An Introduction to U.S. Procurement�Days 1 and 2
Professor Christopher Yukins
George Washington University Law School
Washington DC
Monday-Wednesday
December 8-10, 2025
University of Paris Nanterre
Class Materials on publicprocurementinternational.com
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Introduce Yourself
Please send an email to Professor Yukins, cyukins@law.gwu.edu, with
Professor Christopher Yukins George Washington University Law School
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Readings & Videos
Reading List
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George Washington University�Law School
Government Procurement Law Program
Established 1960
Classroom and distance learning in public procurement law and policy, for students in law and business
Procurement Law Centers: 2000
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Washington, D.C.
Nottingham.
Procurement Law Centers Today
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Washington, D.C.
Beijing
Nottingham.
Paris
Munich
Aix-en-Provence
Turin
Stellenbosch
Stockholm
Copenhagen
Galicia
Rome
Vilnius
Moscow
Poland
Northern China
�What is Procurement: �Principles, Pathologies and Processes�
Principles: The Desiderata (Steven Schooner, 2002)
See Reading
List
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Principal-Agent Model
Principal
Agent 1
CO
Purchase
MONITORING
BONDING (PUNISHING)
Agent 2
Contractor
See Reading
List
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Processes
Planning
Cost Reimb.
Competition - Methods
Qualification
Responsiveness
Rules
Contract
Provisions
The United States . . .
. . . Has Separate Procurement Systems
Federal Procurement
State
Local
U.S. Domestic Harmonization
.. . . Has over US$750 billion in annual federal procurement
. . . Is Dominated by Defense
. . . Procurement is a High-Profile Political Issue
. . . Procurement Remains Political
Question: If President Trump did interfere with this procurement for his personal benefit, would this be:
. . . But Not Driven by Individual Politicians
Virginia 8 (James P. Moran) | 1 |
District of Columbia nonvoting (Eleanor Holmes Norton) | 2 |
Texas 12 (Kay Granger) | 3 |
Missouri 1 (William (Bill) Clay / Wm. Lacy Clay) | 4 |
Virginia 10 (Frank R. Wolf) | 5 |
Alabama 5 (Robert E. (Bud) Cramer Jr.) | 6 |
California 37 (Juanita Millender-McDonald) | 7 |
Mississippi 4 (Ronnie Shows / Gene Taylor) | 8 |
Virginia 3 (Robert C. Scott) | 9 |
California 14 (Anna G. Eshoo) | 10 |
Top 10 Congressional Districts for Federal Contracts, FY07
. . . Accessible
FY07 Contracts - Defense
. . . Is Transparent at Opportunity and Award
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. . . With exceptions to transparency
More Non-Transparency
See Next Page
. . . Prone to Scandal
Darleen Druyun
More
Scandal
Duke Cunningham��David Safavian
Ex-Aide To Bush Found Guilty
Safavian Lied in Abramoff Scandal
Washington Post,
Wednesday, June 21, 2006; Page A01
Congressman resigns after bribery plea
California Republican admits selling influence for $2.4 million
Monday, November 28, 2005
(CNN) -- Rep. Randy "Duke" Cunningham
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
Defense Logistics Agency Supplement
Other Defense Subagency Supplements
Civilian Agency Supplement
Civilian Agency Supplement
1984
. . . Has a Uniform Set of Regulations
. . . a Unified Regulatory System
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
Defense Logistics Agency Supplement
Other Defense Subagency Supplements
Civilian Agency Supplement
Civilian Agency Supplement
. . . A Uniform Set of Regulations
Defense Authorization Act = Annual vehicle for reform
Major methods of competition
. . . Familiar Major Methods of Procurement
Open Procedure (less than 3%)
Restricted Procedure
Negotiated Procedure (primary method)
Sole-Source
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Competitive Negotiations�(EU: “Competitive Dialogue” or “Competitive Procedures with Negotiations”)
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Competitive Negotiations:�Multiple Vendors, for Best Value
Negotiated Procurements
Contractor
Contractor
Contractor
Competitive Negotiations
Award
Exchanges
Submissions
Announcement
Request for Proposals
Competitive
Offeror 1
Awardee
Offeror 2
Non-Competitive
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Frameworks emerged in the United States and elsewhere along parallel paths
Supplier Lists
Frameworks
Frameworks: Sample
| A | B | C |
FRAMEWORK AWARD PRICE – PER UNIT | US$1000 | US$600 | US$1500 |
JANUARY (NASA: 500 UNITS) | US$900 | US$600 | |
APRIL ORDER (ARMY: 1000 UNITS ) | US$800 | US$550 | |
DECEMBER ORDER (NAVY: 2000 UNITS) | US$550 | US$550 | |
Problems in U.S. Frameworks: 1990s
Reduced Transparency – Reduced Accountability -- Misuse of Frameworks
Customer Agencies
Centralized Purchasing Agencies
Contractors
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Scandals
Umer Chaudhry
GWU Law Student
EU uses same methods – but in a different historical progression
Sealed Bids
Negotiated Procurements
Frameworks
Sole Source
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√
√
√
Do the EU Directives Impose Additional Principles?
