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Deterrence Theory

Dr Punita Pathak

Assistant Professor

VCW, Rajghat, BHU,

Varanasi

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A world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for all of us.

Margaret Thatcher

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Prominent Thinkers

  • Bernard Brodie
  • Henry Kissinger
  • Thomas Schelling
  • Herman Kahn
  • Albert Wohlstetter

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Deterrence theory 

  • It is based on the idea that an inferior force, by virtue of the destructive power of the force's weapons, could deter a more powerful adversary,
  • Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons 

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  • Distinct from, the concept of Mutual assured destruction, which models the preventative nature of full-scale nuclear attack that would devastate both parties in a nuclear war. 
  • It is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started by means of threat of reprisal, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires.

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  • Don’t do this ( restriction)
  • Punishment and pay the cost
  • Giving threat to other not to attack me, if they do so then they would be punished

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  • Aims to persuade the opponent not to initiate action
  • A psychological phenomenon
  • No physical involvement rather psychological threat.

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Concept

  • To use military threats to deter international crises and war that is by the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.
  • The threat which serves as a deterrent to such an extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur.

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  • In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the threat of use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

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Deterrence Effect = Estimated Capability X Estimated Intent��

Components of Deterrence

Credibility (Intention to employ it)

Communication

Capability

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�Steps of deterrence

  • Weigh interests at stake
  • Convey commitment to defend those interests
  • Back commitments by threats to respond if the opponent acts
  • Make such threat appear credible and sufficient in the eyes of the opponents.

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Defence

  • Ability to defend oneself against an act of aggression
  • Follows the failure of deterrence

Deterrence

  • Ability to persuade the adversary from committing act of aggression
  • Based on the threat of retaliation with force to inflict unacceptable damage.

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Underlying assumptions of deterrence theory

  1. Decisions by both the defender and challenger will be based on rational calculations of probable costs and gains, accurate evaluations of the situation and careful assessment of relative capabilities
  2. A high level of threat, such as that posed by the nuclear weapons, inhibits rather than provokes aggressive behaviour.
  3. The value hierarchies of both the defender and the challenger are similar, at least to the point that each places the avoidance of large scale violence at or near top.

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  1. Both sides have similar frames of reference so that signals of resolve and reassurance are perceived and interpreted accurately.
  2. Decisions are not sensitive to such extraneous considerations as domestic political pressures.
  3. Both sides maintain tight centralized control over decisions that might involve or provoke the use of strategic weapons.

Deterrence thus presupposes rational and predictable decision processes.

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Types

  • Huth divided deterrence into two broad categories
  • Preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur when there is a territorial dispute between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene
  • Preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a great power becomes involved

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  • Huth divided deterrence into one more category
  • Deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence)
  • Deterrence strategy to prevent a military conflict or short term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).

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  • A successful deterrence policy must be considered when it fulfills
  • Military terms
  • Political terms

International Relations (IR)

Foreign policy

Diplomacy

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In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which threatens armed conflict and possibly war.

The prevention of crises of wars however is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, then it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.

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Factors for successful deterrence

  • (i) A defending state strategy that firstly balances credible coercion and deft

diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and

coercive credibility, and secondly minimizes international and domestic constraints

(ii)The extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and

economic conditions.

  • In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of non-compliance it can impose on, and the benefits of compliance it can offer to, another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.

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  • Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD).
  • Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.

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  • A successful nuclear deterrent requires that a country preserve its ability to retaliate, either by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or by ensuring a second strike capability.
  • A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia, the People's Republic of China and India. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea- and air-based nuclear weapons

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Criticism

  • Deterrence theory is criticized for its assumptions about opponent rationales.
  • First, it is argued that suicidal or psychotic opponents may not be deterred by either forms of deterrence.
  • Second, if two enemy states both possess nuclear weapons, Country X may try to gain a first-strike advantage by suddenly launching weapons at Country Y, with a view to destroying its enemy's nuclear launch silos thereby rendering Country Y incapable of a response.
  • Third, diplomatic misunderstandings and/or opposing political ideologies may lead to escalating mutual perceptions of threat, and a subsequent arms race that elevates the risk of actual war,

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  • Recently, many mainstream politicians, academic analysts, and retired military leaders have also criticized deterrence and advocated nuclear disarmament. 
  • Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz have urged the world free of nuclear weapons.
  • Organisations such as Global Zero, an international non-partisan group of 300 world leaders dedicated to achieving nuclear disarmament, have also been established.
  • Paul Virilio has criticized nuclear deterrence as anachronistic in the age of information warfare since disinformation and kompromat are the current threats to suggestible populations. The wound inflicted on unsuspecting populations he calls an "integral accident"

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Thank You