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Course

“HYBRID CONFLICTS AS A THREAT TO SECURITY SYSTEMS”

Academic year 2022-2023

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Jean Monnet Module Erasmus+

“Civil society in conflict resolution process:

the EU experience for Ukraine”

101084973 — EURoCoRP — ERASMUS-JMO-2022-HEI-TCH-RSCH

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HYBRID CONFLICTS AS A THREAT TO SECURITY SYSTEMS

Course Content (1)

Topic 1: Introduction to the course “Hybrid conflicts as a threat to security systems”.

Topic 2: Current research on hybrid conflicts: the experience of the EU for Ukraine.

Topic 3: EU regulatory and legal support in the field of security.

Topic 4: The role of EU institutions in ensuring the 16th and 17th Sustainable Development Goals.

Topic 5: Institutional principles of counteracting hybrid conflicts in the EU and Ukraine.

Topic 6: Activities of The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

Topic 7: Universal and regional systems of collective security in counteracting hybrid conflicts.

Topic 8: Hybrid threats as an object of analysis in the social sciences.

Topic 9: Hybrid political conflict as an object of study and research.

Topic 10: Hybrid political conflict: origin, forms, causes, driving forces, specifics.

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HYBRID CONFLICTS AS A THREAT TO SECURITY SYSTEMS

Course Content (2)

Topic 11: Cycles of hybrid political conflict.

Topic 12: Hybrid war: types of weapons and ways to start a war.

Topic 13: Hybrid peace as a category in conflict studies.

Topic 14: Security asymmetry in the era of globalization.

Topic 15: Problems of deterrence of hybrid conflicts: EU practices.

Topic 16: Prevention as a way to counter hybrid conflicts.

Topic 17: Non-traditional threats and modern security systems.

Topic 18: OSCE cooperation with Ukraine in shaping the security system.

Topic 19: Reforming the security sector in the context of the spread of hybrid threats: the EU experience for Ukraine.

Topic 20: The role of the EU in resolving the current situation in Ukraine: humanitarian aid, investment support and EU sanctions policy.

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Topic 16: Prevention as a way to counter hybrid conflicts

  • The practice of improving early warning and situational awareness, strategic communications and signals, crisis response, resilience, cyber defense, and energy security.
  • Development of capabilities for statewide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats.
  • The doctrine of countering hybrid threats is based on the Finnish model of integrated security.
  • Conducting situational exercises and discussions based on scenarios.

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Thomas–Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument

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The practice of improving early warning and situational awareness, strategic communications and signals, crisis response, resilience, cyber defense, and energy security (1)

In Conflict Studies, the term conflict prevention is often used, which means forecasting possible conflict situations in systems of specific interactions and taking measures to prevent them.

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Conflict management is the process of conflict control by its participants or external forces (government, manager, entrepreneur, special persons, etc.). The main thing here is to limit the conflict within certain limits and prevent its escalation. When we talk about conflict management, we mean that it is not yet resolved, but is under control.

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Completion of the conflict - its termination by changing the objective conditions. The end of the conflict does not mean its resolution, since no agreement is reached on the subject itself.

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The practice of improving early warning and situational awareness, strategic communications and signals, crisis response, resilience, cyber defense, and energy security (2)

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“Protection of civilians is mandated in most UN peace operations and has a prominent role in the work of security actors worldwide; but a mandate to protect is not enough. Those implementing civilian protection need granular data and improved situational awareness to help apply positive protection protocols proactively”.

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“Mapping Data-Driven Tools and Systems

for Early Warning, Situational Awareness, and Early Action”

by Allard Duursma

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A Strategic Compass For Security And Defence. For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security

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Watch this video

A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence by 2030

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https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (1)

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  • JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response (JOIN/2016/018 final)

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  • This Joint Communication outlines actions designed to help counter hybrid threats and foster the resilience at the EU and national level, as well as partners. As the focus is on improving awareness, it is proposed to establish dedicated mechanisms to exchange information with Member States and to coordinate the EU’s capacity to deliver strategic communications. Actions have been outlined to build resilience in areas such as cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, protecting the financial system from illicit use and efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalisation. In each of these areas, implementation of agreed strategies by the EU and the Member States, as well as Member States’ full implementation of existing legislation will be a key first step, while some more concrete actions have been put forward to further reinforce these efforts.

