1 of 33

To Be or To Do

Capt Daniel Fitzgerald

21/22 July 2021

1

ADVANCED COURSE IN ENGINEERING

Competence | Commitment | Courage | Compassion

UNCLASSIFIED

2 of 33

Purpose
Relevance
Case Studies
Summary

Overview

2

UNCLASSIFIED

3 of 33

At some point in your life, you will be forced to make a decision...
When faced with a moral dilemma where do your priorities lie?
What if your orders go against what you believe is right?
Is it always right or wrong or is there an ambiguous middle ground?

Purpose

3

UNCLASSIFIED

4 of 33

Competence

To know what is right

Courage

To do what is right

Compassion

To guide your decisions

Commitment

To persevere in the face of adversity

Leading Change

Innovation and Adaptation

To Be or To Do

Character and Competence

Leading Up

Risk and Failure

Building Teams

Cultures and Tribes

Relevance

4

UNCLASSIFIED

5 of 33

Doing what is right no matter the cost

Forced march from Maryland to Gettysburg
Water for his troops - Arrested

Reclaiming lost honor at the expense of others

Circumnavigating the enemy
No intel for Lee - No action taken

Discussion:

How do you get the courage to do this when your career �and freedom are at stake?
How does this fit with the culture of the officer corp at �the time?
What was the situation?
What were the risks of this action?
Were they acting malicious?

Case Study: Lt Stephen Brown / J. E. B. Stuart

5

UNCLASSIFIED

Example of To Do.

Doing the right thing even though it will cost you. (He was arrested and faced losing rank/job/freedoms)

Ended up paying off. Charges were not pursued and his service was recognized.

Forced march from Maryland to Gettysburg

“No Straggling” order
Security detail guarding a well to enforce order
Brown placed under arrest and relieved of his sword

Battle of Gettysburg

Armed himself with camp axe and charged into battle
Continued fighting after head trauma from artillery shell
Charges were not pursued

Gained fame from circumnavigating the enemy
Given more trust and responsibility
Ordered grand review of troops for Gen Lee
Repeated the review so Lee could attend
Embarrassed by being victim to a surprise attack
Ordered to guard advancing confederate army
May have wanted to regain glory by circling enemy
Fog and friction changed plans
Lee was left without calvary in enemy territory

0:20 Mark

10 min discuss

0:30 Mark

6 of 33

Culture of the Pentagon in the 70’s & 80’s
F-111, F-15/16, B-1
F-111:

Avg maintenance time 23x more than predicted
AF data: bombs missed 4x more in combat
VCSAF Mathis was program manager
VCSAF ordered radar bombing tests in desert
6 sent to Australia to prove combat effectiveness
CSAF briefed SECDEF with chart of reliability
Criticism of F-111 was viewed as criticism of �VCSAF Gen Mathis

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

6

“They never realized that, in the process of compromising their principles so often in order to get there, they would become programmed to continue operating in that same fashion once they arrived at the top.”

UNCLASSIFIED

7 of 33

Culture of the Pentagon in the 70’s & 80’s
F-111, F-15/16, B-1
F-15 vs F-16:

Cost effectiveness study to show fewer F-15s were�better than more F-16s
Burton noted costs were left out
“I had to, If I included those costs, it might have �changed the answer. And I was given the answer �to begin with.”
AF added “enhancements” to make F-16 a night, �all-weather fighter-bomber and all-weather interceptor
AF own reporting admitted new model not as good as �old model, it wrecked the transient maneuverability

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

7

“They never realized that, in the process of compromising their principles so often in order to get there, they would become programmed to continue operating in that same fashion once they arrived at the top.”

UNCLASSIFIED

8 of 33

Culture of the Pentagon in the 70’s & 80’s
F-111, F-15/16, B-1
B-1

$25 million advertised, closer to $100 million
“We were told to fudge the numbers to save a �program on a direct order from a two-star �general.”
Carter cancelled, Reagan resurrected
Final cost accepted without testing: $280 million

AF sensor fuzed weapon concept, PAVEWAY III, �Maverick anti tank missile, DIVAD air defense gun, �SINGARS radio, Viper bazooka

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

8

“They never realized that, in the process of compromising their principles so often in order to get there, they would become programmed to continue operating in that same fashion once they arrived at the top.”

