Special PNC: Power System Disturbance in Europe on 28 Apr 2025 Aperiodic (Aniyatkalik) (dated 12 May 2025)

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Vijay L Sonavane

ME (Elect)

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All info in this PPT is collected from various open sources available on the internet & News papers. Opinions expressed/ remarks, are my own views, which are based on my LIMITED EXPOSURE. You may not agree with my opinion. I respect your views/ opinions

Spain-Portugal blackouts: what actually happened?

• On Monday the 28 April 2025 morning, there was absolutely no abnormality in peninsular Spain’s Electricity system.
• Demand was at normal levels for the time of year, & was being easily met by the total generation capacity available.
• The day before, the Spanish National Grid Network (REE, Red Eléctrica Española, commercially known as Redeia) had held its usual daily auction to determine which facilities would supply energy over the course of the following day. (Normal day ahead planning)
• REE manages electricity distribution system in Spain, & though formally a private company it is controlled by the Spanish State, which owns 20% of its capital. Its website states that:
• “We are responsible for ensuring that electricity is always available wherever you need it & for making it sustainable by promoting Renewable energies. For all these reasons, Red Eléctrica is the backbone of the electricity system in Spain & the cornerstone of the ecological transition process that the country is undergoing.”

On 28 April 2025:

• At 12:30, most of Spain’s energy demand was being fed by renewable sources, especially PV solar energy, which was contributing just over half of the total. This situation had been repeated throughout the month, as in Spain the combined capacity of Solar & Wind energy can, cover the country’s entire electricity demand during the brightest hours in the middle of the day.
• Grid was supplied with 32 G power to meet 25 GW of demand,& was exporting 2.6 GW to Portugal, 0.87 GW to France & 0.78 GW to Morocco. 3 GW was used for hydro-pumping. More than half of the power supply was from solar & electricity price was slightly negative.
• At that time the price of electricity on the official market was in the negative at around -1€/MW & at these prices Spain was exporting electricity to Morocco, Portugal & France
• Spain’s NUC plants, as planned, were operating at half their usual capacity because, according to their owners, the high O&M, make them economically unviable during periods, when the price of electricity is very low.
• In addition, much of the available energy was being used to pump water from low lying river basins into reservoirs: the only practical way to store energy on a large scale (Pumped Storage HYD) However, this capacity has a limit &, with the reservoirs almost full, it cannot continue to be stored indefinitely.

12:33: Something strange happened

• In the five minutes between 12:30 & 12:35, something anomalous happened which is still yet to receive an official explanation: a sudden drop in the Iberian electricity grid causes a total blackout

Spain System Gen at 1230 Hours

• For the first few minutes confusion reigned, aggravated by the disruption of landline & mobile phone networks.
• Rumours circulated that other European countries were also affected
• Initially the fingers were quickly pointed at a possible cyber-attack & there is Europe wide grid failure.
• After a few minutes Radio, the lifeline, announced that the blackout was limited to the Iberian peninsula (Spain & Portugal), meaning the most likely cause was a technical failure.

What went wrong?

• When analysing the data available from REE between 12:30 & 12:35, one can observe several unusual events.
• A few minutes before the outage, fluctuations were observed in the grid, & there was a spike in wind power gen, which had been very low until then.
• France suddenly stopped importing electricity from Spain, perhaps because it detected a problem in the peninsular grid, & this deepened the imbalance between supply & demand.

Solar PV Gen on 28 APR REE

Electric energy in peninsular Spain

Demd vs Forecast on 25 Apr 2025 REE

• At that point, the few operating NUC power plants received an overload signal. In accordance with protocol, control rods were inserted & they were automatically shut down.
• But what was most surprising was the behaviour of Solar photovoltaics, which dropped sharply from generating 18,000 MW to just 8,000 MW in just a few seconds. Since the sun had not vanished, it must have been an automated command that switched off thousands of solar facilities.
• REE sources indicate that the problem may have been triggered by disconnection of some Solar plants in Southwest Spain, but the grid would normally be able to balance this out thro’ regulation – the mechanism for balancing supply & demand. This was being done mainly with hydropower, as normal, but there came a point when this source (HYD) had exhausted its adjustment capacity.
• Current evidence therefore points to a problem in the Synchronisation of the grid. All sources feeding power into the grid must be synchronised at the same frequency, 50 Hertz. To facilitate this synchronisation, stable base-load power is required, which is normally provided by NUC & other large gas and HEP facilities. These sources act as a natural buffer against disturbances, helping to keep the frequency stable in the face of sudden changes in gen or demand. (some may call this as weak Moment of Intertia, avaialble at the time of disturbance)

• However, variable RE sources, such as Solar PV, do not have this capability of storing Moment of Inertia. They generate “direct current” which is converted to “alternating current” at 50 Hertz, but they cannot react automatically to frequency variations. (weak or zero Moment of Inertia)
• At 1233 Hours there was little by way of stable source base in the Spanish grid &, in addition, the few NUC power plants that were operating had been switched off, when they detected a surge in the grid. Hydro facilities were at the limit of their regulation capacity, & no provision had been made for the availability of gas-fired plants.
• Fortunately, less than 10 hours later, Spain’s electrical system had recovered. Nevertheless, the damage had been done, & its consequences are still lingering.

The diagnosis

• This unusual situation points to a perfect storm of poor grid management & inadequate connections of Solar facilities to the grid, as well as other unknown faults.
• Although the grid is divided into different zones that can be isolated from one another, all zones were affected when thousands of small solar facilities scattered throughout the grid were disconnected at once.
• In addition, the interconnection of mainland Spain with European grid is weak, & a stronger connection to the “stable French grid” would facilitate the synchronisation of the Spanish grid.

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• Solar energy during the sunniest hours distorts all offers (at price or negative), making more stable sources economically unviable unless they have a guaranteed price, & discouraging their production.
• The question is therefore not one of REs versus NUC, but rather how much solar power can be in the grid at any given moment while also maintaining stability.
• A more worrying root cause is the involvement of politics in REE, as its presidency is typically held by former ministers or high-ranking politicians. Its current president is Beatriz Corredor, a lawyer & a former housing minister, & REE is pursuing the somewhat politicised objective of “100% renewables”.
• Within hours of the outage on 28 April, Spanish PM Pedro Sánchez raised suspicions that the origin of the blackout came from “private operators”, & he accused those arguing that more NUC input would help stabilise the grid & of being ignorant. Spain’s current EU-endorsed energy roadmap includes phasing out all NUC power stations between 2027 & 2035.
• Two days after the blackout, Corredor made public statements for the first time saying that an incident like this would not be repeated, a difficult assertion to make when the causes are still unknown.
• It is essential that decisions on energy issues, such as “100% renewables”, have independent technical support that analyses & informs the public with rigour & transparency.
• A rational analysis should not pit renewables against nuclear, & technical bodies such as REE should be run by people outside of political power structures, preferably with appropriate technical training. EU should also have a coordinated energy policy, & a Europe-wide electricity grid designed to deal with outages or potential external aggression.

