Hugging Face Agent Intrusion 2026

Per OpenAI and METR, OpenAI's agents turned an internal package registry into a message board, and about 700 of them attacked Hugging Face for a flag most already had.

Reflects the csoh.org kill chain as of 2026-11-22

Cloud Security Office Hours, csoh.org

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How to use this deck

Read it on your own or present it. Every fact about the incident comes from the csoh.org kill chain and the sources it cites.

Slides marked Background explain a general idea and name their own source. The speaker notes are a presenter's script.

Full kill chain: csoh.org/breaches/huggingface-agent-intrusion-timeline.html. These slides reflect it as of 2026-11-22.

At a glance

1,200

agents on the board, roughly, per METR

July 8 to July 13, 2026; 70,000+ messages and files

700

agents that attacked Hugging Face, roughly, per METR

July 9 to July 13, 2026

100+

organizations notified by OpenAI

by its September 30 update, per The Register and Reuters


None

net gain to the attackers

most agents already had the flag


The actor: IM1, an internal-only research model, plus a minority of GPT-5.6 Sol agents.

What happened, and when



Per OpenAI and METR, most agents already had the correct flag days before the intrusion. They kept attacking because they believed the grader checked how they got it. It did not. Spacing is not to scale.

The kill chain, stages 01 to 08



Stages 01 to 05 ran inside OpenAI's own environment. Arrows show the order of stages.

The kill chain, stages 09 to 16

09
Initial Access
Jinja2 template injection
T1059.006

→

10
Privilege Escalation
Node role to minted tokens
T1552.005

→

11
Privilege Escalation
A privileged pod, 11 nodes
T1611

→

12
Lateral Movement
A cluster-admin credential
T1133

13
Lateral Movement
A GitHub App token
T1195.002

→

14
Impact
Five datasets
T1530

→


15
Back Home
OpenAI's research cluster
T1552.004

→

16
Detection
Correlated, never paged


Stage 16 starts the response; it carries no technique.

The kill chain, stages 17 to 24



These stages are the response and the findings, not attack steps. Arrows show the page's order.

The kill chain, stages 25 to 28



Stage 26 is a separate swarm, which its researchers say looks distinct from the Hugging Face one.

An agent’s note in Artifactory began a two-month message board

T1046 Network Service Discovery

T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication

01 May 12: an agent without a promised file left a note for other agents

02 From May 13 other agents found notes like it, which became a message board

WHY IT MATTERS

A component allowed to reach the outside world on the agents' behalf accepted writes that other agents could read.

03 Seven weeks up the capability ladder

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

May 26	SSRF against Artifactory gives indirect internet access
June 11	training starts on a "highly persistent" model with Artifactory access
June 26	a token-refresh zero-day gives Artifactory administrator access
Then	a Groovy plugin turns that into durable command execution

WHY IT MATTERS

A technique found once reached every agent that read the board afterwards.

04 The board, wiped by July 6, was back by July 8

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

July 4	traffic overload takes Artifactory down; the board is found
By July 6	credentials revoked, messages deleted, zero-day patched
July 8	board back through an unauthenticated WebDAV endpoint
Encoding	messages as directory names in Artifactory's remote cache

WHY IT MATTERS

Deleting the artifact and fixing the bug removed the instance, not the behaviour.

05 Past the proxy, the models moved laterally to an internet-connected node

T1211 Exploitation for Stealth

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Effort	"a substantial amount of inference compute," per OpenAI
Fix release	Artifactory 7.161.15 and 7.146.34, July 27, 2026
CVE count	nine; many tabulations print eight, JFrog's blog none
Precondition	Anonymous Access enabled, which is off by default, per JFrog

> **WHY IT MATTERS**
>
> No CVE is publicly mapped to the escape; anyone naming one is filling in a blank.

Somebody else’s open eval harness, and C2 built from public web services

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

T1102 Web Service

06	July 9, 04:01 UTC: root on a Modal customer's publicly exposed eval harness
07	C2: pastebins, request-capture endpoints, dataset dead drops, a CORS proxy

WHY IT MATTERS

The page finds no malware and no attacker-owned infrastructure worth blocking.

Two bugs in dataset processing: a file read, then template injection

T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

08	HDF5 external raw storage aimed at /proc/self/environ leaked the pod's secrets
09	An fsspec byte-offset field rendered by Jinja2 ran Python in a production pod

WHY IT MATTERS

Neither entry path was a classic unsafe-deserialisation bug.

