1 of 55

Close air support

Close air support

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Last Update: 21JAN2024

2 of 55

INTRODUCTION

Close Air Support (CAS) is air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

Terminal Attack Control (TAC) is the authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. CAS provides commanders with flexible and responsive fire support. Using CAS, commanders can take full advantage of battlefield opportunities by massing firepower to maintain the momentum of an offensive action or reduce operational and tactical risks. The mobility and speed of aircraft provide commanders with a means to strike the enemy swiftly and unexpectedly. The conditions for effective CAS are: thoroughly trained personnel with well-developed skills, effective planning and integration, effective command and control (C2), air superiority (especially suppression of enemy air defense [SEAD]), target marking and/or acquisition, streamlined and flexible procedures, and appropriate ordnance. Although not a requirement for CAS employment, favorable environmental conditions improve CAS effectiveness.

All participants in CAS are responsible for effective and safe planning and execution. Each participant must make every effort to identify friendly units, enemy forces, and civilians prior to targeting, clearing fires, and weapons release. Combat identification (CID) is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. CID characterizations, when applied with rules of engagement, enable engagement decisions to use or prohibit lethal and nonlethal weaponry to accomplish military objectives. The law of war requires commanders to take all practicable precautions to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force. In addition, the US military’s operating environment is increasingly open to scrutiny. This is particularly true for incidents of civilian casualties. These events are tragic and can have lasting negative operational and strategic effects, such as decisions to restrict future operations.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

3 of 55

INTRODUCTION

The entire idea behind the CAS process is essentially to have a logical conversation about the situation and attack plan with the “guys on the ground.” While there are concrete rules and procedures to executing CAS, it is important to remember the overall goal which is to deliver ordnance on target effectively, safely, and on time. What this all boils down to is knowing “Here’s the situation. Here’s the good guys and bad guys. Here’s how we’re going to kill the bad guys. Cleared hot.”

The 12 Step CAS Process is critical to keeping thoughts organized and the flow moving in a manner that is predictable and well established between controllers and attackers alike.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

4 of 55

INTRODUCTION

BIG PICTURE: The extended CAS planning process is obviously a major operation that takes many different agencies to execute. In keeping with the squadron’s stance on balancing emulated realism with time and life as well as DCS limitations, we focus mainly on the 12-Step CAS process and actual execution of CAS as it relates to us and our airframe. This deck covers everything you will need to know and operations we use specially from the larger picture of real life CAS. This slide simply just illustrates that in reality, there is a lot more going on in the picture then we may simulate with our limited resources in the game itself.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

5 of 55

INTRODUCTION

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

12

STEP

CAS

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

6 of 55

JTAC: Joint Terminal Attack Controller - military asset on the ground that commands the CAS mission. (Can also be a FAC on ground)

FAC(A): Forward Air Controller (Airborne) - military asset in the air that commands the CAS mission.

ABORT (or abort code): Do not release ordnance. Do not engage further until more instruction is provided.

CLEARED HOT: You are cleared to release ordnance on this pass. (Type 1 and 2 control)

CLEARED TO ENGAGE: Permitted to drop ordnance in a Type 3 control setting. Attack aircraft flight leaders may initiate attacks within the parameters imposed by the JTAC. Flight will provide “Attack Complete” to the JTAC on attack completion.

CONTINUE: Authorized to proceed with the attack profile, but you may not release any ordnance yet. Used to acknowledge aircraft without providing clearance to engage.

IN: Used by attacking aircraft to announce they are on final attack heading and ingressing to the point of attack on the target. Made after the “IP INBOUND” call. Can also be given with a baring or cardinal direction. Use “IN FROM THE…”

WINGS LEVEL: A call made from the attacking aircraft that only has seconds left to engage the target before they are beyond weapon employment parameters, but is still waiting on the CLEARED HOT from JTAC/FAC(A). If not CLEARED HOT after WINGS LEVEL call is made, attacking aircraft may need to come off DRY and not release ordnance.

OFF: When an attacking aircraft is egressing away from the target after an attack or recce pass. Should also include a baring or cardinal direction. Use “OFF to…”

OFF DRY: When an attacking aircraft was unable to employ ordnance on designated target on a pass. Use “OFF DRY to…”

“E” or “ECHO” POINT: An offset parameter given in relation from the target area. (More detail later in this deck)

INGRESS POINT (IP): The initial waypoint used when committing to an attack run/pass. The is the area in which a JTAC/TAC(A) expects to see the attacking aircraft originating from.

CONTROL POINT (CP): A waypoint establish to hold CAS aircraft in a stack. These aircraft are awaiting further instruction.

CAS-RELATED BREVITY TERMS

DEFINITIONS

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

7 of 55

BLIND: No visual contact on reference point or target.

VISUAL: Sighting of aircraft or ground position visually.

CAPTURE: Acquiring the target or mark via the targeting pod.

CONTACT: Acknowledges the sighting of a specified reference point (either visually or by sensor).

TALLY: Acknowledgment of sighting a specified target.

NO JOY: Aircrew does not have visual or capture on the target.

MARK IS ON THE DECK: Marking device such as smoke or flare has been employed.

CAS-RELATED BREVITY - MARKING TERMS

DEFINITIONS

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

8 of 55

SPOT: Target is being marked with the laser designator actively and the aircrew should initiate LSS to find the mark. Can be initiated by JTAC or aircrew. Proper response is “CAPTURE” or “NO JOY”

LASER ON: Turn on laser designator to paint/mark the target. Can be initiated by JTAC or aircrew.

LASING: Confirmation that the laser designator is being fired at the target. Initiated by the person who is painting the target.

