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AI and Cyber Warfare

Snehal Antani, Co-Founder & CEO, Horizon3

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Military = Civilian��Large = Small��Extortion -> Disruption

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Your attack surface now includes…

  1. + Suppliers
  2. + Distributors
  3. + Shadow and “Reckless” AI
  4. [Cloud, On-prem, Identity, Data, Networks]
  5. Custom Applications
  6. 3rd Party SaaS
  7. Software Supply Chain
  8. Insider Threat

(And employees like this)

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AI Creates Infinite ”cyber bullets”

14 minutes

NodeZero

720 minutes (12 hours)

Expert Human

Vs.

50x Faster in solving Attack Benchmark

Spin up 100,000 AI Hackers in minutes�Each AI Hacker scales to 250,000+ hosts

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Don’t touch the thermostat:

Clean rooms, third-party risk, and the future of chip wars.

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Speed, Scale & Thoroughness

Fortune 250 Customer

  • 70k Hosts in production
  • 284 agents spawned
  • 1B token context window
  • 25M commands executed
  • 500+ attack paths discovered
  • 1 week of total execution time

​

NO Humans in or on the loop

NO Prior knowledge

NO production disruption

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Example: Compromising a Microsoft Entra User

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Example: Compromising a Microsoft Entra User

How does AI transform vulnerability research?

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Accelerating Vulnerability Research

Ivanti Endpoint Manager

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Expect a CISA KEV Tsunami

v1

v1.1

Develop & test exploit

Did the code changes fix or introduce a vulnerability?

Add exploit to rootkit

Mass

Target!

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Vuln Research Lessons Learned from Project Glasswing

  1. When analyzing a code-base, anchor the threat model in previous vulnerabilities
  2. When you know a code base well enough, tell it vulnerabilities of a type already exist and to find them
  3. Mythos is extraordinarily intelligent and has great instinct when it comes to mathematics and computer science, but novel, multidimensional spaces exist
    1. “Follow first principles. Base decisions on only observed data, understanding the code, and better instrumenting the tooling to reveal what cannot be observed currently.”
  4. The harness matters

​

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  • /goal find RCE in email open
  • Budget: $5k
  • Time: 72 hours
  • Human effort: minor nudging

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Example: Compromising a Microsoft Entra User

How does AI transform EDR bypass?

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“We are exploitable to an ActiveMQ RCE that enables attackers like Salt Typhoon to gain full operational control of our network.”

Top Security Tools Fail When Misconfigured

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HORIZON3 RESEARCH / AI-ENABLED ADVERSARIES

05 / 08

How EDR Actually Works

PRIMARY SIGNAL

PROCESS TREE

EDR watches behavior, not just files. Its primary signal is the process tree.

Key Telemetry:

• Parent/Child Relationships

• Command-Line Arguments

• Loaded Modules

SECONDARY SIGNALS

HOST TELEMETRY

Auxiliary instrumentation channels feeding detection logic:

• ETW Providers

Event Tracing for Windows

• AMSI

Antimalware Scan Interface

• Kernel Callbacks

Driver-level monitoring

DETECTION LOGIC

IOA CHAINS

High-fidelity Indicators of Attack (IOAs) key on specific execution chains.

Correlates telemetry sources to identify malicious intent in real time.

ARCHITECTURAL LIMITATION

IOAs are a finite catalog.

Anything outside this catalog remains completely invisible to defenders, creating structural blind spots in behavioral telemetry.

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HORIZON3 RESEARCH / AI-ENABLED ADVERSARIES

05 / 08

Principles for Bypassing EDR

01

Zero cmd.exe / powershell.exe

Zero cmd.exe or powershell.exe instances in the process tree.

02

Zero Impacket Signatures

Zero Impacket signatures on the wire, utilizing native protocols instead.

03

Zero Uploaded Tools/Malware

Zero uploaded tools or malware, relying exclusively on signed Microsoft binaries.

04

Zero Process-Tree Reuse

Finally, zero process-tree reuse across operations.

OPERATIONAL IMPACT: These constraints eliminate approximately 90% of standard EDR IOAs.

