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Using big data to tackle corruption in public procurement: �an auto-ethnography of a collaboration between academia, institutions, and journalism

Grant Agreement number: 101038790 — CO.R.E — ISFP-2020-AG-CORRUPT�This paper was funded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund — Police�The content of this paper represents the views of the author only and is his/her sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.

Alessio Cornia and Dimitri Bettoni

Dublin City University

2023 Global Investigative Journalism Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, 21 Sept. 2023

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CO.R.E. project

The CO.R.E (COrruption Risk indicators in Emergency) project focuses on assessing the risk of corruption in public procurement during emergency times, when the normal public procurement rules do not apply. The main aim is to develop and validate a replicable procedure for computing a Composite Indicator (CI) of corruption risk in public procurement in a time of emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

The CI is intended at enhancing earlier detection of corruption risk and fostering a stronger evidence base for policy reform, by serving primarily anti-corruption authorities and law enforcement agencies, but also journalists and the general public/citizenship, for accountability objectives.

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The Consortium

Partner name

Type

Country

Expertise

University of Perugia (UNIPG)

University

Italy

Social statistic and administrative law (focus on anti-corruption)

Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)

University

Spain

Interdisciplinary (focus on anti-corruption)

Dublin City University (DCU)

University

Ireland

Journalism (studies and engagement with industry)

Transparency International Portugal �(TI Portugal)

NGO

Portugal

Anti-corruption activism and research

Info.nodes

NGO

Italy

Anti-corruption activism, data journalism

Oficina Antifrau de Catalunya (OAC)

Anti-corruption authority

Spain

Investigating corruption and fraud in PP

Fondazione Centro Studi Villa Montesca (FCSVM)

Research body specialised in support for EU projects

Italy

Technical support

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CO.R.E. project pipeline

Data & Privacy Policies�PP principles

Mathematical/statistical �models�computational �development

Data visualisation

Project

Management

Journalism�& CS feed

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Journalists’ perspectives

Two stages of involvement:�

  • Interviews
    • Interviews were held with individual journalists, media organisations and NGOs based in Italy, Spain, and Ireland, which focus their reporting activities on corruption and other financial wrongdoings. Aimed to explore how journalists investigate corruption, their use of indicators and data on public procurement, and feed the theoretical work behind the creation of the CI.
  • Testing and feedback
    • A workshop and individual interviews will be the base for collecting thoughts and feedback on the practical outputs of the project: the Coresoi R package and the data visualisation dashboard.

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The Composite Indicator

The CI will enable relevant stakeholders such as journalists, activists, NGOs, policy-makers, anti-corruption agencies and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to conduct analysis, investigations, assessment and studies on corruption that go beyond the reliance on perception-based indicators and that can be applied in emergency situations.

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The Elementary Indicators (red flags) 1/3

Elementary indicators

Description – Focus on…

Motivation – Consider at risk…

1. Winning rate across the crisis

Companies that were awarded contracts in the relevant economic sector (CPV) more frequently after the emergency outbreak

Exceptional increases of competitive power (in terms of proportion of awarded contracts) over the emergency

2. Awarded economic value across the crisis

Companies awarded higher value contracts in the relevant economic market than before the emergency

Exceptional increases of competitive power (in terms of economic value) over the emergency

3. Contract economic deviation across the crisis

Deviation of the contract actual execution economic value from its initial awarded value, with reference to standards in the relevant economic sector (CPV)

Contracts that undergo a significant increase of the actual amount paid

4. Contract length deviation across the crisis

Deviation of the contract actual execution duration from its stated/expected duration, with reference to CPV standards

Contracts that undergo a significant increase of their length

Gnaldi, M., & Del Sarto, S. (2023). Measuring corruption risk in public procurement over emergency periods. arXiv preprint

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Elementary indicators

Description – Focus on…

Motivation – Consider at risk…

5. Excess of �concentration in the winners’ distribution

For each issuer, whether the distribution of winners exhibits an increase of concentration on a restricted group of companies

Authorities that award most of their contracts to a restricted group of companies over the emergency outbreak