Time vs. Gen log (Real/Expected)

At 12.33pm on Monday 28 April, most of Spain & Portugal were plunged into chaos by a blackout

• While the initial trigger remains uncertain, the nationwide blackouts took place after around 15 GW electricity generating capacity – equivalent to 60% of Spain’s power demand at the time – dropped off the system within the space of five seconds.
• The blackouts left millions of people without power, with trains, traffic lights, ATMs, phone connections & internet access failing across the Iberian peninsula. (a region in South-Western Europe occupied by Spain & Portugal)
• By Tuesday (29/04) morning, almost all electricity supplies across Spain & Portugal had been restored, but questions about the root cause remained. The following questions were raised by the media:
• What happened & what was the impact?
• What caused the power cuts?
• Did RE play a role in the blackouts?
• How has the media responded to the power cut?

What happened & what was the impact?

• Spain & Portugal experienced the most extensive blackouts, but Andorra also reported outages, as did the Basque region of France.
• According to Reuters, the blackout was the biggest in Europe’s history.
• According to Bloomberg Energy’s coloumist Javier Blas: Shortly after 12.30pm, the grid suffered an “event” akin to loss of Power Gen. While the grid almost immediately self-stabilised & recovered, but about 1.5 seconds later a second “event” hit.
• Around 3.5 seconds later, the interconnector between the Spanish region of Catalonia & south-west France was disconnected due to grid instability. Immediately after this, there was a “massive” loss of power on the system, Blas said.
• This caused the power grid to “cascade down into collapse”, causing the “unexplained disappearance” of 60% of Spain’s Gen, according to Politico.

• PM Pedro Sánchez, told in a press conference late on Monday that the causes were not yet known: “This has never happened before. And what caused it is something that the experts have not yet established – but they will.
• The Guardian noted in its coverage that “while the system weathered the first event, it could not cope with the second”.
• El País reported that “the power cut…paralysed the normal functioning of infrastructures, telecommunications, roads, train stations, airports, stores & buildings. Hospitals have not been impacted as they are using generators.”
• According to Spanish newswire EFE, “hundreds of thousands of people flooded the streets, forced to walk long distances to their homes due to paralysed metro & commuter train services, without mobile apps as telecom networks also faltered”.
• It added that between 30,000 & 35,000 passengers had to be evacuated from stranded trains.

• The New York Times reported that Portuguese banks & schools closed, while ATMs stopped working across the country & Spain.
• People “crammed into stores to buy food & other essentials as clerks used pen & paper to record cash-only transactions”, it added.
• Spain’s Interior Ministry declared a National Emergency, according to Reuters, deploying 30,000 police to keep order.
• Both Spain & Portugal convened emergency cabinet meetings, with Spain’s King Felipe VI chairing a National Security Council meeting on Tuesday to discuss an investigation into the power outage, Sky News reported.
• By 10 pm on Monday, 421 out of Spain’s 680 S/S were back online, & that 43% of expected power demand was being met, reported the Guardian.
• In Portugal, power had been restored to every S/S on the country’s grid by 11.30pm on Monday.
• In Spain, by Tuesday morning, more than 99% of total electricity supply had been recovered, according to Politico, quoting Red Eléctrica.
• Red Eléctrica & REN have been congratulated by genral public for the “rapid recovery” of the grid, including the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). (very nice gesture)

• Initial reporting by news agencies blamed the power cuts on a “rare atmospheric phenomenon”, citing the Portuguese grid operator REN, according to the Guardian.
• The newspaper added that REN later said this statement had been incorrectly attributed to it. The phenomenon in question was described as an “induced atmospheric vibration”.
• Prof Mehdi Seyedmahmoudian, an electrical engineer at Swinburne University of Technology in Australia, explained in the Conversation that this was “not a commonly used term”.
• Nevertheless, he said the phenomenon being described was familiar, referring to “wavelike movements” in the atmosphere caused by sudden changes in temp or pressure.
• In general terms, Reuters explained that power cuts are often linked to extreme weather, but that the "weather” at the time of Monday’s collapse was fair”. It added that faults at power stations, power distribution lines or substations can also trigger outages.
• Another theory was that a “divergence of electrical frequency” from 50 Hz, the European standard, could have caused parts of the system to shut down in order to protect equipment,” France 24 explained.

• Tobias Burke, Policy Manager at Energy UK, explained:
• “The fact these frequency oscillations mirrored those in Latvia…at the other extreme of Europe-spanning ENTSO-E network, might suggest complex inter-area oscillations across markets could be the culprit.”
• This phenomenon can be seen in a chart originally made by Prof. Philippe Jacquod, an electrical engineer at the Universities of Geneva & of Applied Sciences of Western Switzerland (Hes-SO Valais-Wallis). The chart was shared – without credit – in a LinkedIn post by Prof. Lion Hirth, an energy researcher at Hertie School.
• With many details still unknown, much of the media speculation has focused on the role that RE could have played in the blackouts
• Portugal’s PM Luís Montenegro, announced on Tuesday (29/04)that the Govt would set up an Independent Technical Commission to investigate the blackouts, while stressing that the problem has originated in Spain, according to Euractiv.
• Finally, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen has indicated that EU will open a “thorough investigation” into the reasons behind the power cuts, BBC News noted.

Did RE play a role in the blackouts?

