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Changes to the mission manager role in contested and congested environments��29^th ICCRTS, Track 4, paper 063�September 2024

Rune Stensrud, Sigmund Valaker and Per A. Langeland(*)

The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller, Norway

* PhD student

Changes to the mission manager role due to barriers of C2. How to weight risk and the need of communication /coordination?

Based on earlier work on 5th generation air C2 (ICCRTS 2020).

In earlier presentation, we explored how the commander's delegation of decision-making authority to the fighter aircraft pilot, could be influenced by current 5th generation fighter aircraft technology.

We are discussing the challenges (due to different place and time dilemma) and what the C2 system needs to do (delegation decisions), as well as some more detailed questions pertaining to implementation, how this could be done.

We suggest ways in which these options will alleviate critical barriers to future C2. We will also illustrate our logic using a tactical collaboration case as well as indicate potentials for experiment designs. Implications for theory, further research and practical implications will be indicated in the discussion.

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Outline of presentation

Background

Mission manager often holds the responsibility coordinating critical defence elements
Challenge: mission manager in different place and time as the subordinates

Theory

Nuancing C2 agility theory
Coordination theory

Case

Method:

Development of plays

Discussion

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Background and research question

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Challenge

Nuancing C2 agility theory
Mission command not detailing ways of coordinating

Research question:

What characterize plays that could ensure coordination when the mission manager is in a different place and/or time than his forces?

We suggest ways in which plays will alleviate critical barriers to future C2.

A tactical collaboration case and potentials for experiment designs.

Implications for theory, further research and practical implications.

Direct access not possible due to a lack of communications (deliberate radio silence or due to opponent).

Compression of levels may not provide a quick enough turn around.

Autonomy successful completion of the mission but at the cost of a direct control.

As mentioned, in the article we propose a framework for potential future options for the mission manager role. We suggest ways in which these options will alleviate critical barriers to future C2. We will also illustrate our logic using a tactical collaboration case as well as indicate potentials for experiment designs. Implications for theory, further research and practical implications will be indicated in the discussion. We examine the research question: What are the future options for the mission manager role– and what decision support (requirements playbooks/plays) do such a role need?

Findings from earlier research:

Direct access might not be possible due to a lack of communications or outright radio silence.

Compression of levels may still not provide a quick enough turn around, in addition to the above issue, which could lead to a loss of operational effect

Autonomy allows for the successful completion of the mission (operation effect) at the cost of a loss of direct control, militarily but perhaps also politically.

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Theory

Mission manager role and barriers to traditional C2

considerations of the decision-making and the communication

Delegation may provide efficiency, as suggested by Simon, but it may lead to wrong decisions and to detrimental consequences to coordinated action (Lanaj et al., 2013)

How to achieve robust C2 and C2 agility at the same time as ensuring coordination?

Coordination theory – a dilemma between viewing coordination work

as planned standardized actions, versus
the lived reality of what participants do when infrastructure breaks down (Fenema, Kumar & Pentland, 2009)

Cybernetics, organization theory and dynamc decision making includes the study of feedback, and derived concepts.

the need for requisite variety in C2 (Ashby, 1956)

Plays that have the required resolution to handle external and internal dynamics and complexity

Beyond seeing standardization as only relevant in stable conditions (Wagner, 2023)
Plays that support the required complexity and dynamics

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Endeavor Space

(STO-TR-SAS-143, Fig.2-14)

Theoretical background and dilemma:

Coordination theory – a dilemma between viewing coordination work

as planned standardized actions versus the lived reality of what participants do when infrastructure breaks down (van Fenema, Kumar & Pentland, 2009)

Restrictions on information sharing is not a new aspect of C2, it is at the core of using strategic resources such as submarines and special operation forces, and delegation could be done using mission type orders which states a broad intent and tasks, e.g. orders that are being considered for use as part of distributed operations. This method of control is also known as mission type command.

With 5th generation aircraft, the ability to acquire a better situation awareness may surpass what has been technologically possible before. This suggest not a fundamental change away from the use of mission type command, but more considerations of the decision-making and the communication surrounding it.

Cybernetics includes the study of feedback, and derived concepts such as communications, command and control (C3). Control can be reactive, thus based on feedback. The main requirement for feedback control systems is to achieve a certain desired performance (temporal response and ability to follow a reference) and robustness (stability and ability to suppress interference). In these respects, organizations representing the variety of its environment is better at controlling it (Ashby, 1956). Cybernetics (or system theory) outline the need for requisite variety in C2.