6. Award communication default across the crisis

Increases in the rate of contracts for which contracting authorities have not communicated the award data to Anticorruption Authorities

Contracting authorities that worsened their communication duties over the emergency outbreak

7. One-shot opportunistic companies over the crisis

Companies that were awarded one or more contracts, without winning in years before the emergency

Companies that show a "one-shot opportunistic behaviour"

8. Lengthy contracts

Post-emergency, contract duration is significantly longer than the overall d contract duration in the same CPV

Post- emergency contracts whose duration is not justified by the nature of the crisis

The Elementary Indicators (red flags) 2/3

Gnaldi, M., & Del Sarto, S. (2023). Measuring corruption risk in public procurement over emergency periods. arXiv preprint

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Elementary indicators

Description – Focus on…

Motivation – Consider at risk…

9. Inconsistent companies across the crisis

Awarded companies that radically change their sector of activity after the emergency outbreak

Companies winning contracts after the emergency that are not consistent with their activity sector (CPV)

10. Inconsistent contract objects across the crisis

Contracts with sub-objectives incoherent with the overall stated emergency context

Contracts including elements in their object field (i.e., TVs for hospitals) incoherent with the main contract object identified by the CPV (i.e., supply of screening tests)

11. Pre-existing contracts modified after the crisis

Authorities/companies that have at least one pre-existing contract (called before the emergency) which has been modified after the emergency outbreak

Authorities/companies with existing contracts (before the emergency) that are modified after 6 months from the emergency outbreak

The Elementary Indicators (red flags) 3/3

Gnaldi, M., & Del Sarto, S. (2023). Measuring corruption risk in public procurement over emergency periods. arXiv preprint

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How journalism feeds CO.R.E.

  • Examples of journalism-inspired Red Flags as derived from the data collection:�
    • Contract related
      • Multiple contracts with similar value awarded to the same company�
    • Tender related
      • Award criteria consistency�
    • People related
      • Analysis of the social network�
    • Other
      • Geospatial references�

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CO.R.E. Data Visualisation Dashboard

A web platform that enables journalists, activists, citizens and any other interested actor, to navigate the public procurement data analysed within the CO.R.E. project through the lenses of the Composite Indicator and its elementary indicators.

Currently under development, the dashboard produces interactive visualisations, and provides for an intuitive and preliminary although limited overview of the project results.

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CORESOI R package

The coresoi R package consists in software codes, a user guide, and other tools to enable journalists, researchers, LEAs and anti-corruption authority to apply the Composite Indicator and the elementary indicator to their own datasets.

Salvini N, Del Sarto S, Gnaldi M (2023). Coresoi: measuring Corruption Risk in Emergency. doi:10.5281/zenodo.8013258

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https://www.core-anticorruption.eu/

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CO.R.E.: collaborative, multi-stakeholder, interdisciplinary

A focus group and a survey conducted with the project partners were the methods used to explore the challenges and the opportunities associated with the cross-border and cross-field nature of the collaboration at the basis of the CO.R.E. project.

In particular, we investigated the specific goals and expectations of each partner participating in the project, analysed their level of homogeneity/divergence, and explored how these have possibility changed during the course the project activities and how they have shaped the functioning, and sometimes the malfunctioning, of the project.

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The discrepancy between initial expectations and what is actually possible to realise became more evident once the consortium started detailed discussions about how much access to the data could be granted to journalists, how the dashboard could be navigated, and how the feedback of journalists could be included in the design of the indicators…

The inclusion of journalists’ perspective was particularly supported by those partners who were more familiar with the journalistic professional cultures. The integration of journalists' skills, needs and wishes was achieved through specifically designed activities included in certain work packages and translated into formal project deliverables.

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Thank You

We need you!

We want to further collect feedback on the indicators and tools developed within the project. To participate in the testing and feedback phase and use the tools in your work, please reach out to us.

Alessio Cornia

alessio.cornia@dcu.ie

Dimitri Bettoni�dimitri.bettoni@dcu.ie