• On 16 April 2025, the Spain’s grid had run entirely on RE sources for a full day for the first time ever, with wind accounting for 46% of total output, solar 27%, hydroelectric 23% & solar thermal & others meeting the rest 4%, according to PV Magazine.
• Spain is targeting 81% RE power by 2030 and 100% by 2050.
• At the time of the blackout on Monday, solar accounted for 59% of country’s electricity supplies, wind nearly 12%, NUC 11% & gas around 5%, reported the Independent.
• The initial “event” is thought to have originated in the South-Western region of Extremadura, noted Politico, “which is home to Spain’s most powerful NUC power plant, some of its largest HEP dams & numerous solar farms.”
• On Tuesday, Red Eléctrica’s Head of System Operation Services Eduardo Prieta said that it was “very possible that the affected Gen [in the initial ‘events’] could be Solar”.
• This sparked further speculation about how grids that are highly reliant on variable REs

• Political groups such as the far-right VOX, which has historically pushed back against climate action such as the expansion of REs – also pointed to the blackout as evidence of “the importance of a balanced energy mix”.
• However, others rejected this suggestion, with EU Energy Chief Dan Jørgensen telling Bloomberg that the blackout could not be pinned on a “specific source of energy”:
• “As far as we know, there was nothing unusual about the sources of energy supplying electricity to the system, yesterday. So the causes of the blackout cannot be reduced to a specific source of energy, for instance RE”
• Others have sought to highlight that, while it was possible solar power was involved in the initial frequency event, this does not mean that it was ultimately the cause of the blackout.
• Writing on LinkedIn, CTO of Arenko, a RE software Co., Roger Hollies, noted:
• “The initial trip may well have been a solar plant, but trips happen all the time across all asset types. Networks should be designed to withstand multiple loss of generators.
• 15GW is not one power station, this is the equivalent of 10 large gas or NUC power stations or 75 solar parks.”

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• Spain’s Environment Minister Sara Aagesen has pushed back against claims that Solar power was to blame for the blackouts, according to the Guardian. It quotes her saying:
• “The system has worked to perfection with a similar demand situation & with a similar energetic mix [in the past], so pointing the finger at renewables when the system has functioned perfectly in the same context doesn’t seem very appropriate.”
• Aagesen has promised a “complete audit” to determine the cause of the blackouts, according to the newspaper.
• Similarly, President of Redeia Corporation – Red Eléctrica’s parent Co. – Beatriz Corredor has said it would be wrong to blame the blackouts on REs, reported Reuters.
• Additionally, she is quoted by El País saying that the “fault that caused the blackout was not Red Eléctrica’s fault”.
• Others pointed to what they said was insufficient NUC power on the grid – a notion that PM Sánchez rejected, according to El País.

• Speaking on Tuesday, he said that those arguing the blackouts showed a need for more NUC power were “either lying or showing ignorance”, according to the newspaper. It said he highlighted that NUC plants were yet to fully recover from the event.
• One key aspect of the transition away from electricity systems built around THM stations burning coal, gas or Uranium is a loss of “inertia”, the Financial Times highlighted.
• “THM plants generate electricity using large spinning turbines, which rotate at the same 50 Hz speed as the electrical grid oscillates. The weight of these “large lump[s] of spinning metal” gives them “inertia”, which counteracts changes in frequency on the rest of the grid.
• When faults cause a rise or fall in grid frequency, this inertia helps lower the rate of change of frequency, giving system operators more time to respond, noted Adam Bell, Director of Policy at Stonehaven, in a post on LinkedIn.
• Solar does not include a spinning generator, & therefore, critics pointed to the lack of inertia on the grid due to the high levels of the technology as a cause of the blackout”

• “A lack of inertia was therefore not the main driver for the blackout. Indeed, post the frequency event, no fossil gen remained online – but wind, solar and hydro did.”
• On LinkedIn, Hirth wrote that it “is not clear that the lack of inertia caused the blackout” & that having more inertia might not have been enough to avoid the situation. He wrote:
• “[It]seems highly plausible that oscillations like those evident thro’ frequency measurements would have been dampened with more inertia…[Yet] that does not necessarily imply that more inertia would have avoided the blackout. That is a possibility, but not a certainty.”
• He highlighted that power system operators worldwide – including Red Eléctrica in Spain – have discussed inertia for decades, noting that “this is not an issue anyone had ignored or ‘overlooked’”
• Moreover, Hirth noted that there are ways to provide inertia without fossil fuel, NUC or HYD plants, such as flywheels & (Syn Condensors), but said that these new solutions needed to be built.

• While the ultimate cause of the blackouts remains to be seen, Media have highlighted the need for an increased focus on grid stability, particularly as the economy is electrified.
• A selection of comments from experts published in Review Energy emphasises the need for further resilience to be built into the grid as it transitions away from fossil fuels.
• Elsewhere, an editorial in the Financial Times called the blackouts a “wake-up call”, arguing that “Govts must invest in electricity resilience alongside the green transition”.

How has the media responded to the power cut?

• As the crisis was still unfolding & its cause remained unknown, several climate-sceptic right-leaning UK publications clamoured to draw a link between the blackouts & the nations’ reliance on RE
• On Tuesday (29/04), the Daily Telegraph carried a front-page story headlined: “Net-zero blamed for blackout chaos.”
• But the article contradicted its own headline by concluding: “What exactly happened remains unclear for now. And the real answer is likely to involve several factors, not just one.”
• None of the experts quoted in the piece blamed “net-zero” for the incident.

• The Daily Telegraph also carried an editorial seeking to argue RE was the cause of the blackouts, which claimed that “over-reliance on RE means a less resilient grid”.
• The Daily Express had an editorial claiming that the blackout shows “relying on RE is dim”
• The Financial Times also ran an article titled “Spain & Portugal blackout blamed on solar power dependency”, which quotes a number of experts pointing to the lack of “firm power”: traditionally from fossil fuel gens & NUC on the system at the time of blackout
• Such firm power sources would have historically kicked in following a frequency event.
• The Article also quotes Corredor & others who have argued that RE was not to blame for the blackouts.
• Additionally, the Standard carried a comment by notorious climate-sceptic commentator Ross Clark breathlessly blaming the blackout on “unreliable” RE, with a fear-mongering warning that the “same could happen in the UK”.
• The Daily Mail published a comment by Rupert Darwall, a climate-sceptic author who is part of the CO2 Coalition, an organisation seeking to promote “the important contribution made by CO2 to our lives”, which claimed that the blackout showed “energy security is being sacrificed at the altar of green dogma”.
• Climate-sceptic libertarian publication Spiked had a piece by its Dy. Editor Fraser Myers titled: “Spain’s blackouts are a disaster made by net-zero.” The article claimed that “our elites’ embrace of green ideology has divorced them from reality”.