Author: Abby Semple
Source: Abby Semple, www.procurementanalysis.eu/
Patterns in U.S. Procurement
www.usaspending.gov
Defense Department Procurement – FY 2019
Access for Foreign Firms to Unitary Federal Procurement Market, Civilian and Defense
DoD Acquisition Workforce
The size of DoD’s civilian acquisition workforce has grown by some 20,000 employees over the past five years and now numbers about 135,000 personnel members, according to Stephanie Barna, acting assistant secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management.
Civilians make up 90 percent of the department’s total acquisition workforce. The military component of the acquisition workforce also ticked up by about 2,500 employees, reaching more than 16,000 employees, Barna said.
Typical Progress
Subcontract
Framework (Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quantity)
Prime Contract
Protectionism and the �Trump, Biden and Trump Administrations
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See Reading
List
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KEY CONCEPTS
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What Is Goal of Protectionism?
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Prewar Protectionism
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U.S. Trade Agreements Act: �A “Walled Garden”
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GPA &
Free Trade Agreements
Europe
USA
Some Asian Nations
Some Latin American Nations
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U.S. Domestic Preference Law: Supplies
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Trade Agreements Act: Above $180,000 (approx.)
Buy American Act
Micro-
Purchase
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RECIPROCAL DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
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Defense – Memoranda of Understanding
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Authority for the defense MOUs rests in the “public interest” exception to the BAA. The agreements serve as a national security benefit, enhance alliance-wide security objectives, and serve as an underpinning for armaments cooperation. – Text § 2:21
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TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
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February 2017
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THE RECIPROCITY CONCEPT
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U.S. – Mexico – Canada Agreement (USMCA):
Procurement Chapter
Price Preferences Applied Against Foreign Items Under Buy American Act | ||
| Small Businesses | Other Businesses |
Existing Law | 12% price preference | 6% price preference |
Trump Proposal | 30% price preference | 20% price preference |
“Squeezing” the Buy American Act | Acquisitions Above Trade Agreements Thresholds (typically $180,000): Buy American Act Does Not Apply |
Buy American Act Applies: Acquisitions from $10,000 to the Trade Agreements Thresholds | |
Micro-Purchases (Currently up to $10,000): Buy American Act Does Not Apply |
End
Biden Administration
Regulatory Cooperation Strategies
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From: Correia de Brito, A., C. Kauffmann & J. Pelkmans, The Contribution of Mutual Recognition to International Regulatory Co-operation (OECD 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jm56fqsfxmx-en (citing OECD, International Regulatory Co-operation – Addressing Global Challenges (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/97892642004663-en).
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“Buy American” Provisions in Infrastructure Legislation
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
Public Law 117-58 (Nov. 15, 2021)
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Infrastructure Legislation, Title IX:�“Build America, Buy America” Act (BABA)
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Context: International Procurement
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“At the EU level, it is estimated that import penetration in the private sector is about 10% higher than in the public sector. . . . There is no consistent indication of a domestic bias in public purchasing despite . . . the fact that overall import penetration in private purchasing is significantly higher than for the public sector. Higher import penetration in private sector purchasing appears to a large extent to be explained by the significant differences in the composition of purchases between the two groups.”
“ . . . the direct cross-border share in the number of awards remained under 5% in the majority of EU28 Member States.”
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U.S. has largest shares of indirect cross-border awards in the European Union
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EUROPEAN UNION INITIATIVES
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European Parliament on the International Procurement Instrument
Public procurement represents a substantial part of the EU economy and the economies of many countries around the world. The EU has opened its public procurement markets to a significant degree to competitors from third countries and has frequently advocated the need for more open public procurement markets, both within the context of the revised WTO Agreement on Public Procurement (GPA) and in its bilateral trade negotiations.
Many non-EU countries, however, are reluctant to open their public procurement markets to the EU. According to the Commission, while the EU opened some €352 billion of EU public procurement to bidders that came from member countries to the GPA in 2012, foreign bidders only had access to €178 billion of US procurement and €27 billion of Japanese procurement in that same year. In addition, only a fraction of Chinese procurement is open to foreign bidders.
In 2012, the Commission proposed the creation of an International Procurement Instrument (IPI). After a legislative deadlock, the Commission presented a revised proposal in 2016. In March 2019, in the context of a review of relations with China, the Commission called on the Council and Parliament to revive the trilogues based on the revised proposal, and adopt the IPI before the end of 2019.
