Special PNC: A Review of Smart City Mission�Aperiodic (Aniyatkalik) (dated 25 May 2025)

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Vijay L Sonavane

ME (Elect)

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All info in this PPT is collected from various open sources available on the internet & News papers. Opinions expressed/ remarks, are my own views, which are based on my LIMITED EXPOSURE. You may not agree with my opinion. I respect your views/ opinions

PM Modi inaugurated a “Smart City Project of Pune” on June 25, 2016

Smart City Mission: Dream Project

• “Hundreds of small cities have a key role in achieving the resolve of a developed India by 2047. Our Government is upgrading basic facilities in such urban centres to improve ease of living”

-- PM Narendra Modi (25^th June 2015)

• Smart Cities Mission (SCM) aims to enhance the quality of life in India's cities thro’ smart, sustainable solutions.
• Its goal is to create cities that are economically vibrant, inclusive & environment friendly.
• By focusing on key areas like infrastructure, governance & social development, SCM seeks to transform urban living across the country.
• Various Projects will demonstrate SCM’s commitment to creating smarter, more livable urban spaces for all.
• Launched on 25 June 2015 by PM Modi, the “Smart City Mission” aims to improve the quality of life in 100 cities by providing efficient services, robust infrastructure, & sustainable solutions.
• Focused on economic growth, inclusivity, & sustainability, it will address diverse needs such as housing, transport, education, healthcare, & recreation, with the goal of creating adaptable urban spaces that serve as models for other cities.

Approach of this Mission

• Smart City Mission implementation is carried out primarily thro’ two approaches.
• First, under the SCM, cities are being developed using an Area-Based Development (ABD) approach, where each of the 100 cities has selected a defined area for targeted interventions.
• These ABD areas, wiil be chosen thro’ citizen participation, & are being developed as replicable models for other parts of the city.
• Second, every city has included Pan-City Projects, which are technology-driven solutions

• Other key dimensions of SCM include creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) structure for program implementation, promoting multiple sources of funding for projects, fostering competitive federalism, & engaging citizens.
• Aim was to create 100 Smart cities. The cities were selected in rounds of competition held from Jan 2016 to June 2018, & they had five years from their respective selection, that is during 2021 to 2023, to complete the projects.
• In 2021, the Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs decided to push the deadline for all 100 cities to June 2023.
• Ten years since it began & after three extensions, Smart Cities Mission has ended on March 31, 2025 , though the 7% of ongoing projects have gone beyond the deadline & officially 93% projects are reported as complete
• Now, it turns out that only 18 of the 100 cities have completed all the projects that would serve as urban planning role models.
• Among the cities that have fully implemented their projects are Agra, Varanasi, Madurai, Coimbatore, Udaipur, etc
• These completed projects demonstrate SCM's commitment to creating smarter, more liveable urban spaces for all.

Smart City program is a promising initiative, but its result depend heavily on thoughtful implementation, inclusivity, & long-term planning. Here’s a balanced take

Positives:

• Better Infrastructure & Services: It aims to modernize urban infrastructure, making cities more efficient in transportation, waste management, energy use, & governance.
• Technology-Driven Governance: With digital platforms, cities can offer more transparent & efficient public services (e.g. smart traffic systems, e-governance).
• Sustainability Focus: Many smart city initiatives emphasize RE, green buildings, and smart grids, helping reduce the environmental impact of urban growth.
• Citizen Engagement: If designed well, smart cities can empower citizens thro’ better access to information & services.

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Concerns:

• Digital Divide: There’s a risk of excluding low-income or digitally illiterate populations, especially if services become overly dependent on smartphones or Internet access.
• Privacy & Data Security: Increased surveillance, a data collection can lead to misuse or breaches if proper safeguards aren’t in place.
• One-Size-Fits-All Planning: What works for one city may not work for another. Local culture, needs, & capacities should guide development.
• Implementation Gaps: In many cases, there’s a gap between vision & on-ground execution, with projects delayed or underutilized due to poor coordination or funding issues.

What Smart Cities were Meant to Do?

• At their core, smart cities integrate digital systems to improve urban services.
• Their technological foundation typically includes:
• IoT networks for monitoring air quality, traffic, energy, & water.
• AI platforms for automating public service delivery & emergency management.
• Big data analytics for infrastructure planning & citizen feedback analysis.
• 5G connectivity to enable real-time, high-volume data exchange.
• Smart city projects have been rolled out in various parts of the world, often promising radical urban transformations driven by cutting edge technologies. However, several studies on Smart city implementation have noted how these iconic & technology intensive projects have often failed to create the impact, they promised.

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Hon. PM in the background is an image of Ranchi, posted on X by the official Smart Cities Mission account.

An Unceremonious End to Smart Cities Mission

• “We will build 100 Smart cities outfitted with high-tech communication capabilities”, PM Modi had thundered, a month after taking office as PM on May 26, 2014.
• “Cities in the past were built on riverbanks,” Modi said. “They are now built along highways. But in the future, they will be built based on availability of optical fibre networks & next-generation infrastructure.”
• He announced an investment of $1.2 Bn over the following year in what was said to be the world’s largest infrastructure project, with more funds to come from private sources & abroad.
• In his budget speech, then FM Arun Jaitley gave details. Most of these new cities would be “Satellite towns around large cities”, he said, & announced incentives for foreign investors.
• Those were the days when, Modi was coming up with attractive plans that the media lapped up without scrutiny. ‘Smart Cities’ was hailed as the best of PM Modi’s visions for modern India.
• For the middle classes, PM Modi became a hero & his ‘Smart cities’ the potential centres of career opportunities.

• Real estate investors, foreign suppliers, & global technology & IT firms saw more alluring business opportunities in “Smart Cities mission” than in the “Make-in-India project”, another GOI initiative.
• By mid-2015, 14 countries, including France, the US, China, Sweden, Israel, Germany, Brazil & Singapore, had expressed interest. They were looking at major investments in Indian Smart Cities.
• A dozen international institutions, such as World Bank, ADB & USAID, offered support. PWC, McKinsey, Lea Associates & Bosch were the empaneled consultants. Private firms were offered equity participation & the right to impose ‘user charges’.
• Contractors were salivating at the prospects of a 7-lakh-km broadband cable to link to connect 2.5 lakh villages with accompanying facilities like WiFi boxes & gear. It was a huge pie. France’s Thales perceived a Rs 3,300-CR market for ‘integrated solutions’ & ‘added value systems’.
• Then, suddenly, a deafening silence fell all over. Private & foreign investors were not forthcoming, their investments were not matching their initial interest. The financial burden on GOI became very huge.
• The grapevine has it that someone in Govt – the rumour is Arun Jaitley – managed to convince PM Modi that his dream project was economically disastrous, technologically unsustainable & politically unwise.
• Citing the experience of other countries, they argued that technology was ever changing & today’s WiFi might soon be replaced by a better system.

