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1

MEV Reduction�via Batch Auctions

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MEV vs HFT

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MEV and HFT similarity:

They represent a race to exploit market opportunities

MEV

HFT

Venue

Blockchain

Traditional exchanges

How to win the race

Tip/bribe miners

Be the fastest / buying speed tech. from exchanges

Who suffers from negative externalities?

Front-run traders, worse prices-> retail & institutional investors

Higher spread in markets -> retail & institutional investors

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Batch Auctions as response to HFT

in traditional finance

3

Paper 2015:

“The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response”

Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, John Shim

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Thesis

4

Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA) are able to reduce the MEV on the application layer

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Agenda

5

  1. Definition Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)
  2. Comparison: Sequential vs batch execution
  3. MEV protections
  4. Challenges with FBA
  5. Conclusions

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Agenda

6

  • Definition Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)
  • Comparison: Sequential vs batch execution
  • MEV protections
  • Challenges with FBA
  • Conclusions

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Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)

7

Discretize trading in time

Collect orders into batches

Calculate 1 uniform clearing price

per batch

clearing

price

amount

price

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Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)

8

Discretize trading in time

Collect orders into batches

Calculate 1 uniform clearing price

per batch

clearing

price

amount

price

given in web3

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Agenda

9

  • Definition Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)
  • Comparison: Sequential vs batch execution
  • MEV protections
  • Challenges with FBA
  • Conclusions

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The inefficiency of sequential trading

in web3

10

  1. Buy-Order
  2. Buy-Order
  3. Buy-Order
  4. Sell-Order

Sequential Execution in 1 block

AMM

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Efficiency of FBA trading in web3

11

AMM

  • Buy-Order
  • Buy-Order
  • Buy-Order
  • Sell-Order

Leftover Order

Batch Execution

=> Less AMM fees, less slippage

clearing price

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Price spreadsexample block: 1417421

12

ETH-USDT price occurrences

price spread of 1.4%

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Price spreadsexample block: 1417421

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ETH-USDT price occurrences

ETH-USDT price occurrences

Auction execution: Additional price improvement 2.5K$

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CoW study: Quantitative impact of FBA

in web3 today

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Surplus yearly:

~27M$ on ETH-USDT

~28M$ on ETH-USDC

if FBA would be used per 1 block

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Agenda

15

  • Definition Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)
  • Comparison: Sequential vs batch execution
  • MEV protections
  • Challenges with FBA
  • Conclusions

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MEV surface

16

AMM

All orders are

prone to MEV-bots

Buy-Order 1

Buy-Order 2

Buy-Order 3

Sell-Order 4

Leftover Order

Only 1 order

is prone to MEV

Sequential Execution

Batch Execution

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Additional MEV protection

17

Less Back-Running:

Optimal trade path is chosen

in the first place

Protocols like CoW Protocol offer also

RFQ trading

RFQ-trading has no MEV surface

Private Submission

Prevent front-running

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CoW study: Quantitative impact of FBA

in web3 today

18

~13% CoW volume

13% of the ETH-USDC volume could be fully settled internal in a batch auction without AMM liquidity

Waiting for CoW

&

Market makers integration

will boost the percentage a lot

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Agenda

19

  • Definition Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)
  • Comparison: Sequential vs batch execution
  • MEV protections
  • Challenges with FBA
  • Conclusions

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Latency

20

  1. Traditionally main critique point
  2. Solving time is not instant
  3. Reduced trade execution speed
  4. Increased inventory risk for market makers

Block n-1

Block n

Price

calculation

Order collection

Not accepting new trades

Submission

13 secs

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Challenges with auctions

21

Information leakage:

  • Information leakage could enable front-run the trade on other market platforms or AMMs.
  • Private mempool/sealed orders might solve it

Incentive compatibility

  • Small trades are incentive compatible
  • Price impact orders are need to be split up, exactly as in the case of continuous trading

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Auction liquidity & AMM price shifts

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Block n-1

Auction price calculation won’t know AMM price shifts within block n

AMM

AMM

AMM

AMM price shifts cause deficits or surpluses of the auction

Block n (1. tx)

Block n (2. tx auction)

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Agenda

23

  • Definition Frequent Batch Auctions (FBA)
  • Comparison: Sequential vs batch execution
  • MEV protections
  • Challenges with FBA
  • Conclusions

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Winners of FBA model

24

Should favor batch auctions

Reason/Examples

Retail investor

Better MEV protection, better price

(if not time critical)

Arbitrageurs

x

They need the speed/bribe to extract value

Market makers

(with inventory risk)

x/

AMMs would earn less fee

Less risk from order snipping

Liquidations

Example: MakerDAO / English Auction

DAO investments

Example: Yearn is using CowSwap

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Dapp layer MEV contribution

25

If we get adoption in green area, => big MEV reduction on Dapp layer

Should favor batch auctions

Example/Comment

Retail investor:

Better MEV protection, better price

Arbitrageurs

x

They need the speed/bribe to extract value

Market makers

x/

AMMs would earn less fee

Less risk from speed snipping

Liquidations

MakerDAO / English Auction

DAO investments

Yearn is using CowSwap

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Thank you for listening

26

This was a lot of theory,� feel free to give it a practical try at

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27

Appendix

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Abstract:

28

MEV reduction on the application layer is important. Batch auctions are a promising venue to reduce the MEV of trading activity. This talk will investigate the benefits, but also all the challenges and shortcomings of auctions usage.

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Main criticism for FBT

In traditional

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Markets are faster than batch time

  • Informations are coming quicker than the th

Incentive compatibility

  • Small trades are incentive compatible
  • Price impact orders are need to be split up, exactly as in the case of continuous trading

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Challenges with auctions

30

Information leakage:

  • Information leakage could enable front-run the trade on other market platforms or AMMs.
  • Sealed order auctions are a solution

Incentive compatibility

  • Small trades are incentive compatible
  • Price impact orders are need to be split up, exactly as in the case of continuous trading

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Batch Auctions as response to HFT

in traditional finance

31

Paper 2015:

“The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response”

Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, John Shim

300M$ Cable for 3 milli sec

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Incentive compatible

32

1. Batch

2. Batch

Revealing willingness to buy

In on batch

Not revealing willingness to buy

In one batch

p

p_1

p_2

p> (p_1+p_1)/2

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Price spreads

example block: 1417421

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Yearly savings (estimated): 30M$ on ETH-USDT only

Auction execution:

price

Clearing price

Additional surplus 2.5K$

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Sequential vs. auction-trading

in web3

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Price ETH/USDC

Price ETH/USDC

# trades

# trades

Prices in a block spread

over a spectrum.

=> MEV opportunities

With auctions: 1 price per block

=> less MEV

Sequential trade execution

FBA trade execution

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Challenges with auctions

35

Auction liquidity

&

AMM price shifts:

Block n-1

Block n

Auction price calculation won’t know AMM price shifts within block n

AMM

AMM

Auctions will suffer deficits or surplus depending on the price changes AMMs