�PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PULSE
A Joint Poll
�24 January 2023
�Dr. Khalil Shikaki
Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin
Dr. Nimrod Rosler
Dr. Alon Yakter
Funded by the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP
�Methodology
Palestinian sample:
Israeli sample:
The analysis has been prepared by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, and Dr. Nimrod Rosler & Dr. Alon Yakter of Tel Aviv University,
�The state of the two-state solution
“Do you support or oppose a solution based on establishment of a Palestinian state, the two-state solution?” (%, time series)
Declining support for two-state solution
“Do you support/oppose solution based on establishment of Palestinian state, the two-state solution?” (%, time series)
Support for two-state principle:
Decline among Israeli Jews and Palestinians
West bank | Gaza Strip |
28 | 40 |
Frameworks over time: erosion for two states – declining support for other approaches
Levels of support for different frameworks for solving the conflict (%, All Israelis, Palestinians)
*July 2018 – 1 democratic state=“elimination” analysis; TSS – modified package, 7/2018, 9/2020; Confederation question modified over time
Palestinians
Israelis
West bank | Gaza Strip | |
28 | 40 | TSS |
18 | 38 | Specific TSS Package |
18 | 28 | One state |
15 | 34 | Confederation |
Unequal one state: Rising among Israeli Jews, close second among Palestinians
Levels of support for different frameworks (%, Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians)
Palestinians
Israeli Jews
*July 2018 – 1 democratic state asked only of those who did not support two state solution; 1 unequal state asked only of those who did not support another option
“And now after we went over the main proposed terms of the two-state solution of the Israeli Palestinian permanent settlement please tell me the extent to which you support or oppose such a permanent settlement in general as one combined package?” (%, All Israelis)
Support for SPECIFIC TSS PACKAGE:
Confederation Items
Support for confederation elements (%, Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians)
Decline in support for confederation among Israeli Jews and Palestinians
2022: Each item asked separately, then support/opposition to total package
(6/17-2020): “Two states, Pal/Isrl, enter a confederation - citizens of one country allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of other, each national group votes only in its state for elections. Freedom of movement, Jerusalem is not divided, serves as the capital of two states; cooperation on security and economy.” (% “support” *12/16, minimal explanation)
Confederation support decline among Jewish center-Right and rise among Jewish Left and Arab Israelis
2022: Each item asked separately, then support/opposition to total package
(6/17-2020): “Two states, Pal/Isrl, enter a confederation - citizens of one country allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of other, each national group votes only in its state for elections. Freedom of movement, Jerusalem is not divided, serves as the capital of two states; cooperation on security and economy.” (% “support” *12/16, minimal explanation)
“What in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years?” (%)
Chances of a Palestinian State:
Low, all populations
Viability of two states: �Decline, minority “viable”
“Some believe that the TSS an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel, is no longer possible, since political changes and developments on the ground, such as settlement expansion, make it impossible to implement. What do you think?” (%, Palestinians and Israelis)
Palestinians
Israeli Jews
�National priorities
“Which of these values is most important to you? (%, Jews only, time series – change since June 2016)
Values: Jews – “Jewish Majority” rise, “Greater Israel” decline
“Which is the most important vital national goal?” (%, Palestinians)
Palestinian goals : Right of return rise, top value alongside Israel withdrawal/67
�Current conflict directions
Israeli Jews: Rise for decisive war, decline for peace Palestinians: rise for unarmed struggle
Which of the following list…should happen now between Israelis & Palestinians? (Israeli Jews & Palestinians)
Palestinians
Israeli Jews
“Given the wave of attacks by Palestinians on Israeli targets on both sides of the Green Line, do you think this is the beginning of a new organized Palestinian Intifada?
Possible new intifada: Both sides
West bank | Gaza Strip | |
68 | 51 | Probably yes |
After Mahmoud Abbas: Armed factions fight
If Mahmoud Abbas is no longer President, what do you expect to happen? (Israeli Jews & Palestinians)
West bank | Gaza Strip | |
49% | 41% | Armed factions fight violently |
22% | 32% | Fatah & Hamas hold elections |
19% | 26% | No violence & no agreement |
Within group, no clear, leading aspiration. �Perception of “other” = extreme.
