Terrorism and Cultic Studies: A Brief Overview��Michael Langone, Ph.D. ��Presented at the 2008 Annual International Conference of the International Cultic Studies Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 26-29, 2008 �

Assumptions

1. Many thousands of people, who call themselves jihadists, are willing to die in order to kill us.

Assumptions (Cont.)

2. Killing jihadists prevents them from killing more innocents.

Assumptions (Cont.)

3. Killing jihadists, however, also appears to motivate some Muslims to join the jihad against the West, thereby perpetuating and possibly even exacerbating the problem.

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Assumptions (Cont.)

4. When jihadists succeed in killing Westerners, however, that too appears to motivate some Muslims to join the anti-Western jihad.

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Assumptions (Cont.)

5. Therefore, the jihad endures so long as people die, whether Muslim or Westerner.

Assumptions (Cont.)

6. To defeat this jihad, then, we must identify nonlethal methods that deter terrorists and prevent others from joining their ranks, even as we continue to use lethal force when necessary.

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Who Kills?

• Not “groups”; not religions; not “isms”
• Individual people kill
• Killers have names, personal histories, a relationship to God, emotions, values, family, personality – individual psychological and social backgrounds

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To decrease killing we must understand

• The individuals who kill
• The individuals who agree with the killers but don’t kill
• The individuals who are angry and sympathize with the killers
• The individuals who reject the killers

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Conversion Pathways

• Cultural trends determine what groups are most likely to get the seeker’s attention.
• Personal psychology narrows population of potential interest.
• Something makes person dissatisfied - seeker
• Chance factors (e.g., friendship networks) may determine who gets seeker’s attention.

Conversion Pathway (Cont.)

• Since most groups present benign face to world, chance may determine whether or not seeker affiliates with violent group.
• Powerful inner experiences may enhance commitment.
• Various factors cause high dropout rate in first few years. Others strengthen commitment.
• Some members submitted to brainwashing.

Immediate Goal

• Stop those who want to kill us
• Physically stop terrorists from acting (military & intelligence dimensions)
• Change thinking of terror detainees
• Stop the movement of terrorist sympathizers toward lethal action
• Prevent nonsympathizers from becoming sympathizers (NOT the same as “winning hearts and minds,” i.e., persuade them to “like us”)
• Study all dimensions of this problem

Beliefs do not lead to terrorism

• Bagby (2004) survey of 1276 Muslims attending Friday service at 12 mosques (out of 33) in Detroit
• 8% follow the Salafi approach
• 2.5 million Muslims in U.S.
• 8% of 2.5 million = 200,000 Salafists in the U.S.
• If beliefs were predominant causal factor, one would expect Salafists to be at least somewhat sympathetic to Jihadists.
• If those who attribute terrorism to certain beliefs (e.g., “fundamentalist Islam”) were correct, why are not bombs exploding in the food courts of America’s malls?

Beliefs alone do not lead to terrorism

• The violent must make a quantum jump.
• What determines who makes this jump and why?
• Belief analysis vs. psychological analysis

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Beliefs do not lead to terrorism�(studies)

• Sageman (Understanding Terror Networks)
• Religiosity came after terror affiliation
• Friendship networks
• “emergent quality of the social networks formed by alienated young men who become transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill.”

Beliefs do not Make Terrorists (studies)

• Khosrokhavar (Suicide Bombers)
• “humiliation by proxy”
• “Jihadist Islam can provide converts who are bored with the cowardly approximations of everyday life with a response to their intoxication with death.”
• Martyrdom as way to recover dignity
• Charismatic figures play an important role in conversion
• Logic similar to that in modern cults

Beliefs do not Make Terrorists (Cont.)

• Esposito & Mogahed (Who Speaks for Islam?)
• Gallup World Poll: base claims on data
• Myths about Muslims; diversity of Muslims
• Faith not distinguishing factor causing extremism

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Area of Research

• We must study through individual interviews and other methods those who subscribe to “violence-friendly ideologies” but do NOT become violent.
• This research would provide clues that would help us move others away from the pathway to violence (prevention).

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Beliefs cannot be ignored

• Become the PERCEIVED reason why people joined
• Help sustain commitment by becoming a common thread binding group members
• Can be manipulative tools in the hands of group leaders

In addition to beliefs

• Psychological dynamics
• Personal history
• Unconscious needs
• Psychological mechanisms (e.g., cognitive dissonance, confirmatory bias)
• Social influences
• Cultural context
• Group dynamics (e.g., conformity pressures; management of conflict)
• Other influence and control factors

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Research Area

• Delphi study – “The Delphi Method is based on a structured process for collecting and distilling knowledge from a group of experts by means of a series of questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback”
• Using the Delphi Method to survey and evaluate the opinions of a large and diverse enough pool of Islamic experts should enable researchers to come up with two lists of propositions that, if paired with an agree-disagree rating (e.g., 1-5), could serve as scales to measure the degree to which individuals’ belief systems are congruent with the Muslim mainstream(s) and with radical terrorists.

Cultic Studies Experts

• Are behavioral and social scientists
• Have specialized in studying how people undergo “worldview shifts” (i.e., conversions) in group contexts
• Have experience observing, inducing, or treating the consequences of worldview shifts

“Cultic studies experts can contribute to the international conversation about Jihadism because they have experience in understanding and responding constructively to the large variety of “alien” systems of thought and value observed in cultic organizations.”

Terminology

Ideologically Driven Violence (IDV)

• Meeting in Philadelphia 2007
• Takes focus away from Islam
• Implies commonalities between terrorism within Islam, other faiths or political “creeds,” and cults
• Utility of this or alternate terms to be determined

Changing a cultic system requires that we understand

• the system of influences, control, and relationships
• the ideology
• how the ideology can be used to manipulate the person into supporting a hidden agenda (making person aware of this may initiate the process of deconversion).
• the leader(s)
• the “internalized leader” – inner gatekeeper, interpreter, filter

[exit counseling]

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What about self-starting cells?

• Construe as mini-cults? (ideology, charismatic relationships, and high demands)
• Somebody is or will emerge as the leader
• The leader (and sometimes the followers) borrows, adapts, or creates a high-demand ideology that resonates with his/their psychological needs. Hero worship may be part of that ideology, e.g., bin Laden.
• The leader utilizes social influence techniques to control the followers

What can cultic studies experts do?

• Participate in multidisciplinary research teams
• Consultation and advice on “deprogramming” of detainees, i.e., shift to nonlethal worldviews - understand cultic dynamics and psychodynamics of individuals; importance of multifaceted and differentiated assessments; importance of involving families
• Consultation and advice on preventive strategies – maintain people in or move them to nonlethal worldviews (NOT turn them into Western pluralists. Analogous to helping ex-member adapt to his/her situation, not turning him/her into a Christian, Jew, atheist.)
• In the case of Islam, essential to work closely with Islamic experts