1 of 66

The Ascent of Airpower��The First Hundred Years

Matt Caffrey

Air Command and Staff College

Air University

2 of 66

Bio

Lt Col USAFR AF/XOOC (CHECKMATE)
Professor of Wargaming and Campaign�Planning, Air Command and Staff College
Co-author Gulf War Fact Book
Originator of the Connections Conference
Designer of Several Air Force Wargames
Originator of the Commercial Wargames db

3 of 66

The Caffrey Cycle

History

Theory

Doctrine

Strategy

War

4 of 66

Airpower’s Enduring Promise

“decrease the length of combat and consequently the evils of war.”

1999?

5 of 66

Airpower’s Enduring Promise

“decrease the length of combat and consequently the evils of war.”

1899

6 of 66

Personalities

7 of 66

Airpower’s First 200 Years

Franklin’s Observation
Civil War Airpower Arms Race
The First “Berlin” Airlift
Spanish American War

8 of 66

In The Beginning

9 of 66

Seeing is Believing

10 of 66

From Kittyhawk to Sonora�Airpower's First Decade

1909 First military aircraft�US, France & Russia

1910 First “Carrier Ops”

1911 First UK Military Aircraft

1911/12 First air combat

1912/13 Balkan War

1913 First “dogfight”

Then Great Powers started fielding aviation units almost immediately. The US Navy was involved within a year. During their war to take Libya from the Ottomans Italy used military aircraft to scout, strafe and bomb - and their adversaries became skilled at what would be called anti aircraft fire. Before World War I began both France and Spain would also use military aircraft in North Africa. A hand fill of aircraft fought on all sides in the Balkan wars but no accounts of “dog fights” have been found. America has the distinction of manning the first air to air combat. In 1913 over Sonora, Mexico two Americans fighting for two different factions of the Mexican Revolution meet and shot it out like two cowboys on horseback - though both exhausted their ammunition without finding their mark.

11 of 66

On The Brink

Germany 230

Austro-Hungary 48

UK 260

France 136

Russia 244

US 23

12 of 66

WHAT DO WE ALL ASSOCIATE WITH WORLD WAR I AIR POWER? NORMALLY, ONE REMEMBERS THE ERA OF “KNIGHTS OF THE AIR,” DARING PILOTS IN SILK SCARVES AND OPEN COCKPITS FIGHTING A CLEAN--AND BUT PRETTY IRRELEVANT--WAR HIGH ABOVE THE ANONYMOUS SLAUGHTER OF THE TRENCHES. THE AVERAGE PERSON IS HARD-PRESSED TO NAME MORE THAN ONE OR TWO WORLD WAR I GENERALS, YET NEARLY EVERYONE HAS HEARD OF VON RICHTHOFEN, MAX IMMELMANN, EDDIE RICKENBACKER, FRANK LUKE, BILLY BISHOP, ETC.. FILMS SUCH AS THE BLUE MAX, DAWN PATROL, ACES HIGH, AND MANY OTHERS HAVE PERPETUATED THE STEREOTYPE OF THE INDIVIDUAL “ACE” PILOT AND HIS FEATS OF DARING-DO.

YET TO QUOTE ANOTHER MOVIE, “SUCH IS THE STUFF DREAMS ARE MADE OF.” WE CAN NOT AFFORD TO ACCEPT AS HISTORY HOLLYWOOD’S VERSION OF WORLD WAR I IN THE AIR.

13 of 66

1914�Information Operations

Reconnaissance

Failure

French v German wheel
German v BEF

Success

French & UK at Marne
Germany at Tannenberg

Surveillance

14 of 66

Surveillance

Balloon

+ cheap, defensible, good comm

- relatively low view angle, fixed

Aircraft

+ mobile, any view angle

- comm initially a problem

1914�Information Operations

As spectacular as these successes were the airpower mission that undoubtedly contributed the most to producing the terrible carnage of World War I was the day in day out mission of surveillance.

To understand this why changes in warfare must be explained first.