SPARKLE: Mark the target with an IR pointer. Can be initiated by JTAC or aircrew. Proper aircrew response is “CONTACT” or “NO JOY”

PULSE: The act of turning the IR pointer on and off rapidly to emphasise the beam. Proper aircrew response is “CONTACT”, “STEADY”, or “NO JOY”

SNAKE: The act of moving the IR pointer around on the target emphasis the beam. Proper aircrew response is “CONTACT”, “STEADY”, or “NO JOY”

STOP: Call made by JTAC to order the use of an IR pointer to be turned off / stopped.

CONTACT SPARKLE: The one responsible for finding the IR pointer target will make this call when they find the target / beam.

MATCH SPARKLE: A call made from the one marking a target with an IR pointer. The marker wants the second person to also place their own IR pointer on the same target.

CAS-RELATED BREVITY - LASER/IR BEAM/POINTER TERMS

DEFINITIONS

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

9 of 55

COMBINED ARMS MODULES

Combined Arms DCS Module

The key module to JTACing in DCS is the Combined Arms (CA) module. This module will allow you to control many types of ground vehicles. These vehicles, in addition to their normal movement characteristics and on board weapons, have the ability to lase, sparkle, flare, and smoke for markers. The CA module is old and not well documented. Ensuring you fully understand how the module controls work, vehicles work (they differ depending on type), and using the resources made available to you is critical to your functioning as a JTAC. Ensure you take the time to fully learn the module.

More information here:

https://www.digitalcombatsimulator.com/en/products/other/combined_arms/

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

10 of 55

1 - ROUTING & SAFETY

STEP

1

ROUTING & SAFETY

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

11 of 55

1 - ROUTING & SAFETY

Routing and Safety is given at the beginning and end of every air action.

JTACs/FAC(A)s should immediately advise newly checked-in aircraft of:

  • Other AOS
  • Their callsign
  • Operating altitude and frequency

JTACs/FAC(A)s should be prepared to deconflict assets (e.g., aircraft from aircraft, aircraft from surface fires, and aircraft from known hazards). JTACs/FAC(A)s should advise aircrews of available airspace and desired IP/hold point locations for the attack. At initial aircraft check-in, AO/JTAC/FAC(A) shall respond with, in order: (2) Aircraft Routing/Holding Instructions. Upon initial contact, each controller shall at least give “maintain” instructions to establish control of aircraft.

Air Crew: “Backhand 3, Hawg 1-1, radio check.”

JTAC: “Hawg 1-1, Backhand 3 reads you loud and clear, send posit.”

Communication is established and immediately the JTAC requests the aircrafts location.

The JTAC then instructs where the aircraft can go in accordance with the tactical situation they are dealing with to support the ground force commander.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

12 of 55

Methods of Routing and Safety of Flight

Keyhole and V Diagrams

Keyhole is used when traditional IP’s (Initial points) have not been pre determined. The keyhole, can be the actual target location. From that location with elevation, you can base all your holding areas and altitudes off of those first coordinates.

The illustrated V diagram can be a tool to assign numerous

supporting CAS flights in keyhole and at which altitude you have

allocated them.

When establishing Keyhole, note A,B,C,D represent cardinal

Directions. E, is the Echo point itself. Echo 5 would be a wheel

5 NM miles around the target.

Alpha 5 would be a holding area 5 NMs north of the target.

The distance (5 NMs) is a no closer than understanding.

You may wish to add more data such as “Hold B-10, 5-8”.

1 - ROUTING & SAFETY

E

A

(N)

C

(S)

B

(E)

D

(W)

“Bravo, 5-8k”

10nm

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

13 of 55

Methods of Routing and Safety of Flight

Keyhole and V Diagrams (Continued)

1 - ROUTING & SAFETY

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

14 of 55

14

Initial (IP) & Control Points (CP)

In pre-planned events, IP’s (Initial points and or Control points) may be in effect

.

These are great ways to accept, hold and send aircraft around the AO (Area of Operation).

Initial Points generally refer to an action point where an ingress to attack or move will occur.

Control Points generally refer to designated areas to stack and control aircraft waiting to be brought further into the fight.

In the illustration, note blue circles with unique identifying words.

Aircrew: “Backhand 3, Hawg 1-1 is

passing through Federal.”

�JTAC: “Hawg 1-1, go north and hold between Hunter and Invader block 14-16, call when established.”

1 - ROUTING & SAFETY

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

15 of 55

2 - CAS CHECK IN

STEP

2

CAS CHECK IN

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

16 of 55

2 - CAS CHECK IN

CAS Aircraft Check-In

  1. Aircraft check-in procedures are essential for establishing the required flow of information between the CAS aircrews and control agencies. Controlling agencies should update all CAS assets on the current situation en route to the target. Consequently, it is important for the JTAC/FAC(A) to brief the current situation to the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC/DASC) allowing CAS aircraft to arrive with the most current information available.

  • JTACs/FAC(A)s should be direct about when they want the aircraft checkin. It should flow in a way that makes sense for the JTAC/FAC(A) and won’t disrupt current communication flow unless needed.

  • It is recommended aircraft establish comms as far away as possible in an effort to maximize time on station before they arrive in the AO.

Example

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

17 of 55

17

Abort Code Authentication

If communication is encrypted, the abort code shall be “in the clear”.

No encryption should use a RAMROD or TRIAD. RAMROD is preferred by JTACs as a word is easily remembered and no document of a triad can fall into enemy hands.

2 - CAS CHECK IN

Not commonly used for simplicity reasons but left in should it come up.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

18 of 55

3 - SITUATION UPDATE

STEP

3

SITUATION UPDATE

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

19 of 55

3 - SITUATION UPDATE

The situation report (SITREP) is a tool used to increase all participants’ situational awareness to the level required by the tactical situation at hand. The brief must be missionized based on the JTAC’s/FAC(A)'s expectations of the use of the CAS asset. Elements that can be included are:

  1. Enemy Activity
  2. Surface-to-Air Threat Activity
  3. Friendly Situation
  4. Remarks
  5. Weather
  6. Hazards.

Minimize chatter where possible via omission.

