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MARXIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

May 2023

Communist Party Webinar

Marc Brodine

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GOALS FOR THIS SESSION

Discuss a Marxist approach to developing strategy

Discuss

Clear up some semantic problems of understanding the distinction between strategy and tactics

Clear up

Clarify our basic Party Strategy

Clarify

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WHY IS STRATEGY IMPORTANT?��MY PERSONAL LESSONS

2 stories:
Free Angela Davis campaign: should the main slogan after she got arrested be “Free All Political Prisoners” or “Bail for Angela”

Which was most radical, which was most broad-based?
Henry Winston’s role

From Allende’s Chile

Leftist criticism: “They just didn’t understand the importance of arming the people”
As if it was as simple as driving down the street with an ice cream truck, handing out weapons to anyone and everyone
Criticism didn’t take into account the actual balance of forces

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WHAT IS STRATEGY?

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SCALE��(DEFINING THE ISSUE)

Not just a semantic question
Strategy for a local election campaign can be just a detail, a minor aspect, of a national election campaign. From the national perspective, local election approaches are tactics, while for the local activists, those “tactics” are big parts of their strategy
In other words, whether something is a tactic or a strategy depends on the scale and scope
Whether something is a strategy or tactic also depends on context and long-range goals

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SCOPE

For example, are we talking about strategy for one national election cycle, or about strategy for the next 10 or 20 years of elections?
Are we focused on winning a strike, or about building a union over many years?
Are we talking about winning a particular struggle, or are we talking about cultural and social change over many years?
Is our scope international cultural, social, political, and economic issues, with U.S. issues as a subset? Or are we picking a smaller scale battle with a shorter timeline, to begin to win small victories?

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CONTEXT

Lenin noted that the essence of Marxist strategy is correctly estimating the balance of forces
Estimating the balance of forces involves questions such as who are our progressive allies? What is necessary to unify a broad-based coalition? What approach or framing will unite more people and organizations?
Also, who is the main enemy? Who are the allies of the main enemy? What splits exist in the ruling class? How can our strategy help drive wedges into those splits?

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GOALS

Goals are closely linked with scale and scope; they need to be aligned
What are the broadest, most fundamental, most unifying goals?
For example, is our basic goal to win a particular strike, and/or to give workers a sense of their own power? Or to build the union long-term? And/or to unite more of the labor movement, using a particular struggle as the vehicle for building that unity?
Those can be complementary goals, but our strategy will vary depending on which is in the forefront at the present moment

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WE NEED TO AVOID

Radicals who seek to build unity based on getting center forces to agree in advance to a radical program are doomed to failure.

For example, even if our goals in working on a particular election campaign go way beyond that specific campaign (building broad unity, building union-based independent electoral infrastructure, using a campaign as a vehicle for building unity way beyond any specific campaign or candidate), that doesn’t mean we can’t work with those who goals are limited to the specific campaign or candidate. Broad-based unity means we MUST work with such forces.

Rigid approaches to strategy and tactics and building unity

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FOR EXAMPLE

Having to make such compromises could be seen as a “defeat,” but the victory, limited though it was, helped set the stage for battles across the country

Without those compromises, victory would not have been possible, not at that time and place, not in those circumstances

Eventually, a coalition was brought together that actually won increasing to $15, but that victory involved some heavy compromises, with the restaurant industry, with phasing in the wage increases, with negotiating with opponents

After the election, her group (Socialist Alternative, a Trotskyite grouplet) tried to set up a coalition to win the battle for $15 an hour, but they wanted people and groups to agree in advance to their approach, meaning no compromise, meaning they stayed in control of the coalition

In Seattle, Sawant won election to the City Council based on a campaign that included the demand for raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour.

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MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC QUESTION

What is the path to changing the balance of forces?

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THE GOAL IN ANY STRUGGLE IS NOT, FOR US, LIMITED TO THAT STRUGGLE

The goal always includes working to change the balance of forces
Why?

