STATE NUCLEAR REGULATORY INSPERTORATE OF UKRAINE���Mechanisms for cross border coordination�in nuclear accidental and post-accidental context��European Round Table on Emergency Preparedness & Response

Nataliia Bizhko

Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Division

of the Department on Nuclear Facility Safety of the SNRIU

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12 January 2022

State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine�

Order of the President of Ukraine of 05.12.2000 on the establishment of an independent body of state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety of Ukraine

Act of the Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine of 20.08.2014 number 363 approving the new provisions of the SNRIU

www.swww.snriuwww.snriu.gov.ua

prpr@snriu.gov.ua

ICC tel: +38044 277 12 13

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The SNRIU functions in the sphere of emergency preparedness and response

• the national competent body in the framework of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident;
• the single national warning point in in the framework of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency;
• exchange of information about nuclear events in the framework of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES);
• early notification, through the mass media, on radiation accidents within and outside the territory of Ukraine in case of possible transboundary transfer of radioactive elements.

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Nuclear installations and other �objects of regulation

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WWER – 440

WWER – 1000

RBMK – 1000

Research reactors

RW storage facilities

Uranium mining and millin

The IECenter was established to support �the SNRIU functions

IEC functions

• receiving information directly from the accident site, from the IAEA, competent authorities of other countries, requesting additional information;
• technical analysis and evaluation of the information received;
• emergency notification and further periodic informing of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, other authorities and participants of the response procedures;
• notification and further informing the IAEA and other countries;
• cooperation and collaboration with the NAEC Energoatom, Security Service of Ukraine , Ukrainian Hydrometeteorological Centre other response participants,
• participation in the work of the interdepartmental operational headquarters, which is developed in the SESU;
• press releases, posting information on the Internet and responding to information requests from mass media and the public;
• assessment of the response actions of the emergency facility personnel and/or operating organization

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���According to IAEA safety standards, �emergency preparedness and response for nuclear or radiation incidents is one of 10 fundamental safety principles.� �

Принцип 9 �Аварийная готовность и регирование

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Existing Emergency Planning Approach

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LESSONS OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

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Longer duration emergency situations;

Events at multi-unit NPP sites;

Extensive infrastructural damage that can impact on-site and off-site emergency plans

Approaches to Emergency Planning Zones

• probabilistic safety analysis
• events and their combinations, including very unlikely
• scenarios of development
• border conditions
• meteorology and orography
• calculated doses
• model (сodes) and measurement
• radiation protection strategy
• roles and responsibilities
• infrastructure and organization
• training and testing
• comparison of Approaches for Urgent Protective Actions by the IAEA, HERCA-WENRA and Nordic Countries

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HERCA-WENRA approach to improve interstate �coordination of protective actions during nuclear accidents

The aim of the HERCA-WENRA approach is to harmonize the emergency measures taken by different countries involved in the same nuclear accident. This cross-border cooperation relies on the alignment of the measures taken with those taken by the country where the accident took place and a coordinated approach for long-term protection measures. This cooperation implies a mutual trust, a very good mutual knowledge of their national approach concerning nuclear safety for neighbouring countries and a quick transfer of information in case of an accident.

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The “HERCA-WENRA approach”, was

established to serve as a basis to

complement existing arrangements in the

initial phase of an emergency situation and

allow better coordination of protective

actions between European countries

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IAEA – Information systems

• Emergency Preparedness and Response Information Management System (EPRIMS)
• International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
• International Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS)
• Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE)
• IAEA – Notification Convention (1986)
• IAEA –Convention on assistance RANET
• IAEA provides a series of Convention

exercises (ConvEx)

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Means of the European Commission

• ECURIE European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange European early notification system in the event of a radiological or nuclear emergency
• NERIS platform - European platform on preparedness for nuclear and radiological emergency response and recovery
• EURDEP European Radiological Data Exchange Platform

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Concepts for communication

• Success of harmonized approach between neighbouringcountries is strongly influences by bilateral / multilateral arrangements
• Bilateral arrangements is key element for implementation of HERCA WENRA approach
• Modes of communication should be agreed between neighbouringcountries in preparedness phase
• Communication should rely on official emergency contact points or mutually agreed channels
• Participations in multilateral and international organizations offer a variety of exchange possibilities and feature infrastructures that can be relevant for a coordinated approach to emergencies

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�Support to the Ukrainian Regulatory Authorities�(INSC - UK/TS/58)

Strengthening of State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) capabilities relevant for the regulation of nuclear activities and in licensing and severe accident management of Nuclear Installations.

In the frame of the INSC project U3.01/18, scenario calculations should be performed to assess the possible cross-national contamination.

Recommended to expand such an exercise to other source terms and more – also complicated – weather conditions.

Observations and recommendations for the use of atmospheric dispersion models in JRODOS.

The calculation results are planned to be discussed with the competent authorities of neighboring countries

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Some observations and recommendations

• intervention criteria may be different from country to country
• assessments performed by the accident country for a neighbouring country might not be relevant for that country due to different intervention levels or approaches (projected dose against dose averted)
• some neighbouring countries operate JRODOS in their emergency centres. This would allow to transfer whole scenarios or the basic start files to allow another organisation to visualise or repeat the calculation from the accident country.
• as USIE is based on the IRIX format, also exchange of individual information blocks such as the source term might be envisaged.
• details of the source term might be also relevant as this can be used by other countries to perform their own atmospheric dispersion calculations.
• a special point for discussion are food countermeasures. Concentration levels are also calculated by JRODOS. They could serve as an independent information as doses are extremely uncertain due to changes in consumption habits following an accident.

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Сonclusions

• Use of reference levels in planning and during response
• Defining information to be exchanged during emergency
• General exchange of information
• Exchange of JRODOS files including source term
• Exchange via USIE mechanism
• Promoted by IAEA
• Exchange via ECURIE system
• Official information exchange system between European Member States
• Bilateral exchange of information
• Definition and agreement on communication channels, means and content
• Definition of means of exchange
• Testing of agreed provision
• Topics to be considered for implementation
• Topics to be considered for implementation
• Dose criteria
• Consideration of concentration in food products as information to be exchanged with neighbouring countries.
• Exercises
• Continuation of bilateral/multilateral exercises to test provisions
• Adaption of planning zones

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SSK recommends the following principle:��«Do what’s likely to happen and�prepare for what’s unlikely to happen!» ����Thank You for Your attention!�

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