Climate Politics -�The road to Paris, Glasgow and Sharm-el-Sheikh
By Meena Raman
Third World Network
UNFCC: took effect 21 March 1994 - key takeaways
Climate change is a global problem and needs a global solution.
The largest share of historical and current global emissions of GHGs gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs
Principle of equity and CBDR embedded in the Convention.
Developed countries to take the lead in emissions reductions.
Developed countries to provide finance, technology transfer and capacity-building to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation.
What the CBDR principle required ---
This equity principle recognised that the major contribution to pollution (including Greenhouse Gas emissions) and resource depletion was by developed countries, and that developing countries are now disadvantaged because there is little “environmental space”, including the “carbon space” or “carbon budget” left, which has implications for their future development.
Hence, developed countries must take the lead in taking action and must assist developing countries through the provision of the means to implement their actions so that equity is realised.
Kyoto Protocol – an offspring of the UNFCCC
Second commitment period (2CP) was meant to be from 2013-2o2o (8 years).
In Doha (2012), aggregate cut was to be 18% cut from 1990 levels, with an agreement to revisit and raise further ambition by 2014, at least by 25 – 40% from 1990 levels.
Instead, several annex 1 parties left the KP or did not take on 2CP.
Canada left while Japan, New Zealand and Russia decided against a 2CP.
Only EU countries, Australia and Norway agreed to 2CP; But no one revisited their targets. So only 18% cut needed from 1990 levels.
Instead of raising their emissions targets, developed countries are actually increasing.
Came into effect on 11 Dec 1997
US refused to ratify; so not a Party
For annex 1 countries (developed countries) to undertake targets for emission cuts. Developing countries had no emission reductions targets
First commitment period was from 2008 - 2012
Aggregate cut was 5% reductions from 1990 levels
The Bali Road Map – 2007 – a key milestone
Major effort to get US on Board for negotiations under the Convention for emission cuts comparable to developed countries who were negotiating the 2CP under the KP.
US wanted to do away with distinction between developed and developing countries. It also advocated non-binding actions for emissions reductions.
The US proposal was rejected by the Europeans and developing countries.
Final compromise was for developed countries to undertake emission cuts and for those efforts to be comparable. Developing countries were supposed to undertake nationally appropriate mitigation actions which are to be supported by technology and enabled financing.
Conference agreed to launch a ‘comprehensive process’ to implement the Convention and for an outcome by COP 15 – at the Copenhagen COP.
The Bali Road-map – a North-South battle
Since Bali, the climate talks have been a clash of perspectives and paradigms, mainly along North-South lines, although there have also been differences among developing countries.
Generally, developing countries have stressed the need to base the talks on the equity principle, arguing that developed countries have to take the lead in mitigation by committing to deep emission cuts by 2020, and for
The provision of substantial finance and technology to developing countries .
Developing countries have seen this as necessary to enhance their own climate actions, while pursuing their development priorities.
A clash of paradigms
Developed countries argued that a category of developing countries, (sometimes called ‘advanced developing countries’, ‘major economies’, or ‘major emitters’) should take on binding or almost-binding targets, and
that all but the most vulnerable should be subjected to having their actions measured, reported and verified (MRVed) by an international process, under what was referred to as a ‘transparency framework’.
This was strongly resisted esp. by developing countries like China and India. Several developing countries stressed need to look at:
Historical/cumulative emissions and not just current and future emissions;
Per capita emissions and not absolute emissions;
Equitable access to atmospheric space.
Not just mitigation but also adaptation, loss and damage and means of implementation – finance and technology transfer for developing countries.
Copenhagen 2009: COP 15 collapsed�
Process was non-transparent, undemocratic and not inclusive.
Weak Copenhagen Accord hatched by a small group of leaders was rejected by several developing countries.
Strong N-S divide remained on many key issues.
Cancun COP 16 – 2010 – key outcomes
Cancun outcome was seen as important to ‘save’ the multilateral system after Copenhagen debacle
US approach of voluntary pledge and review process prevailed instead of top-down legally-binding system for emissions reductions of developed countries – despite objections by Bolivia.