In order to make further victories possible

In order to connect this struggle with the broader struggles in society

In order to weaken the opposition for the next struggle

In order to build unity for those future struggles

To shift the balance of forces in a progressive direction

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SPLITS IN THE RULING CLASS—AREN’T THEY ALL CAPITALISTS AND THUS ENEMIES?

A thought experiment—where would our country and our struggle be right now is Mike Pence, terrible though he is, had decided to bluster his way through the Congressional session which certified Biden’s win?
If Liz Cheney, arch-conservate though she is, didn’t understand the value of maintaining the legitimacy of the system?

Obviously, we can’t know exactly what would have happened, but we could fairly easily been in the grip of full-blown fascism, with many of us being hauled away to prison, with demonstrations and strikes outlawed, with elections being cancelled, with more voting rights taken away

This just means that we need to understand and take advantage of such splits—though we don’t have illusions that temporary, vacillating allies on a specific issue will necessarily be allies in any other way (a flaw of Browderism)

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LEARNING FROM HISTORY

In fighting fascism, our movement has learned many lessons about what works and what doesn’t, and that also provides lessons in strategy in other battles
We have learned, in large part because of actual strategic mistakes that were made in different countries, in different circumstances
This is an example of the primacy of practice. Theory is essential, but the test of theory is actual practice—in other words, does the theory work in real life?

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IN GERMANY IN THE EARLY 1930S

The German Communist Party, one of the four largest parties a the time, saw the Social Democrats as the main obstacle to working class progress, and so directed much of their campaigns against the Social Democrats. They saw the Social Democrats as offering minor reforms which distracted the working-class movement from the need for revolution

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THEY UNDERESTIMATED THE FASCIST DANGER

As a result, they attacked Social Democrats as the main obstacle to progress. They put their main effort into competing with the Social Democrats for working class votes

Did not place the correct priority on building unity of all working-class and progressive forces against fascism

Underestimated how quickly and decisively the fascists would move once in power, so they didn’t prepare for underground functioning

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OBVIOUSLY, THESE EXAMPLES

Are over-simplified—reality is much more complex
Some Social Democrats saw the Communists as the main enemy and drove the Communists to compete rather than unify

the Social Democratic police chief in Berlin, for example, used the police to attack and break up Communist rallies and marches, and threw Communists in jail (some even died from these police attacks). The Social Democratic Party threw up other obstacles to unity

In other words, Communist mistakes weren’t the sole or even primary reason for the (temporary) victory of fascism
The German Communist Party was also determined, heroic, persistent

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SOME ALMOST OPPOSITE ERRORS

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, as the McCarthy period was developing, our Party made some mistakes too
We were correct in warning of, organizing against, and preparing for the fascist danger
We tried to avoid the major mistakes of the German Party in fighting fascism
However, we also over-estimated the danger of fascism, and as a result, made strategic errors

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WHAT WERE SOME OF THE ERRORS WE MADE?

We sent too much of the national and state leadership underground (in my opinion, it was correct to set up an underground organization, but too much of the leadership was shifted into that instead if into the mass political fight against fascism

We kicked out members (or stopped communicating with them) if they were deemed not reliable enough or not committed enough. In some places, this amounted to a majority of the membership, weakening us at the very time we needed all available forces

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A FEW YEARS LATER

As the Party was trying to come to grips with the changed circumstances, we ended up fighting with important allies rather than building unity
In part, this was due to the ways the Party had gotten used to functioning in more of the mainstream during the late 1930s and through the war years
Since broad left organizations also came under attack, and shrunk considerably, the Party concluded that such left formations were a distraction from connecting to masses of people
So the Party fought to disband some left formations, such as the National Negro Labor Council, such as various youth organizations, against the wishes of our allies in those organizations
As a result, we weakened our position, cut ourselves off from allies, and later had to come back and try to re-establish such left formations

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WE ALSO HAVE MUCH TO BE PROUD OF