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• So, it would need constant updating to keep the cities ‘Smart’. Politically, the ruling party might soon be charged with wasting resources on elitist & pro-rich projects while large sections lived in slums.
• Ultimately, the Govt decided to retain the nomenclature but with a changed goal.
• The Smart Cities Mission would be confined to renovating & retrofitting existing cities & providing such facilities as Housing, Clean water, Power & Transport. All the schemes would be managed by the high-sounding SPV, which are PVT cos or PPP ventures.
• The Smart Cities Mission borrowed heavily from former PM Manmohan Singh’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Renewal Mission (JNNURM) & its four sub-missions.
• PM Modi’s mission also overlaps the existing Atal Mission for Rejuvenation & Urban Transformation (AMRUT), the PM Awas Yojana (PMAY-U), National Urban Learning Platform (NLUP), & Housing for All by 2022.
• Originally, the Smart Cities Mission was scheduled to conclude its present phase by 2020, but extensions were granted because of hurdles in implementation. Finally, Govt has decided to end it by March 31, 2025.

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This leaves many questions unanswered :

• Does the Govt really believe that all the objectives of Mission : ‘core infrastructure, a clean environment, & Smart solutions’, have been achieved?
• If not, why has it been abandoned midstream? Will it be revived after reviewing the drawbacks & with appropriative correctives?
• Is it that: Like other PM schemes, the defects of the SCM can be traced to “impulsive announcements” made without ground work.
• The first casualty was the word ‘New’. Suddenly, the word ‘New’ – used in the original version to describe the cities – disappeared from all official records. Foreign media, however, continued to use it.
• The unceremonious end to the SCM has left a trail of dislocation, loss of jobs & associated uncertainties.
• The SPVs, which were managing the projects, the Integrated Command & Control Centre, & monitoring the mission, have already started sacking staff.
• UP Govt has downsized its operation, & will retain only the minimum staff required under the Companies Act. Also, there is much confusion about the future of the incomplete schemes.

• The mission suffered from several conceptual debilities. Unlike developed countries, there is no compact definition of a “Smart City in India” or the programs it needs.
• In developed economies, minimum facilities already exist, making it possible for them to concentrate on total digitisation & high-tech facilities. In India, the emphasis has to be on providing essentials such as food, housing, power & transport.
• But the Smart Cities Mission was announced during Mr. Modi’s early days as PM, when he was presenting India as a “world power” & himself as its “strong leader.”
• Finally the definition of ‘Smart’ was reduced into a curious mix of old schemes & high-tech dreams of GOI.
• A foreign study of the mission described this as a ‘catch-all umbrella’. In the process, the mission became another name for the same old programs for water, electric supply, housing, health, transport, solid waste management, security, e-governance & digitization & there was nothing New or Smart about it
• According to official claims, there are about 75 studies & analyses on the performance of the mission. Most of these safely align with the official line
• (This is main problem in my country. Only favourable studies are published by Authorities as we do not like criticism, even though it might be constructive ).
• Genuinely critical analyses are few or come from abroad, with foreign universities, analysts & media finding several structural debilities in the SCM’s conceptualization & implementation.

• Writing in The Guardian in 2015, Shruti Ravindran predicted that the mission – as it stood at the time – would end up creating ‘social apartheid’. (separating people of different races & making them live apart)
• A study of Aurangabad Smart City plan decried the appointment of big consultancy firms as Project Management Consultants (PMCs). “But there is very little accountability for the solution, the PMCs offered… in fact, Smaller firms proved to be a better option,” it said.
• Another independent study of the Shimla Smart City by Tikender Singh Panwar, a Member of the Kerala Urban Commission, found that the Local bodies had been bypassed by the elite SPVs on the assumption that private management is more efficient.
• Mr Panwar found that Rs 2 CR was wasted on flower pots.
• Look at the irony: We have a plethora of data on Urban Planning & the Smart Cities Mission: Smart City Dashboard, National Urban Learning Platform (NULP), Data Smart Cities Portal, Urban Data Exchange (IUDX) & Smart Code. Yet, investigators found there was all along a watertight information wall at the micro level that hampered a detailed analysis.

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(From an aricle by P. Raman is a veteran journalist in “The Wire’ dated 1 Apr 2025 & also in “The India Cable”)

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Smart Cities Mission: Lessons from the scheme’s mixed legacy (Policy Circle Bureau dated 2^nd Apr 2025)

A decade after its launch, the SCM has delivered patchy progress, exposing deep flaws in urban governance & accountability.

• The March 2025 deadline for the mission passed with only 18 out of the 100 designated smart cities completing all mandated projects
• As the curtain falls on the ambitious SCM, launched nearly a decade ago in June 2015, GOI’s grand urban transformation scheme leaves behind:
• a patchwork of success stories,
• missed opportunities, &
• unresolved questions about India’s approach to urban governance
• Cities such as Agra, Varanasi, Madurai, Coimbatore, Udaipur, Pune, Surat, & Vadodara are among those that have officially crossed the finish line.
• On paper, the numbers appear encouraging: of the 8,062 projects sanctioned under SCM, 93% have been completed, with Rs 1.50 Lakh CR worth of work executed from the total outlay of Rs 1.64 Lakh CR. But the numbers alone do not tell the full story.

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Lofty goals, grounded in reality:

SCM was introduced to address chronic urban woes:

• traffic congestion, waterlogging, pollution, & inefficient civic services

by integrating technology & design.

• Inspired by the internet of things (IoT) & data-driven governance models prevalent in developed countries, the SCM envisioned Indian cities as digitally connected, efficiently run ecosystems.
• However, this techno-utopian vision ignored the ground realities of urban India, where even basic services remain elusive for millions.
• A defining feature of SCM was its governance structure. Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) were established. These are entities, registered under the Companies Act & structured to operate like private firms.
• These SPVs were intended to fast-track implementation by bypassing traditional Municipal systems.
• While this model aimed to inject efficiency & innovation, it often side-lined local institutions & diluted public accountability, ultimately hindering long-term success & most importantly the ownership.

