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Privacy Leakage Study and Protection for Virtual Reality Devices

Dirk Catpo Risco, Brody Vallier, and Emily Yao

25 July 2024

Project Advisor: Dr. Chen

Mentors: Changming Li, Honglu Li, and Tianfang Zhang

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Introducing the Team

Team members:

Mentors:

Advisor:

2

Dirk Catpo Risco

RU ECE MS

Changming Li

RU ECE PhD

Dr. Yingying (Jennifer) Chen

Honglu Li

RU ECE PhD

Tianfang Zhang

RU ECE PhD

Brody Vallier

RU ECE UG

Emily Yao

HTHS HS

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Project Overview

  • Augmented reality (AR)/virtual reality (VR) devices are becoming more popular
  • Used in many applications (e.g. healthcare, communication, tourism)
  • Privacy concerns arise due to zero-permission sensors
  • We study activity privacy leakage in AR/VR devices
  • Our study focuses on activity recognition based on motion sensors

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Week 8 Recap

  • Built a 1-dimensional (1D) convolution neural network (CNN) for activity recognition

  • Improving the prompt design to get more accurate predictions results from LLM

  • Setting CNN as baseline to adjust the LLM’s performance

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Week 9 Progress

  • Built threat models for this AR/VR human activity recognition project (HAR)

  • Conducted feature extraction methods and used a support vector machine (SVM) model to select effective features

  • Improved LLM fixed prompt from a previous 78.18% to a 90.6%

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Potential Security Application: Example 1

  • Typically, an attacker would need to acquire a large dataset to train an activity recognition model to understand user action
  • With an LLM, the attacker can use small groups of data collected via zero-permission motion sensors to infer benign user activities without model training
  • Attacker tracks user activities and acquire privacy-sensitive information:
    • Preferences for VR application usage
    • VR PIN pad patterns for unlocking VR devices.

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Potential Security Application: Example 2

  • For AR/VR activity recognition, attackers can get access to AR/VR motion sensor
  • Attacker can inject designated noise to the received motion sensor data to induce model generating wrong prediction labels
  • LLM can perform robust against this noise and generate correct prediction when using manipulated data as input
    • Defend the recognition system

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Feature Extraction for SVM

  • Statistical Methods:
    • Mean: average value of data
    • Std: variation of data
    • Min: smallest value in data
    • Max: largest value in data
    • Median: middle value of data
    • Interquartile range: spread of middle half of data
    • Peak to Peak: largest - smallest value in data
    • Entropy: randomness in data

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SVM Model Result

  • 6 motions
  • 250 samples per motion
  • 70/30 train-test split
  • Kernel is linear
  • Most effective features were mean, peak to peak, and interquartile range resulting in 99.33% test accuracy

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LLM Prompt Adjustments

  • Changed threshold ranges on determining whether or not there is movement based on data
  • Updated example response by emphasizing what type of output response we want
  • Provided additional expert knowledge based on number of points above/below threshold

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LLM Previous Statistics

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Week 8: Gemini Advanced Accuracy

Trial #

Front Raise

Side Raise

Head Left

Head Right

Head Up

Head Down

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Accuracy (%)

100

57

93

87

67

67

Key

Accurate (3/3)

Partial (2/3)

Inaccurate (1/3)

None (0/3)

Total (%)

78.33

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LLM New Statistics

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Week 9: Gemini Advanced Accuracy

Trial #

Front Raise

Side Raise

Head Left

Head Right

Head Up

Head Down

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Accuracy (%)

100

100

90

76.7

76.7

100

Key

Accurate (3 /3)

Partial (2/3)

Inaccurate (1/3)

None (0/3)

Total (%)

90.6

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Week 10 Goals

  • Improve LLM fixed prompt to get better results than 90.6% by adding statistical features into the prompt derived from SVM results (99.33%)

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