UNCLASSIFIED

James Gavin’s “On to Berlin” - Gavin recounted how his troops died needlessly because their new bazookas had failed to stop the German tanks.

Too many men had paid the ultimate price for the Army to learn what it should have determined on a test range, not a battlefield

�Viper Bazooka - Not a single round was fired at a tank - they placed the warheads on top of a block of steel and detonated them. The size of the hole was measured and entered into a computer model and the model determined the winner.

Earnest Fitzgerald - “Closet Patriots” - Those who want to do the right thing but dont want to face the consequences. Often will support from the shadows.

Earnest “Ernie” Fitzgerald

True cost of C-5 program $2 billion more than reported
Fired in retribution, fought 12 years of legal battles
AF eventually ordered to give his job back and pay fees

40-50 min mark?

9 of 33

The Pentagon Wars
Joint Live-Fire Testing Program
Bradley Fighting Vehicle chosen as first to be tested

Many lives at stake
Early in production phase

Put into production with no vulnerability tests
Letter to OSD from Army Assistant Secretary �Percy Pierre (17 Mar 1980)

“The key factor here is the relative importance �of various kinds of testing ... We feel it is �counterproductive to conduct destructive �testing on such a precious asset …”

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

9

“Revolutions or major changes in the behavior of large organizations usually have a better chance of succeeding if they come from the bottom up, instead of being imposed from the top down.”

UNCLASSIFIED

10 of 33

The Pentagon Wars
Evolution of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

10

UNCLASSIFIED

Background on the BFV

M-113 replacement (APC) to transport an 11 man infantry squad to the battlefield
In dev for 17 years
They wanted Bradley to engage other vehicles but didn’t beef up the armor accordingly
Someone wanted portholes so people could shoot out - feature proved to be useless and the portholes were sealed up
By 1980 it had 3 missions
It performs a variety of tasks but does no task very well
Ended up only being able to carry a squad of 6, not 11
Was intended to be a scout vehicle but ended up being the largest vehicle on the battlefield at 10 feet tall
Given an anti armor mission - 2 man turret added with TOW antitank missiles - guaranteed that it would be subject to return fire from anti tank weapons yet still no more armor
Stuffed with dangerous ammo - carried more ammo than any vehicle on the battlefield

11 Min Video

1:05 Min Mark?

11 of 33

The Pentagon Wars
Evolution of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Type of weapons: �https://youtu.be/ir0FAa8P2MU?t=1047

Flammability:�https://youtu.be/ir0FAa8P2MU?t=2715

Ammo:�https://youtu.be/ir0FAa8P2MU?t=2962

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

11

UNCLASSIFIED

12 of 33

Army agreed to conduct some vulnerability tests
“The $13 Billion Dud” by William Boly claimed �Bradley aluminum armor was more dangerous than�steel - Vaporifics
Romanian weapons substituted for Soviet ones
Hosed inside down with water beforehand
Stopped taking measurements of toxic gases
Test animals killed minutes after tests with claims�that there were no after effects
BRL tried to delay live fire testing for 2 years - �by that time production would near completion

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

12

UNCLASSIFIED

Aluminum’s chemical energy when oxidized is ten time greater than TNT
Uniforms on dummies caught fire so they were stripped naked, they still caught fire so they hosed down everything inside the vehicle just before the test
Large doses of toxic gasses were detected so they stopped taking measurements
Army Surgeon General put pigs and sheep inside to test effects of the choking fumes following a hit - animals were sacrificed within minutes after each test - not long enough to determine if complications developed from breathing the fumes, no tests for flash blindness, no one was permitted to observe the autopsies
Surgeon General reported no serious aftereffects
Burton did watch one veterinarian go into the Bradley 5 min after a test to retrieve the animals only to stagger out choking and collapse unable to breathe. They were able to revive him but from then on all vets wore self contained oxygen masks

Contract specified armor was only required to �protect against small arms fire
Tested on empty Bradley, no ammo, and fuel tanks�full of water

1:20 to 1:30 mark?

