Anscombe’s Elephants

Intention and Theory In Creative Writing

Ben Porter, M.F.A

 “What’s next? Shall we appoint elephants to teach zoology?” (Meyers v) �

Elephants Teaching Zoology

Walter Benn Michaels

Elizabeth Anscombe

Stephen Knapp

The Problem: Intention and Value in CW

The Problem: Intention and Value in CW

When discussing grading in CW classes, she says that “behind” the language we choose for criteria are “implicit and…unnamed assumptions about what makes good literature.” “Words like “vividness, power, authenticity…” reveal a commitment to value, a notion all “theoretical schools…agree” is inappropriate because, as they argue, there is “nothing intrinsic to any text that [makes] it better than any other.” (Boutler 136) �

The Problem: Intention and Value in CW

She also sees this problem when grading students’ critical responses to their own work. When doing so, instructors are faced with a dilemma. “Do we down-grade a student…because they did appear to realize the meaning of their own writing—or do we reward them for creative writing that works on deeper levels than they were aware?” (ibid) 

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The Problem: Intention and Value in CW

Some creative writers like Cassandra Atherton or Jay Parini argue that the problem is structural, that “theory and practice [tore] apart…when the major creative writers…” stopped being “the major critics.” (Parini 127) To fix this rift, English departments must “stop ‘separating students into streams.’” (Atherton 5) 

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The Problem: Intention and Value in CW

John Parras thinks we should “loosen up the idea of authorship…” (Parras 160) without abandoning it completely. These kinds of solutions see theory as a way of avoiding “authorial tyranny” in the workshop, allowing students to “virtua[ly] suspen[d]...authority…unmooring…[their work] from the intention of the creator…” (ibid)

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Introducing Anscombe's Philosophy

Introducing Anscombe’s Philosophy

We can say Truman is a murderer when we observe (a.) what he knew in acting, and (b.) what happened—the death of innocent people. In this view, describing actions as intentional (murder) or unintentional (an accident) are different forms of description, forms that can be either true or false of what they describe. 

Introducing Anscombe’s Philosophy

In it, the philosopher Graham Hubbs says, Anscombe is “going to look at the way… people talk about intentions, the kinds of inferences they make using the concept of intention, see where things are messy, and then use philosophy to try to clear up the mess…” (Hubbs)

Introducing Anscombe’s Philosophy

• ”Intention” is always oriented to a description of events.
• These events are actions like, “I intend to write a poem,” or “I intended to play a practical joke.” But problems come up when we try to distinguish between these kinds of actions and actions which are unintentional. 

Introducing Anscombe’s Philosophy

To distinguish between the two, she suggests that intentional actions are those to which “the question why is given application,” (Anscombe 5) but a certain kind of application, for if the answer to “why are you jiggling your leg,” is “I didn’t realize I was doing that,” then we find that intentional action is not really what is described. She calls this a refusal of the why-question.

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So, by identifying the way a why-question is refused, she says we can develop a reasonable criteria for intentional acts. �

Introducing Anscombe’s Philosophy

Refusals of the Why-Question

1. I didn’t know I was doing that; 
2. I observed I was doing that; 
3. And, when answers involve no mental cause.

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Introducing Anscombe’s Philosophy

Acceptance of the Why-Question

1. When I know I am doing it; 
2. I know without observation that I am doing it;
3. Or, I do not need observation to know why I am doing it.

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Introducing Anscombe's Philosophy

Application to Theory and Creative Writing

Intention

Two people walk along the beach. A wave crashes and recedes to reveal the first stanza of Wordsworth’s, “A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal.” Here is a good candidate for unintended meaning, the beach walkers may think—a text which doesn’t need the intention of the author to be interpreted. But just then, another wave crashes and reveals the second stanza of the poem. This compels the beach walkers to provide a deeper explanation of the phenomenon. As they make a list—Wordsworth’s ghost, a practical joke, a geologic or oceanographic phenomenon—their explanations fall into one of two categories. Either the marks are caused by some agent—ghosts, practical jokers—or they are accidents, as in the case of natural events.

Value

In Intention, she asks us to imagine two different lists. One is a shopping list given to a husband by his wife. The second is a list made by a detective who follows the man while he shops. Anscombe points out that “...the relation of [the shopping] list to the things [the husband] actually buys is one and the same” but “...that there is a different relation” in the list made by the detective.” (Anscombe 56)

Conclusion

• A language for defending the practice of the workshop.
• Intention and value in terms of literary actions.
• A language for theorists to engage with creative writing.
• H. Aram Veeser said in 2022, after a period of assuming a “secondary role,” “theory is just [now] beginning.” (Veeser 6)
• New Materialisms, Eco-Criticism, Transmarxism, indictments of neoliberalism from the left, and postliberal prophecies from the right, should inspire those of us interested in connecting Theory to CW. �

Paper Link

https://shorturl.at/kKgNO