The Structure of Open Secrets
given on 15 November 2023
at UNAM
Sam Berstler
MIT Philosophy
berstler@mit.edu
Due to the nature of the subject matter, this talk will involve brief discussions of:
substance abuse
sexual harassment
Anonymous whistleblower: “It was amazing. Here we were dumping poison into the environment, and nobody wanted to talk about it, as if talking about it would make it real. Well, it was real all right, but we went around pretending it wasn’t. I thought I was going crazy, like it wasn’t happening. You think I’m some kind of hero ‘cause I blew the whistle. The only reason I spoke up is because I didn’t want to go crazy.”
The big question
Why do some groups seem to “turn in a blind eye” or “remain in denial” about wrongdoing within the group?
The big question
Why do some groups seem to “turn in a blind eye” or “remain in denial” about wrongdoing within the group?
Some familiar explanations
1. Moral failing: They don’t actually think that what’s happening is wrong.
2. Individual epistemic dysfunction: Members should know what’s going on but don’t.
3. Collective epistemic dysfunction: The group should collectively know what’s going on but doesn’t.
The big question
Why do some groups seem to “turn in a blind eye” or “remain in denial” about wrongdoing within the group?
Some familiar explanations
1. Moral failing: They don’t actually think that what’s happening is wrong.
2. Individual epistemic dysfunction: Members should know what’s going on but don’t.
3. Collective epistemic dysfunction: The group should collectively know what’s going on but doesn’t.
4. Non-acknowledgment practices: The group is conforming to a non-acknowledgment practice.
Non-acknowledgment practices are often (though not always) social strategies to preserve individuals’ privacy. The claim that privacy strategies can provide cover for “taboo” bad behavior like sexual assault and intimate partner violence is an old feminist critique….
Conceptually, the private is hermetic. It means that which is inaccessible to, unaccountable to, unconstructed by anything beyond itself.…It is probably not coincidence that the very things that feminism regards as central to the subjection of women—the very place, the body; the very relations, heterosexual; the very activities, intercourse and reproduction; and the very feelings, intimate—form the core of what is covered by privacy doctrine…[Privacy] is a very material division that keeps the private beyond public redress and depoliticizes women’s subjection within it. It keeps some men out of the bedrooms of other men.
My Hypothesis
Open secrecy is a type of non-acknowledgment practice distinguished by its structure.
While open secrecy isn’t necessarily morally pernicious, it characteristically is. And characteristically, it is morally pernicious in part because of its structure.
Observation: What we know about each other often vastly outstrips what we are willing to talk to each other about or what it’s morally or socially permissible to talk to each other about.
Observation: What we know about each other often vastly outstrips what we are willing to talk to each other about or what it’s morally or socially permissible to talk to each other about.
This information might be
…embarrassing
…psychologically distressing
…a source of conflict
…legally regulated
…otherwise private
Case 1: Don’t bring it up!
Rose and Theo were recently on opposite sides of a heated and confidential faculty meeting about whether to hire Steve. When they next meet each other in order to discuss Rose’s latest paper, they gingerly avoid talking about Steve or the search.
Problem: When we interact, we normally rely on our joint beliefs in order to coordinate with each other. But when we jointly know something that we don’t want to talk about, we need shared strategies for managing this information.
Problem: When we interact, we normally rely on our joint beliefs in order to coordinate with each other. But when we jointly know something that we don’t want to talk about, we need shared strategies for managing this information.
A and B jointly/commonly believe that p iff
(1) A and B believe that p,
(2) A and B believe that (1)
(3) A and B believe that (2)…
(Lewis 1969, Stalnaker 2002)
Some tools
A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.
p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly believe that they accept that p for the sake of c.
A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff they accept that p is common ground for the sake of c.
(Stalnaker 2002, cf. 2014)
A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.
p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly believe that they accept that p for the sake of c.
A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff A accepts that p is common ground for the sake of c.
(Stalnaker 2002, cf. 2014)
The “playing ground” of the conversation; target of our speech acts; what we principally rely on in order to coordinate.