Example

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

20 of 55

4 - GAME PLAN

STEP

4

GAME PLAN

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

21 of 55

4 - GAME PLAN

Method of Control

The method of attack and type of control are separate and independent constructs. The method of attack is an agreement between the supported commander, the JTAC/FAC(A), and the aircraft, regarding the aircrew’s correlation requirement, and is completely independent of the type of control. In CAS, correlation is the process by which the JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates and confirms that the attacking aircrew, and/or a third-party contributor, have acquired the correct target or mark. Correlation is required on each and every CAS attack. Method of attack conveys the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s intent for the aircraft prosecution of the target; either the aircraft will be required to acquire the target “Bomb on Target” (BOT) or not “Bomb on Coordinate (BOC). These two categories define how the aircraft will acquire the target or mark. Any type of control can be utilized with either method of attack and no type of control is attached to one particular method of attack.

BOT and BOC. JTACs/FAC(A)s will state the method of attack, whether BOT or BOC, as part of the game plan prior to the CAS brief. These methods of attack apply to all types of control and all ordnance employed in CAS missions. JTACs/FAC(A)s and CAS aircrews should think of and use these methods of attack as a clear, concise, effective manner to communicate the requirements for correlation from CAS aircraft employing ordnance. Effective use of BOT and BOC constructs to clarify JTAC/FAC(A) and CAS requirements for a CAS engagement will result in more expeditious attacks and help mitigate friendly fire and collateral damage. The misapplication of BOT and BOC in tactical scenarios will often result in confusion between CAS aircraft and JTAC/FAC(A), increased time to kill, and potentially cause friendly fire or collateral damage.

  1. For BOT missions, only the lead aircraft is required to read back Line 4 and Line 6, in conjunction with other required restrictions. All attack aircraft will conduct readbacks if requested by the JTAC/ FAC(A).
  2. For BOC missions, all aircraft delivering ordnance must read back Line 4 and Line 6 from their system or weapon, as appropriate, in conjunction with other required restrictions.

A BOC attack is used when the JTAC/FAC(A) determines that the desired effects can be created against the target with CAS aircraft employing ordnance on a specified set of coordinates. The coordinates must be of sufficient fidelity/mensuration to produce the desired effect on the target and be used for fires approval. If the aircraft is never required to be TALLY/CAPTURED the target or CONTACT the mark, it is a BOC attack. The JTAC/FAC(A) does not need to delay the CAS attack in order to build CAS aircraft awareness to achieve target TALLY/CAPTURE. If a BOC attack is planned based on the tactical scenario, then unnecessary exposure to the threat by CAS platforms is avoided and time is not wasted conducting targeting confirmation. Great care must be taken to ensure that the target location with the required precision and accuracy determined in the commander’s tactical risk assessment is obtained and entered into the weapon/navigation system.

A BOT attack requires that the JTAC/FAC(A)’s intended target or mark is TALLY/CONTACT/CAPTURED by the aircrew. Coordinate accuracy and precision (to include TLE) are not as important as the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s ability to aid CAS aircraft in acquiring the target. Coordinates provided in the attack brief must be of sufficient fidelity to: provide initial cueing to the attacking aircraft and be used for fires approval. If at any point during the CAS engagement, the attack aircrew is required to gain TALLY/CONTACT/CAPTURE the target, it is a BOT attack. This delivery method is advantageous in numerous tactical situations such as mobile target sets; low threat environments that support continuous target observation by CAS aircraft; situations where controllers are not able, or do not need, to generate low TLE coordinates; or when TALLY/CONTACT/CAPTURED by the aircrew. If a BOT attack is planned based on the tactical scenario, then time should not be wasted conducting detailed precision and/or accurate target coordinate generation. In many tactical scenarios suited to BOT attacks, delaying the attack in order to generate a coordinate for BOC employment will increase the time to kill or result in missed targeting opportunities.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

22 of 55

22

Types of Control

TAC is the authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. There are three types of control (Types 1, 2, and 3).

  1. Type 1 Control. Type 1 control is used when the JTAC/FAC(A) requires control of individual attacks and the situation requires the JTAC/FAC(A) to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and visually acquire the target for each attack.

  • Type 2 Control. Type 2 control is used when the JTAC/FAC(A) requires control of individual attacks and is unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft at weapons release or is unable to visually acquire the target.

  • Type 3 Control. Type 3 control is used when the JTAC/FAC(A) requires the ability to provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement subject to specific attack restrictions.

Note: Any change to the type of control should be coordinated in the game plan. Change must be made prior to the “IN” call for Type 1 and 2 attacks and the “COMMENCE ENGAGEMENT” call for Type 3. If a type change is required after these calls, then the JTAC or FAC(A) should abort the attack and rebrief the aircrew.

4 - GAME PLAN

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

23 of 55

23

Additional Notes

  • If the method of attack is BOT (Bomb on Target), The pilot visually acquires the target via eyes or sensors. If BOC (Bomb on Coordinate) the pilot does not need to see the target and is dropping the weapon of the provided coordinates. This means that you do not go to target correlation or verification during a BOC attack. Situation permitting, BOC attacks are useful for times when weather is a major factor in engaging a target.

  • Desired effects allow the pilot to engineer and select the weapon or the JTAC can select the weapon. JTACs should be clear if they want a specific weapon used in the game plan.

  • Intervals allow JTACs to select if both aircraft in a flight attack or just one along with the spacing. Spacing should never be closer than 30 seconds. Pilots may give feedback as they incorporate mutual support between the flight. Interval attacks are especially critical for game plan communication when using rockets / guns or low level attacking.