• In Spanish media, Jordi Sevilla, former President of Red Eléctrica, wrote in the financial publication Cinco Días that:
• “In Spain, in the last decade, there has been a revolution in electricity gen to the point that RE technologies (Solar PV & wind, above all) now occupy the majority of the energy mix. This has had very positive impacts on CO2 emissions, lower electricity prices & increased National autonomy.
• “But there is a technical problem: PV & wind power are not synchronous energies, whereas our T&D networks are designed to operate only with a minimum voltage in the energy they transport.
• Therefore, to operate with current technology, the electrical system must maintain synchronous backup power, which can be HEP, gas or NUC, to be used when PV & wind power are insufficient, either due to their intermittent nature (there may be no sun or wind) or due to the lack of synchronisation required by the gens to operate.”
• For Bloomberg, opinion columnist Javier Blas said that “Spain’s blackout shouldn’t trigger a retreat from RE”, but shows that “an upgraded grid is urgently needed for the energy transition”. He added:
• “​​The world didn’t walk away from fossil-fuel & NUC power stations because New York suffered a massive blackout in 1977. And it shouldn’t walk away from solar & wind because Spain & Portugal lost power for a few hours.
• “But we should learn that grid design, policy & risk mapping aren’t yet up to the task of handling too much power from RE sources.”

Iberian Grid Blackout: Microgrids & Backup Power Helped Mitigate the Harm for Some Mission Critical Sites (By Rod Walton)

Spanish Airport network “AENA” reported that backup power kept many terminals operating despite the peninsula-wide outage on 28 Apr 2025:

• The potentially deadly & economically devastating impact, due to blackout, however, was somewhat muted compared to historic grid outages such as the Northeast Blackout in the US, 22 years ago & the India blackout of 2012.
• More than 50 Mn customers & businesses throughout Spain & Portugal were forced into a standstill without power, but a host of mission critical facilities carried on despite the broken interconnection.

Why?

• Because of Quick & decisive action by grid operators, but also some impact from deploying Microgrids & backup power at least in the service of air travel.
• A report on “The Conversation” website noted Social media tweets by Spanish Airport Network “AENA” indicating that its airports were operating with backup power, although the outage invariably caused delays.

• The Conversation story also highlighted the fast intercommunication between Spanish & Portuguese grid operators to isolate the blackouts for the benefit of the entire system.
• Four years ago, the Texas grid, managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, was minutes away from a system-wide outage after close to 52 GW Power Gen—including gas-fired, RE & NUC power—was knocked offline due to freezing weather conditions & other factors.
• The Atlanta airport power blackout of 2017 caused a ripple effect throughout the U.S. & some $100 Mn in losses for Delta Airlines & others.
• This led to a Nationwide move toward investing in “Airport Microgrids”.
• Since then, Texas has scaled up its installation of distributed energy, battery storage & Commercial Microgrids.
• Spain reportedly has only 60 MW battery storage capacity which could help respond to intermittencies in RE Gen, while the UK has nearly 6 GW & the U.S. has close to 26 GW installed battery storage capacity. Spain has plans to increase that battery installed capacity to 22 GW by 2030, although that will require huge investment.
• Portugal’s mainland also suffered from the blackout, as well, but energy provider Electricidade dos Açores several years ago installed a Microgrid on the Azores island of Terceira.
• Microgrid project included Siemens' Spectrum Power Microgrid Management System (MGMS) software & a 15-MW battery-based energy storage system from Fluence

Spain’s biggest blackout caused an estimated €400 Mn ($454 Mn) loss to the economy, according to CaixaBank.

• Spain’s biggest blackout on 28 Apr 2025 caused an estimated €400 Mn ($454 Mn) loss to the economy, according to CaixaBank.
• Consumer spending dropped 34% on April 28, the day of the power outage, but partially recovered in the following days, leading to a net 15% decrease. CaixaBank estimates the blackout’s one-off impact on quarterly GDP will be less than one-tenth of a percentage point.
• The blackout affected around 50 Mn people in Spain & Portugal, disrupting transport, telecommunications, & retail.
• Spanish Govt is investigating the cause of the outage, which lasted several hours. Despite the blackout, Spain’s economy is projected to grow by 2.6% in 2025 & 2.2% in 2026.

Iberian Power Disturbance: Analysis by Technocrats

• Red Eléctrica, the public company in-charge of operating Spain’s Trans infrastructure, has preliminarily ruled out a cyber-attack, human error, or unusual weather or atmospheric conditions as a cause of the outage.
• The company points out that the incident could have originated from two “disconnections of Gen,” possibly linked to the inherent volatility of RE sources.
• For a grid to operate stably, energy production must be kept in balance with consumption; imbalances can cause blackouts as well as potentially damage infrastructure.
• A fire in the South-West of France, on Alaric mountain, damaged a EHV power line between Perpignan & eastern Narbonne, which could be one possible cause, according to Portugal’s National electric Co. REN.
• Maintaining grid balance is the responsibility of the System Operator, who monitors parameters such as Electrical Frequency, Voltage, & Load from substations in real time.
• When there are automatic disconnections are activated in specific areas of the grid to avoid imbalances, in the most serious situations, the impacts of these triggered disconnections can extend to the entire network.

• This blackout occurred because, in just five seconds, more than half of the Gen capacity was lost. The grid, unable to balance such a sharp drop between Gen & demand, protected itself by automatically disconnecting both internally & from the rest of European grid. Balance on a grid is typically guaranteed by three things.
• First is a complex network of interconnected lines, known as meshes, that distribute electrical flows across the grid to prevent overloads.
• Second, there are interconnections with neighbouring countries’ grids, which allow energy to be imported or exported as needed to balance gen & demand.
• Finally, there is something called “mechanical inertia.” Synchronous generators, the large spinning machines that generate electricity in power stations, also store a lot of energy in their very large rotating parts.
• For a coal-fired power station, even if it stops burning coal to generate more power, the huge, heavy turbines it uses to create electricity will continue spinning for some time because of the energy stored up in them.
• Known as mechanical inertia, this phenomenon can act as a buffer between energy gen & demand, syn generators can speed up or slow down their rotational speed to balance things out, essentially acting as a shock absorber to the grid by absorbing or releasing energy as needed, against abrupt fluctuations in the grid.
• When there are imbalances between energy gen & demand, Syn. generators can speed up or slow down their rotational speed to balance things out, essentially acting as a shock absorber to the grid by absorbing or releasing energy as needed.