During the same period, the Party helped collect signatures on the Stockholm Peace Appeal, garnering hundreds of thousands of signatures in the U.S., millions worldwide
We waged a several-decade long series of legal battles to defeat fascist laws and efforts to use Congress to destroy our Party, like the McCarren Act, the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Smith Act, and similar legal fights in many states, ultimately a successful series of battles

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THESE ARE EXAMPLES OF

WHY STRATEGY IS IMPORTANT

HOW STRATEGIC MISTAKES LEAD TO DEFEATS AND SET-BACKS

PART OF THE PURPOSE OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT IS TO AVOID BOTH OVER-ESTIMATING AND UNDER-ESTIMATING OUR OPPONENTS

WHY THERE IS NOT ANY ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL LIST OF TACTICS OR STRATEGY—WE HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TIME, PLACE, AND CIRCUMSTANCE, WE HAVE TO CORRECTLY JUDGE THE BALANCE OF FORCES (ON BOTH SIDES, SINCE THERE ARE SPLITS, DIFFERENCES, AND DIVISIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF CLASS BATTLES)

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LIKE EVERYTHING, STRATEGY IS A PROCESS

Strategy is not a one-time procedure, because everything is always in the process of change
The only way we learn if our strategy is correct is to put it into practice and see what happens
As circumstances change, strategy must also change

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WHY ASK THE RIGHT QUESTIONS?

First, because what answers you develop are determined in large part on what the question is
For example, in the early Trump years, following the fascist demonstration in Charlotteville, many on the left asked the question “is it moral to punch fascists in the face?”
The obvious answer is “of course it is. Fascists have given up their right to be treated as normal political actors.”
But if the questions is “how do we build the broadest unity against fascists?”
Then punching individual fascists in the face gets in the way of the broadest political unity
Also, punching individual fascists in the face is not a winning strategy—in Germany, all major parties had paramilitary organizations of ex-servicemen. The fascist groups and the Communist groups had pitched street battles. Plenty of fascists got punched in the face, but that didn’t stop fascism. In fact, the fascists used such street battles to argue that they were the only ones who could bring stability
If our goal is to build the broadest anti-fascist unity, then we have to ask, not is it moral to punch fascists, but rather will that help unite more people and engage them in the struggle?

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STEPS IN THE STRATEGY �DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Make sure you are asking the right questions
Identify long-range goals (but don’t stop there!)
Identify the main enemy/enemies
Identify the main allies (the core forces)
Understand the splits among the enemies
Understand the obstacles to unity among potential allies
Understand the main issue(s) under contention, and how best to frame them to help build maximum unity
Understand the stakes for each side

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BUT THAT’S NOT ALL!

After the strategy development process, proceed to implementation

Learn from reality what works and what doesn’t

Deepen our understanding of all the pieces, and pay attention to what is changing

And then, readjust strategy

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STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT IS A COLLECTIVE PROCESS

But it is not an individual process

Because a collective can share individual experiences, knowledge, and connections to create better strategy
As a result, collective strategy is deeper, more in tune with complex reality
Strategy is not about brilliant ideas or insights; it is about discussing together to plan the work we will do together

It takes a collective to work through the strategy process

Strategy development requires a collective,
And is a key step in building a collective is to go through the strategy development process

It is a two-way street—

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AS THE BALANCE OF FORCES CHANGES, STRATEGY HAS TO CHANGE

For example, in the 1950s in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) mostly organized non-violent resistance to apartheid, with mass protests, civil disobedience, legal challenges, etc.
After years of violent repression and closing all avenues of mass protest, in the mid-1960s the ANC changed strategy, shifting to military opposition, sabotage, training for military operations, founding the Spear of the Nation, They also launched international solidarity campaigns.
In the early 1990s, when the maneuvering room for the apartheid regime shrunk due to the ANC and other popular resistance, and the international campaign increasingly isolated the regime, there was an opening for a negotiated end to apartheid, and the ANC shifted again, engaging in the negotiations and committing to participating in the transition and upcoming elections.
The goal (ending apartheid) didn’t change at all, but as the balance of forces shifted, the ANC (and the South African Communist Party-SACP) shifted strategy

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STRATEGY IS NOT AN ABSTRACT QUESTION, SEPARATE FROM THE REAL CIRCUMSTANCES�

Developing good strategy requires

Starting with the real circumstances (estimating the balance of forces)
Figuring out what is needed to shift that balance (developing a plan)
Doing the work (practice as primary), and
Readjusting strategy as circumstances change

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WHAT DO YOU THINK OUR PARTY’S STRATEGY IS?