For about 1750 to 1850 artillery was often a decisive offensive element in battle. However, with the advent of rifled muskets artillery effectively lost their range advantage. If the artillerists were close enough to the enemy to aim their pieces, the enemy was close enough to shoot the gunners, a priority target. This led to the development of indirect artillery fire. A forward observer would tell the artillerists (well concealed to the rear) where to shoot. This worked OK early in World War I but with the coming of the trenches the forward observer had increasing difficulty seeing the enemy - though increasingly proficient enemy sharp shooters, at times, saw him.

Aircraft largely solved both the vision and the vulnerability problems. Balloons were on average more effective early on because telephones lines could be run from them to the batteries. As enemy camouflage got better and radios got lighter and more dependable, aircraft gradually became the preferred means.

Either way the information provided by aircraft allowed the artillery to become the great killer of World War I.

15 of 66

1915�Counter Air

16 of 66

1915�Counter Information

1915�Counter Air

17 of 66

1916�Airpower Synchronization

VERDUN

German - initial massive air superiority

Take out balloons - block Recce
Bomb troops, RRs, Bridges - sole LOC

France - counter attack began in air

Anti balloon munitions
lots of almost as good aircraft

1916 saw the employment of airpower being more fully integrated into campaign plans. Germany lead the way during their Verdun campaign. German airpower blinded French commanders and artillery while photo reconnaissance and observation balloons provided German commanders and artillerists an unprecedented situation awareness. Because of this German artillery took a terrible toll on French artillery and men while French artillery could not mount effective counter battery fire. In addition German airpower attacked French troop concentrations, RR and bridges. France’s one LOC into Verdun was kept under continual pressure by artillery within its range and by air beyond. Initially, for these reasons and others France suffered far more casualties than the Germans.

France’s counter attack began in the air. Newer French aircraft was still a bit inferior to the German but France brought far more aircraft into the fight. They also fielded special munitions specifically designed to take down German balloons. With the coming of air superiority it was the French’s turn to see while German commanders were blind. Not surpassingly loss rates flip flopped with the Germans now suffering more heavily.

18 of 66

1916�Counter Information

19 of 66

1915�Strategic Attack�Targeting vs Terror

French bombing of German Industry

Countered by Eindecker

German “Terror” bombing of London

Only effective defense offense

20 of 66

1915�Terror

21 of 66

1916�The Dawn After The Nightmare

22 of 66

1917�Prologue To The Future

23 of 66

1916�Counter Land Forces

24 of 66

1917�Prologue To The Future

Arras - Bloody April

50% in a single month
Life expectancy 93 flying hours/21 days
8:1 Loss ratio

25 of 66

No

Mans

Land

*

Max

Arty

Range

1917�The Nature of the Beast

To understand why airpower made such a difference at Cambrai you must understand why the stalemate in the west had occurred.

Increasingly heavy artillery would kill many of the front line defenders and suppress many of the survivors. While crossing “no man's land” still extracted fearful casualties attacks did at times carry the enemy’s trench line. Then unable to communicate with his artillery (no radios) the attacks usually stalled. If somehow the attack continued they always stopped dead at the limit of their artillery’s range. By the time artillery was dragged across the moonscape of no mans land the enemy would have plenty of time to bring in reserves and dig new trenches.

Aerial photography and improvements in the artilerymen’s craft allowed shorter bombardments to hit more enemy targets, while producing less sever moonscape. Still, the the key contribution was close air support. Aircraft could see and strike the enemy beyond artillery range. And while aircraft’s light bombs and machine guns seldom injured entrenched infantry they could produce a terrible carnage against reserved moving up or in hasty defenses. More often the aircraft simply delayed the enemy and forces them to keep there heads down -- which was good enough to permit friendly infantry to continue their advance.

26 of 66

1917�Prologue To The Future

1917�Counter Land Forces

27 of 66

1918�Air Campaign

Saint Mihiel - OB

Allies

696 fighters
366 reconnaissance
323 day bombers
91 night bombers
20 observation balloons

Germany

Initial: 100 fighters - 200 others
Reinforcing: 80 fighters

28 of 66

Saint Mihiel

Allies

Coalition Air Commander
Comprehensive use of airpower
Attacked enemy throughout his depth

Germany

Too little too late

1918�Air Campaign

29 of 66

Palestine

Inside out War
Highway of Death
First Field Army Destroyed From The Air

1918�Air Campaign

An even more impressive use of Airpower took place in Palestine during the last year of the war. The British theater commander had a lot going for him. The services of “Lawrence of Arabia” some outstanding Australian cavalry and his own strategic smarts. Still, airpower played an enormous and to often overlooked part in one of the great victories of the war.