• “A large, well-meshed grid, with strong interconnections & abundant Syn. Generators, will be more stable & less prone to failures,”
• De Simón Martín says “The Spanish peninsular power grid has historically been robust & reliable thanks to its high degree of meshing at EHV, as well as its large synchronous gen capacity. However, its weak point has always been its limited international interconnection, conditioned by the geographical barrier of the Pyrenees.”
• According to his data, the electricity exchange capacity between Spain & the rest of Europe, in other words, how much energy Spain can draw from or send into the continent—barely represents 3% of Spains’s installed capacity. This is well below the European Union’s 15% target for Member States to achieve by 2030.
• The increasing integration of RE into Spanish system may have exacerbated the disconnection issues & subsequent need to balance the grid.
• According to Spain’s National Integrated Energy & Climate Plan, Spain has set a target for 81% of its electricity to come from clean sources by 2030. At the end of 2024, REs already accounted for 66% of installed capacity in Spain & generated 58.95% of Spain's electricity. The main sources were Wind, Solar, & HYD

• De Simón Martín points out that, unlike THM or HEPs, wind & solar systems lack mechanical inertia, as they are connected to the grid not via synchronous generators but by electronic inverters. The robustness of the overall energy system therefore falls as the proportion of these inertia-lacking energy sources grows—essentially, fewer synchronous generators means less grid-wide ability to handle sudden changes in balance.
• “With low interconnection capacity & a high share of inverter-based RE gen, our grid today is more vulnerable and has less margin to react to disturbances,” De Simón Martíne concludes.
• Manuel Alcázar Ortega, Dy. Director Dept. of Electrical Engg. at the Polytechnic University of Valencia, told that an immediate solution would be to “limit the production of PV energy at times of low demand, in favor rolling generation that provides inertia to the system & can respond better to frequency variations.”
• He also considers it necessary to incorporate frequency & voltage stabilizers in the grid to counteract the loss of inertia caused by the high presence of RE.
• De la Puente Gil adds that a priority should be “to increase electricity interconnections with France & other European countries, so that the peninsula is no longer so isolated.” He also thinks there needs to be more flexibility in the existing system on the peninsula, with “more storage mechanisms that can compensate for variability of Res”.

• Instead of spinning machines, solar & wind farms use electronic systems that feed power into the grid, making it harder to maintain that delicate balance.
• RE systems will have to "assist the Grid system with additional controls to support the grid, particularly in inertia terms, in addition to decarbonisation

Frequency Factor:

• Grid operator Red Electrica informed that the blackout was a result of “oscillation,” which suggests a disruption in the grid’s frequency or voltage: both crucial factors for maintaining stability.
• The frequency, which normally stays pretty steady around 50 hertz, is the heartbeat of the grid.
• Frequency monitoring specialist Grid-radar said it identified a rapid movement in frequency just after noon in Spain, right before the blackout hit. Such oscillations can cause chain reactions that ultimately lead to a blackout.
• It’s not known what caused the initial disturbance. But it’s possible it was exacerbated by the large share of energy being generated by RE sources at the time.
• To maintain the right frequency & maintain stability, the grid needs kinetic energy, which is created by the spinning turbines of THM plants. This kinetic energy can’t be supplied by wind turbines or solar panels so Spain & Portugal need coal, gas or hydro plants connected.

• Prof Marc Petit, (Electrical Systems Dept) at top French Engineering School Centrale-Supelec, argued that moving away from fossil fuels would make HEP & NUC power plants "even more essential for stabilizing the system" as they use rotating machines
• REs are intermittent sources of energy as they rely on nature. When the wind stops blowing or the sun is hiding, other sources have to step in within minutes, or there need to be adequate systems for storing—& then releasing—REs in place.
• Additionally, to handle the ups & downs of RE power, countries must ramp up storage capacity. The most widespread method is pumped storage hydropower from water reservoirs.
• Large stationary batteries, akin to shipping containers, are increasingly being deployed alongside wind and solar farms—a segment dominated by China.
• As it undergoes a transition away from coal, Britain is banking on flywheels, a tried & tested system.
• Surplus power from solar & wind farms is used to make the large wheels turn, creating KE. This stored energy can then be converted to provide electricity to the grid if needed.
• Another way to ease pressure on the system would be to shift electricity use—for example when you charge your car battery—to the middle of the day, when solar power is at its peak.

Spain's power outage sparks debate on �NUC energy phase-out amid RE push (12/05)

• The massive power outage that hit the Iberian peninsula on April 28 has reignited a debate in Spain over the country's plan to phase out its NUC reactors as it generates more power with RE
• Some people are questioning the wisdom of decommissioning nuclear reactors that provide a stable. if controversial, form of energy compared to REs, whose output can be intermittent.
• What is nuclear power & why is it controversial? NUC power is a zero-carbon energy source formed from NUC fission, when the nuclei of atoms are split into two or several parts, releasing energy. It accounts for about 10% of electricity gen worldwide, according IEA.
• Many countries consider NUC power critical to reaching their net-zero goals. But while nuclear reactors do not emit planet-warming greenhouse gases like gas or coal-fired power plants, they produce radioactive waste that even advanced economies have struggled to dispose

Why does Spain want to decommission its nuclear reactors?

• Spain generated nearly 57% of its electricity in 2024 from RE sources like wind, HEP & solar, according to Red Electrica, Spain's grid operator. About 20% came from NUC power plants.