In June 2021, the EU Member States reached agreement for a mandate to negotiate with the European Parliament on the IPI.
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International Procurement Instrument
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Vendors from non-agreement nations may be excluded
Country of origin: look for “substantive business operations”
Look to “serious and recurring restrictions” against EU
European Commission may launch investigation and consultations
If no resolution within reasonable time, IPI evaluation penalty or exclusion of bids – Commission specifies targets and scope
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Least Developed Countries (LDC’s) exempted
Contracting authorities may self-exempt for price or competitive reasons
Competitors may cite IPI in bid challenges (remedies)
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Jean Grier on the �International Procurement Instrument
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Regulation on Foreign Subsidies – Nov. 2022 - Summary
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Threshold procurement over 250 million Euros / 4 million Euros per national subsidy
Undertaking (bidder) responsible for addressing subsidy
Commission can demand information and investigate
Undertaking must represent in bid that no foreign government subsidy
Target: “unduly advantageous” tenders
RECIPROCAL DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
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Defense – Memoranda of Understanding
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Authority for the defense MOUs rests in the “public interest” exception to the BAA. The agreements serve as a national security benefit, enhance alliance-wide security objectives, and serve as an underpinning for armaments cooperation. – Text § 2:21
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Defense – Memoranda of Understanding – UK Example
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Discuss
Don’t discriminate
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SECURITY OF SUPPLY
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ANGELA MERKEL’S MOBILE PHONE
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Germany Canceled Verizon Contract
Thu Jun 26, 2014
German government cancels Verizon contract in wake of U.S. spying row
BERLIN
REUTERS/RICK WILKING
The German government has cancelled a contract with U.S. telecoms firm Verizon Communications Inc VZ.N as part of an overhaul of its internal communications, prompted by revelations last year of U.S. government spying.
Reports based on disclosures by former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden alleged Washington had conducted mass surveillance in Germany and had even eavesdropped on Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone.
Berlin subsequently demanded talks with Washington on a "no-spy" deal, but these collapsed after the United States appeared unwilling to give the assurances Germany wanted.
Germany also launched an overhaul of its internal communications and secure government networks. This is one of the first actions involving a U.S. firm to result.
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GPA, Art. III Leaves Discretion To Discriminate Regarding Classified Work
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking any action or not disclosing any information that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes.
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Trump Tariffs
Trump Administration Tariffs�Source: Atlantic Council
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WTO GPA
Trade Agreements on Tariffs
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Tariffs and U.S. Procurement�Starting Point: U.S. Procurements Bear Tariffs
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FAR 25.903: Exceptions
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DFARS 225.901 - Policy
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PGI 225.902 Procedures.
(1) Formal entry and release.
(i) The administrative contracting officer shall—
(A) Ensure that contractors are aware of and understand any Duty-Free Entry clause requirements. Contractors should understand that failure by them or their subcontractors to provide the data required by the clause will result in treatment of the shipment as without benefit of free entry under Section XXII, Chapter 98, Subchapter VIII, Item 9808.00.30 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
(B) Upon receipt of the required notice of purchase of foreign supplies from the contractor or any tier subcontractor—
(1) Verify the duty-free entitlement of supplies entering under the contract; and
(2) Review the prime contract to ensure that performance of the contract requires the foreign supplies (quantity and price) identified in the notice.
(C) Within 20 days after receiving the notification of purchase of foreign supplies, forward . . . information in the format indicated to the Commander, DCMA New York, ATTN: Customs Team, DCMAE-GNTF, 201 Varick Street, Room 905C, New York, NY 10014 . . . .
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Status of National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026
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From SASC Report 119-39 (July 15, 2025)
Sec. 874--Duty-free entry of supplies procured by Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to issue duty-free entry certificates in certain circumstances, and requires supply chain tracking.
Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements
The committee emphasizes that defense-related acquisitions from qualified sources under Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements should remain exempt from any tariffs or trade restrictions. The committee urges the Department of Defense and relevant interagency stakeholders to preserve existing exemptions and ensure that future trade actions do not hinder defense procurement or compromise national security priorities.
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Proposed Senate National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 874
Included in Senate bill as reported by SASC and in Amendment 3748 (as Substitute) by SASC Chairman Roger Wicker and Ranking Member Jack Reed on Sept. 4, 2025
SEC. 874. DUTY-FREE ENTRY OF SUPPLIES PROCURED BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) Issuance of Duty-free Entry Certificates.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided by paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense shall issue a duty-free entry certificate for any of the following supplies imported pursuant to a procurement contract entered into by the Department of Defense:
(A) An end product or component imported from a country with which the United States has a memorandum of understanding for reciprocal procurement of defense items in effect under section 4851 of title 10, United States Code.
