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Course

HYBRID CONFLICTS AS A THREAT TO SECURITY SYSTEMS

Academic year 2022-2023

Jean Monnet Module Erasmus+

“Civil society in conflict resolution process:

the EU experience for Ukraine”

101084973 — EURoCoRP — ERASMUS-JMO-2022-HEI-TCH-RSCH

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HYBRID CONFLICTS AS A THREAT TO SECURITY SYSTEMS

Course Content (1)

Topic 1: Introduction to the course “Hybrid conflicts as a threat to security systems”.

Topic 2: Current research on hybrid conflicts: the experience of the EU for Ukraine.

Topic 3: EU regulatory and legal support in the field of security.

Topic 4: The role of EU institutions in ensuring the 16th and 17th Sustainable Development Goals.

Topic 5: Institutional principles of counteracting hybrid conflicts in the EU and Ukraine.

Topic 6: Activities of The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

Topic 7: Universal and regional systems of collective security in counteracting hybrid conflicts.

Topic 8: Hybrid threats as an object of analysis in the social sciences.

Topic 9: Hybrid political conflict as an object of study and research.

Topic 10: Hybrid political conflict: origin, forms, causes, driving forces, specifics.

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HYBRID CONFLICTS AS A THREAT TO SECURITY SYSTEMS

Course Content (2)

Topic 11: Cycles of hybrid political conflict.

Topic 12: Hybrid war: types of weapons and ways to start a war.

Topic 13: Hybrid peace as a category in conflict studies.

Topic 14: Security asymmetry in the era of globalization.

Topic 15: Problems of deterrence of hybrid conflicts: EU practices.

Topic 16: Prevention as a way to counter hybrid conflicts.

Topic 17: Non-traditional threats and modern security systems.

Topic 18: OSCE cooperation with Ukraine in shaping the security system.

Topic 19: Reforming the security sector in the context of the spread of hybrid threats: the EU experience for Ukraine.

Topic 20: The role of the EU in resolving the current situation in Ukraine: humanitarian aid, investment support and EU sanctions policy.

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Topic 20: The role of the EU in resolving the current situation in Ukraine: humanitarian aid, investment support, and EU sanctions policy.

  • The issue of Ukraine is on the agenda of the EU and the OSCE.
  • Monitoring of actual hybrid threats to Ukraine's security.
  • Calculating the weakness of the Ukrainian security system before the aggression.
  • Humanitarian aid.
  • Investment support.
  • EU sanctions policy.
  • Information sphere - a key dimension of a hybrid war.

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The issue of Ukraine is on the agenda of the EU and the OSCE. �

In response to the Russian Federation’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are actively involved in conflict resolution efforts and ensuring peace, stability, and security in the region.

The EU and its member states maintain the unity in their steadfast support for Ukraine and strongly condemn “Russia's brutal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression” against Ukraine. The EU demands an immediate end of the war and just peace.

At the same time, OSCE denounces the military aggression as “indefensible” and a “gross violation of international law”, and continuously demands for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

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The issue of Ukraine is on the agenda of the EU and the OSCE. �

Since the Russian full-scale invasion, the European Council and the Council of the European Union have been holding regular meetings to negotiate about the current situation in Ukraine from different points of view.

The future of European security and democracy depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, so the EU makes efforts to suppress Russian aggression and restore Ukraine's right to its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

The EU is a loyal partner of Ukraine, providing it with assistance in humanitarian, political, financial and military spheres.

Josep Borrell Fontelles’s official Twitter account

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The issue of Ukraine is on the agenda of the EU and the OSCE. �

Ukraine has presented prominently in OSCE PA field activities, discussions, public statements, and resolutions adopted at Annual Sessions. PA is concentrating its efforts on how to support high-level negotiations to resolve disagreements diplomatically rather than through military operations.

The OSCE confirms its role in promoting dialogue and supporting Ukraine as it defends itself from Russia's aggression in accordance with international law. The OSCE claims that it will ensure the restoration of peace and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, the reconstruction of Ukraine and the implementation of justice.

