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Lessons Learned From�Early Accidents at Los Alamos

Richard “Dick” Malenfant

Los Alamos National Laboratory - Retired

UK Webinar August 17, 2023

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ABSTRACT��The results of an experiment can never be considered a failure.  Analyses of the results often suggest modifications to theories and procedures to improve the understanding of the underlying principles.  In a similar way, observation and analyses of accidents suggest modifications to procedures and behavior to minimize repetition.  

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Although I have worked in the field for over

fifty years, I do not feel that I have been accepted

by the Criticality Safety Community – because…

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Although I have worked in the field for over

fifty years, I do not feel that I have been accepted

by the Criticality Safety Community – because…

I have spent a large portion of my life making

systems critical – rather than keeping systems

from going critical!

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Nevertheless, it has been my privilege

to have worked with GIANTS

Hugh Paxton

Dixon Callihan

Gordon Hansen

John Orndoff

Bob Keepin

Bob Long

Bob Jefferson

Gene Plassmann

Dave Smith

Raemer Schreiber

and others….

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ALWAYS REMEMBER --

You don’t

Plan

To Have An Accident!

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BECAUSE

An Accident is an

UNPLANNED Event

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Ac-ci-dent

  1. An unexpected and undesirable event.

  • Something that occurs unexpectedly or unintentionally

  • A circumstance or attribute that is not essential to the nature of something.

  • Fortune or chance

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Sub-Critical Multiplication

In order to participate fully in the analyses

of the following accidents, it is necessary

to have an appreciation for the concept

of sub-critical multiplication.

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Sub-Critical Multiplication

Subcritical multiplication is the process of

using source neutrons to maintain an

equilibrium neutron population when keff is

less than 1.

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What I would like to have you take from my

presentation:

Neither the Code of Federal Regulations, ANSI Standards, DOE Orders, nor even training prevents

ACCIDENTS!

Safety is a state of mind, attention to detail, and a result of experience…

Although you cannot teach safety, you can study

the lessons of the past and avoid repeating the environment that has resulted in accidents!

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In considering the details of the following three

accidents, I would like to make them personal

by putting us in the position of the participants.

Where do you find the cross-sections to use for

your calculations?

How accurate are they?

Nevertheless, results of calculations are often

reported to four or more significant figures.

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How does your computer program treat the

n-2n reaction in beryllium?

Is it important to know this?

Is the keff resulting from that treatment of the

n-2n reaction correct?

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Nuclear reactions occur in a time frame of micro-sec.

How long is a micro-sec?

There are 86,400 seconds in a day.

Round that off to 100,000 sec./day

There are approximately 1,000,000 seconds in 10 days

The relationship of a micro-sec. to a second is about

the same as the relationship of a second to ten days!

0.000001/1.0 = 1.0/1,000,000

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What is the best reflector for a fast system?

Water

Tungsten Carbide

Beryllium

Steel

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Is the human body a good reflector?

What is the only element in the periodic table that

cannot 180 deg backscatter?

How many collisions are required for a neutron to

be returned from a water reflector?

What is the average solid angle subtended by a

sphere in a close fitting box?

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One of the most difficult calculations to make is

the kinetic reaction of a solution of fissionable

material.

Why?

The reaction is affected by the formation of

radiolytic bubbles of gas that reduce local density,

modify the power density distribution, alter the

chemical composition, and migrate out of

the solution.

We could spend all week exploring the phenomena!

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All of that being said, please:

Close your notes, and turn off your cell phones.

You are limited to using a slide rule, pencil,

nuclear cross-sections that you have measured

or can infer from work on the Water Boiler,

and a table of logarithms to evaluate kinetics

of the following reactions in fast systems.

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In 1944, Emilio Segré and his group in Pajarito

Canyon determined that the Pu240 in reactor produced

plutonium would result in pre-initiation if used in a

gun-type weapon.

This resulted in a redirection of the laboratory effort.

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Nevertheless, work continued on the use of uranium in

a gun-type weapon.

However, there had never been a demonstration of

a chain reaction sustained by prompt neutrons alone,

and the cross-sections for fast fission are not well

known.

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With that in mind, a proposal was made by

Otto Frisch to construct and operate a machine

to demonstrate a nuclear reaction sustained

by prompt fissions alone.

When the proposal was described to a Safety

Committee including Enrico Fermi and

Dick Feynman, the latter observed that this…

“was just like tickling the tail of a sleeping dragon”

Hence, the machine became known as The Dragon

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“A chain reactor (The “Dragon”) was constructed so that by dropping a slug through an assembly (both of active material), a divergent chain reaction supported by prompt neutrons alone was achieved for about 1/1000 second. In this short time neutron multiplications up to 1012 were obtained. Various measurements were made which permitted calculation of the generation time in two independent ways; from the shape, and from the size of the neutron burst which occurred when the system became prompt neutron supercritical; these calculations agreed reasonably well with each other, and also with the time obtained from a Rossi time-scale experiment. The neutron bursts produced by the reactor were used in other experiments on delayed neutrons, gamma-rays, the effect of intense radiation on coaxial cable, and on living animals.”

ABSTRACT, LA-397

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The

Dragon

Machine

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In two excursions the energy release

resulted in heating and expansion of

the slug causing it to stick in the

annulus. The burst was larger than

anticipated resulting in personnel

radiation exposures of 25 rep –

similar in today’s units to 25 rad.

There were no long-term effects.

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Participants in the

experiments with

the Dragon

included:

Otto Frisch

Philip Morrison

Klaus Fuchs

Harry Daghlian

Louis Slotin

Jim Osborn

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The second accident occurred on August 21, 1945.

