1 of 29

An Air Force At Dawn��The Maturing of American Airpower in WWII’s ETO��Matt Caffrey

Matthew B. Caffrey Jr.

Chief, Wargaming

Requirements Directorate

Air Force Research Laboratory

July 2007

Cleared for unlimited release

AFRL 07-0043

2 of 29

My Bio

  • DoD Civil Servant – previous positions
    • Professor of Wargaming, ACSC
    • Research Associate, SAAS
  • Col USAFR (ret.) - USAFR Assignments
    • Senior Reservist, AFRL, Info Directorate
    • Chief Wargaming, AF/XOOC (Checkmate)
  • Author/speaker
    • Co-author Gulf War Fact Book
    • Many articles, chapters, hundreds of talks

3 of 29

4 of 29

Thesis

Both the US Army Air Forces and their ground forces colleagues went through a similar learning process. Later events indicated not all lessons were remembered.

5 of 29

Overview

  • Per War contact sports
  • On the Brink
  • Torch – how much can go wrong
  • Kasserine – myth and reality
  • Tunisia – victory through airpower?
  • Sicily – missed opportunity
  • Italy – limits of airpower, true and false
  • Strategic Bombing – trial and error
  • Air Land Battle – good, better, best
  • System Bombing – the delayed victory

6 of 29

Per War Contact Sports

  • Anticipating best use of Airpower hard
    • Limited reference base
    • Tech progress made relevance uncertain
  • From distance of time fight seemed over winning more then National Defense
    • Mitchell courts marshal
    • Foulois Letter of reprimand
    • Chennault's pulled slot
    • Near death of multi engine aircraft

7 of 29

On the Brink

  • Tech base strengthened by “duel use”
  • Industry energized by allies
  • Strong “merchant marine” of civil aviation
  • Lessons learned or miss learned
    • Louisiana Maneuvers fixed?
    • Superficial report on Battle of Britain

8 of 29

On the Brink

Aircraft: from leading edge to trailing edge

9 of 29

Torch �How Much Can Go Wrong

8 November 1942

  • Grand entrance – but what now?
  • Who is in charge?
  • Who builds airfields?
  • How do you measure airpower?
  • The tyranny of geography and logistic

​

10 of 29

Kasserine – Myth and Reality

14-22 February 1943 – Battle of Kasserine

  • The Myth – “Air Umbrellas” responsible
  • The Truth
    • Allies had far more aircraft, Germans had air superiority
    • Divided control of air DID contribute to defeat

11 of 29

Kasserine – Myth and Reality

14-22 February 1943 – Battle of Kasserine

  • The Rest of the Truth
    • Slow arrival of aviation engineers major cause

​

​

​

​

​

​

Army accepted myth – first JFACC

12 of 29

Tunisia – Victory Through Airpower?

3-13 May 42 – Battle for Tunisia

  • The Palm Sunday Massacre
  • Air Blockade

​

​

​

​

275,000 Axis prisoners

13 of 29

Sicily – Missed Opportunity

11 July – 17 August

  • “Tactical” Airpower staying up with the fight
  • “Strategic” Airpower demurs

​

14 of 29

15 of 29

Italy – limits of airpower, true and false

  • Anzio – again the importance of sortie rates
  • Strangle
    • The spin
    • The truth
    • The hole truth

16 of 29

Strategic Bombing – trial and error

17 of 29

Strategic Bombing – trial and error

18 of 29

Strategic Bombing – trial and error

  • The Bomber did get through
  • How not to pick targets
  • The hazards of a thinking adversary

19 of 29

Strategic Bombing – trial and error

20 of 29

Victory Over the Rich

20-25 February 1944 – Big Week

21 of 29

Air Land Battle – the not so good

  • Ike threatens to resign
  • Wins battle of the buildup, but
    • Overkill on trans
    • Friendly fire
    • Futile sorties
  • Still
    • 2 Luftwaffe sorties
    • 1 Key hit

22 of 29

Air Land Battle – Better

  • Patton’s innovations
    • Air as maneuver element – cavalry screen
    • Ground/air team
    • Patton’s air force?

23 of 29

24 of 29

Air Land Battle – The Best

Air Battle over the Bulge – myth vs reality

  • Luftwaffe
    • Cover Story – shock 8th Air Force
    • Crack front – then bad weather
  • 9th Air Force
    • First day caught elsewhere
    • Effects based airpower
    • Now they notice

1 Jan 1945

    • Death ride of the Luftwaffe
    • Pride of the 9th

25 of 29

System Bombing� The Delayed Victory

Turning off the Rich

  • Synthetic Fuel
    • Tough to replace losses
  • Transportation
    • Blockading Coal

​

What might have been…

26 of 29

27 of 29

Lessons�Learned and Forgotten

  • JFACC Good
    • Relearned in Korea
    • Relearned in Vietnam
    • Resisted in Gulf War I
  • Air only as mobile as bases (engineers good)
    • Relearned in Korea
    • Relearned in Vietnam
    • “Accident” of Gulf War I no accident

28 of 29

Lessons�Learned and Forgotten

  • Enemy as a system
    • Vague idea late in Korea
    • More vague in Vietnam
    • Planners understood concept in Gulf War I
  • Importance of Air Superiority
    • Remember in Korea
    • Relearned in Vietnam
    • High art in Gulf War I

29 of 29

Lessons�Learned and Forgotten

  • Importance of Sortie Rate
    • Vague idea in Korea
    • Forgotten late 50’s, 60’s
    • Well understood today