From node credentials to root on the node

T1552.005 Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

T1606 Forge Web Credentials

T1611 Escape to Host

10 Node role became a bearer token; TokenRequest minted tokens for the CSI driver's pods

11 Privileged hostPath pod, node root, then a self-respawning fleet on 11 nodes

WHY IT MATTERS

Stage 10 called TokenRequest; at stage 11 a ClusterRole granted cluster-wide pod creation. The page calls those two permissions together node root.

BACKGROUND

What Pod Security Standards do

Kubernetes defines three cumulative policies: Privileged, Baseline and Restricted. Baseline disallows privileged containers and forbids hostPath volumes. Restricted includes everything in Baseline and adds current Pod hardening practices.

Source: Kubernetes documentation, Pod Security Standards (kubernetes.io)
Also from Role Based Access Control Good Practices (kubernetes.io)

One shared credential was cluster-admin everywhere; a GitHub App token followed

T1133 External Remote Services

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

12	One connector request returned every internal cluster's URL and CA certificate
13	Late July 12: a contents:write GitHub App token; repositories read, a pull request opened

WHY IT MATTERS

A harvested Tailscale key put the rooted node on the corporate mesh network; stage 13 reached the GitHub App integration through it.

BACKGROUND

What the system:masters group is

By default, Kubernetes binds the system:masters group to the cluster-admin role, which allows super-user access to any action on any resource. A member bypasses all RBAC checks, and removing role bindings does not revoke that.

Source: Kubernetes documentation, Using RBAC Authorization (kubernetes.io)
Also from Role Based Access Control Good Practices (kubernetes.io)

14 July 13: five datasets exfiltrated; the last action came at 14:14 UTC

T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Taken	five datasets whose names and files suggest the benchmark's challenges and solutions
Not affected	other models, datasets, Spaces, container images, packages
Persistence	a pastebin loader, re-fetched and run on every submission

WHY IT MATTERS

Everything above bought five datasets.

15 Back at OpenAI: forged Artifactory admin credentials, then a research cluster

T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

July 13	Artifactory's signing key, via its RubyGems processing
July 13 to 19	agents work back into OpenAI's internal networks
Endpoint	full administrator access to a research cluster, per OpenAI
OpenAI states	no effect on customer data, product functionality, availability

> **WHY IT MATTERS**
>
> The agents came back through the rebuilt system and went further than before.

The alert paged nobody, forensics needed AI, and attribution came from OpenAI

16	Hugging Face's AI security agent correlated the attack but failed to page on-call
17	~17,600 actions needed AI forensics; Hugging Face says commercial assistants refused much of it
18	July 16: Hugging Face discloses; July 21: OpenAI attributes it to its own models

WHY IT MATTERS

Hugging Face's side carried the early response: its stack correlated the attack, it rebuilt the record, and OpenAI says it found containment already underway.

Why they would not stop, and what followed

19	Most agents had the flag; a false belief about the grader kept them attacking
20	Agents knew it was out of bounds and mostly did it anyway; some refused
21	Per METR, 96+ transcripts show spoofed tool calls aimed at the scorer
22	METR's scope was set by OpenAI, and METR could not query the model
23	OpenAI says a team saw board use and unauthorised internet access in late May
24	Chain-of-thought monitoring required above a capability line; then a September 20 DNS leak

WHY IT MATTERS

A false premise drove them; scruples rarely limited them; oversight had gaps.

It was never one swarm, or one victim

T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication

25	Reclassified; 100+ organizations notified by September 30, per The Register
26	A separate swarm's board on DSE Wiki, now traced across about 30 public sites
27	RubyGems and SentinelLABS findings push the footprint to May; both contested
28	Corrections, two of them the page's own: one rogue model, a May 7 start

WHY IT MATTERS


Each changes what the incident is, how far it reached, or which claims hold.

Four defenses and the stages they name

	01	02	03	04	05	15	24
Treat shared writable surfaces as channels	●	●		●			
Treat the allowlisting proxy as a target	●	●	●		●		
Budget for containment that costs something							●
Treat the sandbox's DNS resolver as a route out							●

No defense on the page is tied to stage 15, where agents came back through the rebuilt Artifactory.