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (2)

  • As regards preventing, responding to and recovering from hybrid threats, it is proposed to examine the feasibility of applying the Solidarity Clause Article 222 TFEU (as specified in the relevant Decision) and Art. 42(7) TEU, in case a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs. Strategic decision making capacity could be enhanced by establishing a common operational protocol.
  • Finally, it is proposed to step up cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO in common efforts to counter hybrid threats.
  • In implementing this Joint Framework, the High Representative and the Commission are committed in mobilising relevant EU instruments at their respective disposal. It is important for the EU, together with the Member States, to work to reduce risks associated with exposure to potential hybrid threats from state and non-state actors.

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (3)

  • Action 1: Member States, supported as appropriate by the Commission and the High Representative, are invited to launch a hybrid risk survey to identify key vulnerabilities, including specific hybrid related indicators, potentially affecting national and pan-European structures and networks.
  • Action 2: Creation of an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell within the existing EU INTCEN structure, capable of receiving and analysing classified and open source information on hybrid threats. Member States are invited to establish National Contact Points on hybrid threats to ensure cooperation and secure communication with the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell.
  • Action 3: The High Representative will explore with Member States ways to update and coordinate capacities to deliver proactive strategic communications and optimise use of media monitoring and linguistic specialists.
  • Action 4: Member States are invited to consider establishing a Centre of Excellence for ‘countering hybrid threats’.

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (4)

  • Action 5: The Commission, in cooperation with Member States and stakeholders, will identify common tools, including indicators, with a view to improve protection and resilience of critical infrastructure against hybrid threats in relevant sectors.
  • Action 6: The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, will support efforts to diversify energy sources and promote safety and security standards to increase resilience of nuclear infrastructures
  • Action 7: The Commission will monitor emerging threats across the transport sector and will update legislation where appropriate. In implementing the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the EU Customs Risk Management Strategy and Action Plan, the Commission and the High Representative (within their respective compentences), in coordination with Member States, will examine how to responad to hybrid threats, in particular those concerning transport critical infrastructure.
  • Action 8: Within the context of the upcoming Space Strategy and European Defence Action Plan, the Commission will propose to increase the resilience of space infrastructure against hybrid threats, in particular, through a possible extension of the Space Surveillance and Tracking scope to cover hybrid threats, the preparation for the next generation of GovSatCom at European level and the introduction of Galileo in critical infrastructures dependant on time synchronisation.

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (5)

  • Action 9: The High Representative, supported as appropriate by Member States, in liaison with the Commission, will propose projects on how to adapt defence capabilities and development of EU relevance, specifically to counter hybrid threats against a Member State or several Member States.
  • Action 10: The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, will improve awareness of and resilience to hybrid threats within existing preparedness and coordination mechanisms, notably the Health Security Committee.
  • Action 11: The Commission encourages Member States as a matter of priority to establish and fully utilise a network between the 28 CSIRTs and the CERT-EU as well as a framework for strategic cooperation. The Commission, in coordination with Member States, should ensure that sectorial initiatives on cyber threats (e.g. aviation, energy, maritime) are consistent with cross-sectorial capabilities covered by the NIS Directive to pool information, expertise and rapid responses.
  • Action 12: The Commission, in coordination with Member States, will work together with industry within the context of a contractual Public Private Partnership for cybersecurity, to develop and test technologies to better protect users and infrastructures against cyber aspects of hybrid threats.

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (6)

  • Action 13: The Commission will issue guidance to smart grid asset owners to improve cybersecurity of their installations. In the context of the electricity market design initiative, the Commission will consider proposing 'risk preparedness plans' and procedural rules for sharing information and ensuring solidarity across Member States in times of crisis, including rules on how to prevent and mitigate cyber-attacks.
  • Action 14: The Commission, in cooperation with ENISA , Member States, relevant international, European and national authorities and financial institutions, will promote and facilitate threat information-sharing platforms and networks and address factors that hinder the exchange of such information.
  • Action 15: The Commission and the High Representative (within their respective areas of competence), in coordination with Member States, will examine how to respond to hybrid threats, in particular those concerning cyber-attacks across the transport sector.
  • Action 16: The Commission will use the implementation of the Action Plan on Terrorist Financing to also contribute to countering hybrid threats.