SCM Mess: Smart Cities Mission �Trips on Graft, Delays, False Promises (22/04)

• SCM sought to integrate advanced technology, data-driven governance, & PPPs to enhance core infrastructure, improve quality of life, & drive economic growth.
• Promising “Smart solutions” for urban challenges, the SCM envisioned mixed land use, expanded housing, reduced congestion, improved sanitation, & sustainable environments.
• With a budget of ₹2 lakh CR, including ₹48,000 CR from GOI over five years, the mission was positioned as a cornerstone of PM’s “Gujarat Model” of development, which emphasised rapid urbanisation & investor-friendly policies.
• GOI highlighted the need to move beyond “Poverty & Bottlenecks” in cities, framing the Smart Cities Mission as a transformative step toward making India a global urban leader.
• By 2030, with 40% of India’s population projected to live in cities & contribute 75% to GDP, the SCM was touted as critical to managing rapid urbanisation & positioning India as a modern economic powerhouse.

Tall Promises & a Trail of Failures:

• SCM promised a technological & infrastructural overhaul of 100 Indian cities by 2023, with commitments to Smart classrooms, e-governance, Waste & water management, Urban mobility, & Skill development, all driven by Information & Communication Technology (ICT).
• GOI envisioned SPVs as efficient mechanisms to execute projects worth ₹1.64 Lakh CR, with private sector collaboration ensuring scalability. Yet, as of April 2025, the mission stands as a stark disappointment.
• Authorities have indicated that only 7% of Projects are still be completed, citing “on-ground conditions” like legal disputes & resource constraints.
• However, as on date multiple projects are yet to be completed & even the completed projects are not those that were initially envisaged or promised.
• Project delays apart, “allegations of corruption” have surfaced in many smart cities across the country.

The Mirage of Foreign Investment in the Smart Cities Mission:

• In June 2015, SCM was launched, touting it as a magnet for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to develop 100 technologically advanced cities. Speaking at the launch, PM claimed interest from 14 countries, including France, Singapore, Japan, & the USA, with Finance Minister Arun Jaitley’s 2015 Union Budget offering Tax breaks & streamlined approvals to attract investors.
• Many media reports during this period also reported on ambitious pledges from France, Italy & other countries.

However, these pledges were largely overstated or non-binding.

• A RTI query confirmed negligible FDI inflows for the SCM, with media reports confirming no significant foreign funds had materialised by mid-2016.
• Singapore provided technical assistance for Amaravati, AP’s capital city, thro’ a master plan, but contributed no direct investment.
• Similarly, the World Bank & ADB offered consultancy services but no substantial financial commitments. The SCM relied almost entirely on Central & State funds

Why Foreign Investors Shieded Away?

• The failure to attract foreign investment in SCM stemmed from systemic & structural barriers that undermined investor confidence.
• Land acquisition issues were a primary deterrent, with projects stalled by legal disputes & community resistance, as seen in Amaravati, where 30% of planned land remained un-acquired by 2019 due to farmer protests.
• Lengthy approval processes further eroded trust, with India’s bureaucratic maze—despite reforms like the Foreign Investment Facilitation Portal—delaying clearances for years, as noted in a 2018 World Bank report.
• Unclear returns on investment compounded the problem, as SCM’s SPVs lacked transparent revenue models, deterring private players wary of India’s Municipal governance risks.

A Vision Diluted by Practical Realities

• When Smart Cities Mission was launched initially, it painted a bold picture of 100 futuristic “Special Smart Cities" equipped with cutting-edge infrastructure, including optical fiber networks, Smart Grids, & Greenfield developments like Dholera in Guj & Amaravati in AP.
• The initial vision, as outlined in the mission's concept note, leaned heavily on creating tech-driven urban hubs to rival global cities, with promises of seamless connectivity, sustainable ecosystems, & economic vibrancy to attract investors.

• However, by 2016, Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs (MoHUA) shifted gears by stating that the goal is now to retrofit & redevelop existing urban areas.

This policy pivot prioritised upgrading existing Urban areas:

• like Indore’s Chappan Dukaan food street or Bhubaneswar’s smart mobility systems

& redeveloping aging infrastructure,

• such as East Kidwai Nagar in New Delhi & Bhendi Bazaar in Mumbai.
• The project's shift to retrofitting & redevelopment, formalised in MoHUA’s three-pronged approach by 2016, prioritised incremental upgrades over the transformative vision sold to the public.
• Retrofitting projects, such as smart street-lighting in Surat or waste management systems in Pune, & redevelopment efforts like Bhopal’s smart roads, dominated the mission’s portfolio.
• Retrofitting & redevelopments constituted a large majority of the 8,067 projects.
• Greenfield developments, meant to be the mission’s crown jewels, were side-lined, with only a handful—like Dholera’s partial activation by 2025—showing progress, while Amaravati stalled amid political & funding disputes.

• This retreat from the original promise of new, world-class cities was driven by SCM’s inability to secure the anticipated private & foreign investment.
• What the Govt actually did: was it tried to repackage routine urban upgrades as a Smart City Project.

A Deeper Malaise: Corruption & Missing Fund:

• While delays & shifting from futuristic Smart cities to Retrofitting have marred the mission of the project, its deeper crisis lies in the murky handling of its ₹1.64 Lakh CR budget.
• Widespread allegations of corruption have cast a shadow over the mission, with multiple cities reporting financial irregularities, inflated contracts, & funds siphoned off thro’ opaque SPVs.
• Audits, including those by the Comptroller & Auditor General (CAG), have flagged discrepancies in expenditure, with significant sums unaccounted for or diverted to unrelated activities. But no action was taken & many such suggestions were neglected.

“34 of 100 Smart Cities Saw Forced Evictions”: “The Probe” Survey:

• “We had conducted a study in 2018. In our study we documented displacement & we found that there were forced evictions in 34 of the 100 smart cities being developed.
• We also found that Smart City Projects have directly resulted in about 17,700 people losing their homes.
• For instance, in TN alone we found that Govt demolished 1700 homes for Smart City Project,” Anagha Jaipal, Program Officer at Housing & Land Rights Network told The Probe.
• In Bhopal & Panaji SPVs managing the project bypassed City’s Municipal Corporations, centralising tendering processes that allegedly favoured contractors with political ties, some linked to electoral bond donations to the ruling BJP, raising suspicions of cronyism.

“No More Funding for Smart Cities Mission,” States Director

• “The Probe” reached out to Mr. Sanjay Gupta, Director Smart Cities Mission, Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs. He said:
• “Mission has been concluded means that there will no longer be any financial support to Smart Cities Mission from GOI. But in case some projects have not been completed then these projects will be allowed to complete.”