Delegation theory presents ways of handling competing demands and complexity. Prior organizational research on delegation have primarily focused on how delegation influence the efficiency of the organization. Herbert Simon (1947) suggested that delegation, which he links to decentralization, could be done to save time for the manager in terms of both the time it takes to make decisions, as well as the time to communicate about the decisions. Secondly, he suggested that subordinates may hold the best information about the facts, and thirdly Herbert Simon argued that the subordinates may be the best to coordinate their own work and therefore delegation would be appropriate in many situations. Delegation may provide efficiency, as suggested by Simon, but it may lead to wrong decisions and to detrimental consequences in a wider strategic perspective. (Lanaj et al, 2013)

In article we are citing Brehmer; tradeoff of tight and loose command and control e.g. mission command and harmonizing of efforts. Critical arguments; “Double edge sword of decentralization, Lanaj et al., 2013).

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Framework

Pre-scripted plays

That mitigate asynchrounous distributed interaction with mission manager
Codify plays/set of plays for delegation options

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Traditional C2

C2 Agility theory

Pre-scripted-Plays

C2

Mission command (utilising new technology)

Delegation of decision rights
No	Yes

Traditional C2

C2 Agility theory

Plays

C2

Mission command (utilising new technology)

Delegation of decision rights
No	Yes

Time-place matrix	Same time	Different time
Same place	Face-to-face interaction	Asynchronous interaction
Different place	Synchronous distributed interaction	Asynchronous distributed interaction

We adopt our delegation framework in the context of factors that are characteristic of C2 models and challenges with Play C2. We use time and place. i.e. synchronous interaction / async interaction to codify plays/playbook for delegation options. Ellis et al. (1991,p.41) Time and Place Matrix. O’Neill et al. (2024c) present a mapping of Plays C2 Approach (O’Neill et al., 2021) expanding the Integrated-Process-Value model of SAS-065 (Alberts, Huber & Moffat, SAS-065 CCRP,2010) and C2-“cube” of SAS-085.

Stensrud, Mikkelsen &Valaker, 25thICCRTS, “5th generation fighter aircraft and future command and control: A note on some possible changes,” 2020

Most military organizations combine traditional C2 and C2 Agility theory. We simplify our delegation framework in the context of factors that are characteristic of C2 models and challenges. We use two categories: availability of direct communication and the degree to which the delegation of decision rights is assumed.

“The question is how to manage this process, how to achieve a jointly optimised blend of socio and technical and create the kind of agility and self-synchronisation that modern forms of command and control promise.” (Walker, et al., 2009)

How do we utilize and unleash new technology potential?

Traditional C2 there will be hierarchy, direct communication. C2 agility on the other hand, assumes delegation of decision rights and direct communication (that is when we assume this is the best C2 option). A third quadrant show a situation when C2 is problematic due to no direct communication, and when decision rights is not delegated (example; cyber contested environment). The last quadrant, however, show the situation when there is delegated decision rights and no direct communication (during the execution phase – silent mission). There is reasons to believe that new technology may operate best with some degree of autonomy. It is the last quadrant we are going to talk about today. Expanding the discussions regarding situations where information sharing is not desired or is uncertain.

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USE CASE

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Use Case: Defending critical infrastructure

Air and navy teams with a mission of jointly striking a target fast approaching critical infrastructure
The air entities are able to use their sensors to detect a target
Naval entities can be used to strike the target
Opponent anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability suggest that the mission is facing a fleeting congested and contested environment
Restrictions to their communication and the need to use stealthy modes in order to succeed

Mission manager temporarily not available to enact coordination functions

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Photo credit: The Norwegian Armed Forces

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Case: Transfer of Tactical Control (TACON)

Air-sea mission (ICCRTS 2020 og 2021)

«A mission commander is responsible for leading and coordinating various aspects of a mission, often in military or aerospace contexts..»

Challenges (different place and time) - what the C2 system needs to do (delegation decisions), as well as some more detailed questions pertaining to implementation, how this could be done

Example: Use Case, Analysis

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Selected mission:

# 17

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Selected mission:

# 17

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Selected mission:

# 17

The C2 chain can invoke a mission recall, but the downside of silent running is that the asset cannot confirm the recall if is requested.

In addition the asset may not be able recieve a recall if it is outside communication range, illustrated by the dotted lines.

Together with the checklist, the mission recall node gives rise to three potential ways for the mission to be aborted.

A successful mission recall, which returns the asset to standard control where it may be used for other missions.
A checklist failure, which returns the asset to standard control once it is outside the silent mission area. It may be used for other missions.
A critical mission timeout, forcing the asset to completely abort, perhaps due to the tactical situation. Here it’s defined as being forced to return without being available for other missions.

