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Multilingual Disinformation Detection for Digital Advertising

Maryline CHEN 

Machine Learning Engineer

@ Criteo AI Lab

Žofia Trsťanová, Nadir El Manouzi, Maryline Chen, Andre L. V. da Cunha, Sergei Ivanov 

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Problem statement

  • Digital advertisement is funding the independent journalism.
  • 3 main actors in this industry: the Advertiser, the Publisher and the internet users. 
    • Advertisers: entities that want to show their ads.
    • Publishers – Internet Media: websites that accept to display ads.

  • Publishers are funded mostly via digital advertising (39% Share of media revenue from digital advertising in 2020 [Pew Research]).
    • Huge increase in disinformation on the internet.
    • Risk of supporting and financing disinformation publishers.
    • Negative impact for the advertiser, the user and the ad industry.

  • Our inventory: ~hundred thousands publisher domains, ~billion pages.
  • Q: How to remove such Publishers from our inventory? 

Publishers

Advertisers

Internet Users

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Related work

  • Work on social media content.
      • Propagation-based: analyse the way the content circulates. (Zhou et al., 2020a; Zhou & Zafarani, 2018; Wu et al., 2015; Castillo et al., 2011)

      • Content-based: analyse the textual and image contents. Two types: combinatorial (Pérez-Rosas et al., 2017; Shi & Weninger, 2016; Ciampaglia et al., 2015) or neural (Zhou et al., 2020b; Wang et al., 2018).

  • Work on news articles.

    • Using BERT-based and LSTM-based models for sentence representation (Vorakitphan et al. 2022; Blaschke et al. 2020).

  • Work on online propaganda.
    • BERT model for multi-class sentence classification (Chang et al. 2021).

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Our solution : Repurposed Embeddings for Disinformation Detection (REDD)

  • Content-based approach using multi-lingual text embeddings as input.
  • Quantity: Machine learning analyses billions of webpages per week.
    • Constraints on scalabilitylatency and efficiency.
  • Quality: Human expert review in the loop.
    • Review a shortlist of top-ranked Publisher domains.

  • Empowers internal teams to proactively blocklist unsafe content.

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The REDD pipeline

  1. Leverage the online system.
    • Currently in production: a fine-tuned XLM-RoBERTa.
    • Repurpose the multilingual embeddings for input of our model.

  • From the embeddings, filter the topic to reduce and target relevant pages.
    • Embedding-based similarity search with a topic specific threshold.

  • A non-linear classifier predicting probability of being disinformation.

  • Human review of the top ranked domains.

Publisher text

Text embeddings

Topic projection

Disinformation Classifier

Human review

~0.5B

~12K

~4K

#pages

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Dataset

  • Built from Publishers webpages on one disinformation topic.
    • Positive label: from 60 domains already blocked for spreading disinformation;
    • Negative label: from renowned media with a good reputation in fact-checking;
  • Manually annotated: quality over quantity.
  • Size after topic filtering: train dataset (17K URLs) vs test set (2K URLs)
    • 53% of positive (disinformation) examples;
  • Multilingual but with some languages being more represented than others
    • Language bias: risk that the model might simply become a language detector;

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Results: Topic filtering

 

AUC-ROC

REDD

0.955

No topic filtering

0.65

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Results: text vs embeddings as the input

  • REDD, the disinformation classifier: a model with three non-linear (SELU) layers.
    • Trained on 100 epochs, with AdamW optimizer and BCE Loss.
    • Multilingual embeddings as input.

  • 3 main setups: REDD vs text XLM-R vs text XLM-R frozen embeddings.
    • AUROC at 1 for the full-text models (XLM-R)
    • BUT they only learned to distinguish one language from others: skewed dataset.

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Results: Human review

  • Review only the top-ranked Publishers.
  • Page-level score from the REDD classifier are aggregated at the domain level.
  • Output from human inspection: 300 domains reviewed.
    • 178 flagged as suspected of spreading disinformation.
    • 26 directly block-listed from the publisher inventory.

more likely to be

ranked higher by REDD

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Conclusion

  • The REDD pipeline: a tool that red-flags domains that potentially spread disinformation. 
    • Topic filtering from text embeddings;
    • A non-linear classifier predicting probability of being disinformation;
    • Human review at the end;

  • Industrial application: A scalable solution that supports different languages and topics of interest.

  • Potential future work:
    • Leverage orthogonal sources of information such as images;
    • Use adversarial training;
    • Use semi-supervised learning;
    • Combine with a user-based disinformation graph;

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Thank you!

Contact: @ Criteo AI Lab

ma.chen@criteo.com

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Q&A

Contact: @ Criteo AI Lab

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Appendix

The topic classification schema

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Appendix

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.03762.pdf

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.02116.pdf

XLM-RoBERTa architecture

  • a transformer-based multilingual masked language model pretrained on text in 100 languages.

  • 12 layers, 768 hidden states and 12 attention heads.

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Appendix

Embedding prediction schema

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