SCM’s failure

• To secure promised foreign investment,
• Corruption by Govt officials,
• Inefficient contractors with political backing,
• Reliance on opaque SPV, &
• Inability to deliver futuristic smart cities

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• Squandered public resources,
• Eroded trust, &
• Left India’s urban landscape far from the transformative vision promised by Modi Govt

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(Author: Ajay N in The PROBE)

Smart Cities Mission: The pockets of impact; Key Achievements:

Despite structural limitations, Smart Cities Mission did produce tangible benefits in certain sectors.

• A pair of studies conducted by IIM, Bangalore highlighted significant gains in education & public safety.
• One study found that “introduction of 9,433 Smart classrooms across 2,398 Govt schools in 71 cities contributed to a 22% increase in school enrolment between 2015-16 & 2023-24 in 19 cities”. This improvement was linked to better infrastructure & access to digital learning tools made possible thro’ Smart Cities Mission funding.
• Another critical area of impact was Urban surveillance & safety.
• Across 93 smart cities, 59,802 CCTV cameras & emergency call boxes were installed, significantly strengthening real-time monitoring. This infrastructure, integrated thro’ Integrated Command & Control Centres (ICCCs), enhanced Public safety & emergency responsiveness.
• In Nagpur, this led to a measurable decline in crime, with a 14% drop in incidents following the deployment of surveillance systems.
• Beyond education & policing, SCM also spurred development of digital libraries in 41 cities, including notable examples in Raipur & Tumakuru. These libraries, with a combined seating capacity of 7,809, played a vital role in supporting students from economically weaker sections & those preparing for competitive exams.

The broader impact, as noted in the studies, was that smart educational tools & infrastructure helped democratise access to quality learning resources.

Key case studies highlighting Major Issues & Lesson learnt in the India’s Smart Cities Mission

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Reflecting issues like delays, poor planning, corruption, & exclusion

1. Bhopal, MP

Issues:

• Despite being among the first 20 smart cities selected, most projects have faced severe delays.
• Bhopal Smart City Development Corporation Ltd (BSCDCL) was accused of irregularities in procurement: contracts for CCTV, LED lighting, & Smart poles were reportedly overpriced.
• Public outcry over evictions in the redevelopment of Shivaji Nagar & Tulsi Nagar neighbourhoods, without adequate rehabilitation.

Lesson:

• Lack of transparency & citizen engagement, combined with a un-human Technocratic approach, led to public resentment & poor execution

2. Chandigarh, UT

Issues:

• One of the wealthier & better-planned cities, yet faced slow implementation of core projects like Smart Water Management & Intelligent Transport System.
• Projects were stuck in planning or incomplete ,even after 6+ years, despite full funding.
• Local administration blamed SPV structure for overlapping responsibilities & weak coordination

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Lesson:

• Even well-resourced cities struggled with execution due to Institutional conflicts & rigid governance models

3. Guwahati, Assam

Issues:

• Only a small fraction of proposed projects completed
• The city suffered from poor planning capacity & lack of expertise, resulting in poor project design & delays.
• Reports surfaced of financial mismanagement, with inflated tenders & questionable expenditures

Lesson:

• Capacity-building & strong institutional frameworks are more essential in smaller or less-developed cities to avoid failure.

4. Pune, Maharashtra (Partial Success)

Context:

• Touted as a “Model” Smart city, but its success is limited to specific zones like Aundh-Baner-Balewadi.
• Projects like public WiFi & Smart street lighting were completed, but core issues like traffic, waste, & slums remain unaddressed.
• Citizens criticized the program for serving affluent areas while neglecting the urban poor

Lesson:

• Tech-focused development without inclusive planning creates “islands of affluence” rather than systemic urban change

5. Ranchi, Jharkhand

Issues:

• Faced severe delays & underutilization of funds

• Reports indicated that projects remained on paper or were abandoned midway ,due to corruption & administrative inefficiency.
• Basic infrastructure like drainage, waste management, & roads saw little improvement.

Lesson:

• Political instability, corruption, & poor governance make smart city transformation nearly impossible.

6. Agartala, Tripura:

Issues:

• The city lacked the technical manpower & planning infrastructure to execute projects.
• Many proposals were too ambitious given local capacity, leading to stalling & fund underutilization.
• Little citizen participation in the planning process

Lesson:

• Smaller cities need tailored, scalable projects—not one-size-fits-all tech solutions.

Key Themes Across all Six Cases

• Governance bottlenecks (SPV vs Local Municipal bodies)
• Corruption & inflated costs
• Displacement & exclusion of the poor
• Focus on aesthetics over essentials
• Lack of public consultation

KOCHI Smart city implementation & tensions surrounding its flagship Integrated Command & Control Centre (ICCC).

• The case study reveals that “the Smart city arrives as a “top-down directive” from GOI” where the existing problems of the city are reconfigured to fit Nationally envisioned Smart city agendas.
• Over time, the increasing distance between the Smart city projects & existing Local Authorities results in limited integration of the ICCC with urban governance in Kochi.
• Smart city SPV was created to isolate & protect the implementation process from political interference. Govt of Kerala retained decision-making powers over some elements of Smart city & posted a State-Govt appointed bureaucrat at the helm of SPV. (in majority of cases Govt officials were heading the SPV)
• Kochi case demonstrates tensions between Municipal body & State Govts in control over urban governance.
• Further, Implementation of Smart city project involves a new set of actors looking for problems to solve.
• On the one hand, private sector engineers are hired on contractual basis to staff the smart city SPV. These engineers simultaneously attempt to learn the intricacies of implementing public sector projects while making sense of what Smart city is supposed to do.
• On the other, is the CEO of the Smart city SPV who is a state-Govt appointed bureaucrat. The person filling CEO position changes often due to administrative & political reshuffling of bureaucrats.

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• Over time, the Integrated Command & Control Centre (ICCC) becomes a key element of the National Smart Cities Mission. The top-down approach of the Mission means that the Smart city SPV in Kochi is obliged to conform to these directives from GOI
• The growing institutional separation between Smart city SPV & Local Municipality means that it is unclear how the ICCC could integrate into existing governance processes.
• Thus future of ICCC remains unclear as organizational & funding decisions around the technologies that support it remain unresolved.
• Evidence from Kochi Smart city SP indicates that such organisational isolation may pose issues in integrating Smart city projects into existing governance processes. (which is an issue in many SCs)
• Smart city projects are often “veiled beneath notions of efficiency & improved decision-making” but instead “the governance of smart cities is immutable to the deeply political, messy, ambivalent & contested features that have long characterized decision-making within urban governance at local levels of Govt.

