Preventing anthropogenic biorisk –�Paths and levers to impact diagrams
By Sam Hilton
DRAFT – not yet written up for sharing
Note: please download to view (does not display well in Google Docs)
MISSUSE
ACCIDENT
Accidental release
Lab escape
Dangerous research
happens (non-malicious)
Does research
Individuals
Laboratory
Provides tools
DNA provider
Misuse
Dangerous research happens (deliberately)
Deliberate attack or use of bio weapons etc
Publishes research
Publisher
Funds research
Funder
Hostile state
Hostile state
Terrorist
Has influence
Transnational orgs
Countries
Global disaster
Has influence
Regulator
Our influence
Philanthropists
Think tanks / NGOs
Individuals
RESEARCH
USE
1. Actors on the path to disaster
Laboratory
MISSUSE
ACCIDENT
Accidental release
Dangerous research
happens (non-malicious)
Education. Community norms. Code of practice. Culture. Etc.
Whistleblowing. Ethics committees. Certification. Etc.
Misuse
Dangerous research (deliberate)
Deliberate attack / weapon use
Publishing standards. Certification. Ethics committees. Etc
Culture of ethics. Add costs (taxes, insurance). Etc.
International agreements. Prevent arms races. Expand BWC remit. Diplomacy. Exchange programs. Etc
Has influence
Strengthen BWC. Better UN policy. Response & investigation plans. Etc
Global disaster averted
Has influence
Provide funding. Etc.
Policy research. Policy activism. Etc.
Activism community. BSL4 nimbyism. Etc
RESEARCH
USE
Bans on types of research. Regulator. Regulation. Fines. Data sharing. Etc
DNA screening. SecureDNA. Redteaming. Etc
2. Ways to influence
Lab safety / security / transparency requirements. Close labs.
Safeguarding. Non-proliferation. Anti-radicalisation schemes. Scientist security clearances. Etc.
Risk identification and plans. Set up regulators, oversight, etc
MISSUSE
ACCIDENT
Accidental release
Lab escape
Dangerous research
happens (non-malicious)
Does research
Individuals
Laboratory
Provides tools
DNA provider
Misuse
Dangerous research happens (deliberately)
Deliberate attack or use of bio weapons etc
Publishes research
Publisher
Funds research
Funder
Hostile state
Hostile state
Terrorist
Has influence
Transnational orgs
Countries
Global disaster
Has influence
Regulator
Our influence
Philanthropists
Think tanks / NGOs
Individuals
RESEARCH
USE
1. Actors on the path to disaster
Laboratory