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Economics of Digital Ad Identity

Garrett Johnson, Assistant Professor

Questrom School of Business, Boston University

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About me

  • Assistant Professor of Marketing, Questrom School of Business (Boston U)

  • Economics of ad identity expert
    • Dissertation research
    • 2020 Marketing Science publication

  • Award-winning researcher examining digital privacy (GDPR) & digital ad effectiveness (ghost ads)
    • Paul Green Award winner

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Agenda

  • What is the value of cookies?
  • What does advertising look like without cookies?
  • How can privacy & modern advertising coexist?

Prof. Johnson - Digital Marketing Analytics

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What is the value of cookies?

(In the status quo)

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What work do cookies do?

  • Cookies allow for cross-site, digital ad identity
  • Digital ad identity powers 3 key value generators:
    • Targeting
      • Behavioural targeting including retargeting
      • Database match
      • Ad frequency & reach management
    • Measurement
      • Ad effectiveness measurement
      • Cross-site attribution
    • Automation at scale
      • Optimization & deployment loop

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Literature review: Value of a cookie estimates

Study

Data

Method

Outcome

Estimate

Goldfarb & Tucker (2011)

9,596 ad campaigns

Natural experiment (e-Privacy Directive)

User purchase intent (surveyed)

65%

Beales & Eisenach (2014)

2 ad exchanges +

"significantly diversified [company] operating multiple Internet-based enterprises"

Regression adjustment

Exchange/ publisher price

>66%

Johnson, Shriver, & Du (2020)

Ad exchange

(10K+ advertisers, publishers)

Regression adjustment

Exchange price+

Publisher, SSP, DSP, Advertiser

52%

Marotta, Abhishek, & Acquisti (2019)

large, multi-site publisher

Augmented inverse probability weighting

Publisher revenue

4%

Google (2019)

(Ravichandran & Korula)

Google top 500 publishers

Experiment

Publisher revenue

52%

UK CMA Report (2020)

Google study's UK users

Experiment

+subsampling + imputation

Publisher revenue

70%

(Upper bound)

Notes: Value estimates measure loss in e.g. price without a cookie. Industry studies in grey. †Marginal effect estimates for new cookie (Figure A-1).

Studies:

Goldfarb, A. & Tucker, C. (2011). Privacy regulation and online advertising. Management Science.

Beales, J. H. & Eisenach, J. A. (2014). An empirical analysis of the value of information sharing in the market for online content. Technical report, Navigant Economics.

Johnson, G., Shriver, S., & Du, S. (2020) Consumer privacy choice in online advertising: Who opts out and at what cost to industry? Marketing Science.

Marotta, V., Abhishek, V., & Acquisti, A. (2019). Online tracking and publishers’ revenues: An empirical analysis. Working paper.

Ravichandran, D., & Korula, N. (Google 2019) "Effect of disabling third-party cookies on publisher revenue" (Original blog post here)

UK Competition and Markets Authority "Online platforms and digital advertising market study" Appendix F

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  • Ad effectiveness fell 65% after 2002 e-Privacy Directive in EU
    • Measured using purchase intent through ad surveys

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Study

Data

Method

Outcome

Estimate

Goldfarb & Tucker (2011)

9,596 ad campaigns

Natural experiment (e-Privacy Directive)

User purchase intent (surveyed)

65%

Strengths

Limitations

  • Published, peer-reviewed
  • View of "post-cookie" world
  • No revenue figures
  • 20 years old

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  • Ads without cookies have >66% lower prices
    • All else equal: User OS, devices, browser, language, media type, ad position, ad size
  • Older cookies fetch higher prices

Study

Data

Method

Outcome

Estimate

Beales & Eisenach (2014)

2 ad exchanges +

"significantly diversified [company] operating multiple Internet-based enterprises"

Regression adjustment

Exchange/ publisher price

>66%

Strengths

Limitations

  • Revenue/prices
  • 2 ad exchanges+
  • Industry study
  • Attention to detail lacking

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  • Opt-out users have 52% lower ad exchange prices
    • All else equal: Ad placement, day, hour, user browser & region, past categories browsed
  • Drop is roughly proportional for: advertiser spend, DSP cut, exchange cut, SSP cut, & publisher revenue

Study

Data

Method

Outcome

Estimate

Johnson, Shriver, & Du (2020)

Ad exchange

(10K+ advertisers, publishers)

Regression adjustment

Exchange price+

Publisher, SSP, DSP, Advertiser

52%

Strengths

Limitations

  • Published, peer-reviewed
  • View of ad tech revenue funnel
  • Measures opt-out impressions (vs cookieless)
  • 1 ad exchange

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  • Ads without cookies have 11% lower publisher revenues
    • All else equal: Date, hour, DSP, website, advertiser, user audience
    • Another model (not included) says 4% lower publisher revenue