Harry Daghlian, the sole participant, was working

alone, at night, to complete an experiment started

earlier in the day. He was stacking tungsten carbide

blocks around a plutonium sphere.

The exact details of what happened are not known

because the only other person present – the Security

Guard - was apparently not actually observing the

experiment although he did report a “blue flash”.

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The Daghlian Accident – August 21, 1945

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Although there were no eyewitnesses except for the security guard who wasn’t looking, Jim Osborn

had worked with Harry Daghlian and was perhaps

the last person to see him before the accident. He documented his recollections in the February 2003 Newsletter of Children of the Manhattan Project.

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The third accident occurred on May 21,1946 and it

involved 8 participants.

Louis Slotin planned to go to the Pacific to participate

in nuclear weapons tests. His position at Los Alamos

was to be taken by Al Graves. On the afternoon of

May 21, 1946 Graves requested a demonstration of the

measurement of the “crit.” Slotin agreed and proceeded

to lower a hemishell of beryllium on to a plutonium

sphere supported in another hemishell of beryllium.

An excursion occurred and the “blue flash” was observed

by others in the room.

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At this point I would like to make the following

observations.

Both Harry Daghlian and Louis Slotin:

* were experienced researchers,

* knew what they were doing,

* were fully aware of the consequences,

* were doing work that they had done before.

However, something went wrong!

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Raemer Schreiber was in the room where the accident occurred. He presented the following observations to Darol Froman, Deputy Director, in a memo written on May 28, 1946.

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1. Slotin was not, by any possible Interpretation, guilty of what legal minds like to call “criminal negligence.” The monitors were set up and running, an adequate number of observers were

present who, by their silence, agreed to the procedure, and he had provided a safety device in the form of wedges to keep the tamper from dropping if it slipped. The fact that this safety

device failed does not alter the situation as far

as this point is concerned.

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2. The assembly was made too rapidly and

without adequate consideration of the details

of the method. A “dry run” without the

active material to check the details of the

mechanical operations should have been

made.

  1. Only those persons actually concerned

with the assembly should have remained

in the room.

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  1. No conventional safety devices operating from

a neutron monitor could have prevented the

accident. The neutron rise was too rapid to have

the reaction stopped by any devices that I have

seen used at Los Alamos.

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  1. While operation of such an assembly by

remote control would have eliminated the

hazard from this particular “burst”, it might well

have become a real explosion with equal or

greater damage to personnel in spite of

shielding walls unless a positive and fast-

acting safety device were part of the

assembly. In this case, Slotin was that safety

device.

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Schreiber went on to recommend a list of guidelines.

Although they were specific to the conduct of

critical experiments, I believe that they form the

basis of nuclear criticality safety to this day.

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  1. The formulation, approval and publishing of a

new set of rules will not prevent more

accidents. As stated in item (1) of the

preceding section, the existing rules were

nominally complied with. In addition to the

restatement of rules, there must be a

continuous and vigorous campaign to keep the

people participating in this work aware of the

potential danger in every assembly. Perhaps

the work should be rotated among a number of

people. As soon as a person ceases to be

nervous about the work, he should be

transferred to another job.

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  1. Any new assembly should be planned

in detail a considerable time in advance.

The plan should be sent to several responsible

people, any one of which could veto the plan

or ask for a clarification.

  1. Every new assembly should be attended by

one or more observers whose job would be to

stop any procedure which they consider

hazardous.

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  1. Wherever feasible, an assembly should be

done by remote control provided that this

control incorporates safety devices guaranteed to

stop the reaction in the shortest possible time.

  1. A complete account of each assembly should

be kept, possibly with a running commentary fed

into a wire recorder and either a movie camera

or an automatic still camera.

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  1. New critical assemblies should never be

reduced to a routine matter to be “run through

before lunch.”

  1. A detailed file of all critical assemblies should

be kept up to date. This file would be valuable

as a guide in making future assemblies and

could also be evidence for removing assemblies

known to be safe from the rather severe

restrictions which will undoubtedly be imposed

on all untried assemblies.

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In other words:

Regulations do not prevent

accidents - people do.

Study the accidents of the

past – to avoid repeating

them.

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Never take anything

for granted!

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Keep the law of unanticipated consequences

in mind at all times.

I recommend

“The Black Swan”, by Nassim Nicholas Taleb

(now available in paperback)

“The Limits of Safety”, by Scott D. Sagan

“Inviting DISASTER”, by James R. Chiles

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THE ACCIDENT

Richard E. Malenfant

American Nuclear Society 1995 Annual Meeting

June 25-29, 1995

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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LAMD-120, Series A, REPORT ON ACCIDENT OF AUGUST 21, 1945 AT OMEGA SITE, August 28, 2945,

Paul Aebersold

Dr. Louis Hemplemann

Louis Slotin

LA-3861, REVISED DOSE ESTIMATES for the

CRITICALITY EXCURSION at LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY, May 21, 1946

December 1967

Dale E. Hankins

G. E. Hansen

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“A Summary of Accidents and Incidents Involving

Radiation in Atomic Energy Activities”,

June 1945 thru December 1955. D. F. Hayes

LA-13638, “A Review of Criticality Accidents”,

Thomas P. McLaughlin et. al.

RAK-2. “Accidents in Nuclear Ships”, December,

1996, P. L. Olgaard, Riso National Laboratory,

DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark. This document can be

Obtained from NKS Secretariat, P.O. Box 49,

DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark.

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