Joint Statement of Members of the OSCE Permanent Council

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Monitoring of actual hybrid threats to Ukraine's security. �

Since 2014, the Russian Federation has actively carried out a series of disinformation attacks on Ukrainian and Western institutions, which urged the EU to develop a strategy of combating hybrid threats. The EU has developed a number of approaches and measures to counter and prevent hybrid threats, comprehensively outlined in the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response and the 2018 Joint Communication on Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats.

Also in November 2022, the EU has concluded the EU Integrated Resolve 2022 joint exercise under the leadership of the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European External Action Service. The purpose of the exercise is to strengthen the EU's ability to respond to a complex hybrid crisis.

The Joint statement following the results of the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit states that the EU confirmed its commitment to support Ukraine in countering hybrid threats. The parties have emphasized the intensification of cooperation in the cybersecurity sphere and the importance of strengthening cooperation in the fight against Russia’s manipulation and disinformation.

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Monitoring of actual hybrid threats to Ukraine's security. �

The EU actively monitors hybrid threats to Ukraine's security recognizing that they also endanger European security. Identifying key vulnerabilities and assessing risks helps deter hybrid threats, so the EU pays special attention to the strategy of minimizing security risks from Russia's hybrid threats to Ukraine and Europe and strengthening the integrated approach to such type of threats between various institutions and bodies.

The EU focuses predominantly on the spread of disinformation and propaganda, cyberattacks on Ukrainian state and financial institutions, the damage to transport and energy infrastructure, and terrorism. The EU concentrates on strengthening Ukraine's internal resilience to hybrid threats, rather than on a coordinated response to them.

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Calculating the weakness of the Ukrainian security system before the aggression.

Vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the state security system should be seen as dangers, because the opponent will use them to create threats. Untimely detection of potential threats and gaps in the security system and its separate components significantly complicate the implementation of measures to counter security threats. For the EU, the best pillars of stability in their neighboring countries are strong statehood with stable security and defence institutions, which prompts the EU to calculate the state of Ukraine's security system.

The EU took Russia's potential attack on Ukraine seriously and called on the world community to help Ukraine in countering the aggression mainly through diplomacy. At the end of 2021, the intelligence services of the EU member states began to publish their assessment of Russia's invasion intentions, giving accurate forecasts of its actions. Despite the fact that the EU overestimated the strength of Russia's military power, it still realized that objectively Russia had more troops, more military equipment than Ukraine and the Ukrainian security system is characterized by weakness and instability.

Western partners also had serious concerns about Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who lacked experience in politics and public administration.

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Calculating the weakness of the Ukrainian security system before the aggression.

In 2014, the weakness of Ukraine's security system allowed Russia to annex Crimea and seized the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Since then, Ukraine has improved its security system, but it was still not strong enough to prevent a Russia’s full-scale invasion and quickly restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, after the Russia’s invasion, the whole world was stunned by the extraordinary strength and courage of the Ukrainian people and Ukraine's military build-up. And one of the biggest surprises for the world in 2022 was the power and leadership of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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Humanitarian aid.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine causes a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Almost 13 million people have fled their motherland, 5.9 million Ukrainians are internally displaced. People in the occupied territories suffer daily from a lack of food, drinking water, medicine, electricity and heating, and the spread of infectious diseases. In addition, millions of Ukrainians are subjected to physical, psychological, armed and sexual violence, robbery, eviction and human trafficking.

The EU offers a great assistance to the refugees fleeing the war in Ukraine and the countries hosting them.

The Joint statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit states that «the EU is fully committed to continue providing and coordinating the full spectrum of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Ukrainian society, in close cooperation with international humanitarian actors».

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

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Humanitarian aid.

Since the Russia’s invasion, the European Commission has allocated €630 million for humanitarian aid programs to help civilians affected by the Russia’s aggression: €485 million - in 2022 and €145 million - in 2023. The EU and all its 27 member states together have mobilized €1.7 billion. More than 13.9 million people have received humanitarian assistance in Ukraine thanks to the EU.