A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.
p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly believe that they accept that p for the sake of c.
A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff A accepts that p is common ground for the sake of c.
(Stalnaker 2002, cf. 2014)
A is “taking it for granted” or “treating it as background.”
A accepts that p for the sake of a conversation c iff she acts as if p for the sake of c.
p is common ground in c just in case A and B jointly believe that they accept that p for the sake of c.
A presupposes that p for the sake of a conversation c iff A accepts that p is common ground for the sake of c.
(Stalnaker 2002, cf. 2014)
A can accept p when she doesn’t believe p.
A can fail to accept p when she believes p.
Joint beliefs
Common ground
Common Ground
(for c)
Joint
beliefs
Common Ground
(for c)
Common Ground
(for c)
Joint
beliefs
Common Ground
(for c)
Joint
beliefs
Pretense
Simple conversation
Assuming
Ignoring
Some speakers, S…S*, are not acknowledging p in a conversation c iff
(a) S…S* jointly know that p
(b) S…S* are not presupposing that p in c
Non-Acknowledgment
P as an open secret in a group g iff:
(a) p
(b) there is a social norm, rule, or agreement in g requiring
members of g to act as if not p (for the sake of all interactions in g).
(c) If p is an open secret in g, then it’s an open secret in g that (b).
Open secrecy
P as an open secret in a group g iff:
(a) p
(b) there is a social norm, rule, or agreement in g requiring
members of g to act as if not p (for the sake of all interactions in g).
(c) If p is an open secret in g, then it’s an open secret in g that (b).
Open secrecy
Factivity: if it’s an open secret that Kyle is a sexual harasser, then Kyle is a sexual harasser.
P as an open secret in a group g iff:
(a) p
(b) there is a social norm, rule, or agreement in g requiring
members of g to act as if not p (for the sake of all interactions in
g).
(c) If p is an open secret in g, then it’s an open secret in g that (b).
Open secrecy
Note that this includes but extends beyond acceptance for the sake of a conversation.
P as an open secret in a group g iff:
(a) p
(b) there is a social norm, rule, or agreement in g requiring
members of g to act as if not p (for the sake of all interactions in
g).
(c) If p is an open secret in g, then it’s an open secret in g that (b).
Open secrecy
Secures iteration principle!
If p is an open secret in g, then it’s an open secret in g that
p is an open secret in g.
“Meta-silence” (Zerubavel 2006)
Open secrecy iteration principle
P as an open secret in a group g iff:
(a) p
(b) there is a social norm, rule, or agreement in g requiring
members of g to act as if not p (for the sake of all interactions in g).
(c) If p is an open secret in g, then it’s an open secret in g that (b).
Open secrecy
If you can’t or won’t conform to the open secret norm for p in some context c, then do not treat p as common ground in c.
Meta-norm
Don’t treat it as conversational background!
Simple open secrecy
p: Harvey sexually harasses his employees.
p is an open secret.
Evidential open secrecy
p: There’s evidence that Harvey sexually harasses his employees.
Merely moral open secrecy
p. It’s wrong to sexually harass your employees.
(Where, Smith sexually harasses his employees is not also an open secret.)
how the iteration works
Rose and Theo know that it’s an open secret in their firm that (p) their boss, Harvey, sexually harasses his employees.
They don’t presuppose that p. But they also don’t presuppose that they’re not presupposing that p because p is an open secret.
Rose and Theo know that it’s an open secret in their firm that (p) their boss, Harvey, sexually harasses his employees.
They don’t presuppose that p. But they also don’t presuppose that they’re not presupposing that p because p is an open secret.
They might presuppose that not p or that they don’t know whether p.
Violations
“We don’t talk about Harvey’s creepiness around here.”
“Nia was being really vague with you about Harvey because she didn’t want to reveal to you that he’s a sexual harasser.”
You can’t explain the norm to newcomers or recalcitrant members without thereby violating the norm!
Violations
“We really need to revisit our norm around talking about Harvey. It’s not good for the community.”