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BASIC CPUSA STRATEGY

Workers, oppressed peoples, women, youth

Build unity among the core forces

Unions, civil rights organizations, pro-democracy movements, youth groups, seniors, health care, education, peace and many more . . .

Build unity between movements

Labor rights, civil rights, women’s rights, environmental groups, immigrant rights groups, good governance groups, and many more

Link issues, build coalitions

On the job, in electoral struggles, building progressive coalitions, civil disobedience, mass education, mass demonstrations, legal battles

Engage on every field of struggle we can

Main obstacle to progress, main enemy on all progressive issues, most anti-democratic force

Work to defeat the extreme right

Shift the balance of forces decisively against the extreme right, move increasingly from defensive struggles to fighting for real solutions

Main goal of this stage of struggle

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THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY AS THE BASIC FRAMEWORK

Powerful link to struggles throughout U.S. history to protect and extend democracy

Protecting even limited democracy protects the ability to organize and protest

Winning progressive victories in all fields of struggle depends on our ability to mobilize people, and for them to express their will through voting, demonstrating, petitioning, mounting legal challenges, striking, engaging in civil disobedience

The struggle for democracy enables us to build broad-based coalitions of many kinds

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THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY

Provides a framework to fight for unity of many kinds, to fight divisions in the working class and people

Places the struggles against racism and sexism at the center

Unites us with progressive but thus far non-revolutionary allies

Protects our ability to engage in struggles of many kinds—electoral, mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts, petitions

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WHY IS THIS OUR STRATEGY?

It matches the objective needs of the working class and allies
It connects us to the struggles and movements that must come together to have a majoritarian movement for fundamental progressive change
It helps divide the most militaristic, most chauvinistic, most authoritarian sections of the capitalist class from the sections that prefer to rely on the legitimacy of the existing system (Trump vs. Liz Cheney, for example)
It has the aim of shifting the balance of forces, from defensive struggles to working for real solutions, ending the stranglehold of the extreme right on our political systems
It enables us to use the framework of the fight for democracy to link together many movements

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OUR GOALS

Are not picked out of a hat, or out of our long-range aims, they are our reading of the objective needs of our class, the objective political situation in which we must struggle, and what is necessary to move to a higher level of struggle
As Marx and Engels said, we make our own history, but we do not do so in circumstances of our own choosing. The circumstances we struggle in determine the goals we can reach for1, pushing the struggle in a way that helps shift the balance of forces

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AN EXAMPLE

There are some in the environmental movement who correctly understand that capitalism is the source of the environmental problems we face, and correctly understand that to reach fundamental solutions requires a struggle for socialism.

But then they stop, feeling they have reached the end of strategy development, when all they have done is the first step, identifying long-range goals.

But those correct understandings of ultimate solutions don’t address the crucial issues: How to we get from here to there? How do we put together a massive coalition with the power to create fundamental change?

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ULTRA-LEFT FAILURES

An ultra-left strategy leads to silly chants like “Revolution, Nothing Less!” But how do we reach people who are not yet ready for revolution?

Attack them?
Shout louder at them?
Sound more radical, turn the bullhorn up all the way, and wave the biggest red flags?

This leads to attacking people who are the natural allies of the revolutionary movement, because they are not yet revolutionary, a self-defeating strategy
Or do we work with masses where they are at to begin to create change, and to educate in the process of struggle?