As of today, more than 82 thousand tons of aid have been delivered. Civilians are provided with food, water, necessary household items, medical care, hygienic and sanitary services, psychosocial support, shelter, protection, education, financial assistance to meet their basic needs.

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism is being used by the EC to coordinate emergency aid to Ukrainians including the medical evacuation of Ukrainians and supply of medical goods.

Source: European Commission

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Investment support.

The EU considers Ukraine as an important partner that cherishes the principles of freedom and democracy, protection of European values and integration into the European environment. The EU is interested in supporting Ukraine in a time of Russia's armed aggression and makes a significant contribution to strengthening the current stability of the state.

Since the invasion, the EU, its member states and European financial institutions have provided up to €50 billion in financial, humanitarian, emergency, budget and military aid under the Team Europe approach. €37.8 billion were provided to support the economic, social and financial stability of Ukraine. EU member states also grant €12 billion in military aid under the European Peace Facility.

An unprecedented manifestation of the European Union's support for Ukraine is the approval of a financial assistance package in the amount of €18 billion for 2023 through the new Macro-Financial Assistance+ (MFA+) instrument. The funds will be used for providing basic public services and restoring critical infrastructure.

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Investment support.

The European Investment Bank is actively cooperating with Ukraine. From the Russian invasion in 2022, the EIB with the support of the European Commission has allocated €1.7 billion of emergency assistance to Ukraine. The EU Bank supports hundreds of projects that are important for the lives of Ukrainians in a time of war. The EIB supports the process of restoration and reconstruction of Ukraine.

The EIB provided 2 large financing packages for Ukraine. The first package of €668 million was used for urgent needs, while the second package of €1.59 billion was used to restore infrastructure and critical projects, repair damaged roads and railways, install temporary bridges, improve homes for people who were forced to flee. The EIB also takes care of the transfer of new transport for Ukrainian cities, repair of health care facilities and damaged educational institutions, the restoration of logistics centers.

Source: European Investment Bank

Total EIB financing in Ukraine by sector

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EU sanctions policy.

In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU has massively imposed sanctions and taken unprecedented restrictive measures against Russia. Since February 23, 2022, the EU has adopted 10 packages of heavy sanctions against Russia to weaken its economy, military power and critical industries, block access to markets and limit the ability of warfighting.

A significant number of persons and entities were included in the sanctions list. Nowadays, 205 entities and 1,473 people are under sanctions, including political figures, military authorities, oligarchs, businessmen and propagandists.

One of the biggest sanctions achievements is the disconnection of Russian banks from the international payment system Swift. Russia has limited access to EU capital markets and Russian currency reserves held by the EU are blocked. The transactions of Russian Central Bank are also banned. In general, 70% of the assets of the Russian banking system are sanctioned.

The EU also imposed sanctions on Belarus over its involvement in Russian aggression and Iran over the production and supply of drones to Russia.

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EU sanctions policy.

Source: European Council. Council of the European Union.

EU sanctions mostly target the Russian elite, the financial, business, transport, defence, energy, technology, trade and media sectors.

Russia was significantly influenced by:

  • a complete ban on the import of all Russian marine oil, oil products and coal;
  • closure of EU airspace for all aircraft owned, registered or controlled by Russia;
  • suspension of the EU's Visa Facilitation Agreement with Russia;
  • strengthening and expanding export controls on dual-use goods.

The EU added violations of restrictive measures to the list of "EU crimes" in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. The Union monitors the coordinated application of sanctions across the EU and deters attempts to circumvent or violate sanctions.

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Information sphere - a key dimension of a hybrid war.

Today, the information is a powerful weapon that cause more damages than other tools of hybrid war. The information sphere is a key dimension of hybrid war, as an actor can effectively achieve its goals without the use of significant financial resources and military power.

The key concept of hybrid warfare is the use of the latest information technologies to undermine national statehood, influence public consciousness and target distant objects and processes through non-traditional ways, namely the information transmission channels. Through Internet, mass media and social networks, information spreads rapidly and reaches a large percentage of the public.

The application of new powerful tools of warfare in the information sphere are facilitated by the latest developments in modern technologies and an increasingly complex information environment. The EU is significantly focused on identifying, investigating and countering threats in the information sphere.