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Smart city is, therefore, not a quick fix for existing urban problems. As Smart city agenda remained popular amongst National & local Govts, it is worth re-considering if iconic projects such as Integrated Urban control Rooms merit the investment.

Major Challenges

• India’s SCM, launched in 2015, aimed to transform 100 cities into sustainable, citizen-friendly urban spaces using technology and innovation. While the program had ambitious goals, its execution has faced significant challenges, & many consider it a “partial failure”. Here’s an overview of the reasons behind this:

1. Incomplete Implementation

• As of March 2025, only a portion of proposed projects were completed. According to Govt. data, fewer than 50% of the projects were finished in most cities.
• Projects often focused on small, well-developed zones rather than entire cities, leading to “islands of development” rather than “holistic urban transformation”

2. Funding & Financial Issues

• Many cities struggled to mobilize funds, especially thro’ public-private partnerships (PPPs), which were a key component of the financial model.
• Delays in Central & State Govt fund disbursements also hampered progress.

3. Poor Urban Governance

• The formation of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to bypass traditional governance structures led to conflicts between Local Bodies & State-level Authorities.
• These SPVs lacked accountability to the public & often had limited local engagement or transparency.

4. Overemphasis on Technology

• While technology was a cornerstone of the mission, cities focused heavily on digital solutions (like surveillance cameras or command-&-control centers) without addressing basic infrastructure needs such as water supply, waste management, & housing.
• This tech-centric approach ignored the more pressing concerns of the urban poor.

5. Lack of Citizen Participation

• One of the mission’s guiding principles was public engagement, but in many cities, citizen consultation was superficial or completely missing.
• Project planning often happened in top-down ways, (as in typical Govt projects) with little input from marginalized groups

6. Environmental & Social Oversights

• Some smart city projects involved eviction of slum dwellers or redevelopment plans that displaced informal settlements without adequate rehabilitation.
• Environmental clearances & sustainability assessments were sometimes rushed or bypassed

7. Inequality & Exclusion

• The mission disproportionately benefited already developed areas within cities.
• Rural-urban divides widened, & many smaller towns, which lacked planning capacity, were unable to implement even basic projects

Conclusions:

• While the Smart Cities Mission had visionary goals & did lead to some urban improvements, especially in select cities like Pune or Ahmedabad, its overall impact has been limited.
• The mission fell short due to poor planning, inadequate funding, governance challenges, & a lack of focus on inclusivity and sustainability. It serves as a lesson in the complexities of urban transformation in developing countries like India.

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Corruption has been a significant factor undermining the effectiveness of India’s Smart Cities Mission

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• India ranked 96th in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2024, down from 93rd in 2023,
• India's rank on global corruption index was 85th in 2014

Corruption Scandal Rocks Srinagar Smart City Project

• Srinagar Smart City Project, launched in April 2017 with a budget of ₹3,535 CR, was promised to transform Srinagar into a modern Urban Hub thro’ Smart roads, Integrated Command & Control Centres (ICCCs), & enhanced public services.
• Managed by Srinagar Smart City Ltd (SSCL), a SPV, the project allocated about ₹500 CR for 70 initiatives, including Urban mobility & heritage preservation.
• However, by Jan 2025, the project was mired in a corruption scandal, with the J&K Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) registering FIRs against SSCL’s CFO Sajid Yousuf Bhat & EE Zahoor Ahmad Dar under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for possessing assets disproportionate to their known incomes.
• On Jan 10, 2025, that ACB raided across 7 locations in Srinagar & Pulwama uncovered suspicious financial transactions, including Bhat’s ownership of a commercial property in Rambagh valued far beyond its sale deed & Dar’s lavish multi-storied house & Benami properties.

• ACB’s probe, triggered by public complaints about delayed & substandard work, revealed that ₹466 CR had been spent by 2024, yet the key infrastructure projects lagged, raising serious questions about fund misuse & the integrity of SSCL’s operations.
• With the ED launching a money laundering probe in April 2025 against Bhat & Dar, the Srinagar Smart City Project exemplifies how corruption, coupled with SCM’s structural weaknesses, has undermined the stated vision of the Smart Cities Mission.
• Srinagar Smart City Project’s corruption scandal deepened in Jan 2025 when Abdul Waheed Shah, a Sr Superintendent of Police at J&K ACB, was transferred to Home Department just six days after exposing financial irregularities. It was Shah’s investigation that led to FIRs against Bhat & Dar. But Authorities transferred Mr Shah showing the approach of Govt in such serious matters.
• At a 10 Jan 25 press conference, Shah alleged widespread fund misuse, but his abrupt trasfer, alongwith two colleagues, drew sharp criticism.
• Kindly note that Operational leadership & budget for the J&K UT’s police are managed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, GOI. The MHA appoints the Director General of Police & determines the budget.

“Heritage Trees Lopped for the Srinagar Smart City Project Must be Transplanted”

• Srinagar Smart City Project, already embroiled in corruption scandals, has faced fierce criticism for environmental negligence, particularly the destruction of Chinar trees—protected heritage symbols under J&K law—during infrastructure projects like road expansions & urban beautification.

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• Dozens of centuries-old heritage Chinar trees were felled to make way for Smart City initiatives, prompting accusations of environmental recklessness from activists and residents.
• Allegations centred on Srinagar Smart City Ltd (SSCL)’s failure to secure mandatory environmental clearances or explore transplantation options, despite spending ₹466 CR by 2024 on projects touted as sustainable.
• Environmentalist Raja Muzaffar Bhat, speaking to The Probe, condemned the Authorities, stating,
• “Big trees can be replanted now as there is a provision for it. Even if the trees are 300 to 400 years old, they can be transplanted. There is a tree transplantation policy in many states.”
• Delhi Govt has a policy for tree transplantation & they have transplanted 100-150 year old trees as well. So I don’t think that the Govt should have any problem with transplanting or replanting Chinar trees which were axed in Srinagar city under Smart city project.”
• The Chinar tree controversy in Srinagar is not an isolated incident but a symptom of Smart Cities Mission’s failure to uphold its promise of sustainable urban development across India.
• The project's initial vision of eco-friendly, tech-driven cities has been undermined by a pattern of environmental oversights, with projects prioritising cosmetic upgrades over ecological preservation.