5 min break

13 of 33

Burton’s “Rubicon Memo”

Discussed with wife and children
May be out of a job and blacklisted
Both children in college with out of state tuition
“We can always get along somehow”

Accused Army and BRL of purposely conducting�unrealistic tests, they were not useful, and could�put 50000-70000 lives at risk
Burton wanted a new management team and �realistic “full-up” testing
Met with Army leadership - they were furious

“We don’t want to test it because we know what �will happen. It will just blow up and people will �get all excited over that and want to cancel the �Bradley.” - Lt Gen Robert Moore

Army directed BRL to complete full-up testing

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

13

UNCLASSIFIED

14 of 33

Burton informed his position had been eliminated

They RIF’d Burtons position instead of 2 others
He sent copies of all memos to relevant offices
“Lots of little brothers and sisters”
Story hit press but Burton did not comment
Would stay in job until tests complete

Burton informed he would be transferred to Alaska

He made copies of his transfer notice and passed�them out
Press and Congress got wind - SECAF cancelled

Phase 1 tests completed

Army hid Burtons report
Intentionally skewed data
Computer models way off in both directions so�Army averaged the errors and claimed accurate
Burton concerned with casualties - Army �concerned with vehicle

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

14

UNCLASSIFIED

15 of 33

Congressional Hearings

Informed testimony was classified
Threatened to say he was being censored
Testimony was unclassified 1hr before hearing

Minimum Casualty Baseline

Ammo exploded to outside
Store TOW missiles outside
Move fuel to outside
Line troop compartment with Kevlar lining
Troops access ammo through sliding doors

Phase 2 tests

2 5-gallon water cans placed behind aim point
Burton calculated no difference in probability
25% of test shots aimed at water cans
Burton wrote “Water Can Memo”

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

15

UNCLASSIFIED

Ammo in the troop compartment is the major cause of unnecessary casualties:

When hit, casualties increase by factors of 2-3

Fuel and fire extinguishers in troop compartment may force troops out of vehicle almost every time it is hit

Atmosphere inside after a hit is simply intolerable. Casualties can be significantly reduced by moving ammo, fuel and extinguishers out of troop compartment

When ammo was hit, casualties were about the same as BMP: ammo presents about 3 times as much area to a hit as does the BMPs. We can therefore expect greater casualties in combat
Army's argument

Auto fire suppression system effective in extinguishing fuel fires

Didnt mention 2 out of 3 times it discharged there was no fire

Little effect on vehicle or crew due to overpressure and temp (vaporifics)

Pressure high enough to rupture eardrums - Army didnt consider this a casualty

Prevention of penetration and spall will reduce vehicle damage and casualties

First sales pitch at new high tech armor, future events would show it could not prevent major penetrations

Spall has minimal effect on ammo due to ammo packaging

Small low speed fragments didnt set off ammo; large high-speed fragments did

Secondary fires unlikely
Survivability can be improved

Army claimed Burton saying “Bradley casualties could be significantly reduced” was classified

Army just watned to test reactive armor

16 of 33

Burton informed of assignment to Wright-Patt

7 days to accept or retire
Many feared this would strengthen cause to cancel
Arrangements for him to stay and monitor tests�and return to monitor Minimum Casualty Baseline
His boss kept this info from him until 20 min after

Burtons last memos

Called out the Army for test shot choice
Only 29% of combat shots could be expected to �land in area Army was testing

Post retirement

Forced to finish Phase 2 testing
Random shot dispersion and full-up tests
Design significantly changed to make vehicle safer
Legislation mandating all new weapons go through�live-fire testing

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

16

UNCLASSIFIED

On 17 April 1986 the deadline arrived and Burton signed the retirement papers

He wrote across the papers in bold “All I wanted to do was see the Bradley tests through to the end. It is clear now that I will not be permitted to do that, so I am retiring. My work is finished.”
20 min after he signed the papers, Gen Jones burst into the office and handed him a copy of a letter that Sec Weinberger sent to Congress.
It said that if Burton agreed to transfer the Air Force would let him stay and monitor the phase 2 tests and come back to monitor the minimum casualty baseline tests
This was the first time Burton was made aware of this.
Gen Jones later admitted to the congressional investigation team and in sworn testimony to DoD IG that he did not inform Burton of these agreements with the Air Force until after Burton signed the retirement papers.
This was a deliberate act of withholding information that might have influenced my decision to retire or accept transfer