Other developed countries ‘escape’ from legally-binding KP 2CP with a top-down approach to weaker pledge and review system.
Agreement to mobilise US $ 100 billion per year by 2020 for developing countries
Agreed to set up of Green Climate Fund and more institutions e.g.
Standing Committee on Finance
Technology Executive Committee
Adaptation Committee
Durban COP, 2011 – launch of negotiations for new global deal
Main outcome: was the Durban Platform – to work on a new legal outcome that eventually led to Paris Agreement in 2015
Also adopted was the Green Climate Fund’s governing instrument, paving the way for its establishment. It is now hosted in Songdo, S. Korea
Paris Agreement – a big North-South fight
The PA adopted at COP21 in Dec 2015 and came into effect in 2016, was the outcome of major battles on a multitude of issues.
Developing countries by and large had these negotiating objectives.
They wanted the following :
What developing countries wanted – continued -
(d) ensure differentiation between developed and developing countries reflected with the principles of equity and CBDR;
(e) ensure that developed countries enhance the provision of finance and technology transfer’
(f) ensure that ‘loss and damage’ is recognised as a separate pillar apart from adaptation and for
(g) legally binding provisions, especially on the developed countries.
What the US and its allies wanted
The US and allies wanted the opposite of what major developing countries wanted.
They mounted an onslaught on the Convention, seeking to weaken the provisions and their obligations;
Redefine differentiation so as to blur the different obligations of developed and developing countries;
and sought a legal “hybrid” (in terms of what clauses are and are not legally binding), mainly to suit the US administration’s relations with the US Congress which is hostile to the climate change issue.
What prevailed
Some of the key points gained by developing countries were that –
Although the temp goal is to limit temperature rise to well below 2 degree C from pre-industrial levels, there is reference to pursuing efforts to limit temperature rise to below 1.5 degree C is .
The PA is not mitigation-centric;
Loss and damage recognised as a separate pillar – apart from adaptation.
The Convention was successfully defended and the plans of developed countries to drastically re-write it was stopped;
Differentiation between developed and developing countries was retained in the main, although weakened in some areas. The principles of equity and CBDR were mentioned.
Developed countries should take the lead in mitigation and in the provision of finance.
PA- glass half full or half empty?
The PA fails to provide actions that fulfil the 2 degree C pathway, let alone 1.5 degrees C.
The emissions gap between what countries in aggregate should do and what they pledged to do in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) up to 2030 is very large, that can lead to a 3-5 degree C world.
This has led many commentators to condemn the Paris COP21 as a failure.
Another perspective is that COP21 is only a start, and the PA represents an agreement internationally to enhance individual and collective actions to face the climate catastrophe.
A real failure would have been a collapse of the Paris negotiations, Copenhagen-style, or an outcome that only favours the developed countries with the rewriting of the Convention.
Foundation for more ambition?
The PA has laid the foundation on which future actions can be motivated and incentivised, a baseline from which more ambitious actions must flow.
There are mechanisms in place in the PA, such as the global stocktake (GST), that can be used to encourage countries to raise their ambition level.
International cooperation, however inadequate and flawed, remains intact from which much more cooperation can flow in future.
The outcome represented by the PA, that a bottom-up approach is taken on enabling each country to choose its “nationally determined contribution” with presently very weak or even no compliance, was the only possibility, given the state of many governments (including the US) generally not being ready or willing or able to undertake legally binding targets.
Article 3 – Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)
As NDCs are a global response to climate change all Parties to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts covering mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building and a transparency framework with view to achieving purpose of PA.