Bhopal’s Smart City Tarnished by Corruption & Cronyism

• Bhopal Smart City Project, managed by Bhopal Smart City Development Corporation Ltd (BSCDCL), sought to transform the city with a ₹2,000 CR Area-Based Development (ABD) in T.T. Nagar, Smart roads, affordable Housing, & Integrated Command & Control Centres.
• However, the initiative has been mired in corruption allegations, including fund mismanagement, forced slum evictions, & a ₹300 CR tender irregularity probe by MP Economic Offences Wing (EOW)
• In T.T. Nagar, over 1,200 families were displaced without adequate rehabilitation, with funds allegedly diverted to elite-driven developments thro’ inflated land acquisition costs, as documented in a 2017 Housing & Land Rights Network study.
• EOW’s 2021 investigation into commercial plot auctions for the ABD revealed a rigged tendering process designed to favor select builders, with plots worth ₹208 CR sold at just 8–9% above base prices, causing a ₹35 CR loss to the State, per EOW findings.

Goa’s Smart City Mired in Wasteful Spending & Cronyism Claims

• Panaji Smart City Project, managed by Imagine Panaji Smart City Development Ltd (IPSCDL), aimed to transform Panaji into a sustainable Urban hub with a ₹1,053 CR budget, including a ₹450 CR Sewerage system, Smart roads, & Heritage redevelopment.
• Despite ₹760 CR utilised by Nov 2024, only 36 of 49 projects were completed by Mar 2025, with delays in major initiatives like ₹41.1 CR St Inez nullah rejuvenation & ₹6.3 CR smart parking at Miramar.
• RTI findings from 2019 exposed extravagant spending, such as
• ₹1.2 CR on replacing footbridge tiles & ₹35 lakh on painting zebra crossings, pointing towards inflated costs & potential fund diversion.
• SPV’s centralised tendering process, bypassing Panaji’s Municipal Corporation, has raised suspicions of rigged contracts, with opposition leaders alleging that ₹ 717 CR was embezzled to benefit “politically connected Contractors”.
• “Electoral bond data has also revealed that major SCM contractors, including those donating ₹966 CR & ₹55 CR to the BJP, secured favourable awards.

“Panjim City Virtually Converted into a War Zone”

• Advocate Abhijit Gosavi said:
• “I filed a petition before HC in Goa challenging the haphazard manner in which the Smart City work was being carried out.
• Panjim city was virtually converted into a war zone. After our Petition, the judges of the Division Bench which was hearing the matter went to the site & conducted a site inspection. HC had also given the Govt a timeline but despite this IPSCDL have failed to adhere to the timeline & a lot of work is pending

Gosavi representing Panaji citizens & filed this petition before the HC criticising the State Govt for misleading claims about Smart City roadworks completion.

• Speaking to The Probe Gosavi claims that Smart City issues plaguing Goa is not just about delays, it’s also about corruption.
• “We had also questioned the substandard work which was being carried out in the name of the Smart City Project. In fact in our petition we had requested that an independent committee has to be appointed on the supervision of the HC & the entire audit must be done on all the work that has been carried out in the name of Smart City Projects.
• No one knows where the money has gone. Who has been paid? There is no transparency. We also pointed at some sites which they claim are completed & when we actually went there we found that it was not completed & whatever little was done was of substandard quality,” states Gosavi.

IPSCDL failed, Quality of Smart City work is horrible says mayor Rohit Monserrrate (TOI (08/04))

• Expressing sheer dismay over Panjim condition, Mayor Rohit Monserrate said that everyone is fed up with the quality of projects executed by IPSCDL. He blamed the “stupidity” & “failure” of IPSCDL engineers for the “horrible” state of the completed projects.
• “We want them out of the city as soon as possible.”
• He said that IPSCDL failed to supervise the works that have been executed across Panajim as many of the projects have fallen into disrepair.
• “If you walk through some of the areas, the pavers have already fallen apart. I have not seen anyone from Smart city monitoring. The smart city should conduct a survey once every 10 days. They should deploy their engineers once every five days or so to do an overall audit of what has been done,” said Monserrate.
• He said that the Corporation of the City of Panaji (CCP) has been facing the brunt of the citizens’ ire.
• “The moment they do not do something, it is we who have to respond to the calls. It is a waste of everyone’s time.”
• Asked if he agrees with IPSCDL CEO Sanjit Rodrigues’ statement that 90% Smart City Mission projects have been completed, Monserrate said, “Obviously not.”
• “They will say whatever they have to say. We have to check the damage that has been done.”
• He said that CCP has been following up on complaints raised by residents & commuters by “forcing” IPSCDL officials to resolve the issues.
• “We don’t want to wait for the monsoon to come & then start addressing the issues. It has gone on long enough, it must come to an end. We just want their Contractors to wrap up their work & leave,” said Monserrate .

Jaipur Smart City Project

Shimla: A cautionary tale

• Shimla, was added later to Smart cities list, received an investment proposal worth Rs 2,906 CR, largely via public-private partnerships.
• Shimla’s plan aimed to improve pedestrian crossings, vehicular mobility & public infrastructure across 244 acres through a combination of pan-city & ABD strategies.
• Redevelopment was targeted at Lower Bazar, Ganj Bazar & Krishnanagar, with goal of replacing dilapidated, unsafe structures with earthquake-resilient, tourist-friendly infrastructure.
• Additional ambitions included storm water & spring water management, improved transport corridors, & the promotion of eco-adventure tourism.
• Despite the comprehensive plan, ground implementation fell far short.
• None of the funds earmarked for redevelopment of Lower Bazar, Middle Bazar, or Krishna nagar were utilised.
• Residents report worsening traffic conditions & a continued neglect of pedestrian-friendly infrastructure.
• A particularly glaring mis-step was the installation of large escalator structures, intended to ease movement in hilly terrain but which remain non-functional & obstruct iconic valley views.

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Shimla’s experience underscores recurring pitfalls within Smart Cities Mission: misallocation of resources & a failure to prioritise sustainable, citizen-focused urban development.

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AGRA: High-tech command centre:

• Agra, on the other hand, offers a tale of contrasts.
• While the city has completed its Smart Cities projects on paper & has been consistently lauded in National Awards—trailing only Indore & Surat—it continues to grapple with fundamental civic issues.
• In Tajganj, the neighbourhood adjacent to the Taj-Mahal & a focal point of the SCM effort, the ground reality includes gaping potholes, tangled overhead electrical wires,& locked “Smart” Toilets.
• Schools which were upgraded under the mission now struggle with non-functional digital classrooms, faulty RO water systems, & dilapidated sports infrastructure
• Agra’s Integrated Command & Control Centre (ICCC) is operational & arguably its most successful component.
• Agra city now boasts over 1,530 CCTV cameras, AI-enabled traffic monitoring, & live GPS updates from garbage trucks & dumpsites. Citizen complaints are routed thro’ the “Mera Agra App”, phone lines, & social media channels, all feeding into a central monitoring hub. Advanced cameras flag violations such as helmetless riders, stray cattle on roads, & unsanitary conditions, enabling quicker municipal response.
• Yet the question remains: how will cities like Agra maintain these sophisticated systems without a reliable revenue stream or fresh central funding?

