South China Sea Crucible

Scenario Overview

Phases & Domain-Specific Activities

Phase 1: Competition (2025-2027) – Gray Zone Tactics & Influence Operations

• Focus: China employs gray-zone tactics to gradually increase its control over the SCS. The U.S. and allies respond with diplomatic pressure and limited military presence.
• Land: Continued militarization of artificial islands, construction of dual-use facilities. Philippine and Vietnamese protests.
• Sea: Increased PLAN patrols, harassment of fishing vessels and oil exploration activities by regional states. China Coast Guard (CCG) asserts control over disputed areas. US Navy conducts FONOPs.
• Air: Increased PLAAF patrols, airspace violations near disputed islands. US Air Force enhances regional air patrols.
• Space: Enhanced satellite reconnaissance of regional naval activity. US Space Force monitors Chinese space capabilities.
• Cyber: Cyber espionage targeting regional governments and maritime industries. Disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining regional alliances.

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Phases & Domain-Specific Activities

Phase 2: Crisis (2027-2029) – Incident & Escalation

• Focus: A specific incident – e.g., a collision between a Chinese CCG vessel and a Philippine supply ship, a Chinese cyberattack on Vietnamese oil infrastructure – triggers a crisis.
• Land: China increases military presence on occupied features. Philippines and Vietnam request U.S. assistance.
• Sea: China establishes a more expansive ADIZ covering disputed areas. Increased naval deployments by both sides. Potential for naval standoff.
• Air: Increased PLAAF deployments, aggressive aerial intercepts of regional aircraft. US Air Force prepares for potential air combat.
• Space: China conducts electronic warfare exercises, disrupting satellite communications in the region.
• Cyber: Intensified cyberattacks targeting regional critical infrastructure and military networks.

Phases & Domain-Specific Activities

• Phase 3: Conflict (2029-2031) – Limited Conflict & Contested Waters
• Focus: China initiates limited military operations to seize control of key features in the Spratly Islands. The U.S. and allies respond with a combination of military and economic measures.
• Land: Amphibious assaults on contested islands. USMC and allied forces conduct counter-landings and support regional partners.
• Sea: Naval battles, submarine warfare, anti-ship missile strikes. US Navy and allied navies attempt to maintain sea control.
• Air: Air combat, strikes against military targets, air defense operations.
• Space: Limited use of ASAT weapons to disrupt satellite communications.
• Cyber: Widespread cyberattacks targeting military and civilian infrastructure.

Phases & Domain-Specific Activities

• Phase 4: Protraction (2031-2035) – Stalemate & Regional Instability
• Focus: The conflict devolves into a protracted stalemate, with ongoing skirmishes and a heightened risk of escalation. Regional instability increases.
• Land: Insurgency on occupied islands.
• Sea: Blockades, naval patrols, and continued harassment of regional shipping.
• Air: Limited air strikes and air defense operations.
• Space: Ongoing cyber and electronic warfare.
• Cyber: Persistent cyberattacks and espionage.

Road to Conflict

This outlines the escalating sequence of events leading to open conflict, culminating in the initial operational posture of all involved parties. The scenario assumes a gradual escalation, not a sudden attack.

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• Phase 1: Grey Zone Operations & Increased Tensions (January - March 2025)
• Phase 2: Provocation & Limited Confrontation (April - June 2025)
• Phase 3: Escalation & Initial Posture (July - September 2025 - Scenario Start)

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Road to Conflict

Phase 1: Grey Zone Operations & Increased Tensions (January - March 2025)

• China: Intensifies maritime claims enforcement in the South China Sea, particularly around the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Increased presence of PLAN Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia vessels harassing Philippine and Vietnamese fishing boats and energy exploration activities. Deployments of HQ-9 SAM systems to newly reclaimed features. Subtle cyberattacks targeting Philippine infrastructure (power grid, communications).
• Philippines: Protests Chinese actions through diplomatic channels but lacks significant military capability to effectively challenge PLAN presence. Requests increased security assistance from the US. Begins strengthening ties with Vietnam and Australia.
• Vietnam: Mirrors Philippine actions, lodging protests and bolstering its own maritime defenses. Quietly seeks closer military cooperation with India.
• United States: Conducts increased Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, challenging excessive Chinese maritime claims. Increases military aid to the Philippines and Vietnam. Publicly condemns Chinese harassment of regional claimants. Begins deploying additional ISR assets (P-8A, RQ-4) to the region.
• Australia: Increases naval presence in the South China Sea, conducting joint exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam. Publicly supports US FONOPs.