You call for renegotiating the norm without violating the norm itself!
Violations
“You’ll get in trouble if you keep talking about that.”
“Your pay is being docked for talking about you-know-what.”
You can’t sincerely explain why you’re socially sanctioning a violator of the norm without thereby violating the norm yourself!
Not a violation
“It’s not true that Harvey is a creep.”
“Your pay is being docked for your unprofessional rumor-mongering.”
compare and contrast�mere exclusion norms
Exclusion agreements
In a committee meeting, Rose and Theo agree that for the purposes of hiring, they won’t take into account where someone received her PhD.
Not a violation here (but would be under open secrecy)
“As a reminder—please don’t draw attention to the fact that Steve has a Harvard PhD. We agreed to exclude that kind of information from our deliberations.”
“We need to rethink this agreement.”
compare and contrast�no-go zones
No-go zone
Theo and Rose jointly know that Rose has cancer. But Rose doesn’t like to acknowledge it at work.
A violation here (but wouldn’t be under open secrecy)
“What are you talking about, Harvey?
Rose doesn’t have cancer.”
how the meta-norm works
P as an open secret in a group g iff:
(a) p
(b) there is a social norm, rule, or agreement in g requiring
members of g to act as if not p (for the sake of all interactions in g).
(c) If p is an open secret in g, then it’s an open secret in g that (b).
Open secrecy
If you can’t or won’t conform to the open secret norm for p in some context c, then do not treat p as common ground in c.
Meta-norm
Not a violation of the meta-norm
At a party, Theo and Rose are in earshot of Harvey, who is currently aggressively hitting on an employee. Theo and Rose work together to slowly move towards Harvey (and so hopefully protect the employee). They don’t acknowledge what they’re doing.
One can successfully mean, and communicate, something without entering it onto…the common ground.
Camp 2018 53
Not a violation of the meta-norm
Rose tells her female employee, “I’d stay away from Harvey if I were you.” In context, she is insinuating that Harvey is a sexual harasser. She intends for her insinuation to bypass the common ground and so not accept or presuppose what she insinuated.
Big question: Why do we comply with open secrecy norms, even when it should be obvious that they’re morally perverse?
If we can understand that, we will learn more about why groups “turn in a blind eye” or “remain in denial” about wrongdoing within the group
Big question: Why do we comply with open secrecy norms, even when it should be obvious that they’re morally perverse?
1. We’re afraid of retaliation from other group members.
Big question: Why do we comply with open secrecy norms, even when it should be obvious that they’re morally perverse?
2. We think the perpetrator, whom the open secret protects, didn’t do anything wrong. So, we don’t think the open secrecy is perverse.
Big question: Why do we comply with open secrecy norms, even when it should be obvious that they’re morally perverse?
3. We think that that perpetrator did do
something wrong but that the open secret
is justifiably protecting her privacy. So we
think that we ought to comply with the open
secret.
Big question: Why do we comply with open secrecy norms, even when it should be obvious that they’re morally perverse?
FUN COMBO!
4. We’re “really” conforming out of fear
of retaliation. But we tell ourselves that we
believe that open secrecy is norm is justified,
since that’s more psychologically bearable.
why think we’re conforming due beliefs about privacy?
What people say
“Don’t air our dirty laundry.”
“You need to be discrete.”
“I don’t do gossip.”
The “Going to Vegas” phenomenon
People are most willing to talk about open secrets in contexts where privacy norms are globally relaxed or regularly flouted. These include:
risqué or edgy joking
drunken conversations
highly intimate gossip sessions
Reactive attitudes
Even someone who knows that she knows that Harvey is a sexual harasser and believes that she ought to warn others may feel shame or guilt and that she is committing a pro tanto wrong against Harvey. She may also conform to the meta-norm.
A modest prescription
If you genuinely want to undermine an open secret norm on p, do not insinuate that p. That still reinforces the meta-norm and so presupposes the open secrecy. Say p explicitly!
Why should I care?
Questions?
Emails always welcome:
berstler@mit.edu