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Dr. Charles Kamhoua

Senior Electronics Engineer

Network Security Branch

AI for Cybersecurity

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U.S. ARMY COMBAT CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT COMMAND – ARMY RESEARCH LABORATORY

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CONTENTS

  • What is AI?

  • Introduction to Cybersecurity

  • Machine Learning

  • Adversarial Machine Learning

  • Future Research

  • Concusion

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WHAT IS AI

  • Artificial intelligence (AI) is a wide-ranging branch of computer science concerned with building smart machines capable of performing tasks that typically require human intelligence.

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APPLICATIONS

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ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING

  • Is a machine learning technique that attempts to fool models by supplying deceptive input.

  • The most common reason is to cause a malfunction in a machine learning model.

  • It studies a class of attacks which aim to deteriorate the performance of classifiers on specific tasks.

  • Adversarial attacks are classified as:

    • Poisoning attacks.
      • The attacker influences the training data.
    • Evasion attacks.
      • The attacker manipulates the data during deployment to deceive previously trained classifier.

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ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING

  • Evasion attacks are most common, practical types of attacks.

  • Usually used on intrusion and malware scenarios.

  • Is not to be confused with GANs

  • In GANs the adversary goal is to make the model stronger! (non-cooperative game).

  • But in Adversarial ML, the adversary goal is to fool the model!

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ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING

Adding a tiny magnitude of noise makes a huge difference for the Neural Network Classifier

This attack Can be Untargeted 🡪 misclassify the panda

In the case of Targeted attack 🡪 The goal is to classify the panda as another specific class!

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ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING

  • The goal of the adversary is to move the classifier away from the correct label!

  • For targeted attack, the adversary moves the classifier away from the correct label toward the direction of the targeted class/label

  • We have two types of attacks

          • White Box Attack: The adversary have access to the model parameters.

          • Black Box Attack: The adversary

does not have access to the model parameters

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GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS

  • GANs Can:
          • Generate New Data.

Such as unreal face images

Try: www.thispersondoesnotexist.com

Restore New Videos from Old recordings.

  • The GAN has two networks that are working against each others (adversarial).

  • It generates data (Generative) in the self-supervised learning settings.

  • Generative models can generate new data instances.
    • given a set of data instances X and a set of labels Y:
      • Generative models capture the joint probability p(X, Y)
  • Discriminative models discriminate between different kinds of data instances.
    • given a set of data instances X and a set of labels Y:
      • Discriminative models capture the conditional probability p(Y | X)

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GAN’S STRUCTURE

  • Both the generator and the discriminator are neural networks.
  • The generator output is connected directly to the discriminator input.
  • Through backpropagation, the discriminator's classification provides a signal that the generator uses to update its weights.

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GAN SCENARIO

  • When training begins, the generator produces obviously fake data, and the discriminator quickly learns to tell that it's fake:

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GAN SCENARIO

  • Finally, if generator training goes well, the discriminator gets worse at telling the difference between real and fake. It starts to classify fake data as real, and its accuracy decreases.

  • During discriminator training:
  • The discriminator classifies both real data and fake data from the generator.
  • The discriminator loss penalizes the discriminator for misclassifying a real instance as fake or a fake instance as real.
  • The discriminator updates its weights through backpropagation from the discriminator loss through the discriminator network.

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BEYOND ML SECURITY

  • RL algorithms learns by interactions:

  • Reinforcement learning is learning what to do (in a given situation (state)).

  • “The learner is not told which actions to take, but instead must discover which actions yield the most reward by trying them.” —Sutton and Barto, Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction

  • Reinforcement learning is one of three broad categories of machine learning.

Reinforcement Learning with MATLAB

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REINFORCEMENT LEARNING

  • RL works with data from a dynamic environment.

  • The goal is not to cluster data or label data, but to find the best sequence of actions that will generate the optimal outcome.

  • The way reinforcement learning solves this problem is by allowing a piece of software called an agent to explore, interact with, and learn from the environment.

