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Surveillance Tech in Asheville

  • Residents are more aware of the costs and risks of AI-fueled surveillance tech
  • Concerns heard include:
    • Costs - facilities, staffing, budget amendments, and post-grant funding
    • Risks - Constitutional rights, health care access, data protections, and more
    • Data Access - Tech companies, stalkers, and overreaching federal agencies

Slides created by Councilmember Kim Roney

without the use of generative AI

May 2026

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Support from ACLU of North Carolina

  • As part of my due diligence, I reached out to the state and local chapters of the ACLU
  • I shared with the ACLU the publicly-available Flock and Axon agreements as well as the staff memo linked to the April 28th agenda materials.
  • Yesterday, I received a position outlined by Nicole Mance-Foster, Assistant to the Executive Director and Board Administrator for the NC Chapter of the ACLU
  • I immediately submitted the ACLU position to the full Council, City Manager’s office, and City Attorney’s office.
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The ACLU of NC’s Position: Part 1

“Real-Time Crime Centers (RTCCs) are designed to combine data from a wide range of technologies, including cameras, license plate readers, body cameras, and other monitoring tools, into centralized platforms for police departments. Rather than keeping information in separate systems, RTCCs allow police to analyze data in one place and claim to help officers make decisions more quickly and solve crimes more efficiently. Supporters often rely on emotionally charged examples, such as stories about missing children being found through RTCCs, to justify their expansion.

“But these systems raise serious concerns about privacy, mass surveillance, and civil liberties.

Continued…

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The ACLU of NC’s Position: part 2

“Companies like Axon Fusus, which has previously described itself as ‘the most widely used & trusted Real-Time Crime Center platform in U.S. Public Safety,’ allows private security cameras, including Ring cameras, to share footage with local RTCC networks, further expanding police surveillance capabilities.

“Data from Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) is commonly integrated into RTCCs. These surveillance cameras capture, document, and store the license plates of vehicles that pass by, along with the date, time, and location of each scan. The result is a growing database of people’s movements, often shared across regional and national networks. In many cases, this information is retained for years or indefinitely, with few meaningful safeguards to protect privacy rights.

Continued…

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The ACLU of NC’s Position: part 3

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“Flock Safety is one of the most widely used ALPR companies in the United States. As of November 2025, more than 5,000 law enforcement departments nationwide used the company’s systems. Flock in particular has drawn scrutiny after reports showed its data was used by ICE to support the federal government’s deportation agenda, including enforcement tactics that subvert due process.

“Communities across the country, including Hillsborough and Durham, are pushing back against ALPRs and RTCCs. These technologies do not just track people suspected of serious crimes. They collect information on everyone who uses public spaces, building massive databases that reveal where people live, work, travel, worship, seek healthcare, and participate in political activity.

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The ACLU of NC’s Position: Part 4

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“Taken together, ALPRs and RTCCs represent a broader trend toward the automation and expansion of policing, often with little regard for constitutional rights or meaningful public oversight. The growing integration of cameras, data-sharing systems, and real-time analytics dramatically increases the potential for abuse and expands the ability of police to monitor nearly every aspect of daily life.”

The ACLU of NC position states awareness of that Asheville has titled it’s Real Time Crime Center a Real Time Intelligence Center, as well as awareness of the Sheriff’s existing RTIC.

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The Electronic Futures Foundation: Part 1

I also reached out to staff at the Electronic Futures Foundation.

Their recommendation focused on our contracts, or lack thereof since we do not have one in advance of the Axon vote tonight: “When a city is asked to buy surveillance technology, elected officials and community members should review both the city contract and the vendor’s terms and conditions. The city contract usually sets out the formal structure of the deal: the parties, the term, the cost, the incorporated exhibits, and the basic rules for amendment, audit, acceptance, renewal, and termination. It is also where to look for whether the city preserved meaningful public-sector control.”

Continued…

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The Electronic Futures Foundation: Part 2

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“Vendor’s terms, master service agreement, and attached policies often contain the rules that govern how surveillance will actually work in practice. Those documents may define:

  • What counts as city data;
  • What the vendor may do with the data;
  • How features can change over time;
  • What confidentiality rules apply;
  • How incidents are handled; and
  • What barriers the city will face if it later tries to narrow or end the system.”

Continued…

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The Electronic Futures Foundation: Part 3

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“That is why the key question is not just, ‘What are we buying?’ It is also, ‘What permissions, dependencies, and control relationships are we authorizing?’ A contract that incorporates platform terms, service agreements, and implementation materials may do far more than approve a purchase. It may connect the city to a broader data ecosystem, normalize ongoing vendor control over public safety infrastructure, and make future expansion feel administrative.”

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State & Federal Override

  • Staff requested this funding instead of other, documented capital needs
  • We have tremendous demand for additional Helene recovery funding instead
  • Even with community concerns, common sense requests for regulation & oversight, and promises by electeds to reinstate an advisory committee to provide community oversight, it has become abundantly clear that collection of the data in the first place is the ultimate risk. Why?
    • For-profit, AI-based surveillance tech companies are very difficult to regulate
    • The State of NC prevents cities from withholding data
    • The federal government has recent practices of violating 4th amendment rights of citizens across the United States.

All of these override any policies or practices designed to protect the constitutional rights of the people who live, work, and visit in Asheville.