First, the campaign opened with the AT&T building being bombed in what is today Amman, Jordan. With their communications cut off the various Turkish armies defending Palestine could not assist each other. In fact one army did not even know the campaign had opened for several days. Airpower attacked the Turks throughout the depth of their armies, degrading their ability to fight as a cohesive force. At one point Allied airman spotted a Turkish army on the road moving through a desert pass. The later descriptions of this “Highway of Death” would sound strangely familiar to contemporary readers. Turkish losses were so great that army ceased to be a operational unit - it had been defeated, indeed effectively destroyed by airpower.

30 of 66

31 of 66

1919 - 1938�Inter-War Airpower

Theorists

Douhet
Trenchard
Mitchell
Air Corps Tactical School
Naval Aviators

32 of 66

1919 - 1938�Inter-War Airpower

Practice

Russo-Polish War
British Air Policing
USMC Small Wars
Spanish Civil War
Sino-Japanese

33 of 66

1919 - 1938�Inter-War Airpower

Technology

Aluminum
Higher Power to Weight Engines
Navigation
Retractable Landing Gear
Bomb Accuracy

34 of 66

1938 - 1940�The War Hitler Won

Czechoslovakia - The highest form of victory

35 of 66

1938 - 1940�The War Hitler Won

Czechoslovakia The highest form of victory

Poland Operational Airpower & Coercion

Norway Victory through Counter Sea

Holland Victory from above

France Strategic CAS

Britain “A Damn near run thing”

“We have won the war,

now all we have to do is end it”

36 of 66

Balkans - air vs history
Crete - the price of victory
USSR

Early - to lose and Air Force
Mid - Springtime for the Luftwaffe
Late - outrunning your airpower

Pearl Harbor - Strategic Surprise

1941�The World Held Its Breath

37 of 66

The German Airlift that worked
Doolittle does a lot
British Bombs begin to bite
British counter land matures
Coral Sea & Midway - if there were any doubts
Guadalcanal - like day and night
First 60 B-17 raid on occupied Europe

1942�By a Knife’s Edge

38 of 66

1943�The Tide Turns

The German airlift that did not.
Kasserine Pass -- be careful what you ask for
The Palm Sunday Massacre & the forgotten Stalingrad
Hamburg - death of a great city
Sicily - “a mere tactical operations”
A Ball bearing too far

39 of 66

1944�Harvest of Doom

Strangle - the campaign and the spin
Big Week
The race for the Normandy buildup
Air as a maneuver element
Turning off Germany
The Battle over the Bulge

40 of 66

1945�Victory Through Airpower?

Germany Paralized - at a cost
Japan Starved - in large part due to subs
Blinded by the light

41 of 66

Was War Obsolete?

UN
A-Bomb

What forces were now obsolete?

Cavalry?
BB, CVs, Navies?
Fighters?

1946-48�A New World?

42 of 66

1949�Victory (without war) Through Airpower?

43 of 66

1950�Then Came Korea

The World Turned Upside Down

War not obsolete
F-51 worth 4 Jets
CVs life saver

Yet one thing remains the same

In the long history of war no advantage is quite so precious as being up against an idiot.

General George Kenney

44 of 66

Airpower Was Devastating

% of destruction by Air & Ground

Tanks
Trucks
Artillery

45 of 66

1950�The Chinese Intervention

A Hard Lesson in the limits of airpower

MacArthur’s perception

Battle of Bismarck Sea

What is the measure of Airpower

Airframes?
Sorties?
Bombs on target?
Rate/distance needed to reach breakpoint!

46 of 66

1951�The Interdiction Campaign Won

And -- Chinese strategy defeated

47 of 66

1952� The Interdiction Campaign Lost

48 of 66

1953�Victory Through What?

Death of Stalin - less credible
Threat of nukes?

China had been willing to accept some risk to cities
Were tactical nukes more credible?