One last element that might influence the handover/takeover of control is the dynamic nature of a potential conflict.

[Click]

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Selected mission:

# 17

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Selected mission:

# 17

1.

2.

3.

4.

At each level of command, we thus suggest that the decision to delegate should be informed by several criteria, of which the tactical effectiveness and strategic implications are two of the most important ones. Given a predefined type of mission, some of them may be decided upon by default.

The column flowchart on the left here is a simplified illustration of typical C2, with direct communication.

A governing authority allocates recources for desired missions.
A selected mission is given to an asset.
The mission is planned, with its given mission parameters, like ROE (Rules of Engagement), CDE (Collateral Damage Estimate), etc.
The mission begins and follows outlined mission procedures. Finally a call is made by the tactical controller, based on procedures, whether to give the mission a go or no-go.

In the procedure block, there may be room to expand out to include non-direct control of the asset. One such way could be the inclusion of pre-planned silent running, where the asset is given control of the final call for go/no-go. ‘

[Click]

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Selected mission:

# 17

Mission # 1, 2, 3…n

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Example of possible plays within an air-sea mission

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Play type	Authority	JHQ	Naval HQ	Air HQ	Fighter Jet	Naval vessel
Networked	Centralized	X	X Holds authority	X	X	X
Semi-autonomous Sub-tactical defence elements	Decentralized and centralized	X	X Holds authority	X	(X) In execution, silent parts of the time. May hold (partial) authority during silent periods.	X
Autonomous Sub-tactical defence elements	Decentralized	X	X	X	(X) Only coms in planning. Holds (limited) authority in execution.	(X) Only coms in planning. Holds (limited) authority in execution

Considering escalation control
Built on the characteristic and requirements of each team
Require shared plays

Various plays, dynamic selection of options for Defence Elements (DEs),

X denote communication bidirectionally

*In networked mode bidirectional communication is assumed as being continuous among all entities during the planning and/or execution.

**In the semi-autonomous mode one or more of the entities are in silent running parts of the duration of the planning and/or execution. In this mode a detailed expected timeline for when one or more entities are expected to be silent will need to be in place. Additionally, handover takeover procedures to ensure the knowledge of the status of the entity when going in and out of silent mode, may be needed.

***In the autonomous mode one or more of the entities are in silent running throughout the whole planning and/or execution. Preferably static targets may be prosecuted based on third party sensor information, due to lack of update during mission. Given the lack of communication between the types of entities (e.g. F-35 cannot communicate with the naval vessels) the type of entities may need to operate in different sectors and deconflict. As a consequence, authority may be split between types of entities. Preferably the authority should then be split so that one type of entity have the authority to engage certain targets, and another type of entity has the authority to engage other targets (e.g. in another sector).

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Detailed explanation air-sea plays

Autonomous mode:

One or more of the DEs are in silent running throughout the whole planning and/or execution
Given the lack of communication between the type of entities may need to operate in different sectors and deconflict
As a consequence, (limited) authority may be split between types of DEs

Networked mode:

Bidirectional communication among all DEs during the planning and/or execution

Semi-autonomous mode:

Selected DEs in silent running parts of the duration of the planning and/or execution
Pre-scripted timeline when DEs are expected to be silent
Handover-takeover procedures to ensure known status of the DE when going in and out of silent mode

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Discussion

We build on O’Neill et al. (2024b) codifying system response along timeframes:

(1) a pre-programmed set of plays, and
(2) a reflexive set of plays operating in the opposite time direction anchored in a future goal

We also make this fit better with human factors (Wickens et al.,2021) and decision-makers' capacity switching between direct and indirect command options

This can be done in several ways, we are only detailing some generic features of the plays

Plays C2 Approach (O'Neill et al,2024c,p.2) can satisfy responsiveness in tactical timeframes, when humans (human-in-the-loop) require additional decision support mechanisms (O'Neill et al., 2024b, p. 3)

The need for coordination may be handled by a certain type of plays
Further research can examine best and least suited plays in different contexts

Self-synchronization i.e., synchronization which emerges from the local interactions of the military units or forces, not imposed from outside (Moffat, 2014, p. 239)

Such synchronization may require detailed shared plays, triggers for plays and agreed timelines

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We build on O’Neill et al. (2024b) codifying system response along two timeframes: (1) a pre-programmed/rule-based/synchronized phase (tactical/ executing timeframe) set of plays (playbook), and (2) a reflexive set of plays operating in the opposite time direction anchored in a future goal (planning timeframe) playbook.(O'Neil et al. ,2024b)

Mapping the C2 functions (mission objectives, allocate decisions and tasks, monitor progress, and adapt) to planning-based decisions and decision-based decision support mechanisms.