Example:

JTAC: “HAWG 1-1, this is going to be a Type 2 control, Bomb on Target,

1 by GBU-38 per ship, 1 minute spacing, call when ready 9 line.”

HAWG 1-1: “Type 2, BOT, 1 x GBU-38 per ship, 1 minute spacing, ready 9-line.”

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

24 of 55

5 - 9-LINE CAS BRIEF

STEP

5

9-LINE

CAS BRIEF

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

25 of 55

5 - 9-LINE CAS BRIEF

  • Line 1: IP or BP. The IP is the starting point for the run-in to the target. For RW aircraft, the BP is where attacks on the target are commenced.
  • Line 2: Heading and Offset. The heading is given in degrees magnetic from the IP to the target or from the center of the BP to the target.
  • Line 3: Distance. The distance is given from the IP/BP to the target. For FW aircraft, the distance is given in nautical miles. For RW, the distance is given in meters from the center of the BP.
  • Line 4: Target Elevation. The target elevation is given in feet MSL.
  • Line 5: Target Description. The target description should be specific enough for the aircrew to recognize the target.
  • Line 6: Target Location. In grid coordinates, lat long, from a known point (bearing and distance)
  • Line 7: Mark Type / Terminal Guidance
  • Line 8: Friendlies. Cardinal/sub-cardinal heading from the target (N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, or NW) and distance of closest friendly position from the target in meters (e.g., “South 300”).
  • Line 9: Egress. These are the instructions the aircrews use to exit the target area

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

26 of 55

Type 1 Control Attack Flow

  1. The JTAC/FAC(A) visually acquires the target.

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) passes the game plan and CAS brief to the attacking aircrew.

  • The attacking aircrew validates target / coordinate location by cross-checking that the position is coincident with the expected target area, using all appropriate means.

  • The aircrew will read back Line 4, Line 6, and any restrictions provided by the JTAC/FAC(A).

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) will conduct correlation as required if BOT.

  • Aircrew will provide an “IP INBOUND” call when departing the IP and ingressing to the target via the established attack heading.

  • Attack aircrew will provide “IN” call, indicating entering terminal phase of air-to-ground attack prior to weapons release. The terminal controller may require the CAS aircraft to “Call ‘IN’ with direction” during the remarks/restriction portion of the CAS brief.

(Meaning, Lead calls IP INBOUND, then once rolling in on the target, will call IN.)

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) will visually acquire the attacking aircraft.

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) will analyze attacking aircraft geometry to ensure mission success and reduce the risk of the attack affecting friendly forces and/or collateral concerns.

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) will provide a “CLEARED HOT,” “CONTINUE DRY,” or “ABORT,” based on the above procedures being met.

Note: In the case where aircraft acquisition/analysis by the JTAC/FAC(A) is difficult or impossible,

attack aircraft may be forced to modify their attack profile to aid in acquisition.

5 - 9-LINE CAS BRIEF

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

27 of 55

Type 2 Control Attack Flow

  1. The JTAC/FAC(A) visually acquires the target or acquires targeting data from another asset with accurate real-time targeting information.

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) passes the game plan and CAS brief to the attacking aircrew.

  • The attack aircrew validates target or coordinate location by cross-checking that the position is coincident with the expected target area, using all appropriate means.

  • The aircrew will read back Line 4, Line 6, and any restrictions provided by the JTAC/FAC(A).

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) will conduct correlation as required.

  • Aircrew will provide an “IP INBOUND” call when departing the IP and ingressing to the target via the established attack heading.

  • The attack aircrew will provide the JTAC/FAC(A) with an “IN” call, indicating entering terminal phase of air-to-ground attack, prior to weapons release. Aircrew should make this call at the appropriate time to allow clearance before entering the release window. If a restriction in the form of a direction or final attack heading (FAH) was given in the CAS brief, then it will be included with the IN call. Example: “IN from the South” or “IN heading 360.” All attacking aircraft are required to provide an IN call unless coordinated otherwise.

  • JTAC/FAC(A) will provide a “CLEARED HOT,” “CONTINUE DRY,” or “ABORT” based on the above procedures being met. In the case of a flight conducting attacks together, the JTAC/FAC(A) may elect to either provide a single clearance for the flight or each attack aircraft individually, based upon the tactical scenario.

5 - 9-LINE CAS BRIEF

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

28 of 55

Type 3 Control Attack Flow

  1. The JTAC/FAC(A) visually acquires the target or acquires targeting data from another asset with accurate real-time targeting information.

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) passes the game plan and CAS brief to the attacking aircrew. Briefing should include the following in the remarks and restrictions specifically for Type 3:
    1. Area for attack
    2. Restrictions/limitations
    3. Attack Time Window / Expiration

  • The attacking aircrew validates target location / area by cross-checking that the position is coincident with the expected target area, using all appropriate means.

  • The aircrew will read Line 4, Line 6, and 8 along with any restrictions provided by the JTAC/FAC(A).

  • The JTAC/FAC(A) will conduct correlation on the area / target if required.

  • Once satisfied the attacking aircraft are correlated on the appropriate target(s), the JTAC/FAC(A) will provide attacking aircraft “CLEARED TO ENGAGE” or “Type 3, CONTINUE DRY.”

  • Prior to initial weapons release, the attack aircrew will report “COMMENCING ENGAGEMENT” to the JTAC/FAC(A).

At this point, the attacking aircrew do not need to make further calls the JTAC nor do they need to be cleared hot

on specific targets. They attack and re-attack as needed until the target(s) or area has been cleared and desired effects are complete.

  • JTAC/FAC(A) will continue to monitor the engagement by all means available (visual, voice, digital, etc.). No other communications are required unless directed by the JTAC/FAC(A).