• In 2019, Sanchez's Govt approved a plan to decommission Spain’s remaining NUC reactors between 2027 & 2035 as it expands its share of RE even further.
• Sanchez said that the four NUC facilities that were online the day of the blackout did not help re-power the grid. Batteries & other methods help regulate changes in electricity supply from wind & Solar
• Why is Spain's renewables push being questioned now? While the cause of the sudden outage on 28 APR is still unknown, the event has raised questions about the technical challenges facing electricity grids running on HI level of Solar & wind
• Solar & wind provided roughly 70% of the electricity on the grid, moments before Spain lost 15 GW electricity - about 60% of its supply - in just 5 Seconds.
• Electricity grids were designed for a different era, according to Gilles Thonet, Dy. Secretary General of the International Electrotechnical Commission, an industry group.
• Traditionally, power flowed in one direction: from large Coal, Gas or Nuclear plants to homes & businesses,' Thonet said. 'These plants provided not only electricity but also stability. Their spinning turbines acted like shock absorbers, smoothing out fluctuations in supply & Demand .
• Spain's NUC lobby group Foro Nuclear said this week that the Govt should rethink its plan to decommission its nuclear reactors after the outage. Ignacio Araluce, its President, said the NUC plants online before the outage 'provide firmness & stability’

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• Would more NUC power have prevented a blackout? Others say it is too soon to draw conclusions about what role NUC energy should play.
• 'We do not know the cause of the oscillations,' said Pedro Fresco, DG Avaesen, an association of RE & clean technology firms in Valencia.
• Environment Minister Sara Aagesen said “earlier this week that the grid had initially withstood another power gen outage in Southern Spain 19 seconds before the blackout”
• Sanchez in his speech to Parliament said “there was 'no empirical evidence' to show that more NUC power on the grid could have prevented a blackout or allowed Spain to get back online faster. In fact, the 4 NUC facilities online on April 28, before the blackout were taken offline after the outage as part of “emergency protocol” to avoid overheating.”
• He said nuclear energy “has not been shown to be an effective solution” in situations like what we experienced on April 28, & called the debate surrounding his Govt's NUC phase-out plan 'a gigantic manipulation’. Gas & HEP, as well as electricity transfers from Morocco & France, were used to get Spain’s road back online.

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Why restarting a power grid after massive collapse is so hard? (by Rachel Morison)

• It’s a worst case scenario that grid operators plan for but hope never to encounter is to bring the system after widespread cascading grid collapse.
• After one of the worst blackouts in Europe in more than a decade, electricity grid operators in Spain & Portugal were trying to get networks back up & running from the ground up.
• By Monday evening at 9pm Madrid time, there was 17.3 GW demand on the grid, about two thirds the amount seen just before the blackout happened, according to grid data.

BLACK START:

• When there has been a failure on the entire grid, a complex process called a “black start” is needed to restore the network gradually. Smaller, often diesel generators, are used to start bigger ones, in a process that creates “islands” of power which connect together on the main Trans network to gradually restore the grid.

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• European Grid Rules require grids regularly test their black-start capability, so operators should have a clear plan to follow. But the process is painstaking & complicated.
• These islands of power then need to be all synchronized together,” Simon Gallagher, MD UK Network Services, said in a post on LinkedIn. “Not simple & again, takes time & has to be very controlled.”

Past Blackout:

• Last time a blackout of this scale in Europe was in 2006, when there was an outage affecting 15 Mn homes in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal & Spain.
• Since then, RE has been built out at a rapid scale across the region, creating more challenges for grid operators to balance huge swings in supply, when it’s sunny or windy.
• Frequency was a major contributor of blackouts in Texas during an extreme winter storm in Feb 2021. Freezing weather & ice forced gas plants to trip offline en masse, causing frequency to plunge & other power plants to trip offline, resulting in cascading failures.

Spain may find valuable lessons �from South Australia's 2016 Blackout (By Akshat Rath)

For those who’ve worked in energy industry in Australia, these feelings of uncertainty & blame directed to renewables sound familiar.

• On Sept. 28 in 2016, the state of South Australia’s grid was hit with a blackout. At the time it was generating a high proportion of its power from wind turbines.
• And what happened in the years that followed is worth examining to understand how blackouts occur in an era in which RE account for an of increasing share of electricity mix, & how the grid continues to develop as a result.

What went down on that day? The Australian Energy Regulator’s report in 2018 summed it up as:

• “It was triggered by severe weather that damaged T&D assets, which was followed by reduced wind farm output & a loss of synchronism that caused the loss of the Heywood Interconnector.
• Subsequent imbalance in supply & demand resulted in remaining electricity Gen in SA shutting down. Most supplies were restored in eight hours”

So were renewables to blame?

• A wind farm contributed, but so did many other things.
• “The discourse on social media & traditional media tends to hyper-focus on a single cause,” said Ketan Joshi, author of “Windfall”, a book that explored the mistakes & opportunities of RE deployment in Australia. “But no one cause was alone sufficient to have caused the blackout.”
• Cooler heads prevailed at the grid operator. In the short term, utilities increased the share of reserve gas power plants, improved weather warnings & brought Syn. condensers (a device that mimics a rotating power turbine) on the network.
• Over the longer term, electricity providers added tons of Lithium-ion batteries onto the grid & increased the share of power generated from cheap, clean solar & wind farms.
• In 2017, Tesla Inc.’s Elon Musk promised to build a battery for South Australia’s grid in a mere 100 days. And he delivered what was then the world’s largest grid-connected battery, helping to kick-start an Australian Energy Storage boom that BloombergNEF forecasts will see 2.5 GW new utility-scale capacity added in 2025
• Nonetheless, Joshi said the blackout led to years of misinformation about REs. He’s documented many examples of politicians bringing up the 2016 blackout to slow down policies aimed at deploying REs
• But REs kept advancing. “Engineers basically dealt with the problem by looking at the evidence, but equally Australia had a democracy that could withstand the level of disinformation being spread about REs,” said Joshi.

And Renewables % in South Australia is increasing � in spite of 2016 Grid failure (blackout)

Spain’s blackout is a “wake-up call” for India: �Bloomberg Report

• For Spain & Portugal, last week’s Nationwide blackout may have felt unprecedented. But in India, we have lived thro’ these already.
• In July 2012, a severe grid collapse caused 600 Mn Indians to lose access to power, many of them for days. Most assume that, as the country grows richer & energy becomes more abundant, such problems won’t recur.
• But, as Europe has learned, preventing grid collapse is a constant endeavour, not a battle that you only fight once.
• GOI has prioritized energy access, vastly expanding availability to un-electrified households & building more Gen capacity.
• It is now time for it to work on “grid stability” as well.
• We don’t yet know what caused the initial disruption to Spain’s grid that made it to lose its connection to France’s more stable electricity network, but the additional variability has been introduced to Spain's system by REs: particularly on a sunny day: which probably did not help.
• That should worry India’s policy makers & Regulators.

And This is not an argument against RE.

• Indian Policy makers have correctly noted that solar & wind power meet 3 requirements, they view as crucial.
• First, they might end our crippling dependence on imported fossil fuels;
• Second, grid-scale solar energy is now quite cheap; and
• Third, off-grid renewables can sometimes reach where the regular grid does not.