The Irrigation Dam Attacks

We now know food also short in China

Late attacks on forward depots?

49 of 66

1953 - 1963�Now What?

If

Korea seen as an aberration
Nukes seen as key to Victory

Then

DoD money goes to Air Force
Air Force money goes to SAC

50 of 66

1964 - 1968�Rolling Thunder

Flaming Dart -- “I think we sent the wrong message”
The real 94 target list
Toward the self licking ice-cream cone
The tortoise vs the hare
The Price of Airpower Folly

922 Aircraft
60,000 Total KIA

51 of 66

1965�The Battle for Kashmir

The fight

Stalemate in the air
Stalemate on the ground

Lessons?

Evenly matched airpower not decisive
Gnat wave of future?

52 of 66

1967�6 Day War

Holland 1940 -- Egypt 1967
Strategic CAS -- Again

53 of 66

1968-1970�The War of Attrition

Egypt’s strategy

Don’t start a war / Don’t make peace
Indirect attack Israel's economy

Israel's strategy

Ground eyes, air muscles
Political embarrassment through SOF

54 of 66

1971�Battle for Bangladesh

East Front -- the decisive combination

Offensive Counter Air (OCA)
Air Mobility

West Front -- the decisive draw

Air Parity
Ground Stalemate

55 of 66

1973�Linebacker I & II

The Bankruptcy of Airpower

a.k.a. -- Kenny was right -- twice

Dawn of the precision revolution
Rebirth of Air Campaigning

56 of 66

1973�Arab Israeli War

The Victory of Air Defense

Politics - war by other means
Hardening - operating under attack
Integrating - Air Defense as a system

Limits of Air Defense

Air and the holding of ground
Breaking the system

57 of 66

1975�The Fall of Freedom

South Vietnam 6th largest Air Force - But

Sortie rates low

Self inflicted cyber attack
Congressional funding

Attrition high

Communist mobile Air Defense Artillery
South Vietnam had no smart bombs

Ground power defeats Air Power

58 of 66

1982�Malvinas / Falkland

Airpower as mobel as its base

UK: Importance of CVs -- again
Argentina: base not established

Airpower is as secure as its base

UK: Impact of Anti-Ship Missiles
Argentina: Impact of SAS

Airpower the impact of munitions

UK: AIM-9L
Argentine: But for the right fuse

59 of 66

1983�The Lebanon Conflict

Air Defenses can be overcome - still

Campaign approach
Joint attack

Cities limit effect of airpower - still

60 of 66

1990�Desert Shield

Iraq

Ground based Offensive Counter Air
Land based battle of the Coral Sea

US / Coalition

Saudi air credible from day one
US Airframes - fast
Nail biter for munitions

61 of 66

1991�Desert Storm

If the PTO was a naval campaign

Then the second Gulf war was an air campaign

Planning started with the endstate
Inside out campaign
Increased precision permitted parallel attack
Parallel attack permitted paralysis

Yet ground could have played decisive role

62 of 66

199�Bosnia

Victory through airpower alone?

Before Airpower intervention

Serbian heavy weapons
Bosnian numbers

After Airpower intervention

Serbian’s hide heavy weapons
Bosnians know without air they can be used

Is this really victory through Airpower alone?

63 of 66

1999�Kosovo

Victory through airpower alone?

If “no”, where were the ground forces?
If “yes”, why do we need them now?

64 of 66

1899 - 1999�Assessing Airpower’s First 100 Years

Assessment One Airpower is a fickle panacea

Its effectiveness depends on:

Numbers -- relative and absolute
Platforms
Munitions
Sortie Rates
Terrain/Weather
The Enemy

65 of 66

1899 - 1999�Assessing Airpower’s First 100 Years

Assessment One Airpower is a fickle panacea

Its effectiveness depends on:

Numbers
Platforms
Munitions
Sortie Rates
Terrain/Weather
The Enemy

But most of all it depends on your

Strategy

66 of 66

1899 - 1999�Assessing Airpower’s First 100 Years

Assessment Two Airpower has kept its promise

Airpower never promised to end war
Airpower can avoid the slaughter of WWI
Airpower can facilitate a better state of peace

When Airpower fails to do these things we should look not to the skys, but into ourselves