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HORIZON3 RESEARCH / AI-ENABLED ADVERSARIES

05 / 08

Horizon3’s Combinatorial LOLBin Engine

ENGINE COMPONENT BREAKDOWN

103 EXECUTION

Execution LOLBins integrated in pipeline

38 DOWNLOAD

Download LOLBins leveraged for staging

28 CHANNELS

Execution channels supporting diverse deployment

11 SIDELOAD VECTORS

DLL sideload vectors for stealth persistence

TOTAL DELIVERABLE CHAINS

272,814

Unique payload-delivery chains generated with isolated process trees.

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Horizon3’s AI Learning Loop to maximize EDR Bypass

​

AGENT AGENTIC WORKFLOW

01. PLAN

Evaluate state & map bypass vectors

02. INVOKE

Execute via 20 structured tools

03. READ & ITERATE

Parse telemetry & adapt strategy

NEXT-GEN THREAT MODEL

Demonstrates art of the possible for APT threats running on Strata-equivalent tooling.

TOTAL DELIVERABLE CHAINS

272,814

Unique payload-delivery chains generated with isolated process trees.

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Example: Compromising a Microsoft Entra User

Can we catch the attacker living off the land?

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Hacking Hackers….

  • Bias for pursuing actions they’ve seen before
  • With the right deception, you can induce models to run into traps
  • Burn tokens, blow out context windows, chase dead-ends

HONEYTOKENS

DATA

OWASP JUICE SHOP | XSS

TRAP

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“Unix home directories are near-perfect traps —

/home/user/.aws/credentials�

hit 95.6% trip rate.

LLMs trust canonical AWS CLI paths almost universally”

AI Agents are 2x more likely to click on a honey token than expert humans�

Optimally placed honey tokens can trick AI Agents into clicking 95%+ of the time

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And NodeZero will optimally place decoys while running a pentest

​

Tripwire alerts are then routed directly into your SOC

The hardest part of deception is where to place the decoy!

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Why now?�NodeZero hacked an organization in 77 seconds.

  • Can your SOC stop us in 76 seconds?

Attack

Defend

Attack–Defend Learning Loop

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Confirmed Exploitable Weakness

Verified

Fixed

Open Tickets

Fix Issue

Run Retest

Close Ticket

Tune Detection

& Response

Deploy

Honey Tokens

Proactive

Threat Hunt

Reduce Blast

Radius

CVE

Misconfigs

Credentials

Ineffective SOC Tools

Poor policies

Untrained Humans

Precision �Patching

Time is your enemy.

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AI SOC Analyst Agent Auto-Improves EDR and SIEM

NodeZero successfully deploys an implant onto a host via SMB using a compromised Windows credentials with local admin permissions

The EDR and SIEM didn’t detect & respond to this attack.

I will create the following detections in the EDR.

I will add the following alerts to the SIEM.

When NodeZero runs again, I’ll verify these alerts addressed the gap.

Horizon3 AI SOC Analyst Agent

SIEM logs triggered by NodeZero Actions

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Data Security AI Agent Fixing Data Security Issues

Successfully compromised a credential, logged into a host, and accessed a share drive that contained sensitive data including PII

  • This data was NOT discovered and classified by data discovery tools
  • The DLP did not detect and prevent sensitive data exfiltration
  • UBA did not detect abnormal credential behavior

So I will…

… adjust the DSPM’s discovery scope to find and classify this data

… tune the DLP solution to ensure sensitive data exfiltration is blocked

… adjust sensitivity in the UBA to catch this type of credential abuse

Data Security AI Agent

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AI Threat Hunter Initiates Threat Hunt

Search for abnormal activity related to this user �

Look for indicators of compromise on this host related to BlackBasta and Conti

Horizon3 AI Threat Hunter Agent

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Evolving to Real-time Hack, Fix, Verify

OCSF Notable

Event Stream

NodeZero Pentest

Emit Notable Event that a misconfigured EDR was identified on Host x.x.x.x

Data Security Agent

Threat Hunting Agent

3rd Party Agents

EDR Tuning Agent

“IAM Fixer” Agent

Horizon3 Blue Team Agents

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The Loop

VERIFY

FIX

HACK

HACK

FIX

VERIFY

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