, criminality will increase… Are we going to ask someone buying food or visiting a relative to pay for a visa?” – Immigration Official, Paga

Results Cont’d: The withdrawal and anticipated developments

• Burkina Faso and AES allies' exit from ECOWAS raises concerns about trade and mobility (IISS 2024; Pichon 2024; Balima 2024).
• Predicted Impacts: Redefinition of regional policies, amended economic relations; Increased transaction costs, reintroduction of tariffs; Surge in migrant smuggling, trade disruptions, logistical constraints for WAEMU.
• Study Findings:
• No Immediate Changes: Ghana’s border practices align with ECOWAS free movement protocols; no new restrictions on Burkinabe mobility despite new passports without ECOWAS logo (Reuters 2024).
• Security Challenges: Sahel’s volatile security (terrorism, Bawku conflict) impacts trade and mobility more than ECOWAS withdrawal.
• Passport Issue: New Burkinabe passports denied entry; national IDs still accepted under routine checks.

DISCUSSIONS

• Trade Dynamics:
• Informal Trade: Continues uninterrupted; exchange rate volatility (Cedi vs. CFA franc) raises import costs (Osuji 2020).
• Formal Trade: Burkina Faso relies on Ghanaian ports; no tariff changes, but security issues delay transport (Ahiataku-Togobo 2024; Raga et al. 2023; Courtright 2023).
• Cost Increase: Sharp rise in Burkinabe laissez-passer fees impacts truck drivers’ earnings (Herbst 2014; Bach 2016).
• Future Risks:
• Visa requirements, trade barriers, and retaliatory measures could disrupt flows.
• Formalized withdrawal may lead to visa requirements, increased unauthorized crossings, and illicit trade (Sosuh 2011; Akinyemi 2019; Donko et al. 2021).
• Stricter border policies may increase informal crossings and undocumented trade (Hartzenberg 2011; Meagher 2021).
• ECOWAS-AES dialogue critical to mitigate economic and diplomatic disruptions (Musah 2024).

DISCUSSIONS: CONT’D

SOUND! AND! COLOR!

POLICY TAKEAWAYS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional Response

• ECOWAS must adopt proactive, adaptive policies to mitigate socio-economic and security risks.
• Expedite negotiations with AES; future-focused transitional agreements to safeguard trade & mobility.

Practical Interventions

• Enact bilateral mobility agreements to avoid restrictive visa policies.
• Strengthen cross-border infrastructure (security & customs) aimed at curb smuggling and facilitating trade.
• Enhance institutional coordination among border agencies during transition.

Economic Stabilisation

• Invest in currency stabilisation measures to protect informal traders from exchange rate shocks.
• Strengthen agriculture and socio-economic systems in anticipation of reduced Burkinabe exports (unprocessed goods).

RECOMMENDATIONS

• AES exit introduces evolving challenges, but trade and mobility protocols remain stable currently.
• Security (terrorism, Bawku conflict) and economic issues (currency volatility) drive current changes.
• Ghana-Burkina Faso interdependence persists; future hinges on negotiation outcomes.ss
• Call to Action: ECOWAS and member states must adopt adaptive policies to ensure West African stability and integration.

CONCLUSION

Let’s keep

in touch.

THANKS FOR LISTENING!

sbotchway@gimpa.edu.gh