  • The attack aircrew will report “ENGAGEMENT COMPLETE” to the JTAC/FAC(A) at which point the JTAC/FAC(A) will continue on as required back in control.

5 - 9-LINE CAS BRIEF

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

29 of 55

5-LINE (JTAC)

5-Lines are most commonly used for rotary wing assets. 5-Lines are simply a condensed version of a 9-Line which can be employed faster. 5-Lines have their own type of control.

CALL FOR FIRE (NOT A JTAC)

The Call For Fire can be used for all threat conditions by friendly forces on the ground. It does not affect the aircrew tactics in executing attacks. It is used when operating in close proximity to friendly forces the flight lead must have direct communication with the ground forces to provide direct fire support. After receiving the CFF, aircrews must positively identify the location of friendlies and the target before conducting any engagement.

5 - CALL FOR FIRE / 5-LINE CAS

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

30 of 55

6 - REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

STEP

6

REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

31 of 55

6 - REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

REMARKS

The following is a list of remarks that may be included in the CAS brief. The order of the remarks portion of the CAS brief is recommended for a standard, logical flow of information. Only those elements that are applicable and have not previously been briefed should be included.

  1. LTL shall be passed if using ground-based laser designators (in degrees magnetic).
  2. PTL shall be passed if using a ground-based IR pointer (in degrees magnetic).
  3. Desired type/number of ordnance and/or weapons effects can be passed here when not passed in the game plan prior to the CAS brief.

RESTRICTIONS

The following information is always a restriction and should be included if applicable. Additional restrictions are at the discretion of the JTAC/FAC(A). All passed restrictions shall be read back.

  1. Danger close (if applicable and with commander’s initials).
  2. Airspace Coordination Area (formal and informal).
  3. Final Attack headings:
    1. Final attack directions/restrictions are given in sub-cardinal directions or compass heading.
    2. There is often a need to restrict aircraft run-in headings to deconflict with other assets, avoid threat, reduce collateral damage potential, or create desired effects on the target. JTACs/FAC(A)s should choose the least restrictive FAHs possible while still accomplishing the ground commander’s objectives and maximizing target destruction. Over-control should be avoided as it may create unsafe or unrealistic situations for the attacking aircraft.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

32 of 55

7 - READBACKS

STEP

7

READBACKS

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

33 of 55

7 - READBACKS

Though this section is rather to-the-point, the read back of a 9 or 5 Line CAS call is critical to the safety and accuracy of the mission at hand. Not only does it ensure that the attacking aircraft has the correct location of the target, but it confirms that pilot also fully copied the 9 line CAS mission well enough that they acknowledge with the readback. Readbacks must include:

  • Lines 4 (Target Elevation) and 6 (Location) are mandatory for the CAS readback.

  • Line 8 (Friendlies) is also encouraged if the situation calls for it and time permits. Line 8 should be called back whenever there are friendlies in close proximity to the target area.

If time and radio air space permits, additional info is encouraged to be read back. However, Lines 4 and 6 are always required to acknowledge and provide a proper readback.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

34 of 55

8 - CORRELATION

STEP

8

CORRELATION

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

35 of 55

8 - CORRELATION

Target correlation is the process by which the JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates and confirms that the attacking aircraft and/or a third-party contributor have acquired the correct target or mark. Correlation is required on each and every CAS attack.

a. BOC. Correlation is complete when the attacking aircraft correctly reads back lines 4, 6 (from aircraft system or weapon), and restrictions. When using a third party for terminal guidance for a BOC attack, it is still necessary to conduct correlation with that third party.

b. BOT. Depending on the tactical situation, JTACs/FAC(A)s must determine whether the aircrew needs to acquire the target prior to commencing attack run or whether desired effects can be created by employing on an offset from a mark, GEOREF, or TRP. During correlation, the JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates actions to mark the target and/or positions the aircraft to acquire the mark and/or target.

(1) Once the JTAC/FAC(A) is satisfied that the aircrew has acquired the correct target, the JTAC/FAC(A) should transmit “The xxxx is your target.” Aircrew should respond with “TALLY,” “(target/object) CAPTURED,” or “CONTACT,” as appropriate. JTACs/FAC(A)s should strive to include what the target is in this statement, such as “The third vehicle is your target” or “The individual north of the road is your target.”

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

36 of 55

9 - ATTACK PHASE

STEP

9

ATTACK PHASE

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

37 of 55

9 - ATTACK PHASE

Once correlation is complete and mandatory readbacks are complete, the JTAC/FAC(A) may issue a Time on Target (TOT) or soonest TOT.��The aircraft will fly the 9-line as discussed and provided aircraft call in with the remarks and FAH given by the JTAC, they will issue the “Cleared Hot, for weapons release.” “Abort” if parameters are not met.

JTACs/FAC(A)s should compare the distances required by attack geometry, from IP to the target, with the time it will take the CAS aircraft to transit that distance and relate this to the TOT. By developing this timeline, and using aircraft calls to update it, JTACs/FAC(A)s can monitor the CAS attack timeline to ensure effective integration with fire and movement. [Expand]

If no abort code was briefed, then the CAS attack is aborted by simply transmitting, “ABORT, ABORT, ABORT.”

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

38 of 55

Standard Attack Flow

9 - ATTACK PHASE

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

39 of 55

Medium/High Altitude Tactics

Medium/high altitude tactics are flown above approximately 8,000 ft AGL. High altitude bombing can be described as bombing with the height of release over 15,000 ft AGL. These tactics are employed when slant range and altitude can be used to negate local threat systems. For visual deliveries, the local weather conditions must include sufficient visibility and ceilings for the desired/required weapons deliveries to be employed. Terrain must also be considered when selecting employment altitudes. More time may be available for target acquisition, but bombing accuracy with unguided munitions may be degraded.