17 of 33

Is the fight worth it?
James Gavin’s “On to Berlin” - Ineffective bazookas
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YTbVwH8xg8E

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

17

“During Desert Storm, more soldiers’ lives were saved as a result of Bradley live-fire testing than we can count.”�Army Maj Gen Peter McVey

UNCLASSIFIED

18 of 33

Impact of one person's actions on others and the�organization as a whole
https://youtu.be/ir0FAa8P2MU?t=5599
Discussion:

Put yourself in Burton’s shoes
What were the consequences of going against the culture?
How did a leader's virtues or experience inform their decision-making?
Did leaders understand capabilities, effects, and limitations?
Did leaders squander opportunities to minimize risk?
What do you do when you know you are right but no one will listen?
What assumptions about technology affected analysis?
Was the relationship between leader and follower able to endure hardship?
Where does your group think Col Burton falls on the To Be or To Do roll call? Why?

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

18

“Revolutions or major changes in the behavior of large organizations usually have a better chance of succeeding if they come from the bottom up, instead of being imposed from the top down.”

UNCLASSIFIED

19 of 33

Key Players:

Capt Brett Crozier, Captain of the �USS Teddy Roosevelt
Thomas Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy
US Navy
San Francisco Chronicle

Intent:

Present the facts
Guide discussion

Timeline of Events
Discussion

Case Study: Capt Brett Crozier

19

UNCLASSIFIED

20 of 33

ASECNAV Modley’s Speech to the crew of the USS Roosevelt
Apology

“I want to apologize to the Navy for my recent comments to the crew of the TR. Let me be clear, I do not think Capt. Brett Crozier is naïve nor stupid. I think, and always believed him to be the opposite. We pick our carrier commanding officers with great care,”
“Capt. Crozier is smart and passionate. I believe, �precisely because he is not naive and stupid, that �he sent his alarming email with the intention of �getting it into the public domain in an effort to �draw public attention to the situation on his ship. �I apologize for any confusion this choice of words �may have caused.”

Discussion

Case Study: Capt Brett Crozier

20

UNCLASSIFIED

21 of 33

Navy’s Command Investigation Report (27 May):

“Capt Crozier will not be reassigned to�USS Roosevelt”
“His email was sent with the well-being of �the crew as his top concern”
“Capt Crozier did not act according to the �standards expected of commanding officers”
“Capt Crozier did not forcefully and expeditiously �execute the best possible and available plan, or do �enough, soon enough.”
“Capt Crozier failed to effectively communicate his �concerns up the chain of command, at key moments, despite numerous opportunities to do so.”
“The email and letter Capt Crozier sent was not delivered outside his chain of command and was not intended by him to be released to the media.”
CNO’s Opinions

Case Study: Capt Brett Crozier

21

UNCLASSIFIED

22 of 33

Discussion

How did leaders handle incompetent followers or their own incompetence?
Did leaders squander opportunities to minimize risk? Why?
Did organizations adequately prepare for the circumstances?
How accurately did leaders foresee the consequences of their decision?
Did leaders communicate objectives and/or clarify ambiguity?
Where does your group think ASECNAV Modly and Capt Crozier fall on the To Be or To Do roll call? Why?

Case Study: Capt Brett Crozier

22

UNCLASSIFIED

23 of 33

Which way will you go?
Col John Boyd’s To Be or To Do speech

Competence

To know what is right

Courage

To do what is right

Compassion

To guide your decisions

Commitment

To persevere

Summary

23

UNCLASSIFIED

“Tiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road: And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go.” �He raised his hand and pointed. “If you go that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn �your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.” �Then Boyd raised his other hand and pointed another direction. “Or you can go that way and you can do something — �something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted �and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won’t have to compromise yourself. �You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference. To be somebody or to do something. �In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do? Which way will you go?”

3:55 Mark

24 of 33

Capt Daniel Fitzgerald

fitzgerald.daniel.p@gmail.com

Questions?