Smart city Program & Maharashtra: A critical Review by “Loksatta” Newspaper (06/04)

• GOI’s Smart city Scheme ended officially (rather unceremoniously) on 31^st March 2025 after 3 extensions. The scheme began in June 2014 & it was planned for Eight cities in Maha were included in this much advertised Scheme with 100 Cities all over India
• (Pune, Thane, Kalyan-Dobivali, Aurangabad, Nagpur, Sholapur, Nasik, Pimpri-Chichwad)
• A review was carried by News correspondents of Marathi Newspaper LOKSATTA & published on 6^th April & it was revealed whether these cities have turned SMART? If so upto level? If not why not??
• GOI as usual declared that all 100% works in these eight cities were fully completed . However it’s only a paper compliance. “On ground the systems are a not making any effective success” that what people are saying.

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Nasik:

• 52 Projects including Smart Street, Swatcha Godavari River were on agenda of Smart Nasik. Only 21 were taken up by Nasik SC Co. Exp: Rs 830 CR
• Nerhu Vano-udayn, Cycle track (12 CR), Beautification of area below Highway bridges (3.5 CR), Traffic education Park (4 CR), are the completed projects
• 24x7 Water Supply in Gaothan area, CCTV projects are still WIP
• Smart Streets, Road digging in Dahi pul area, have resulted in inconvenience to Citizens. Smart Parking lots, Bicycle on rent projects were utter failure

Nagpur:

• Projects started in 2016. Inadequate finance availability, issues in land Acquisition, Red tapism by Govt officials causing inordinate delays & cost escalation.
• Project cost: Rs 730 CR
• Only 17 of the 42 declared projects could be completed
• Two stages: Smart Secured Nagpur City, Area development
• CCTV camera project completed (3600 CCTVs commissioned)
• Initiated e-bus Project, Bio-mining & e-Goverenence, Traffic Signal projects
• Plans: To convert “Bardi” area to “vehicle free” status. To start 10 THEME Parks: Happy thouht Garden/ Art garden/Cycle club /18 Km cycle lane could not be completed in 8 years still WIP

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Kalyan-Dombivali:

• 12 projects initiated. 8 officially completed. 4 held up due to land acquisition & Tech problems. Project cost: Rs 950 CR
• Beautification of Kalyan (West) Station area work in progress (WIP). Needs Rs 290 CR fund. Fund already raised thro’ Metro Cess. Utilization matter pending with GOM
• Gauripada City park, beautification of Kala Talao, 30,000 Smart LED Street lights, Smart parking lots, CCTV based City security scheme, Smart Governance programs are 100% completed
• Durgadi Fort & creek area development & beautification projects, Navy Musium, Smart Roads project, Logagram pedestrian Bridge are WIP. But efforts will be taken to complete work by Dec 2025

Thane:

• As per Govt Authorities 32 of 35 projects planned are completed. Total project cost Rs 950 CR
• Incomplete works: Water supply scheme Renovation, construction of “Jal Kumbh”, Beautification of “New Thane Station” area. Very serious issue of Garbage management was missing in the project list, so neglected
• Projects completed: UG Drainage system, Vehicle parking lot at Gaodevi Maidan, Footpath improvement project, Intelligent traffic management system for Municipal city transport, Development of areas: Mumbra bypass to Kharegaon toll plaza, Nagla bunder, Kavesar, Waghbil, Saket-Balkumb, Kalwa Shastri nagar, Chawpaty at Kopari Creek.
• It’s painful to mention about the status of REST ROOMs all over Thane city. Poor Maintenance. (Why Thane City Majority of publicRest Rooms not maintained at all )

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Solapur:

• 46 projects Rs 985 CR,
• Main: Water supply Improvement scheme : Rs 864 CR/ 170 MLD capacity Ujani Dam to Solapur Double pipe line 110 KM line the project work is in Final Stages
• To supervise city water supply scheme SCADA commissioned (Rs 80 CR)
• New 90 Kms pipe lines in Goathan area & piped water connection to all area
• 12 Kms new Road Constructed (Rs 150 CR)
• Beautification of Indira Gandhi Park Stadium completed . National/International sports can be arranged
• Garbage management : New 120 “Ghanta Gadis”
• Beautification of Sidhheshwar mandir area, talao, Rangbhan Chauwk, Laxmibai Bhaji Mandai
• Solar panels commissioned on 22 Municipal corporation offices/ establishments

Aurangabad (Ch. Sambhajinagar)

• Authorities claim that 38 of 40 projects completed (Cost Rs 950 CR). Renovation of “Safari park & Sant Tukaram Natya Griha” completed
• Much of the project fund went to City Road development for TAX collection
• 700 CCTV Cameras commissioned. Infact city needs 2900 CCTV cameras Moreover maintenance of CCTV cameras is now an issue
• Operation of Municipal Corporation digitized “Integrated Command & Control centre” established
• Safari Park in Mitmiti area is stiil no progress
• For Cycle track: Plastic poles were erected on main streets. All these poles are now damaged by the people, because of traffic jams due to smaller roads.
• City bus scheme started but it is in financial loss.

Pune’s Rs 900 CR Dilemma: Smart City Project Faces Scrutiny (03/04) (Pune Mirror)

• For Pune Smart City Mission, on completion, its ambitious initiative has faced mounting criticism for failing to meet its promises.
• Originally designed to transform Pune into a sustainable & technologically advanced urban hub, the project has been marred by delays, inefficiencies, & a lack of transparency.
• In a recent development, social activist Ujjwal Keskar met Mr Prithviraj BP, Additional Commissioner, PMC, who is overseeing the Smart City project. During the meeting, Prithviraj stated that 54 projects have been completed, & two are ongoing. He also directed officials to upload all reports on the official website by the evening of April 2. Prithviraj BP & his team plan to inspect one or two of these projects based on the available reports.
• Pune Smart City Mission, initially positioned as a model for modern urban development, has increasingly come under scrutiny. While the GOI envisioned the mission as a transformative step toward sustainability, Pune’s execution of the initiative has left much to be desired.
• Instead of experiencing a seamless shift towards Smart urban living, the city has been left with incomplete projects, mounting costs, & a growing sense of disillusionment among citizens.