9 - ATTACK PHASE

PROS

  1. All flight members can continuously observe the target area, marks, and hits from other aircraft.
  2. Lower fuel consumption and increased time on station.
  3. Reduced navigation difficulties.
  4. Improved formation control.
  5. Improved mutual support.
  6. Allows considerable maneuver airspace and allows aircrews to concentrate on mission tasks instead of terrain avoidance tasks.
  7. Communications between aircrews and control agencies are less affected by terrain.
  8. Reduces exposure to AAA and man-portable IR SAMs.
  9. More flexibility in attack axis selection.
  10. Easier timing of TOT.
  11. Improved performance of guided weapons using steeper impact angle.
  12. Improved LGB self-lasing options and targeting pod capture capability.
  13. Increased ability to deconflict aircraft with altitude, in addition to timing and lateral deconfliction measures. Potential to use more aircraft within smaller lateral confines via an aircraft “stack.”

CONS

  1. Enemy acquisition systems can detect the attack force at long range, allowing the enemy to prepare its air defenses.
  2. Requires local air superiority.
  3. May require high weather ceilings and good visibility when using laser guided or other weapons requiring visual target acquisition by the aircrew (may not be a limiting factor when the ground commander authorizes use of IAMs).
  4. May make it difficult for the JTAC to visually acquire the aircraft.
  5. Visual target acquisition can be more difficult from higher altitudes and slant ranges.
  6. Greater potential for reduced accuracy of non-guided weapons attributed to wind effects, pipper placement during visual designations (size of pipper relative to target at high altitude), and increased aim-point errors due to increased slant range.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

40 of 55

Low/Very Low Altitude Tactics

Low/very low altitude tactics are flown below approximately 8,000 ft AGL. Low altitude bombing can be described as bombing with the height of release between 500 and 8,000 ft AGL. Very low altitude can be described as a height below 500 ft AGL. These tactics may be employed when threat system capabilities, weather conditions, or weapon delivery parameters preclude aircraft operating at higher altitudes.

9 - ATTACK PHASE

PROS

  1. Decreases enemy acquisition systems ability to detect the attack force at long range, decreasing the enemy’s time available to prepare its air defenses.
  2. May be used when local air superiority has not been achieved.
  3. May be used with low weather ceilings and poor visibility.
  4. Degrades enemy ground control intercept radar coverage, denying intercept information to enemy fighters, and forcing enemy aircraft to rely on visual or onboard acquisition systems.
  5. May improve target acquisition and accuracy of weapons delivery due to shorter slant ranges at low altitude.
  6. May allow easier assessment of aircraft geometry relative to the target/friendlies during CAS TAC.

CONS

  1. Navigation is demanding and requires a high level of aircrew skill.
  2. Terrain avoidance tasks and formation control become primary tasks, decreasing time to concentrate on mission tasks.
  3. Observation of the target area, the marks, and hits from other aircraft are limited prior to the attack, which increases the difficulty of properly acquiring the target during the attack. This difficulty can be offset by a thorough enhanced target description, which requires more time coordinating and holding between attacks. Some observation of the target may be feasible through magnifying sensors.
  4. Higher fuel consumption and decreased time on station.
  5. Terrain may reduce communications effectiveness between aircrews and control agencies, such as the JTAC due to LOS limitations.
  6. Attack timing and geometry are more critical than in higher altitude tactics.
  7. Exposes aircraft and aircrew to small arms, MANPADS, and AAA.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

41 of 55

React to Fire

When targeted by a surface-to-air threat, the CAS aircrew will execute defensive maneuvers to allow it to survive long enough to egress the threat envelope. The type of defensive maneuver will depend on the type of threat.

  • SAMs: When a SAM is launched against a CAS aircraft, the pilot will execute a break turn and dispense chaff, flares, or active decoys in an attempt to defeat target tracking and/or decoy the missile. The maneuver is designed to force the missile to fly a longer flight path, thus using up energy and ultimately causing it to overshoot and miss the aircraft.
  • AAA: When fired upon by AAA, the pilot will maneuver the aircraft, changing altitude and heading in a 3-dimensional maneuver, called a “jink,” to defeat the bullets already fired by the gunner and complicate further firing solutions. This also causes an increasing slant range, which decreases the gun’s accuracy. The pilot may also dispense chaff to decoy any radar that is providing aiming information to the gun.

JTAC Mutual Support

During wartime, when CAS aircraft have been shot down, it was usually by threats they were not aware of. The JTAC can contribute greatly to the mission’s success by suppressing threats, briefing the CAS aircraft on the threats, and monitoring for threats during the attack. During CAS mission execution, the JTAC/FAC(A) should endeavor to monitor the attacking aircraft and the target area to the extent possible. Depending on the threat level, aircraft may need to expend ordnance on AAA or SAM systems before they can prosecute the required CAS target(s). In general, attacking aircraft will attempt to first avoid known threats, then suppress threats during CAS attacks, and finally, if necessary, kill the threats with the prosecution of an AAA/SAM system as an actual target. The JTAC can provide attacking aircraft with mutual support by providing descriptive communications during threat activity. In the case of a SAM launch, the JTAC should immediately transmit, “(Aircraft call sign), SAM launch,” followed by the launch location in relation to the target. Do not delay the call, since the time of flight of the missile may only be a few seconds. If AAA is observed in or around the target area, then transmit, “(Aircraft call sign), Triple A,” followed by the firing location in relation to the target.

Note: During CAS operations at night, JTACs should be aware that SAM and AAA threats will be easier to see, potentially causing threat activity to be called out that is further away/outside the tactical effective range to attacking aircraft.