Reinforcement Learning with MATLAB

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FROM RL TO GAME THEORY

  • When the environment is under attack.

  • There is a new agent (attacker) acting with adversarial goal to minimize the reward of the RL agent.

  • This formulated as a dynamic game between the two players.

Reinforcement Learning with MATLAB

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GAME THEORY FOR CYBERSECURITY

  • Recently, Algorithmic Game Theory have been extensively used to study security problems both in the cyber and physical domains.

  • The application of game theory in cyber security can be generally divided into two categories:
        • Cyber attack-defense analysis.
          • Cyber attack-defense analysis predicts the actions of the cyber attackers through modeling the attack and defense behaviors as games
        • Cyber security assessment.
          • The analysis of the equilibrium of the cyber attack-defense game and the predication of the attack and defense strategies can be also used as the basis of cyber security and reliability assessment.

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GAME THEORY FOR CYBERSECURITY

A Survey of Game Theoretic Methods for Cyber Security Yuan Wang, Yongjun Wang, Jing Liu, Zhijian Huang and Peidai Xie, 2016

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MORE-GENERAL MODEL POSG

  • Partially observable stochastic games generalize stochastic games by introducing imperfect information.
  • The players can only observe their private observations and recall the actions they made.

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INTRUSION DETECTION USING ML

  • IDS has been in use for a number of years.
  • Their objective is to scan network traffic and identify any malicious activities or threats in real-time.

  • As a security system, like a firewall, an IDS has the security purpose of protecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability, which are the main target of a potential attacker to break.

  • IDS consists of two kind of attack detection methods:
        • Anomaly-based detection
          • Compares the behavioral changes of the system in order to discover abnormalities in action or activities.
        • Signature-based (or Misuse detection) detection
          • Fingerprints or signatures from previous attacks are stored and rules are written within the IDS.
          • These rules are used to compare against new packets that enter the network

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EXAMPLE: SPAM FILTER

  • This is used as an example of pattern recognition
          • There is a vast number of features, or characteristics, that can be associated with spam (labels).

  • Spam mail being received by users has vastly reduced with the introduction of ML into the spam detection.

  • Google claimed to block 99.9% of spam mail after introducing Artificial Neural Network (ANN) to their spam filtering (2015)

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GAME THEORY FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION

  • Stackelberg Security Games have been used for secure resource allocation and have been deployed in many applications.

  • Infrastructure security:
        • ARMOR at the Los Angeles Airport (LAX) deployed in 2007 to randomize checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport; which was followed by IRIS
          • A game-theoretic scheduler for randomized deployment of the Air Marshal Service that has been in use since 2009; and PROTECT which is deployed for generating randomized patrol schedules for the Coast Guards

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GAME THEORY FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION

  • Stackelberg Security Games have been used for secure resource allocation and have been deployed in many applications.

  • Environment security:
        • Green security games
          • Focus on defending against environmental crimes. These problems exhibit a spatial and temporal aspect that distinguishes work on these problems from infrastructure security

  • Opportunistic crime:
    • Refers to the problem of urban crime where criminals are not committed to detailed plans and are flexible in the execution of their plans, as opportunities arise.
    • Protecting against such urban crime has been studied as a Stackelberg game and evaluated for deterring fare evasion within the Los Angeles Metro System (TRUSTS) and for crime prevention at the University of Southern California.

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OPEN PROBLEMS

  • Scalability
        • remains an issue despite many existing approaches, especially in handling uncertainty.

  • Uncertainty
        • Many of the game/environment parameters may be unknown or partially known to the agents.
  • Deception

        • A fundamental issue in any security situation is deception.
        • The mythical Trojan Horse is a classic example of deception.
        • Deception by the defender has been studied in GT literature, albeit in simple one-time interaction settings using signaling enabled by the advantage of extra information available to the defender.

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THANK YOU

  • Questions!

  • Contact:

charles.a.kamhoua.civ@army.mil

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