• Mr Ujwal Keskar has been vocal about shortcomings of the mission, emphasising that PUNE SC Project was designed with specific timelines & objectives.
• However, the slow progress, delays in key initiatives, & unfinished projects have cast doubt on the mission’s overall success.
• His letter to the Director of the Pune Smart City Mission demands a transparent & honest assessment of the failures, particularly in terms of financial mismanagement & unmet expectations.
• One of the major concerns raised by Mr. Keskar revolves around the involvement of consultants in the mission.
• He has questioned whether the consultants hired to prepare the Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) for the 58 projects have delivered the value for the money spent?
• There is a growing demand for clarity on how much these consultants have been paid & whether their recommendations have led to any tangible improvements
• “The failure of these projects points to either poor planning or poor execution,” Keskar remarked. “A full report is necessary to understand why such large sums of money have been spent without yielding the expected results.”

“Public share bicycle” project which was started under Pune Smart City Project was ultimately shut down

• Pune Smart City Mission had clear objectives: to provide Smart infrastructure, enhance public services, & improve the overall quality of life for residents.
• However, in practice, its implementation has been fragmented,& many of its promises remained unfulfilled. While the project was meant to bring improvements in areas like healthcare, education, & green spaces, the results have been underwhelming.
• Smart transportation initiatives, such as intelligent traffic management & smart parking solutions, were supposed to ease urban congestion.
• However, traffic jams & pollution continue to plague the city, with little evidence of the promised improvements.
• The staggering sum of Rs 900 CR spent on the mission has left citizens questioning whether their tax money has been used effectively.
• In response to these concerns, Mr Prithviraj BP has assured that all project reports will be made publicly available on the official website. This marks an important step toward accountability, allowing citizens to scrutinize the progress and effectiveness of the mission.
• Keskar & his team will conduct an on-ground inspection of selected projects to verify the claims made by the Authorities.

Mr Keskar finally remarked:

• “The Pune Smart City Mission was supposed to be a beacon of progress, yet it has turned into a failure of monumental proportions,” Keskar stated. “The Authorities must take responsibility for the delays, the waste of public funds, & the lack of transparency.
• The citizens of Pune deserve nothing less than full accountability.”

Financial Irregularities in Pimpri-Chinchwad Smart City Project

• Fund Received: Rs 490 CR from GOI, Rs 245 CR GOM & PCMC: 245 CR: Total 900 CR.
• As per official data 91% of target has been completed
• Pimpri-Chinchwad Smart City Ltd (PCSCL) faced serious allegations of corruption amounting to Rs 300 CR in a Rs 520 CR Tender awarded to a consortium including Tech Mahindra, Krystal Integrated services & Arceus Infotech .
• Shivsena leaders claimed that inflated costs & manipulated contracts benefited specific contractors. For instance: an “Advanced water Metering Application” was billed Rs 9.70 CR while actual cost was reportedly Rs 2.53 CR suggesting Rs 7.2 CR discrepancy (283% over charging).
• An opposition MP also pointed out: a scam of Rs 500 CR involving tailored tender conditions & incomplete work, despite of significant fund disbursement

Why do Smart City projects fail to create enough impact?

While not always overt (done in open way), various forms of mismanagement, favourism, & lack of transparency have marred the SC program.

Basic issues:

1. Lack of Transparency in Tenders & Contracts

• Contracts for smart city projects were often awarded without open, competitive bidding, leading to allegations of favouritism & nepotism.
• In several cases, bidding processes were rigged or tailored to benefit specific private firms.

2. Misuse of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)

• SPVs were set up to bypass traditional Municipal governance, but they often lacked accountability.
• These bodies operated with limited public oversight, creating opportunities for corruption in decision-making & financial management leading to Inflated Project Costs
• Reports have emerged of cost overruns & inflated budgets for basic infrastructure projects like LED lighting, Smart poles, & Command centers.
• These inflated costs sometimes pointed to kickbacks & bribes between contractors & officials.

4. Ghost Projects & Delays:

• Some projects existed only on paper, with funds disbursed but little or no work done on the ground.
• In some cities, contractors were paid for incomplete or substandard work, suggesting collusion with officials.

5. Political Interference

• Project selection & contract awards were influenced by local political leaders rather than technical merit or citizen needs.
• Political favouritism led to unequal allocation of resources & misuse of funds for electoral gains.

6. Weak Audit Mechanisms

• Inadequate auditing & monitoring allowed corruption to go unchecked.
• The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) & other oversight bodies reported several irregularities in fund usage in multiple states.

Examples (Indicative, not exhaustive):

• Bhopal: Allegations of corruption in procurement for Smart lighting & CCTV installations.
• Guwahati: Reports of inflated tenders for infrastructure projects.
• Navi Mumbai: Delays & poor quality in Smart road construction with questionable billing.

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Conclusions:

• Mismanagement/non-trasparancy & corruption issues in India’s Smart city programs have not only delayed progress but also eroded public trust. The combination of opaque structures (SPVs), limited public involvement, & weak oversight created a breeding ground for misuse of funds.
• For future urban missions, transparency, public accountability, & strong anti-corruption mechanisms will be essential

Finally,

• It is necessary to put people, their needs, their financial capacities, their cultural environment; in the centre of planning; not technology. Top-down approach is not accepted by people in such schemes
• Equating Smart cities with an abundance of technology is a misconstrued idea.
• Implementation of Smart city projects is bound up with Political tensions between existing Local & State organisations & often disrupted by election-cycles & the shuffling of Govt Bureaucrats at the helm of the Smart city organisation.

In summary, Smart City program has strong potential, but it must prioritize people just as much as technology. It’s not just about making cities “smarter,” but making them more liveable, inclusive, & resilient.

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What comes next?: Future of 100 Smart Cities:

• With the official end of Smart Cities Mission, many cities are staring at an uncertain future.
• Ministry of housing & urban affairs has not clarified whether existing SPVs will continue receiving funds or support post-March 2025.
• GOI needs now to build upon the learning from SCM.
• While the scheme may have fallen short of its transformative promise, but it has yielded a valuable prototype—an urban innovation test-bed showing both the possibilities & limitations of top-down, tech-driven development.
• As India’s cities continue to grow & strain under demographic & environmental pressures, future urban policy must go beyond smart solutions & focus on inclusive, “Bottom-Up planning”.
• The success of city-making will ultimately depend not on the number of sensors installed, but on how well public systems serve their most vulnerable users.
• In the final analysis, technology alone cannot fix broken cities. People, politics, & planning must work in sync to make urban India truly liveable

Thanks!!! I await your kind responses.�(Contact me: vlsonavane@gmail.com/M: 98333 62062)