• As a consequence, India has prioritized building out RE capacity. Of the 34 GW gen added last year, 85% was RE , with 24 GW from solar power alone. Another 300 GW is being planned by 2030.
• Much of this is driven by private capital & entrepreneurial energy at every level.
• At one end of the scale, street markets in the poorest states are full of cheap RT solar sets. And at the other, highly valued Cos like ReNew Power Pvt. ; Tata Power Co. have soaked up investor dollars, promising to benefit from the Nation’s vast solar ambitions.
• Recently, UAE-led green private capital fund ALTÉRRA & Brookfield Asset Management Ltd. announced plans to invest $100 Mn in the Solar project developer Evren.
• All of this sounds great. India does best on those tragically few occasions when its consumers & Cos. are left to make the right choices, & are given access to Capital & supportive Regulations. That is how India became an IT superpower that now has the cheapest high-speed data in the world.

• Yet the Govt has responsibilities, too. It has to ensure the grid can manage the additional requirements: both new consumers & new sources.
• This will cost money, but even the Govt doesn’t knows how much. Predictions vary from $107 Bn to $500 Bn. Even the lower end seems unaffordable at the moment. New Delhi hates spending money, but soon it has to have a workable plan for investment into the grid
• Govt’s tasks don’t stop there. It must also try & figure out what’s actually getting installed in terms of Solar power, & who is doing the building.
• Self-consumption electricity systems of various kinds, whether off grid, or Captive, the way that can provide power to the grid as well as taking it out; come with very special issues that must be addressed.
• As BNEF Research has pointed out, one of the problems that Spain faces is that Authorities there, don’t know enough about solar power gen Spain; it may have 10.5 GW more PV modules installed than official data suggest.
• Grid management becomes very complex under such circumstances. Ideally, one should be able to forecast electricity demand, when it will peak & who will put how much into the network under various circumstances. But a lack of clarity about self-consumption means predictions lose accuracy, & the grid turns vulnerable.

• It has also become clear that all is not well even among India’s large corporate champions of RE power.
• One such, Gensol Engineering Ltd., has just run into trouble after the misbehaviour of its founders came to light. Govt raids on Gensol offices & various other problems have eroded 70% of its value in two months, & sent shock-waves through the solar sector.
• Clearly, it can’t stay the Wild West forever. Regulators have realized that it is now systemically important, & Corporate governance standards need to reflect that.
• India’s per-capita consumption of energy is still very low by global standards: 1,331KWH in 2022-23, compared to 6,257 KWH/year in China.
• The Govt is determined to narrow that gap. We may not know how much & when, but it is absolutely certain that more new gen capacity will be installed in India than anywhere else in the world in the next few decades. And majority of that will come from REs.
• For a build-out without blackouts, Regulators & Govt will also need to work on better data, a more robust grid, & better-run companies.

As Europe’s grid collapse showed, some problems aren’t magically solved when you get rich.

India Predicts Searing Heat in May, �Raising Power Blackout Risk (30/04): Bloomberg Report: Pratik Parija

• India is bracing for scorching heat until start of monsoon season in June, potentially straining power grids & posing a severe health risk to residents.
• Several areas of India will witness higher-than-AVG heat wave days in May. Above-normal max temps are likely over most parts, except at some places in Southern & Eastern states.
• The world’s 2nd-biggest producer of Wheat, Rice & Sugar has been witnessing extreme weather events due to climate change, with the intensity & frequency of heat waves, floods & droughts gradually increasing.
• Rising temps tend to boost the use of cooling devices & put pressure on power Dist system, which may lead to severe Grid Collapse in May 2025, besides raising the risk of water shortages.
• India recorded its eighth-warmest April since 1901, according to IMD

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Should India go steady on RE generation? (09/05)

• Govts of Portugal & Spain are trying to figure out the reason(s) for this blackout but no concrete results have been arrived at so far.
• Purely on facts, what is known is that there was a sudden plunge in the power supply to the tune of 15 GW (60% of Demd) & this happened within a span of 5 Sec.
• The masses are complaining that Spanish Govt is deliberately hiding the facts though a Enquiry Commission has been constituted. There is a demand for a “Parliamentary probe”, instead of an executive enquiry which conveys an element of trust deficit as far as the Govt is concerned.
• Having said that it may be added that blackouts can be caused by weather related events & there are several instances in the past which are documented.
• One particular report says that 83% of all blackouts which occurred in the USA between 2000 & 2021 were weather related. One specific instance is of a case in the UK where a lightning strike on a Trans circuit in 2021 near London led to a frequency drop which affected about one million consumers by way of a blackout.

• Some experts, however, feel that the main reason for the blackout in Spain could possibly due to overdependence on RE, especially solar, & that the grid could not contain the domino effect of a sudden drop in supply.
• Just before the blackout, 60% of power in the grid was being supplied by Solar. The problem is that when such a huge quantum of power is being supplied by solar, there is no inertia available in the grid.
• Inertia is available from conventional turbines like Coal, HYD & NUC stations & this acts as a cushion for any disturbance in the grid & smoothens out the fluctuations. When it come to Solar power, you have inverters which cannot absorb these shocks.
• Experts feel that the lack of any backup gen created this mess & decision of Spanish Govt to add more & more RE gen added to their woes.
• Spain, incidentally, has limited connectivity with the Europe Grid. Had it been better connected, perhaps, this catastrophe could have been averted as power could have flown in from other countries. Of course, the reverse could have also been true, that blackout could have spread to other countries instead of being limited to a small portion in France.
• France disconnected its grid from Spain once the problem erupted thereby limiting own damages. In the process, however, this squeezed the Spanish grid further as there was no power flow from neighbouring countries.

• It is certainly a wake-up call to other countries who are pursuing an aggressive policy of installing RE capacity.
• What is a safe proportion of RE in the total electricity mix (in terms of gen & not IC) will vary from country to country depending upon its ground realties.
• Though some experts feel that there should be no problem till one reaches 40%, much depends on other aspects like availability of spare HYD or gas-based gen, which can be started immediately if there is a fall in RE gen, the availability of grid scale batteries which can provide storage etc.
• In the case of India, RE power (leaving aside large HYD) accounts for about 14% of the electricity mix & hence, there is a lot of margin available.
• However, even this small proportion of RE gen is being managed by ramping up or down our coal-based gen which is not really the most efficient way.
• Finally, the decision taken during the Conference of Parties (CoP 28) to triple RE Capacity by 2030 should be viewed with circumspect.
• Increase in RE capacity has to be a well planned exercise with proper power flow studies under different scenarios. In the absence of such due diligence, catastrophe may follow in any system.