24

Dr. Jack Martin, USAF Assistant Secretary for R&D presenting Col Jim Burton with the Legion of Merit

UNCLASSIFIED

25 of 33

"My individual actions may matter little, but their aggregate impact on the culture I imbue and promote in those around me may one day have a large impact." - Eoin McQuaid
"As a cyber leader, it is your responsibility to know what is right, and it is your privilege to act on it." - Jacob Foster
"When your people know you love and support them, they will return in kind. The less you care about yourself, the easier it is to be a leader. Trust that your people will fill in the gap, and you will find the hard decisions are always worth it." - Liam Weinfurtner

To Be or To Do: GBOTs

25

UNCLASSIFIED

26 of 33

Doing what is right no matter the cost
Forced march from Maryland to Gettysburg

“No Straggling” order
Security detail guarding a well to enforce order
Brown placed under arrest and relieved of his sword

Battle of Gettysburg

Armed himself with camp axe and charged into battle
Continued fighting after head trauma from artillery shell
Charges were not pursued

Discussion:

How do you get the courage to do this when your career and freedom are at stake?
How does this fit with the culture of the officer corp at the time?
What was the situation? What were the risks of this action?

Case Study: Lt Stephen Brown

26

UNCLASSIFIED

27 of 33

Reclaiming lost honor at the expense of others
Gained fame from circumnavigating the enemy
Given more trust and responsibility
Ordered grand review of troops for Gen Lee
Repeated the review so Lee could attend
Embarrassed by being victim to a surprise attack
Ordered to guard advancing confederate army
May have wanted to regain glory by circling enemy
Fog and friction changed plans
Lee was left without calvary in enemy territory
Discussion:

Was Stuart acting malicious?
Where did he go wrong?
What was the situation? What if he succeeded?
How does this fit with the culture of the officer corp at the time?

Case Study: J. E. B. Stuart

27

UNCLASSIFIED

28 of 33

Chuck Spinney and David Chu
“Defense Facts of Life”
Using AF’s own data:

AF was decreasing in size
Pilots leaving in droves
Flying hours decreasing
Training replaced by simulation
Spare parts not available
Skill level for mechanics too high
Readiness at all time low
Cost of readiness increasing
Ammo supply only last a few days in war
Performance of frontline systems questioned

“Budget constraints are not the source of the problem”
David Chu 1981-1993: Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation �and then Assistant Secretary of Defense

1st order: Stop briefing Defense Facts of Life

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

28

UNCLASSIFIED

Spinney: The son of an Air Force colonel, Spinney graduated from Lehigh University in 1967 as a mechanical engineer. He began working as a Second Lieutenant engineer in the flight dynamics lab at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. In 1975 he left military life and eventually re-joined the Pentagon in 1977 as a civilian analyst in the Pentagon’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (better-known by its former name, Systems Analysis, set up in 1961 to make independent evaluations of Pentagon Policy) under his mentor, the famous fighter pilot Colonel John R. Boyd.

Chu: Chu received a Bachelor of Arts Degree, magna cum laude, in Economics and Mathematics from Yale University in 1964 and a PhD in Economics, also from Yale, in 1972 following a break due to military service.[3] In 1968 he was commissioned in the United States Army and became an instructor at the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia. He later served a tour of duty in the Vietnam War, working in the Office of the Comptroller, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. He obtained the rank of captain and completed his service with the Army in 1970.[2] From 1978 to 1981, Chu served as the Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs, Congressional Budget Office, providing advice to the Congress on the full range of national security and international economic issues. He was Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation and then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) from May 1981 to January 1993. In that capacity, he advised the Secretary of Defense on the future size and structure of the armed forces, their equipment, and their preparation for crisis or conflict.

SHOULD THIS EVEN BE IN HERE OR DOES IT DISTRACT FROM BURTON?

29 of 33

“Plans/Reality Mismatch and Why We Need �Realistic Budgeting”
Accuracy of projected costs of all weapons �compared to actual costs

Pentagon systematically underrepresented cost
Reagan defense buildup would cost $500B more

Chu directed him to stop briefing

Wanted study to verify accuracy
Stall for time, eventually proved accuracy
Chu denied report existed when asked by press
Sen Charles Grassley (R-IA) denied brief by SECDEF Weinberger
Congressional hearings were called and Spinney briefed with Chu
Chu claimed analysis was historical and didn’t apply to Reagan admin
Congress wanted Spinney to update, Chu forbid him
Congress forced update, answer was “Yes” it did apply
Chu did not accompany Spinney to these final hearings

Case Study: Col Jim Burton

29

UNCLASSIFIED

30 of 33

The fight against leadership
The need to be recognized or proven right?
Early adopter and theorist of modern armored warfare
Wrote 45 books and many articles
Emphasized potential of new weapons to surprise enemy
Plan 1919
Developed “Nine Principles of War”
Leadership didn’t agree with his ideas
Constantly fought with them to get ideas adopted

Trying to amend Army operations handbook
Fighting for use of tanks over horses
“Tidworth Affair”

Discussion:

What do you do when you know you are right but no one will listen?
What assumptions about technology affected analysis?
Was the relationship between leader and follower able to endure hardship?
How did a leader's virtues or experience inform their decision-making?