We also make this fit better with human factors (Wickens et al.,2021) and decision-makers' capacity. Looking into future contexts, cf. the self-synchronization model (Kalloniatis et al., 2020) and where decision-makers can switch between direct and indirect command options, a Plays C2 Approach (O'Neill et al,2024c,p.2) can satisfy responsiveness in tactical timeframes, when humans (human-in-the-loop) require additional decision support mechanisms(O'Neill et al,2024b,p.3).

Self-synchronization i.e., synchronization which emerges from the local interactions of the military units or forces, and is not imposed from outside. (Moffat, 2014, p-239)

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Conclusion

Plays can be a way of ensuring persistent leadership

In particular in the high dynamic high dependency situations

Where mission commander is in a different place and time

Developing plays may need to take into account:

Requirements of the different teams
Developing shared understanding

General plays can be designed given general criteria:

However, tailoring plays to the specific circumstances may be needed

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Questions and Comments

End of presentation

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References

Alberts, D., Johansson, B. J. E., & Eikelboom, A. (2024). Agile Multi-Domain C2 of Socio-Technical Organizations in Complex Endeavors Operating in a Contested Cyberspace Environment (Technical Report No. STO-TR-SAS-143; pp. 1–250). https://scienceconnect.sto.nato.int/files/1027908.Ashby, W. Ross. (1956). An introduction to cybernetics. J. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.5851
Ellis, C. A., Gibbs, S. J., & Rein, G. (1991). Groupware: some issues and experiences. Communications of the ACM, 34(1), 39–58. https://doi.org/10.1145/99977.99987
van Fenema, Paul C. and Kumar, Kuldeep and Pentland, Brian, Paradigm Shifts in Coordination Theory (February 25, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1349026
Kalloniatis, A., Kwok, H., Oxenham, M., & Unewisse, M. (2020). One ring to rule them all, and through the headquarters bind them: Ai, emergence, and the planning-execution-evaluation continuum in a fifth generation headquarters,. 25, 1–22.

Langeland, P. A. (2024). Need to distinguish between first and second order cybernetics: Excessive regulation affects safety and health (pp. 1–21).
Lanaj, Klodiana, John R. Hollenbeck, Daniel R. Ilgen, Christopher M. Barnes and Stephen J. Harmon. “The double-edged sword of decentralized planning in multiteam systems.” Academy of Management Journal 56 (2013): 735-757.
Moffat, J. (2014). Complex Adaptiv Information Networks for Defence. In Network topology in command and control: organization, operation, and evolution (pp. 216–240). Information Science Reference.

O’Neill, J., & Kingston, G. (2024a). C2 Harmonisation Arrangements for Entities with Heterogeneous C2 Approaches. C2 for Complex Enterprises, p.1-11. 29th-iccrts
O’Neill, J., & Kingston, G. (2024b). Examining C2 Manouevre Agility Responsiveness Requirement. C2 for Complex Enterprises, p.1-6. 29th-iccrts
O’Neill, J., & Kingston, G. (2024c). Plays C2: How to Achieve Network-Centric Warfare with Limited Information Distribution. C2 for Complex Enterprises, p.1-7. 29th-iccrts

Stensrud, R., Mikkelsen, B., & Valaker, S. (2020). 5th generation fighter aircraft and future command and control: A note on some possible changes. 25th ICCRTS.
Stensrud, R., Valaker, S., Haugen, R., & Mikkelsen, B. (2021). Possible consequences for command and control of shifting coordination form: Navigating the murky waters of adverse situations and complex missions. International command and control research and technology symposium.
Valaker, S., & Stensrud, R. (2020). The influence of harmonization levels on multi-domain operations effectiveness: The moderating roles of organizational environment and command and control variety. International Command Control and Technology Symposium. https://www.academia.edu/45184131/The_influence_of_harmonization_levels_on_multi_domain_operations_effectiveness_The_moderating_roles_of_organizational_environment_and_command_and_control_variety
Valaker, S., Lofquist, E. A., Yanakiev, Y., & Kost, D. (2016). The Influence of Predeployment Training on Coordination in Multinational Headquarters: The Moderating Role of Organizational Obstacles to Information Sharing. Military Psychology, 28(6), 390–405. https://doi.org/10.1037/mil0000123
Valaker, S., Stensrud, R., Jenssen, A.-C., Åsen, W., Nyaas, A. R. M., & Andersen, T. (2022). Shifting between coordination forms: The role of competencies and organizational structure. 27th ICCRTS Topic 3, Submission #6, 1–25.