Road to Conflict

Phase 2: Provocation & Limited Confrontation (April - June 2025)

• China: CCG vessels intentionally collide with a Philippine Coast Guard ship near Second Thomas Shoal, resulting in minor damage and injuries. Simultaneously, a PLARF cyberattack successfully disrupts a key communications node in Manila. China frames the incident because of "provocative actions" by the Philippines.
• Philippines: Responds by formally invoking the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Requests immediate US assistance.
• United States: Begins deploying the Ford-class Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the South China Sea as a show of force. Increases tempo of joint military exercises with the Philippines. Publicly warns China against further escalation.
• Vietnam: Increases its military presence in the Spratly Islands, reinforcing existing outposts.
• China: Responds to the US CSG deployment by conducting large-scale naval exercises in the South China Sea, simulating amphibious assaults and anti-ship missile strikes. Begins deploying additional PLAN warships to the region.

Road to Conflict

Phase 3: Escalation & Initial Posture (July - September 2025 - Scenario Start)

Trigger Event: A Chinese J-10 fighter intercepts and aggressively maneuvers near a US P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft conducting ISR over international waters near the Spratly Islands. The J-10 pilot issues a series of increasingly hostile warnings. A miscalculation or intentional act leads to a mid-air collision, resulting in the loss of the P-8A and its crew.

Immediate Reactions:

• United States: Condemns the incident as a reckless and unprovoked attack. Orders the immediate deployment of the second Ford-class CSG to the region. Initiates a full-scale military alert.
• China: Denies responsibility for the incident, blaming the US for “provocative reconnaissance activities.” Mobilizes its military forces and declares a “defensive posture.”
• Philippines: Declares a state of national emergency. Requests full US military assistance.
• Vietnam: Places its military on high alert.

Road to Conflict

• This "Road to Conflict" sets the stage for the initial operational posture of all sides. The situation is highly volatile, with a significant risk of further escalation. The loss of the P-8A serves as the catalyst, but the underlying tensions and competing interests have been building for years. The scenario begins with both sides poised for conflict, but with a degree of uncertainty regarding the other’s intentions.

Order of Battle

• This provides a detailed snapshot of the initial force compositions and dispositions. It's important to note that this is a dynamic situation, and these positions are subject to change as the scenario unfolds. The initial advantage lies with the US in terms of carrier strike group power, but China has a significant home-field advantage and a large missile arsenal.

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Blue Force: United States

Navy:

Carrier Strike Group 1 (CSG-1):

• USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) – 60 aircraft (F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, E-2D Hawkeye, CMV-22B Osprey, MH-60R Seahawk, MQ-25 Stingray)
• USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) – Stealth Destroyer
• USS Gravely (DDG-107) – Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer
• USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116) – Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer
• Combat Logistics Force ships (replenishment oiler, ammunition ship) – supporting.
• Position: Philippine Sea, approximately 200nm East of Luzon.

Navy

Carrier Strike Group 2 (CSG-2): (Arriving, 48 hours out)

• USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) – 60 aircraft (similar composition to CSG-1)
• Escort Destroyers/Cruisers (composition mirroring CSG-1)
• Position: Approaching from Guam, approximately 800nm Southeast of Luzon.

Submarines:

• USS Virginia (SSN-774) – Virginia-class Attack Submarine – Operating in the Luzon Strait.
• USS Texas (SSN-775) – Virginia-class Attack Submarine – Operating in the South China Sea, near the Spratly Islands.

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Blue Force: United States

Air Force:

• Clark Air Base, Philippines: 24 x F-35A Lightning II, 6 x KC-46 Pegasus Tankers, 2 x E-3 Sentry AWACS.
• Andersen Air Force Base, Guam: 12 x F-35A Lightning II, 4 x RQ-4 Global Hawk ISR aircraft, 2 x U-2 Dragon Lady ISR aircraft.

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Marine Corps:

• Initial Deployment (Phase 1): 2,000 Marines (elements of 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force) – securing Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base.
• 1 x Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) – approx. 40,000 personnel (deployed in phases)
• 2 x Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) - Key component for island hopping/distributed maritime operations.
• Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs)
• Naval Gun System (NGS) - Long-range precision fires capability.
• High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
• Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) capabilities integrated into MLRs.

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Blue Force: United States

Space Force:

• Resilient satellite constellation for communication, navigation (GPS III), and ISR.
• Cyber Warfare teams for offensive/defensive operations. Space Domain Awareness (SDA) assets.

