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CSE 163

Privacy�

Suh Young Choi�

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Announcements

Last resubmission period opens today

  • Closes 11:59pm Tuesday 8/15

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Final course evals open today

  • Closes 11:59pm Wednesday 8/16
  • If 60% of the class fills it out by 9:00am Wednesday (8/16), then everyone gets a bonus resubmission period
  • Any ONE THA and any ONE LR from the entire quarter can be submitted

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Project due dates

  • Report, Code, Video Presentation all due Wednesday (8/16) at 11:59pm
  • No late submissions or resubmissions

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This Time

  • Privacy
  • Anonymity
  • Differential Privacy

Last Time

  • Defining Fairness
  • Quantifying error

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Anonymous Data Isn’t

Mid 1990s, insurance group in Massachusetts published anonymous records of hospital visits with attributes like name, address, social security removed but left in demographic information.

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Turns out this data release was not so anonymous!

  • Latanya Sweeney was able to link demographic information in hospital data with voter rolls. Found which hospital record corresponded to governor.

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Sweeney estimates 87% of the US is uniquely identified by knowing 1) date of birth, 2) sex, and 3) zip code.

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k-anonymity

K-anonymity: A first definition of privacy by Sweeney that requires every query results in at least k people in the dataset.

  • Achieved by removing columns or fuzzing values

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Weakness: Fails under composition

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Differential Privacy

A stronger notion of privacy that guarantees how much information you can learn about a person.

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Consider two worlds, one where A participates in a study and one where they don’t. If results of the study are similar, we say it respects differential privacy.

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Differential Privacy

Say an algorithm or analysis is 𝜀-differentially private if results with or without any single person in the dataset are “at most 𝜀” off.

  • Defining how close results are is a little complex, but is a statement of probabilities
  • If 𝜀 = 0, require results to be exactly the same
  • If 𝜀 is small, require results to be very similar
  • If 𝜀 is large, require more deviation in results (less privacy)

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Two methods for commonly achieving 𝜀-differential privacy

  • Jittering Result (Laplace Mechanism)
  • Randomized Response

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Jittering

Take result of analysis and add a small amount of random noise to result.

  • Example: Report average age of census but add a small random number to it

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Specifically if you add noise that follows a Laplace distribution with parameter 𝜀, you can achieve 𝜀-differential privacy.

  • See below for 𝜀=0.5 (red dashes), 𝜀=1 (blue solid), 𝜀=2 (purple dots)

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Randomized Response

What if we don’t trust the data collector with our data?

  • Even with differentially private statistics published, they still have access to the raw data. What if they get hacked?

�Change the differential privacy mechanism to be done locally rather than centrally!

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Differentially Private Polling Procedure:

  • Call up person.Ask them to flip a coin (don’t tell us result)
  • If Heads, tell us their honest answer to question (“Yes”/”No”)
  • If Tails, flip coin again
    • If Heads, report “Yes”
    • If Tails, report “No”

�Key idea: Can learn aggregate trends without knowing true result of individual

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Randomized Response Analysis

Key property: People tell the truth ¾ of the time and lie ¼ of the time. ½ of the time they are honest, and then half of the time they tell us a random answer that lines up with the truth.

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To see why this work, suppose we know the answer is “Yes” for ⅓ of people. How many “Yes” responses would we expect in this procedure?

  • ⅓ of the population has true answer “Yes”. ¾ of them will tell us the truth so we will get a total of ¼ of responses being honest “Yes”es
  • ⅔ of the population has the true answer “No”, but ¼ of the time they will randomly tell us “Yes”. This means we would expect ⅙ of the population to lie and tell us “Yes”
  • Total of “Yes” received (on average): ¼ + ⅙ = 5/12

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In general, work backwards to solve for underlying probability

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Before Next Time

  • Read through Lesson 23 and participate in the discussion
    • This one’s for credit!
  • Fill out course evals
  • Go to section tomorrow
  • Get started on the project!

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Next Time

  • Ethics case studies
  • Come to class!

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