Study

Data

Method

Outcome

Estimate

Marotta, Abhishek, & Acquisti (2019)

large, multi-site publisher

Augmented inverse probability weighting

Publisher revenue

4%

Strengths

Limitations

  • Premium publisher
  • "Preliminary Draft", not peer-reviewed
  • Raw difference is 37%
    • Ads w/ cookies: $1.18 CPM
    • Ads w/o cookies: $0.74 CPM

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  • Publisher revenue 52% lower without cookies
    • Measured using an experiment
    • News publishers worse off: 62% less revenue without cookies

Study

Data

Method

Outcome

Estimate

Google (2019)

(Ravichandran & Korula)

Google top 500 publishers

Experiment

Publisher revenue

52%

Strengths

Limitations

  • Randomized experiment
  • Top publishers
  • Industry study ("Don't be evil")
  • Some detail, not a lot

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  • Reanalyze Google experiment data
  • Publisher revenue at most 70% lower without cookies
    • Removed users without cookies (e.g. Safari & Firefox), which are immaterial for the value of a cookie
    • Accounted for missing unsold impressions (by adding 0s)

Study

Data

Method

Outcome

Estimate

UK CMA Report (2020)

Google study's UK users

Experiment

+subsampling + imputation

Publisher revenue

70%

(Upper bound)

Strengths

Limitations

  • Regulator study
  • Thorough
  • Cookies only shut off for Google, not the rest (e.g. other DSPs)

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Additional evidence

  • CMA report also cites 3 UK publishers who document [50-60%], [50-60%], & [70-80%] lower revenue from Safari/Firefox users (relative to Chrome or rest) due to lack of 3rd-party cookies
  • 2020 Facebook experiment: "more than a 50% drop in publisher revenue" without personalized ad ranking
    • Setting: Facebook Audience Network, restricted to mobile app install ads
  • Miller & Skiera (2017) further show older cookies are more valuable, as they accumulate more information
  • Bidswitch "Programmatic Insights 2019" report: Ads to matched (identifiable) users have "2x higher eCPMs" than unmatched (non-identifiable) users. Also, Chrome has "1.8x higher eCPMs" than Safari

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Ad identify increases ad revenue by

2X-3X

(In the status quo)

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What does advertising look like without cookies?

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Market will adjust & money will flow—or will it?

  • Brand advertisers: Cling to premium publishers
    • Want cross-site reach & frequency
  • Direct advertisers: Some will reduce spend
    • Want consumer intent, ad measurement, attribution, & optimization
  • So, ad revenue pie will shrink, and will be divided more unequally
    • Case studies of "flight to safety": NYtimes.com increased EU revenue post-GDPR, NPO (Dutch) increased revenue
    • How does a worse product affect an industry? See post-secondary education revenue post-COVID

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Context

Sign-in

Walled gardens

The birds

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Context

  • Not all context is valuable
    • General vs. niche content: General & news content does worse (Goldfarb & Tucker 2002; Ravichandran & Korula 2019)
    • Differences by niche content: The "sperm whale" problem
    • Valuable niche content may lack sufficient scale to retain value
  • Benefits publishers that offer scale & brand-safe premium
  • Context must compete with sign-in & walled gardens

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Sign-in: Hashed email identifier solutions

  • Provides identity solution to advertisers
    • Better: Cross device ID
    • Worse: Lower scale
  • Winners / losers based on 1st party data relationships
    • Publishers: Requires trusted relationship with users
    • Advertisers: DTC have customer emails, CPG do not
    • Creates barrier to entry for advertisers & publishers
  • Tension over coordinating identity solution: More publisher control over audience, less value creation in total
  • Irony: Cookie (pseudonymous) replaced by e-mail (PII), albeit with consent

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Walled gardens: the rich get richer

  • Both will be hurt by limiting 3rd-party conversion tracking
    • "In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king"
  • Facebook: ~40% of display spending
    • Cross-device identity
    • Scale: Facebook + Instagram
    • Ease of use: Substantial value from long tail advertisers
  • Google: ~40% of digital ad spending
    • Cross-device identity among logged-in users
    • Scale: Search + YouTube + Google Display Network
    • Multi-product offering: Data-sharing, in-house attribution, one-stop shop for advertisers

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A matter of perspective...

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How can privacy & modern advertising coexist?

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FLOC

TURTLEDOVE

SPARROW

DOVEKEY

PARROT

PTEROSAUR

TERN

PETREL

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Audience of 1 is not enough

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Advertisers want to reach audiences

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Advertisers want to measure clicks

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Advertisers want to measure conversions

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Advertisers want to retarget recent visitors

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Advertisers want to measure reach & frequency

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CONTROL

TREATMENT

Advertisers want to run experiments

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CONTROL

TREATMENT

Conclusion: Identity solves every use case (!)

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TENSION

PRIVACY

Measurement

& Targeting

(De)centralization

Competition

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FLOC

TURTLEDOVE

SPARROW

DOVEKEY

PARROT

PTEROSAUR

TERN

PETREL

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Q & A

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