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Information sphere - a key dimension of a hybrid war.

The Russian Federation is a vivid example of effective use of information sphere as one of the best platforms for achieving its goals. The most affective tools are spreading of disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks, manipulation of information and falsification. Using these tools, Russia seeks to discredit the leadership of Ukraine, the Ukrainian army, the state's foreign policy, the restoration of Ukrainian power in the liberated territories and reforms in the country. Pro-Russian views of a significant number of people are the proof of the effectiveness of Russia's information warfare methods.

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Sources

  1. EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. European Council. Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/
  2. OSCE PA Action on Ukraine. OSCE PA. URL: https://www.oscepa.org/en/activities/action-on-ukraine
  3. Josep Borrell Fontelles’s official Twitter account. URL: https://twitter.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1487829352364527618
  4. JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response. European Commission. April 6, 2016. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=EN
  5. JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL. Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats. European Commission. June 13, 2018. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_increasing_resilience_and_bolstering_capabilities_to_address_hybrid_threats.pdf
  6. Joint Statement of Members of the OSCE Permanent Council. U.S. Mission to the OSCE. URL: https://osce.usmission.gov/joint-statement-of-members-of-the-osce-permanent-council/
  7. Hybrid threats: EU concludes EU INTEGRATED RESOLVE 2022 exercise. European Union External Action. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/hybrid-threats-eu-concludes-eu-integrated-resolve-2022-exercise_en
  8. Hybrid CoE continues to work to support European security and Ukraine. Hybrid CoE. March 18, 2022. URL: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/news/hybrid-coe-continues-to-work-to-support-european-security-and-ukraine/
  9. Joint statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit. European Council. Council of the European Union. February 3, 2023. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/03/joint-statement-following-the-24th-eu-ukraine-summit/
  10. ‘It is the time to defeat Russia’. EurActiv. January 19, 2022. URL: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/it-is-the-time-to-defeat-russia/

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Sources

  1. UKRAINE REFUGEE SITUATION. OPERATIONAL DATA PORTAL. URL: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine
  2. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. European Commission. URL: https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/europe/ukraine_en
  3. EU solidarity with Ukraine. European Council. Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/eu-solidarity-ukraine/#humanitarian
  4. Infographic - EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine (since 2014). European Council. Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine/
  5. EU sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. European Commission. URL: https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine_en
  6. Reconstruction of Ukraine. European Commission. URL: https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine/reconstruction-ukraine_en
  7. Commission proposes stable and predictable support package for Ukraine for 2023 of up to €18 billion. European Commission. November 9, 2022. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_6699
  8. The EIB stands with Ukraine. European Investment Bank. URL: https://www.eib.org/en/projects/regions/eastern-neighbours/ukraine/eib-solidarity.htm?sortColumn=StartDate&sortDir=desc&pageNumber=0&itemPerPage=10&pageable=true&language=EN&defaultLanguage=EN&tags=ukraine-solidarity&ortags=true
  9. For the long haul in Ukraine. European Investment Bank. URL: https://www.eib.org/en/stories/ukraine-war-rebuilding.htm
  10. Hybrid threats as a concept. Hybrid CoE. URL: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon/
  11. Paul K. ‘Catastrophic’ cyberwar between Ukraine and Russia hasn’t happened (yet), experts say. The Guardian. March 9, 2022. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/mar/09/catastrophic-cyber-war-ukraine-russia-hasnt-happened-yet-experts-say

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Jean Monnet Actions

Useful links

EURoCoRP

Ostroh Academy, NU

European Commission

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Thank you for attention!

Prof. in charge – Kateryna Yakunina, PhD

Co-Lecturer - Sergii Ishchuk, Doc. Sci.

Co-Lecturer - Tetiana Sydoruk, Doc. Sci.

Co-Lecturer - Dmytro Shevchuk, Doc. Sci.

Co-Lecturer - Olena Shershnova, PhD

The National University of Ostroh Academy

https://www.oa.edu.ua/

https://eurocorp.oa.edu.ua/