Using big data to tackle corruption in public procurement: �an auto-ethnography of a collaboration between academia, institutions, and journalism
Grant Agreement number: 101038790 — CO.R.E — ISFP-2020-AG-CORRUPT�This paper was funded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund — Police�The content of this paper represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.
Alessio Cornia and Dimitri Bettoni
Dublin City University
2023 Global Investigative Journalism Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, 21 Sept. 2023
CO.R.E. project
The CO.R.E (COrruption Risk indicators in Emergency) project focuses on assessing the risk of corruption in public procurement during emergency times, when the normal public procurement rules do not apply. The main aim is to develop and validate a replicable procedure for computing a Composite Indicator (CI) of corruption risk in public procurement in a time of emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
The CI is intended at enhancing earlier detection of corruption risk and fostering a stronger evidence base for policy reform, by serving primarily anti-corruption authorities and law enforcement agencies, but also journalists and the general public/citizenship, for accountability objectives.
The Consortium
Partner name | Type | Country | Expertise |
University of Perugia (UNIPG) | University | Italy | Social statistic and administrative law (focus on anti-corruption) |
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC) | University | Spain | Interdisciplinary (focus on anti-corruption) |
Dublin City University (DCU) | University | Ireland | Journalism (studies and engagement with industry) |
Transparency International Portugal �(TI Portugal) | NGO | Portugal | Anti-corruption activism and research |
Info.nodes | NGO | Italy | Anti-corruption activism, data journalism |
Oficina Antifrau de Catalunya (OAC) | Anti-corruption authority | Spain | Investigating corruption and fraud in PP |
Fondazione Centro Studi Villa Montesca (FCSVM) | Research body specialised in support for EU projects | Italy | Technical support |
CO.R.E. project pipeline
Data & Privacy Policies�PP principles
Mathematical/statistical �models�computational �development
Data visualisation
Project
Management
Journalism�& CS feed
Journalists’ perspectives
Two stages of involvement:�
The Composite Indicator
The CI will enable relevant stakeholders such as journalists, activists, NGOs, policy-makers, anti-corruption agencies and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to conduct analysis, investigations, assessment and studies on corruption that go beyond the reliance on perception-based indicators and that can be applied in emergency situations.
The Elementary Indicators (red flags) 1/3
Elementary indicators | Description – Focus on… | Motivation – Consider at risk… |
1. Winning rate across the crisis | Companies that were awarded contracts in the relevant economic sector (CPV) more frequently after the emergency outbreak | Exceptional increases of competitive power (in terms of proportion of awarded contracts) over the emergency |
2. Awarded economic value across the crisis | Companies awarded higher value contracts in the relevant economic market than before the emergency | Exceptional increases of competitive power (in terms of economic value) over the emergency |
3. Contract economic deviation across the crisis | Deviation of the contract actual execution economic value from its initial awarded value, with reference to standards in the relevant economic sector (CPV) | Contracts that undergo a significant increase of the actual amount paid |
4. Contract length deviation across the crisis | Deviation of the contract actual execution duration from its stated/expected duration, with reference to CPV standards | Contracts that undergo a significant increase of their length |
Gnaldi, M., & Del Sarto, S. (2023). Measuring corruption risk in public procurement over emergency periods. arXiv preprint
Elementary indicators | Description – Focus on… | Motivation – Consider at risk… |
5. Excess of �concentration in the winners’ distribution | For each issuer, whether the distribution of winners exhibits an increase of concentration on a restricted group of companies | Authorities that award most of their contracts to a restricted group of companies over the emergency outbreak |
6. Award communication default across the crisis | Increases in the rate of contracts for which contracting authorities have not communicated the award data to Anticorruption Authorities | Contracting authorities that worsened their communication duties over the emergency outbreak |
7. One-shot opportunistic companies over the crisis | Companies that were awarded one or more contracts, without winning in years before the emergency | Companies that show a "one-shot opportunistic behaviour" |
8. Lengthy contracts | Post-emergency, contract duration is significantly longer than the overall d contract duration in the same CPV | Post- emergency contracts whose duration is not justified by the nature of the crisis |
The Elementary Indicators (red flags) 2/3
Gnaldi, M., & Del Sarto, S. (2023). Measuring corruption risk in public procurement over emergency periods. arXiv preprint
Elementary indicators | Description – Focus on… | Motivation – Consider at risk… |
9. Inconsistent companies across the crisis | Awarded companies that radically change their sector of activity after the emergency outbreak | Companies winning contracts after the emergency that are not consistent with their activity sector (CPV) |
10. Inconsistent contract objects across the crisis | Contracts with sub-objectives incoherent with the overall stated emergency context | Contracts including elements in their object field (i.e., TVs for hospitals) incoherent with the main contract object identified by the CPV (i.e., supply of screening tests) |
11. Pre-existing contracts modified after the crisis | Authorities/companies that have at least one pre-existing contract (called before the emergency) which has been modified after the emergency outbreak | Authorities/companies with existing contracts (before the emergency) that are modified after 6 months from the emergency outbreak |
The Elementary Indicators (red flags) 3/3
Gnaldi, M., & Del Sarto, S. (2023). Measuring corruption risk in public procurement over emergency periods. arXiv preprint
How journalism feeds CO.R.E.
CO.R.E. Data Visualisation Dashboard
A web platform that enables journalists, activists, citizens and any other interested actor, to navigate the public procurement data analysed within the CO.R.E. project through the lenses of the Composite Indicator and its elementary indicators.
Currently under development, the dashboard produces interactive visualisations, and provides for an intuitive and preliminary although limited overview of the project results.
CORESOI R package
The coresoi R package consists in software codes, a user guide, and other tools to enable journalists, researchers, LEAs and anti-corruption authority to apply the Composite Indicator and the elementary indicator to their own datasets.
Salvini N, Del Sarto S, Gnaldi M (2023). Coresoi: measuring Corruption Risk in Emergency. doi:10.5281/zenodo.8013258
https://www.core-anticorruption.eu/
CO.R.E.: collaborative, multi-stakeholder, interdisciplinary
A focus group and a survey conducted with the project partners were the methods used to explore the challenges and the opportunities associated with the cross-border and cross-field nature of the collaboration at the basis of the CO.R.E. project.
In particular, we investigated the specific goals and expectations of each partner participating in the project, analysed their level of homogeneity/divergence, and explored how these have possibility changed during the course the project activities and how they have shaped the functioning, and sometimes the malfunctioning, of the project.
The discrepancy between initial expectations and what is actually possible to realise became more evident once the consortium started detailed discussions about how much access to the data could be granted to journalists, how the dashboard could be navigated, and how the feedback of journalists could be included in the design of the indicators…
The inclusion of journalists’ perspective was particularly supported by those partners who were more familiar with the journalistic professional cultures. The integration of journalists' skills, needs and wishes was achieved through specifically designed activities included in certain work packages and translated into formal project deliverables.
Thank You
We need you!
We want to further collect feedback on the indicators and tools developed within the project. To participate in the testing and feedback phase and use the tools in your work, please reach out to us.
Dimitri Bettoni�dimitri.bettoni@dcu.ie