9 - ATTACK PHASE

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

42 of 55

Laser Guided Munitions

Laser-guided systems provide the joint force with the ability to locate and engage high-priority targets with an increased first-round hit probability. Laser-guided systems can effectively engage a wide range of targets, including moving targets. Laser-guided systems provide additional capabilities, but also have distinct limitations. Laser operations supplement other CAS procedures and are not substitutes for other planning and execution procedures and techniques. In any laser-designating situation, strive for simplicity and use all available resources to help ensure first-pass success. For off- board laser designation, the JTAC/FAC(A) shall confirm the laser code prior to CAS execution. During execution, the attacking pilot should call “LASER ON” roughly 10-15 seconds before weapon impact. JTAC must reply with “LASING” and begin to lase if not doing so already.

Basic Considerations

There are six basic considerations for using laser spot trackers (LSTs) or laser-guided weapons (LGWs):

  1. LOS must exist between the designator and the target and between the target and the LST/LGW.
  2. Pulse repetition frequency (PRF) codes of the laser designator and the LST/LGW must be compatible.
  3. The direction of attack must allow the LST/LGW to sense enough reflected laser energy from the target for the seeker to acquire and lock onto the target.
  4. The LTD must designate the target at the correct time, and for the correct length of time. If the length of time is insufficient, the seeker head could break lock and the flight pattern of the LGW becomes unpredictable.
  5. The delivery system must release the LGW within the specific LGW delivery envelope to ensure the weapon can physically reach the target. There is an increased hazard to friendly forces when aircrews release weapons behind friendly positions. The final decision to release standoff LGWs from behind friendly positions in a CAS environment rests with the ground commander.
  6. The DCS limitation of any and all lasers is ~8.5nm (15K). Lasers will not track beyond that.

Target Reflection. Most surfaces have a mixture of mirror-like and scattered reflections. Laser energy reflects in an arc, but is strongest at the angle where it would reflect if the surface were a mirror. If the LTD is perpendicular to a surface the reflection can be seen from all angles on the designated side, but can be detected best near the LTL, which is a line from the LTD to the target, usually expressed in degrees magnetic. When the surface is at an angle to the laser designator, the angle of strongest reflection is also predictable. Glass, water, and highly polished surfaces are poor surfaces to designate because they reflect laser energy in only one direction. This requires the seeker to be in this small region and looking toward the reflected energy to achieve target acquisition. Battlefield dynamics will rarely provide the opportunity to perfectly align laser designation/reflectivity in the direction of approaching aircraft or munitions. Strict adherence to laser cones or baskets and center mass target designation will best ensure success. This is not modeled well in DCS but should be considered for realism sake. Of note, lasers may shine “through” some map objects so aim for the base of the object if hits seem close but unsuccessful.

9 - ATTACK PHASE

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

43 of 55

Offset Direction

The offset direction tells the aircrew on which side of the IP-to-target line they can maneuver for the attack. JTACs/FAC(A)s use an offset direction to ease fire support coordination, align the aircraft for the attack or egress, or keep aircrews away from known threats. An offset direction aids fire support coordination by restricting aircrews from using airspace on the side of the IP-to-target line where there might be a conflict with a GTL. The offset direction regulates the attack quadrant without assigning a specific attack heading.

9 - ATTACK PHASE

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

44 of 55

Final Attack Headings

JTACs/FAC(A)s assign attack headings for several reasons: to increase ground troop safety, aid in aircraft acquisition by the JTAC/FAC(A), aid aircrews in target acquisition, mitigate collateral damage, meet laser safety cone attack restrictions, and facilitate fire support coordination. Controllers may employ FAHs/windows that allow aircrews to maneuver on either side of the attack heading. This gives aircrews more flexibility in prosecuting the target while maintaining the required degree of restriction on the aircraft heading. Attack headings also allow RW aircraft to maneuver over terrain or urban sprawl to enhance delivery while remaining survivable. Attack headings/windows might be particularly useful when the attack aircraft are using coordinate-dependent weapons, as it is possible for the weapon’s FAH to differ significantly from the aircraft’s heading. If the JTAC/FAC(A) requires a specific attack heading for the weapon (but not the aircraft), that restriction must be stated clearly when the FAH is passed. JTACs/FAC(A)s must weigh the advantages of issuing an attack heading with the disadvantages of restricting aircraft tactics.

Plot an IP and a target and connect them with a straight line. Specify the offset direction as either right or left. If told to offset right, as in the example above, proceed on or to the right of this line while inbound to the target. Aircrews cannot fly to the left of this line. An offset restriction applies from the time aircrews leave until they release their ordnance or begin egress. Attack headings are not issued when there is no requirement. JTACs should attempt to place as few restrictions as possible on attacking aircraft. Unnecessary or overly restrictive run-in restrictions often increase the time required to attack, decrease the flexibility and survivability of the flight, and increase the likelihood of an aircraft not releasing its ordnance because it was outside of parameters. JTACs should limit restrictions to the minimum required; however, any final attack geometries provided as part of the CAS briefing in the form of headings or directions are by definition “restrictions” and therefore must be read back.

Giving a cardinal heading is also acceptable and allows the attacking pilot to maneuver within 45 degrees of the that cardinal direction. Cardinal headings are preferred if FAH restrictions are needed. Exact headings should only be used when very specific items such as terrain, limited line of sight, or threats are a primary factor.

The following are examples of briefed final attack geometry:

  1. Magnetic heading: “Final attack heading 230.”

  • Magnetic headings with a cone: “Final attack heading 240-300” or “Final attack heading 270 plus-or-minus 30 degrees.”

  • Use of cardinal/sub-cardinal directions: “RAZOR 5-1, BROADSWORD 8-8, make your attack from northeast to southwest.”

  • Use of a geographical reference: JTAC/FAC(A) states “Make all attacks parallel to the road.”