(by Somit Dasgupta is Ph.D. Senior Visiting Fellow, ICRIER & former, Member CEA)

List of Worst Blackouts in the World :

2012 India Blackouts:

• This event, which occurred on July 30 & 31, 2012, affected a staggering 620 million people, representing 10% of the world's population at the time. The failures were caused by overdrawing electricity by certain states & weak inter-regional power Trans corridors, leading to a cascading effect across the Northern, Eastern, and NE grids. 

1999 Southern Brazil Blackout:

• This blackout, which lasted for several days, affected a large portion of southern Brazil, causing widespread disruption & chaos. 

2003 Northeast U.S. & Canada Blackout:

• This outage, which occurred on August 14 & 15, 2003, affected millions of people in both the US & Canada, causing significant disruptions to daily life & businesses. 

2021 Texas Blackout:

• The extreme winter storm in Texas in Feb 2021 led to a grid collapse, leaving millions without power & causing widespread damage. Freezing weather & ice forced gas plants to trip offline, leading to a cascading failure. 

2006 European Blackout:

• This blackout affected 15 Mn homes in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, & Spain, highlighting the challenges of balancing RE sources with traditional grids. 

Recent Cuba Blackouts:

• Cuba has experienced a series of nationwide blackouts in recent months, exacerbated by its economic crisis & dependence on imported fuel. 

Recent Spain & Portugal Blackout:

• A major power outage in Spain & Portugal in late April 2025 affected 50-60 millions people, causing disruptions to various sectors. 

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Finally, we conclude: �‘Blackouts can happen anywhere’:

• Europe’s biggest blackout in over 20 years on the Iberian peninsula unleashed hours of chaos for people in Spain, Portugal & parts of France on 28^th Apr 2025.
• But in the aftermath it has raised a common question for Govts across the World: could the same happen here?
• Energy experts have warned that although wide-scale blackouts may be rare, no grid is infallible. Prof Jianzhong Wu, Head school of Engg at Cardiff University, told the Guardian blackouts “can happen anywhere”.
• Charmalee Jayamaha, Sr manager at UK Govt-backed Energy Systems Catapult, said: “No system can be 100% resilient,” so risks “need to be balanced with our willingness to pay to reduce them”.
• If no power system is bulletproof, then what are the risks that could trigger a catastrophic blackout in any country? Here we look at the top reasons a power system might collapse.
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• Major power system collapses are frequently due to factors that are difficult to foresee or control e.g. Extreme weather events & natural disasters present a clear risk because storms, heatwaves & earthquakes can lead to devastating damage to critical national infrastructure, which are crucial to maintaining the stability of the grid.
• Most outages due to natural disasters are easier to identify.
• In Texas, a series of 3 winter storms in early 2021 caused wind farms & gas power plants to freeze over, leaving 4.5 Mn homes & businesses without power, some for several days.
• In August 2019 the UK suffered its biggest blackout in over a decade, leaving almost 1 Mn people in England & Wales without electricity & hundreds of people stuck on trains for up to nine hours.
• The blackout occurred after a lightning strike hit a Trans circuit north of London & managed to cause two electricity generators more than 100 miles apart to trip off the system within seconds of each other. It was described as an “extremely rare & unexpected event” by the energy system operator.
• Lightning strikes on energy infrastructure are relatively common, as are power plant outages, but the impact of the large double-outage on the grid’s stability was severe enough to cause scores of small generators & batteries using incorrect safety settings to trip off the system & make it impossible for the operator to avoid a loss of power.

Human-made mayhem:

• Some blackouts are entirely human-made. Jayamaha said geopolitical factors & cyber-attacks had the potential to cause “major interruptions” to the grid. Human error could also play a role. Red Eléctrica was quick to insist there was no sign of an Cyber-attack.
• According to the Dutch cybersecurity expert Dave Maasland, “attacks on power supplies are possible & have already caused disruptions in the past”. He pointed to Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s power system in 2015 & 2016, & a failed attempt after its invasion in 2022.

Grid glitches:

• In the most simple terms, a blackout is caused when Power System stops working: this can be due to an unexpected mechanical glitch involving power lines, S/S or other grid infrastructure or a more complex problem with how the system runs

• Spain’s electricity system suffered two major gen losses in the solar-rich south-west Spain within seconds, which may have destabilised the grid connection between Spain & France, and ultimately led to a full loss of power across the energy system. The initial trigger remains under investigation.
• It is true that a RE-rich grid is more difficult to run than one powered by fossil fuels. This is because the grid was originally designed with big coal, gas & NUC power plants in mind. These plants feature spinning turbines that create inertia on the system, which helps to maintain the grid’s frequency at about 50Hz.
• Wind & solar farms do not create inertia on the grid, meaning that at times of high RE output it can be more difficult to keep the frequency steady if there is a sudden loss of power. A significant fluctuation in frequency can cause gens to automatically disconnect, leading to a collapse of the system.
• No single element in the event would cause a large-scale blackout on its own, but the combination proved devastating.
• Jayamaha said the shift to REs would require grid cos. to invest in grid-stabilising technologies. “The electricity grid is undergoing unprecedented change as we reduce our reliance on fossil fuels & move to solutions that are cheaper, better, & cleaner. This creates different resilience challenges that need to be managed,” she said.

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• “Resilience is no longer just about having enough spare MWs you can simply switch on – but about the right mix of technologies & system capabilities to operate a grid with a lot more REs.”
• Kate Mulvany, a principal consultant at Cornwall Insight, said that in the UK, a key part of that effort had been the development of new balancing & system management tools, “particularly the integration of grid-scale batteries, which play a vital role in maintaining stability”.
• “So, while a major blackout will always be possible, the extensive safeguards in place make it extremely unlikely,” she said.

‘Black swan’ event:

• In many cases, the risk factors outlined above can coincide, meaning relatively common or innocuous events can compound to create a cascading failure that leads to catastrophe. Such “black swan” events are nearly impossible to anticipate: meaning grid operators are always under pressure to prepare for the unexpected.

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(Prepare for the worst & Hope for the Best!!)

Thanks! “Let there be LIGHT ‘ON’ !!!”�(Contact me: vlsonavane@gmail.com/M: 98333 62062)