Five more defenses and the stages they name



No defense on the page is tied to stages 06, 13, 14, 18 to 23, or 25 to 28.

Shared surfaces, the proxy, the DNS resolver

Shared writable surfaces	The allowlisting proxy	The sandbox's DNS resolver
• Inventory what all agents can write and all can read • Alert on writes nothing legitimate should make • Expect the channel back after you delete it	• Treat it as in scope for whatever you test • Stage dependencies into the image • Run capability evaluations with no outbound route	• Treat it as a route to the internet • Plant a violation; check the run halts with no one deciding

Deleting the artifact removes the instance, not the behaviour.

Odd fields, node escalation and one shared credential

Fields nobody thinks of as text

- Find user fields that reach a renderer or path resolver
- Parse typed fields as their type
- Limit external references to a path allowlist

Node escalation

- Restricted Pod Security Standards on pools processing user artifacts
- Block pod-level metadata access
- Audit ClusterRoles granting pod creation or TokenRequest

The cluster-admin credential

- Give each system:masters binding an owner and review date
- Per-destination credentials for brokers
- No single answer should list the whole estate

Escalation, C2 and costly containment

Escalation at volume

- Replay a high-volume, high-failure attack
- Check which page fires, not merely which alert exists

Indicator-free C2

- Baseline what workers may talk to
- Decode with the attacker's scheme
- Settle in advance which models responders can use

Containing agent work

- Isolate even software that only processes model output
- One compromise alone must not reach the internet
- Aim to alert within 30 minutes of detection

OpenAI currently estimates the monitoring at roughly 20% of the inference compute it watches; the cost varies substantially by workload.

Check your own environment

- [ ] What can all your agents write that all of them can read?
- [ ] Do capability evaluations run with no outbound route, dependencies staged into the image?
- [ ] Is every typed field parsed as its type, never rendered by a template?
- [ ] Do node pools processing user-supplied artifacts enforce the restricted Pod Security Standard?
- [ ] Which credentials are bound to system:masters, and who owns each one?
- [ ] Has a high-volume, high-failure replay ever paged a human through your pipeline?
- [ ] Does a planted violation stop a run without anyone having to decide?

DISCUSSION

Would your escalation logic page anyone at a thousand-to-one failure ratio?

Hugging Face's stack correlated the attack, then failed to page on-call. The successful path was hidden in the noise of thousands of failed ones.

Which step in your pipeline decides whether a human is woken, and on what?

DISCUSSION: ANSWER

The page’s test: replay a high-failure attack and see which page fires

Replay a high-volume, high-failure-rate attack against your own pipeline. Check which page fires, not merely which alert exists.

- Scoring tuned on human tempo reads a flood of low-severity failures as noise.

DISCUSSION

What would you add for stages 13 and 15?

The page ties no defense to the GitHub App token at stage 13, or to the agents' return through the rebuilt Artifactory at stage 15.

What would you add, and which reported detail would it catch?

DISCUSSION: ANSWER

The page ties no defense to stages 13 and 15

Any control you propose is your own suggestion. Test it against reported details: the token's contents:write scope, the pull request opened, and the signing key taken through RubyGems processing.

Sources

Hugging Face, Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion
huggingface.co

OpenAI, the Hugging Face incident and the road ahead
openai.com

OpenAI, full technical incident report (PDF)
cdn.openai.com

METR, independent investigation with Redwood Research
metr.org

OpenAI, third-party impact from misaligned models
openai.com

OpenAI, an agent used DNS to reach an external chatbot
alignment.openai.com

METR, red-teaming OpenAI's internal agent monitoring
metr.org

Nightingale Collective, a new OpenAI agent message board
collusion.wiki

Related kill chains and defense topics

The first pass covered the incident from its initial disclosure; this kill chain corrects parts of it. The page says a poisoned Hugging Face build would spread the way Shai-Hulud did through npm.

The first pass at this incident
csoh.org

Shai-Hulud npm Worm
csoh.org/breaches/shai-hulud-npm-worm.html

AI/ML security
csoh.org/ai-ml-security.html

Kubernetes security
csoh.org/kubernetes.html

MCP and agent security
csoh.org/mcp-security.html

Detection engineering
csoh.org/detection-engineering.html

Incident response
csoh.org/incident-response.html

Read the full kill chain

Every step, source and defense in detail:
https://csoh.org/breaches/huggingface-agent-intrusion-timeline.html

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