9 - ATTACK PHASE

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

45 of 55

10 - ASSESS EFFECTS

STEP

10

ASSESS EFFECTS

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

46 of 55

10 - ASSESS EFFECTS

Assess Effects of the Attack

Once ordnance impacts the target, the JTAC/FAC(A) must assess whether the commander’s desired effects were created. This assessment will determine whether to continue the attack, provide subsequent corrections, abort sequential attacks, set up a reattack, or issue a new game plan/CAS brief.

  1. Throughout a CAS attack, the JTAC must maintain awareness of the aircraft position, the friendly situation, and the objective area.

  • JTACs should compare the distances required by attack geometry, from IP or HA to target with the time it will take the CAS aircraft to transit that distance and relate this to the TOT. By developing this timeline, and using aircraft calls to update it, JTACs can monitor the CAS attack timeline in order to ensure effective integration with fire and movement.

  • Changes to the friendly situation must be monitored to ensure their fire and movement will remain integrated with the CAS attack timeline. If changes occur, JTACs must weigh their ability to continue, shift, or abort the attack based on the attack timeline.

  • The JTAC must also maintain awareness to the objective area for the timely recognition of changes, such as target movement and/or entrance of non combatants and civilians.

  • TAD Discipline. The TAD net (radio) can become very congested very quickly. All players on a TAD net must use “active listening” and appropriate communications discipline and cadence. Ultimately, the TAD belongs to the JTAC, and the JTAC must control it.
    1. Once an aircraft calls IN, all other calls should be held until after the JTAC has issued weapons-release authority or an abort. An exception to this is that anyone can and should call an abort at any time they deem necessary.

  • Clearance to Drop/Fire. Once the clearance requirements for a particular type of control are met, it is important to pass clearance in a timely manner to give aircrews time to prosecute the attack before release parameters have expired.

  • Abort Procedures. The JTAC/FAC(A) shall direct CAS aircrews to abort if they are not aligned with the correct target, and must abort them if it appears that friendly troops may be endangered, or for the safety of the CAS aircrew.

  • Assess Effectiveness of the Attack. Execute re-attacks or issue new game plans/CAS briefs as necessary. Once ordnance impacts the target, the JTAC must assess whether the commander‘s desired effects were created. This assessment will determine whether to continue the attack, abort sequential attacks, or set up a reattack.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

47 of 55

10 - ASSESS EFFECTS

Reattacks

The aircrew’s goal is to complete a successful attack on the first pass. Reattacks may be required for the following reasons:

  1. Multiple targets remaining in the target area.
  2. Desired effects not created on first attack.
  3. Aircraft reconnaissance/BDA.

JTAC/FAC(A) must authorize all reattacks. JTACs/FAC(A)s authorize reattacks after assessing the need for a reattack, aircraft vulnerability to enemy fire, and probability of success. The JTAC/FAC(A) may provide additional target marks for the reattack and can describe the target location using the last mark, last hit, terrain features, or friendly positions. The reattack may engage other targets within a specific target area as long as PID is obtained or maintained by the JTAC/FAC(A) and/or the attacking aircraft and appropriate coordination is conducted. For any retargeting or attacks on alternate targets, controllers must ensure the affected sorties have appropriate munitions for the desired effects. Additionally, controllers and pilots must ensure appropriate safe distances from friendly forces are considered for any new munitions and fuzes assigned. JTACs and aircrews must ensure follow-on munitions used in immediate reattacks still meet the ground commander’s intent and JTAC restrictions before expending ordnance. For reattacks on the same target area, JTAC/FAC(A)s should use their best judgment as to using the originally passed CAS brief, creating a new CAS brief, or providing a correction off of the last target hit.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

48 of 55

11 - BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

STEP

10

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

49 of 55

11 - BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

BDA

Used to update the enemy order of battle. Accurate BDA is critical for determining whether a target should be re-attacked. In a high-threat environment, BDA may be difficult to judge by the attacking aircraft. There is no simple answer as to who is in the best position to determine BDA. Aircrews and JTACs have different capabilities based on experience, weather, terrain, weapons employment techniques, and enemy actions, when assessing BDA. BDA is crucial in determining mission effectiveness, enemy disposition, and reattack requirements.

INFLIGHT / BDA REPORTS

An IFR is used to give governing agencies such as a AWACS or JSTARS accurate BDA. In CAS (for us in DCS) this is only used if requested by the agency. Standard CAS BDAs are simple communications back and forth with the JTAC and the report below is not required. This is here simply as a solid note for non-CAS operations or if requested coming off a CAS engagement. This is the same standard report used to report strikes and effects on targets in general.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

50 of 55

12 - EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY

STEP

12

EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY

1. ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

2. CAS CHECK IN

3. SITUATION UPDATE

4. GAME PLAN

5. 9-LINE CASE BRIEF

6. REMARKS & RESTRICTIONS

7. READBACKS

8. CORRELATION

9. ATTACK PHASE

10. ASSESS EFFECTS

11. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

12. EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY OF FLIGHT

RE-ATTACK

NEW TARGET

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

51 of 55

12 - EXIT ROUTING & SAFETY

Routing / Safety of Flight

JTACs are responsible for providing routing and safety of flight instructions to aircraft as they egress. This provides safe passage for exiting aircraft, and allows JTACs to maintain a picture of their CAS stack and positions of assets. Routing should include a point and an altitude block that provides deconfliction from other aircraft and fires.

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

52 of 55

CAS EXAMPLE SITUATION 1

EXAMPLE

1

TYPE II

BOT

GROUND BASED LASER

Click to play

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

53 of 55

CAS EXAMPLE SITUATION 2

EXAMPLE

2

TYPE II

BOT

2-SHIP 2 MIN SPACING

Click to play

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

54 of 55

KNEEBOARDS

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY

55 of 55

KNEEBOARDS

FOD’S A-10 COMMUNITY