Participatory simulation to test incentives�for provisioning ecosystem services �in agroforestry systems. Costa Rica

COMUNICATION PRESENTED IN ECOSUMMIT 2016 �« ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY: ENGINEERING CHANGE »�29 AUGUST - 1 SEPTEMBER 2016, LE CORUM, MONTPELLIER, FRANCE

BONIFAZI Mathilde (SupAgro / CIRAD); LE COQ Jean-François (CIRAD ART-Dev); FERRAND Nils (IRSTEA G Eau); SIBELET Nicole (CIRAD Innovation); RAPIDEL Bruno (CIRAD System)

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Introduction

Coffee provisionning

ecosystem services�and disservices

Farming practices

Regulating �and supporting

ecosystem services

Agro-ecosystems

Farms and watershed 

Instruments

Promote

Limit

Introduction

• Which instruments to foster adoption of �agro-environmental practices rebalancing �ecosystem services / disservices provision ?

Objective 1: Characterize ecosystem services/disservices provision, agro-environmental practices and farmer’s strategic managements

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Objective 2: Analyze the actual instruments and their effects

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Objective 3: Identify and test instruments to trigger the adoption of agro-environmental practices

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H1: Lack of instruments to support farmers to develop agro-environmental practices: little-known, technically more complicated and/or costly

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H2: Actual instruments inaccessible and/or inappropriate to the agro-ecosystems �and farmers’ situation

Study area

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• ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
• Legal framework
• Payment for ecosystem services
• Ecolabel

Costa Rica

Los Santos – Llano Bonito

• COFFEE SECTOR
• 1rst area of national coffee production
• High productivity and quality coffee
• 600 family farms
• Shade grown Coffee �(but low shade diversity)

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• ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
• Watershed with soil erosion,
• Nitrogen contamination,
• Biodiversity loss

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Method

• 7 Institutional interviews
• 30 semi-structured interviews of coffee producers
• → Analyze the diversity of their production systems
• → Response to existing policies

Construction and test of a Role Playing Game �with 13 farmers among the ones interviewed

→ Test instruments

• Bibliography about instruments, role playing games, ecosystems services and coffee production

Results → Goal 1

Practices and ecosystem services analyze

Fertilization

Shade trees mangement

Weed management

Buffer zones (vegetal hedge)

Drainage

Regulating erosion

Coffee production

Biodiversity

Nitrogen pollution of the water

Waterway protection

Practices

Ecosystem services and disservices

Terraces

Results → Goal 1

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5 types according to:

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The part of coffee in the income

The area of coffee in the farm

The type of workforce in coffee production

The type of economics activities in the household

The number of persons working in coffee production

Identification of a livelihood typology

Results → Goal 2

• No Payments for environmental services (PES) in the area

• Constraints of land ownership

• Conditions about trees not adapted to the coffee production

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• All the producers certified by eco-labels
• • Environmental criteria not precise • Without recurrent control

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• Law of protection of the waterway
• • Generally not respected • No control

Actual incentives in the study area

Results → Goal 3

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Construction of the model for the role playing game

Fertilization

Shade trees mangement

Weed management

Buffer zones (vegetal hedge)

Drainage

Regulating erosion

Coffee production

Biodiversity

Nitrogen pollution of the water

Waterway protection

Practices

Ecosystem services and disservices

Terraces

Role of the gamer = simplified types� of producers

Dynamic of one round in the role playing game��

Results → Goal 3

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Choice of the practices and adoption or not of the instrument proposed�

Presentation of the scenario

Play on the individual card table

Calculations of the individual and collective results

Play on the collective card table

Results

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3^rd Turn :

Green credits for a reduce use of inputs and plots arrangement with terraces

2^nd Turn:

Payment for Environmental Services (PES) �for adoption of highly shaded coffee and protection of water line

1^st Turn:

Enforcement of the law prohibiting coffee production on water line

Results → Goal 3

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Incentive rules in the game

12

Evolution of the game units compared to the reference turn (without instruments)

Ecosystem services compromises and disservices in the game

Evolution of the erosion units

Evolution of the nitrogen contamination units

Evolution of the coffee units

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Evolution of the biodiversity units

Results → Goal 3

Enforcement of the law turn

Green credits turn

PSE turn

Evolution of the units produced in the watershed by the gamers

We observed too different effects of the instruments depended on the role game of the gamers.

In the game:

• PES and green credits are the most effective incentives to reduce environmental impacts without decreasing coffee production.

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• Enforcement of the law impacts negatively coffee production.

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• Existing instruments are currently not effective in the region but farmers would be responsive to some of the new incentives.

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• Economics and voluntary incentives (PSE and green credits) with decentralized and inter-institutional governance seem adapted to the farm’s local techno-economic constraints and the environmental issues of the territory.

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• The sensibility of farmers to instruments would be dependent on the socio-economic criteria related to their household.

Conclusion

Some limits :

• The agro-ecosystem and the instruments were simplified in the game.
• Few simulation (Only 13 farmers participated).
• We didn’t simulate costs transactions and financing modalities.

Thank you for your attention