If intended NDC contains time frame up to 2025, to communicate by 2020 new NDC and to do so every 5 years
Efforts to reflect progression over time, recognizing need to support developing countries for effective implementation
If intended NDCs contain a timeframe up to 2030, to communicate by 2020 these contributions and to do so every 5 years
Article 4 – deals with NDCs and mitigation
Parties aim to reach global peaking of emissions as soon as possible; will take longer for developing countries and to undertake rapid reductions so as to balance between emissions and sinks in 2nd half of century, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty
Each party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve; pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions
Cooperative approaches- art 6
Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation
Use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) towards NDCs i.e. carbon-markets
Art. 6.2
Mitigation mechanism and support sustainable development
Art. 6.4
Non-market based approaches
Art.6.8
Adaptation – article 7
Global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity; strengthening resilience; reducing vulnerability; contributing to sustainable development and ensuring adequate response re temperature goal
Recognise support for adaptation
Each party submit and update periodically an adaptation communication without creating additional burden on developing countries
Adaptation communication can be a component of an NDC
Loss and damage- article 8
Recognise L and D;
Warsaw Mechanism may be enhanced and strengthened;
Enhance understanding, action and support - Early warning systems, Emergency preparedness, Slow onset events, Events –irreversible and permanent L and D, Risk insurance, Non-economic losses, Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems
BUT: para 52/CP.21 – article 8 does not involve or provide basis for any liability or compensation
Finance- article 9
Developed countries shall provide financial resources to developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation
Should represent a progression beyond previous efforts
Scaled-up resources should aim for balance between mitigation and adaptation
Consider need for public and grant based resources for adaptation
Developed countries shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing countries;
From COP21 decision –
Developed countries intend to continue existing mobilisation goal through 2025;
Prior to 2025, CMA shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD100 per year.
Global stocktake – article 14
Periodic taking stock of implementation of the PA to assess collective progress towards achieving the purpose and its long-term goals.
Outcome shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support and in enhancing international cooperation for climate action
1st GST in 2023 and every 5 years thereafter
Post Paris – N-S fight over PA implementation rules
From 2016 onwards, focus was on negotiating the rules for the implementation of the PA.
Developed countries continued to insist that NDCs were about mitigation. This was countered by some major developing countries.
Overall approach of developed countries seems to undermine equity and CBDR principle - From common but differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing countries to common and shared responsibilities.
Their approach is to NOT look at historical/cumulative emissions but at current and future emissions, with developed and developing countries at the same starting point. This continues even until today.
Developing countries wanted focus also on developed countries meeting their promises made pre-2020 under the Convention decisions.
Katowice rules: a few key areas -
Parties have to provide up-front information about their NDCs. This can cover the full scope of NDCs viz. not only mitigation, but also adaptation and the means of implementation (finance, technology and capacity-building).
The information to be provided about the NDCs is mandatory only for the 2nd and subsequent NDCs – which means for most countries for NDCs post 2030.
Under the enhanced transparency framework of the PA to report and review the actions and support provided and received, all parties are required to submit their first biennial transparency report (BTR) accordance with the Katowice guidelines by 31 Dec 2024, with flexibilities granted to developing countries.
Some other key Katowice outcomes
The package of decisions adopted also included guidelines that relate to:
Glasgow Outcomes:�Overall narrative of false solutions for the Great Escape/�Carbon Colonialism
2 years for UN SG/UK Presidency/UNFCCC Secretariat in preparing overall narrative and pressure of pretense of keeping 1.5°C alive with charade of net zero targets for all by 2050, with carbon markets/offsets in nature based solutions - all of which legitimized at COP 26.
Myth of saving the planet has been secured with these false solutions. A Big Con!
Meeting emissions gap between temperature limit and NDCs without differentiation – ‘common and shared responsibilities’ instead of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; ‘all parties’; ‘taking into account national circumstances’ for all.
No to fair-shares, no historical responsibility and cumulative emissions of past and present. Focus only on future emissions; no account of consumption emissions.
Pretense of ambition in phase-out/phase-down of fossil fuels – with focus only on unabated coal; fossil fuel subsidies; first time mention of coal and fossil fuel subsidies – but with qualifiers and no differentiation. Actual expansion in fossil fuel extraction/production in the North
Strong US pressure with US ‘leadership’ once again
UK Presidency complicit with US to enable a deal
G77 – disunited over mitigation approach and carbon markets
No international cooperation but competition – Carbon border measures; no relaxation of IP (even for pandemic). Cold war – US-China!
