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ACN Roundtable: “Drawing from the lessons learned from COVID, the emerging challenges for EP&R”,��26 January 2022�

Yvan Pouleur, Unit D3 - Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

DG ENER, European Commission

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When the pandemic started:

The European Commission and EU Member States in their fields of competence were active from the beginning: monitoring the evolution of the situation, anticipating and mitigating possible impacts

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Initiated Actions

European Commission adopted guidelines aiming to facilitate the free cross-border movement of critical workers and to ensure the availability of goods [C(2020) 2051 final, 30.3.2020]
Based on MS’s experiences across sectors - ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Energy Security: good practices to address pandemic risks’ [SWD(2020)104 final, 2.6.2020]
Facilitating information exchange amongst European nuclear safety regulators (ENSREG) on nuclear safety aspects (DG ENER)
Monitoring impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on medical radioisotope production and transport (ESA)
Media and public information monitoring, liaising and coordination with European and international organisations, industry groups (IAEA, NEA, WANO, Foratom) (JRC/ENER)

Taking account of the stress tests findings and the findings of the accident investigation into Fukushima, the EC proposed and discussed with the Council the changes to the NSD provisions.

In 2014 a new NSD was adopted. Amongst the main changes are:

Emphasis on independence of the regulator
Enhanced provision - Transparency and informing and involving the public, providing information on incidents, and accidents, and ensuring that the general public is given opportunities to participate in the decision-making process related to licensing of nuclear installations.
An EU wide safety objective requires that nuc installations are designed, sited, commissioned, operated, and decommissioned with the objective of preventing accidents and if an accident occurs – mitigating its consequences and avoiding both early and large radioactive releases.
Promoting nuclear safety culture is an importance aspect.
New topical peer- review mechanism has been introduced.
Consistency in the on-site EPR and the BSS provisions which cover both on-site and off-site EP&R matters

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Commission Staff Working Document, Energy Security: good practices to address pandemic risks across the energy industry: Examples

Recognising the energy sector as an essential service;
Preserving the free movement of specialised energy workers;
Strong business continuity and contingency plans;
Preserving essential transport flows to maintain energy supply chains;
Cross-border cooperation, coordination, communication and information sharing;
Pragmatic-risk based approach, licensees, regulators esp. nuclear sector;
Attention to economic impact on energy companies, subcontractors, investors.

Taking account of the stress tests findings and the findings of the accident investigation into Fukushima, the EC proposed and discussed with the Council the changes to the NSD provisions.

In 2014 a new NSD was adopted. Amongst the main changes are:

Emphasis on independence of the regulator
Enhanced provision - Transparency and informing and involving the public, providing information on incidents, and accidents, and ensuring that the general public is given opportunities to participate in the decision-making process related to licensing of nuclear installations.
An EU wide safety objective requires that nuc installations are designed, sited, commissioned, operated, and decommissioned with the objective of preventing accidents and if an accident occurs – mitigating its consequences and avoiding both early and large radioactive releases.
Promoting nuclear safety culture is an importance aspect.
New topical peer- review mechanism has been introduced.
Consistency in the on-site EPR and the BSS provisions which cover both on-site and off-site EP&R matters

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Survey of European nuclear safety regulators (ENSREG)

Business continuity plans - continuity of operations, maintaining safety
Operators giving priority to facilities for electricity production
Defined minimum staff presence for operations and maintenance as set out in licence conditions
Regulatory oversight continuing, including through teleworking, where appropriate
Some licensees, re-scheduled outages for refuelling and maintenance to minimise impacts
Organisational factors, changes to work process, communication means, safety systems inspections
Ensuring continuity of nuclear emergency preparedness and response arrangements

Taking account of the stress tests findings and the findings of the accident investigation into Fukushima, the EC proposed and discussed with the Council the changes to the NSD provisions.

In 2014 a new NSD was adopted. Amongst the main changes are:

Emphasis on independence of the regulator
Enhanced provision - Transparency and informing and involving the public, providing information on incidents, and accidents, and ensuring that the general public is given opportunities to participate in the decision-making process related to licensing of nuclear installations.
An EU wide safety objective requires that nuc installations are designed, sited, commissioned, operated, and decommissioned with the objective of preventing accidents and if an accident occurs – mitigating its consequences and avoiding both early and large radioactive releases.
Promoting nuclear safety culture is an importance aspect.
New topical peer- review mechanism has been introduced.
Consistency in the on-site EPR and the BSS provisions which cover both on-site and off-site EP&R matters

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Study launched by the EC early 2021:

“Resilience of the Nuclear Sector in Europe in the Face of Pandemic Risks”

The study focus is on:

Operation continuity
Nuclear safety
Supply chain
Radioisotopes production and distribution

No in-depth review of EP&R under Covid

Main general finding:

The nuclear sector has remained resilient thanks to strong risk assessment culture and practical effective preparation – possible lessons for other sectors

Some components of this resilience are relevant for EP&R

Even though operational safety was deemed unimpacted by Safety Authorities and Utilities reorganizations during COVID-19 pandemic, the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) was considered negatively impacted by a few of the surveyed safety authorities78. As detailed previously, the staff availability was never at risk, either for operating personnel or emergency workforce, but the sanitary considerations prevented in some cases utilities to have emergency exercises and drills for their key personnel.

To reduce infection risks, the licensees and regulators of a few number of Member States decided jointly to abstain from performing normal, full-scope emergency exercises during the pandemic while most of the countries developed adjusted EP&R procedures, to cope COVID-19 constraints (reorganisation of crisis room, use of teleworking, hygiene and organisational specific provisions against pandemic, etc.).

The applicability of EP&R procedures under external threats situation was not assessed neither reported through the survey.

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Identified challenges

The study, experience sharing, monitoring and other sources confirm risks and challenges:

availability and movement of critical workers, access to medical testing, access to specialist components equipment, resilience of workforce, impacts of delaying maintenance, supply chain, cybersecurity

No conclusion can be drawn on the effective applicability of EP&R procedures under a pandemic situation. Yet, some countries were able to maintain EP&R exercises without reporting specific issues related to COVID-19.

Crisis occurring during the pandemic, like flooding can provide useful feed-back.

Even though operational safety was deemed unimpacted by Safety Authorities and Utilities reorganizations during COVID-19 pandemic, the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) was considered negatively impacted by a few of the surveyed safety authorities78. As detailed previously, the staff availability was never at risk, either for operating personnel or emergency workforce, but the sanitary considerations prevented in some cases utilities to have emergency exercises and drills for their key personnel.

To reduce infection risks, the licensees and regulators of a few number of Member States decided jointly to abstain from performing normal, full-scope emergency exercises during the pandemic while most of the countries developed adjusted EP&R procedures, to cope COVID-19 constraints (reorganisation of crisis room, use of teleworking, hygiene and organisational specific provisions against pandemic, etc.).

The applicability of EP&R procedures under external threats situation was not assessed neither reported through the survey.

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��Thank-you