Wickens, C. D., & Carswell, C. M. (2021). INFORMATION PROCESSING. In G. Salvendy & W. Karwowski (Eds.), HANDBOOK OF HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS (1st ed., pp. 114–158). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119636113.ch5

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Development of plays

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Development of plays

Identify and prioritize

proposals of plays

Plan play

development

Carry out play

development

Decide

implementation

Lead and manage the development of operational plays

Support systems and methods

Identify and prioritize proposals of plays

Identify

proposals of plays

Prioritize

play proposals

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Identify and prioritize proposals of plays

Identify

proposals of plays

Prioritize among proposals of plays

Describe play proposals �(top-down)

Describe play proposals (bottom-up)

Research

Questions

(MQL)

play proposals

Increased operational utility

Feasibility / practicability

Implementation of a play

Realization of a play

Cost

Uncertainty

Cost

Morality/ethics/legality

Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) 1

MOE 2

MOE 3

MOE n

Decide planning of play development

Decide further planning

Stop

Further

planning

Military experiences

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Plan play development

Define objectives

Choice of method and activities

Calculate resources

Prepare play development plan

Objective

play proposal

Choice of method

Method

Identify activities
Calculate needed

ressources

Decide implemen-tation

Plan

Stop

Implement

Decide implementation

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Implement and develop plays

Method 1

Method 2

Method 3

Method n

Tools/ methodological basis /frame work

decision

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Implement and develop plays

Method 1

Method 2

Method 3

Method n

Tools/ methodological basis /frame work

Decide

Play develop-ment

plan

One iteration using method x

More than one iteration using method x, y and z

Revision of plays development plan

Decision

Recommended not realized

Recommended realized

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Design considerations

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Design considerations of plays/playbooks (states, conditions)

Example: When the mission manager is not in same place and different time, the forces (tactically) initiate playbooks according to different C2 modalities – we will need a Plays C2 approach adjusted to a set of modes: PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency).

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Building on studies of Langeland (2024) we are making some design considerations of plays/playbooks (states, conditions) adapted different C2 modalities i.e., the modes of regulations in a complex adaptive system (Langeland, 2024, p.5-6). Similar modes of regulation on C2 (PACE) are included in [Stensrud et al. (2023), p.4] where the adaptive system is expanded to a social-technical enterprise (STE).

Table A-1 indicates modes of operation accommodating persistent leadership sustained through the C2 modalities: Primary, Contingency, Alternate and Emergency. Table A-1 shows different phases and domains of regulation, related to the process to be controlled. The table has been created through meta-cybernetic modelling, as Conant & Ashby (1970) did when they recognized that a good regulator in a system must be a model of this system.

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Modes of operation Attributes	4b Manual mode	4a Primary automation mode	3 Alternate automation mode	2 Contingency automation mode	1 Emergency fully auto-mated node	References
Situation domain	Simple	Simple (asymptotic stable)⁽**⁾	Complicated	Complex⁽*⁾	Chaotic	Snowdon & Boone (2007) ⁽*⁾Nyquist(1932)Perrow (1984)
Type of control	Open loop	Feedback control (world state reported to controller)	Feedforward control (estimated world state)	Feedback & feedforward control	Feedback & feedforward, with a goal generator by ethics*	Conant & Ashby (1970) *Ashby (2020)
Input management	Actuation	Target	Prediction	Reflexive & predictive (goal-driven)	Reflexive, predictive,& adaptive (goal-generation by intrinsic values*) – AI/ML)	Moffat (2014); *Maslow(1969)
Output management	Command (promulgation)	Control	Reflexive (plan-based)	Command & control (goal-driven)	Adaptive command,& control (goal-generation by intrinsic values*)	Conant & Ashby (1970) Ashby (2020) *Maslow (1969)
Language and leadership	Semiosis <enact<	Syntactic <transfer<	Syntactic <Predictive transfer<	Semantic <translate<	Pragmatic <transform<	Carlile (2004)
Reason for Action	Do the things	Do things right	Do planned things right	Do right things	Greater good*	*Maslow (1969)
Performance driven by	Skills	Rules	Information (intel)	Knowledge⁽*⁾	Intrinsic values**	Rasmussen (1983) Stacey (2003) *Maslow (1969)
Decision-making	Act*	Decide*	Orient*	Observe*	Sense	*Boyd (1976, 1995)