MITIGATION AMBITION WITH NO AMBITION IN FINANCE
Decides to establish a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation…and requests the SBs to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by CMA 4, in a manner that complements the global stocktake (Para 27, of dec. 1/CMA3)
Global Stocktake in 2023 is comprehensive – assessment of collective efforts implementing all Paris goals, ‘considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science
Mitigation-centric approach with no commensurate finance for developing countries for ramping up mitigation ambition
Requests Parties to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their nationally determined contributions as necessary to align with the PA temperature goal by the end of 2022 (para 29)
Requests Secretariat to annually update the synthesis report (para 30)
Annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition (para 31);
Urges Parties that have not yet done so to communicate, by CMA 4, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies…towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around midcentury, taking into account different national circumstances (para 32)
The ‘controversial’ coal para
From the G20 Rome Summit Declaration ( Oct 30-31, 2021)
27. We will increase our efforts to implement the commitment made in 2009 in Pittsburgh to phase out and rationalize, over the medium term, inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption and commit to achieve this objective, while providing targeted support for the poorest and the most vulnerable.
28. …We will cooperate on deployment and dissemination of zero or low carbon emission and renewable technologies, including sustainable bioenergy, to enable a transition towards low-emission power systems. This will also enable those countries that commit to phasing out investment in new unabated coal power generation capacity to do so as soon as possible. We commit to mobilize international public and private finance to support green, inclusive and sustainable energy development and we will put an end to the provision of international public finance for new unabated coal power generation abroad by the end of 2021.
Para 36 of decision 1/CMA 3
Calls upon Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition (para 36)
Overwhelming domination of developed countries in past emissions
| Past Emissions: Cumulative Emissions 1850-1990 | Present Emissions: Cumulative Emissions 1991-2018 | Share of Global Population | ||
| [GtCO2eq] | Share of Global Emissions (%) | [GtCO2eq] | Share of Global Emissions (%) | (2018) |
All Annex-I | 976 | 71% | 500 | 46% | 18% |
All Non-Annex-I | 395 | 29% | 584 | 54% | 82% |
FINANCE
Process for the new collective quantified goal on climate finance agreed to.
According to UNFCCC’s Needs Determination Report, the current NDCs of developing countries (for the time frame 2021-2030), with only 30% of the costs quantified, USD 5-11 trillion needed!
Mandate for the Standing Committee on Finance to work on climate finance “definitions”
Glasgow decision only “notes with deep regret that the goal of developed countries to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020…has not yet been met”.
ADAPTATION
EXPECTATIONS
Call for a concrete process on the Global Goal on Adaptation of:
OUTCOMES
Adaptation got its due recognition at COP 26, and it got the political importance it deserves
A two-year (2022-2023) Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, work on which will began in 2022 in June.
Developed countries urged to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources
LOSS AND DAMAGE
EXPECTATIONS
Additional finance from developed countries and effective mechanism and approaches for loss and damage action and support
OUTCOMES
No additional finance. Instead of calls for a facility, the ‘Glasgow dialogue’ was established, where developing countries are expected to raise the issue of financing loss and damage
Functions of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage agreed – for technical assistance to developing countries
Key demands for COP 27
Developed countries ramp up their mitigation targets to be consistent with their fair shares. Not net zero by 2050, but real zero and fair-shares finance.
Fossil fuel phase out for developed countries – not just coal but oil and gas as well.
Just and equitable transition for developing countries
Oppose carbon markets and offsets, especially in so-called nature based solutions!
Concrete delivery of the $100 billion goal – should not be debt-creating and should be mainly from public sources and increased allocation for adaptation.
Santiago Network on Loss/Damage – operationalised to meet real needs and demands of impacted peoples.
Loss and Damage finance facility established.
for further information -
Contact meena@twnetwork.org
Visit TWN website: https://www.twn.my/
See also new book by TWN – ‘A Clash of Climate Change Paradigms – Negotiations and Outcomes at the UN Climate Convention’ by Martin Khor and Meenakshi Raman at TWN bookshop on the web.