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (7)

  • Action 17: The Commission is implementing the actions against radicalisation set out in the European Agenda on Security and is analysing the need to reinforce procedures for removing illegal content, calling on intermediaries' due diligence in managing networks and systems.
  • Action 18: The High Representative, in coordination with the Commission, will launch a hybrid risk survey in neighbourhood regions. The High Representative, the Commission and Member States will use the instruments at their respective disposal to build partners' capacities and strengthen their resilience to hybrid threats. CSDP missions could be deployed, independently or to complement EU instruments, to assist partners in enhancing their capacities.
  • Action 19: The High Representative and the Commission, in coordination with the Member States, will establish a common operational protocol and carry out regular exercises to improve strategic decision-making capacity in response to complex hybrid threats building on the Crisis Management and Integrated Political Crisis Response procedures.

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Development of capabilities for state-wide and national approaches to countering hybrid threats (8)

  • Action 20: The Commission and the High Representative, in their respective areas of competence, will examine the applicability and practical implications of Articles 222 TFEU and Article 42(7) TEU in case a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs.
  • Action 21: The High Representative, in coordination with Member States, will integrate, exploit and coordinate the capabilities of military action in countering hybrid threats within the Common Security and Defence Policy.
  • Action 22: The High Representative, in coordination with the Commission, will continue informal dialogue and enhance cooperation and coordination with NATO on situational awareness, strategic communications, cybersecurity and "crisis prevention and response" to counter hybrid threats, respecting the principles of inclusiveness and autonomy of each organisation's decision making process.

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The doctrine of countering hybrid threats is based on the Finnish model of integrated security (1)

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“The Finnish concept for comprehensive security means that society’s vital functions are secured through collaboration between the authorities, the business community, organisations and citizens.”

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Watch this video

What’s up with well-being data – collaboration?

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https://youtu.be/yP_o493Qnnw

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The doctrine of countering hybrid threats is based on the Finnish model of integrated security (2)

The purpose of the 2nd Doctrine Forum was:

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a. The description of the SP role in countering hybrid threats.

b. The promotion of SP as an effective tool to prevent and mitigate hybrid

threats.

c. The identification of legal framework implications in countering hybrid

threats.

d. The identification of possible improvements of the Allied doctrinal corpus

with regards to the role of SP in countering hybrid threats.

e. The enlargement of the SP network.

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Conducting situational exercises and discussions based on scenarios

Conducting a Discussion-Based Exercise

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https://youtu.be/f0YvoODn-js

Watch this video

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Sources (1)

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Sources (2)

  • The Finnish Concept for Comprehensive Security. URL: https://www.defmin.fi/files/3827/Valtonen_2017_06_14_FI_Concept_for_Comprehensive_Security_Valtonen.pdf.
  • The role of Stability Policing in countering hybrid threats 2nd Doctrine Forum Final Report. 2022. URL: https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20public/20230207_sp%20doctrine%20forum%202022_final%20report.pdf.
  • Ґеник М. Методологічні проблеми міждисциплінарних досліджень миру. Політичні дослідження / Political Studies : Український науковий журнал, 2021, (1), 8–21. URL: http://pd.ipiend.gov.ua/article/view/235379.
  • Національна стійкість України: стратегія відповіді на виклики та випередження гібридних загроз: національна доповідь / ред. кол. С. І. Пирожков, О. М. Майборода, Н. В. Хамітов, Є. І. Головаха, С. С. Дембіцький, В. А. Смолій, О. В. Скрипнюк, С. В. Стоєцький / Інститут політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І. Ф. Кураса НАН України. Київ, 2022. 552 с.
  • Управління конфліктами для потреб публічної служби: посібник і методичні рекомендації / Калениченко Т., Кисельова Т., Копіна А., Корабльова О., Проценко Д., за заг. ред. Д. Проценко. Київ: Ваіте, 2 224 с.
  • Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen and Tapio Juntunen. From “spiritual defense” to robust resilience in the Finnish comprehensive security model. Nordic Societal Security. Routledge, 2020. рр. 154-178. DOI: 10.4324/9781003045533-11.

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Jean Monnet Actions

Useful links

EURoCoRP

Ostroh Academy, NU

European Commission

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�Thank you for attention!

Prof. in charge – Kateryna Yakunina, PhD

Co-Lecturer - Sergii Ishchuk, Doc. Sci.

Co-Lecturer - Tetiana Sydoruk, Doc. Sci.

Co-Lecturer - Dmytro Shevchuk, Doc. Sci.

Co-Lecturer - Olena Shershnova, PhD

The National University of Ostroh Academy

https://www.oa.edu.ua/

https://eurocorp.oa.edu.ua/