Blue Force: Philippines

Navy:

• 2 x Jose Rizal-class Frigates, 6 x Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRV), various patrol craft – primarily focused on defending Second Thomas Shoal and other occupied features.

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Air Force:

• 12 x FA-50PH Fighting Eagle light combat aircraft – limited operational radius.

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Army:

• Primarily focused on internal security, limited capacity for high-intensity combat.

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Blue Force: Vietnam

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Navy:

• 6 x Gepard-class Frigates, 3 x Molniya-class Corvette, various patrol craft – reinforcing positions in the Spratly Islands.

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Air Force:

• Su-30MK2 fighters – limited operational radius.
• Various transport and reconnaissance aircraft

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Blue Force: Australia

Navy:

• 1 x Hobart-class Destroyer, conducting patrols in the South China Sea.
• 2 x Anzac-class Frigates (undergoing modernization)
• Various patrol craft

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Air Force:

• P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft
• F-35A Lightning II (growing fleet)

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Red Force: PRC

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN):

CSG-1 (South China Sea):

• Liaoning (CV-16) – Aircraft Carrier – 50 aircraft (J-15 fighters, Z-18 helicopters).
• 2 x Type 055 Destroyers
• 2 x Type 054A Frigates

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CSG-2 (South China Sea):

• Shandong (CV-17) – Aircraft Carrier – 50 aircraft (J-15 fighters, Z-18 helicopters).
• 2 x Type 055 Destroyers
• 2 x Type 054A Frigates
• CSG-3 (Preparing for Deployment):
• Fujian (CV-18) - Aircraft Carrier - undergoing final sea trials, projected deployment within 72 hours.

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Submarines:

• 2 x Type 093A Attack Submarines – Operating in the South China Sea.
• 1 x Type 094 Ballistic Missile Submarine – Deployed to the region.
• Amphibious Group: 2 x Type 071 Landing Platform Dock ships, 4 x Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ships – positioned near Hainan Island, prepared for potential amphibious operations.

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Red Force: PRC

People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF):

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• Airbases (Hainan Island, Guangdong Province): 72 x J-20 Stealth Fighters, 72 x J-16 Multi-role Fighters, H-6N Bombers.
• Reclaimed Islands (Spratly Islands): Limited fighter presence (J-10s), primarily focused on air defense with HQ-9 SAM systems.

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People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF):

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• Coastal Missile Sites: DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) and DF-26 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) – targeting US naval assets.
• Inland Missile Sites: DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) and other ballistic/cruise missiles – targeting regional airbases and infrastructure.

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People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF):

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• Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare units – actively engaged in reconnaissance and preparing for disruptive attacks.

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Rules of Engagement (ROE)

These ROE are initial guidelines and will evolve throughout the wargame based on escalation levels, specific orders from the Game Director, and actions taken by opposing forces. They are categorized by side (USA, China, Philippines) and phased to reflect the changing conflict environment.

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Key:

• Use of Force (UoF): Defines when force can be employed. Levels: 1 (Show of Force), 2 (Defensive), 3 (Offensive)
• Collateral Damage (CD): Acceptable level of risk to non-combatants and infrastructure. Levels: High, Medium, Low.
• Identification (ID): Requirements for positively identifying targets. Levels: Positive, Reasonable Certainty, Visual.

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Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Phase 2: Crisis & Limited Conflict (Escalation)

USA/Allies:

• UoF: 3 – Offensive (Limited). Respond to significant attacks with proportionate offensive measures. Authorization to conduct strikes against military targets.
• CD: Low – Minimize collateral damage but prioritize mission accomplishment.
• ID: Positive – Requires clear identification of military targets.
• ROE Notes: Authorization to conduct SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses). Increased tempo of operations.

China:

• UoF: 3 – Offensive (Limited). Respond to perceived threats with proportionate offensive measures. Authorization to conduct strikes against US/Allied military assets.
• CD: Medium – Acceptable risk of collateral damage in achieving strategic objectives.
• ID: Reasonable Certainty – Increased tolerance for ambiguity in identifying military targets.
• ROE Notes: Authorization to conduct anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operations.

Philippines:

• UoF: 2 – Defensive. Continue defense of Second Thomas Shoal. Authorization to engage attacking forces.
• CD: Low – Prioritize protection of personnel and infrastructure.
• ID: Reasonable Certainty – Increased tolerance for ambiguity in identifying hostile intent.
• ROE Notes: Full integration with US forces.

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