(B) A defense item that is an eligible product as defined in section 308 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2518).
(2) Exceptions.--Paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to a product or component described in that paragraph if--
(A) the product or component is eligible for duty-free treatment under the column 1 special rate of duty column of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States; or
(B) the product or component has already entered the customs territory of the United States and the contractor already has paid the duty with respect to the product or component.
Explanations:
*19 U.S. Code § 2518 defines “eligible product” to include those covered by the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and various Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). FAR 25.003 defines “eligible product” as “a foreign end product, construction material, or service that, due to applicability of a trade agreement to a particular acquisition, is not subject to discriminatory treatment.” DFARS 225.003 is similar, designating certain supply categories as “eligible.”
[Section 874 language continues . . .]
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Section 874 (cont’d)
(b) Tracking of Supply Chain.--The Secretary shall--
(1) track the impact of economic fluctuations, include tariffs, supply chain disruptions and inflation, on all major prime contracts entered into by the Department of Defense;
and
(2) not later than January 30, 2026, submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes--
(A) an assessment of cost increases to both the Department and contractors as a result of tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862);
(B) an assessment of the effects of such tariffs on supply chains and lead times for major defense platforms; and
(C) a summary of agreements entered into under section 4851 of title 10, United States Code [Defense memoranda of understanding and related agreements], and an assessment of the application of those agreements to the defense supply chain.
(c) Report on Duty-free Entry Certificates.--Not later than January 30, 2026, and annually thereafter until January 30, 2030, the Secretary, acting through the Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on articles classified under subheading 9808.00.30 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States [“Materials certified to the Commissioner of Customs by the authorized procuring agencies to be emergency war material purchased abroad”] that includes--
(1) a summary of such articles for which the Secretary issued a duty-free entry certificate; and
(2) a summary of such articles for which a duty-free entry certificate was requested and denied.
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Open Questions
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Electronic Marketplaces
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MAJ Abraham Young, USA
Online Solution
Centralized Purchasing Agency
Market
Congress
Users
The Players
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MAJ Abraham Young, USA
Online Solution
Centralized Purchasing Agency
Market
Congress
Users
The Problems
Vendor data – bid challenges – transparency –
competition -- socioeconomic goals (including Buy American) – no- standards security review -- fee to GSA – Most Favored Customer pricing
Current Status
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“According to GSA’s data, between August 2020 and July 2021, the participating agencies made nearly 24,000 purchases valued at $5.9 million through the commercial platforms.”
GSA 2019: “With a potential $6 billion addressable market for the e-commerce channel . . . “
Where GSA Commercial Platforms Initiative Stands
Convergence and Compliance
Convergence: Procurement Regulation
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Best Practices
U.S.
Europe
Others
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| USA - Federal | EU | World Bank | WTO | USA Model Law for States |
Acquisition Planning | | | | | |
Publication of Opportunities | | | | | |
Electronic Auctions | | | | | |
Open Procedure | | | | | |
Competitive Dialogue | | | | | |
Frameworks | | | | | |
Contract Award Notices | | | | | |
Bid Challenges | | | | | |
Exclusion | | | | | |
Contract Administration | | | | | |
CONVERGENCE
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EU 2014/24/EU: Self-Cleaning
Art. 57
6. Any economic operator that is in one of the situations referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 may provide evidence to the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of a relevant ground for exclusion. If such evidence is considered as sufficient, the economic operator concerned shall not be excluded from the procurement procedure.
For this purpose, the economic operator shall prove that it has paid or undertaken to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct, clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively collaborating with the investigating authorities and taken concrete technical, organisational and personnel measures that are appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct.
The measures taken by the economic operators shall be evaluated taking into account the gravity and particular circumstances of the criminal offence or misconduct. Where the measures are considered to be insufficient, the economic operator shall receive a statement of the reasons for that decision.
An economic operator which has been excluded by final judgment from participating in procurement or concession award procedures shall not be entitled to make use of the possibility provided for under this paragraph during the period of exclusion resulting from that judgment in the Member States where the judgment is effective.
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| | | | |
1. Standards and procedures | √ | √ | √ | √ |
2. Knowledgeable leadership | √ | √ | √ | √ |
3. Exclude risky personnel | √ | √ | √ | √ |
4. Training | √ | √ | √ | √ |
5. Monitor, evaluate, reporting hotline | √ | √ | √ | √ |
6. Incentives and discipline | √ | √ | √ | √ |
7. Adjust program to risk | √ | √ | √ | √ |
Victim Compensation?
Conclusion
Christopher Yukins
cyukins@law.gwu.edu