Case Study: J. F. C. Fuller

30

UNCLASSIFIED

The gray area. It won't always be black and white.

What personal factors could he have changed to help get his ideas adopted. Was he able to lead change or build teams?

Fuller fought to do something by pushing for a new way of warfighting. His concerns lay with getting the ideas adopted instead of getting promoted.

This slowly morphed. He demand a full-time secretary and refused to waste time with other duties. He constantly threatened to resign as he had gained popular support among the press.

He retired “victim of his own inability to trim his words and actions to the winds of political reality and human fragility … to arrogant to be successful”

He became involved in the facist movement. Invited to Hitlers mechanized army parade which Hitler called “your children”.

Became a media talking head during WW2 (Newsweek’s “military analyst”)

REDUCE NUMBER OF BULLETS

31 of 33

Germans were rebuilding and did listen to his ideas
He traveled to observe their maneuvers
Treated as an honorary guest to Hitler with his theories driving their doctrine
He became a proponent and supporter of Facism

Case Study: J. F. C. Fuller

31

UNCLASSIFIED

On 20 April 1939 Fuller was an honoured guest at Adolf Hitler's 50th birthday parade and watched as "for three hours a completely mechanised and motorised army roared past the Führer." Afterwards Hitler asked, "I hope you were pleased with your children?" Fuller replied, "Your Excellency, they have grown up so quickly that I no longer recognise them."��On the principles of war:�When Fuller published his memoirs a decade later, he

admitted that his enthusiasm for the principles had waned,

. . . for their purpose has been completely misunderstood, mainly

because the military and naval literature which has arisen out of

them (in the U.S.A. as well as here) has most successfully obscured

their aim, use and value. 1 9

Fuller did not elaborate on the aim, use and value that he intended for

the principles, but his writings gave frequent clues. In his memoirs

he wrote, "... true education consists in training the mind how to

think, in place of cramming it with what to think." 2 0 In his journalistic writings during World War I1, he complained in a similar vein,

"Why do so few soldiers think? Because so many have never been taught

to do so."21 4a foresaw the danger of dogmatic interpretations of the

official list, for he was never one to discourage cogitation and reflection.

Jomini on the principles of war:�“Of all the theories on the art of war the only reasonable one

is that which, based on the study of military history, lays down

a certain number of regulating principles but leaves the greater

part of the general conduct of war to natural genius, without

binding it with dogmatic rules. On the contrary, nothing is more

likely to kill this natural genius and allow error to triumph than

these pedantic theories, based on the false notion that war is a

positive science and that all its operations can be reduced to

infallible calculations. “

32 of 33

Finite thinking - See Simon Sinek’s “The Infinite Game”
Focused on shareholders and profits
Created millions of fake accounts for clients without their consent
Top down pressure from higher management to open as many accounts as possible through cross-selling
“Eight is great” - John Stumpf, CEO
Employees encouraged to open credit cards without consent
Received bonuses for the more they did
Reports of unreachable goals and inappropriate conduct by employees to supervisors did not result in change
Discussion:

Put yourself in the employees shoes
How accurately did leaders foresee the consequences �of their decision?
What was the relationship between leadership and the �employees?
What were the consequences of going against the culture?

Case Study: Wells Fargo

32

UNCLASSIFIED

33 of 33

Also issued unwanted insurance policies

3 whistle-blowers brought fraud to light
They were later fired by the insurance company

5300 employees fired for fraudulent sales
Fined $100 million in Sept 2016
By Dec 2018 they had paid nearly $3 billion
CEO resigned after intense pressure and fines

Case Study: Wells Fargo

33

UNCLASSIFIED