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EXTENDED CPUSA STRATEGY

As we move from defensive to proactive struggles, as the balance of forces shifts, our strategy will shift from our current anti-extreme right strategy

(as described on an earlier slide)

To an anti-monopoly strategy, uniting all in opposition to the monopolies, the oligopolies, the transnational corporations

Uniting the working class, its natural allies (the core forces) small business interests, all progressive movements, and even some medium-sized business interests who get squeezed by monopoly pricing

With a further shift in the balance of forces, our class will move on to the direct struggle for socialism

Once the working class, its organized sector, plus coalition partners have gained enough strength, they can contend directly with the capitalist class for power

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WHY NOT JUST MOVE TO THE DIRECT STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM?

Because wishing we were there doesn’t make it happen
The whole idea of strategy is to map out the balance of forces that fit the current circumstances, and figure out what steps are necessary to shift that balance
Because we can’t only preach our way to socialism, we have to engage in struggle with tens of millions of workers who are not yet revolutionary
They will learn to be revolutionary in the process of struggle, they will learn in that process from their own experiences
As they learn from experience, our lessons (and preaching) about the need for fundamental economic and political change will resonate—not because we are preaching but because our preaching will match their reality

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WHERE DO WE ENGAGE IN STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT?

In all our collectives

Clubs
Leadership bodies on all levels

As we engage with others in struggle—they have lessons to teach us about what works and what doesn’t, about how to mobilize the changing generations and changing circumstances

Discussing strategy with those we work with is part of winning them to socialism

Using our self-study to help guide our practice, our work

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WHAT ABOUT TACTICS?��THUS FAR WE HAVE FOCUSED ON STRATEGY, BUT WHAT ABOUT TACTICS?�

First, if you recall my lesson in semantics from the beginning, in one sense tactics are just strategy at a smaller level. Much of the approach we’ve already discussed is just as relevant to tactics as to strategy

Second, tactics are not as major as strategic concerns, so therefore, there is more room for experimentation, for trial and error, for testing out different approaches, for trying it out and seeing what works

Third, the key issue is whether a particular tactic aligns with your strategic goals. If not, don’t do it!

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WHAT IS ALIGNMENT? �A PERSONAL EXAMPLE

Mid-1980s solidarity with El Salvador

If your strategic goal is to build a broad movement, you shouldn’t pick tactics that will create obstacles on your path to that goal. Here’s an example of what doesn’t work:

Effort to build a coalition of union locals in our area against U.S. military intervention

Existing solidarity group saw this as competition, wanted us to adopt their strategy of getting locals to pass resolutions proclaiming support for the FMLN

Was it more radical to sound more radical, or was it more radical to build a movement capable of keeping the U.S. military from invading? Which approach was more helpful in reality to the revolutionary forces in El Salvador?

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WHEN DECIDING ON �APPROPRIATE TACTICS

Moral issues are important, but do not necessarily take precedence over strategic considerations (it may be moral to punch a fascist in the face, but that is not the most important question)
Clear thinking about the most important goals and how to reach them must take precedence over how we feel, or what we hope, or over the way we wish things were

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THERE IS MORE FLEXIBILITY TO TACTICS

Tactics should make it easier to reach your strategic goals

Tactics shouldn’t conflict with strategic goals

We can’t know in advance which tactics will gain a response from those we are trying to organize—therefore, we have to keep trying new and different tactics until we find what gets the response we need

While tactics shouldn’t conflict with strategic goals, tactics are not an end in themselves, they are just efforts to reach the next level of struggle

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IN SUMMARY

Strategy and tactics are relative terms—they depend on the context
Strategy needs to be based on an objective, collective reading of reality, of the balance of forces
We see the struggle developing in stages—not fixed, immutable stages, but shifts in emphasis of where the struggle is and is going
Stages of struggle are about shifting the balance of forces
Our tactics have to match our strategy
Practice is primary—life and work are the test of how correct a strategy is, how well it matches the current political moment