“What in your opinion are the long run aspirations of Israel/the Palestinian Authority and the PLO? “ (Israeli Jews & Palestinians)
The Palestinian Authority and the PLO aspiration
The Israel aspiration
West bank | Gaza Strip | |
20% | 30% | Conquer Israel and destroy the Jewish population |
Confidence-building measures
Israel Jews: reforms in Palestinian education and disarm. �Palestinians: Prisoner release top measure
“…confidence building measures that Palestinian and Israeli sides can jointly take to improve Palestinian-Israeli environment & promote conditions to resume viable peace negotiations. Support/oppose the following measures? (% Support - Israeli Jews & Palestinians)
Gaza Strip Palestinians are more open
“…confidence building measures that Palestinian and Israeli sides can jointly take to improve Palestinian-Israeli environment & promote conditions to resume viable peace negotiations. Support/oppose the following measures? (% Support – Palestinians, WB and Gaza)
Low willingness to participate �in reconciliation activities
To what extent do you disagree or agree with following statements? (% Agree - Israeli Jews & Palestinians)
Annexation and voting rights
“Do you support or oppose the annexation of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria without granting the Palestinians there full citizen rights? (%, Jews only)
Annexation, no full rights for Palestinians: More Jews oppose, settlers support
“If Israel establishes full formal control over the entire West Bank, do you think Palestinians should demand the right to vote in elections for Israeli Knesset and to form its own political parties that compete with Israeli parties?
Minority think Palestinians should demand the right to vote (symmetrical)
West bank | Gaza Strip | |
24 | 37 | Probably yes |
Israeli Jews: “Do you think Palestinians would actually vote if given the right to vote in national elections? “
Palestinians: “In the scenario in which the West Bank comes under Israel's political control and the Palestinians have equal rights with Israeli Jews including in voting for the Knesset and party competition, Would you vote in the elections?“
Palestinians say they will not vote. Israeli Jews think they will.
West bank | Gaza Strip | |
12 | 29 | Probably yes |
Policy Conclusions and Implications
A time of no solutions:
What can be done?
|
Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, December 2022�Dahlia Scheindlin, �Nimrod Rosler and Alon Yakter (TAU), �Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa (PSR)��Palestinian and Israeli Attitudes�Toward A Permanent Peace Agreement: �Issues, constituencies, and paired incentives��Khalil Shikaki�24 January 2023��Funded by the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP
Peace Plan Package: �11-point Permanent Status
1) Mutual recognition/End of conflict
2) Demilitarized PAL state
3) PAL sov / ISR early warning
4) Multinational Force
5) Border: Green Line / with qual territorial exchange
6) Two capitals in Jerusalem
7) Divided sovereignty in Old City of Jerusalem
8) Family unification in ISR of 100,000 PAL refugees
9) Future Palestinian state will be democratic
10) Guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on implementation
11) Part of regional peace, according to the Arab Peace Initiative
Palestinian and Israeli support for peace package, 2022
Palestinian/Israeli support for peace package, �2016-2022
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian support for components of peace plan, 2022
Degree of support/opposition by public/issue
Degree of support/opposition | Israeli Jewish public 2022 | Palestinian public 2022 |
Majority support | Mutual recognition Democratic Palestine/Israel Regional peace Multinational force | |
50/50 | | |
Large minority | Implementation guarantees Demilitarization | Refugees |
A third, more or less | Sov/ early warning Combined package Borders: Green Line/ equal exchange | Regional peace Implementation guarantees Democratic Palestine Borders: Green Line/ equal exchange Multinational force |
A quarter, more or less | Capital Jerusalem Old City Refugees | Mutual recognition Combined package Sov/ early warning Capital Jerusalem Old City Demilitarization |
Palestinians and Israeli Jews: �How far apart on the issues, 2022?
How Far Apart? | Issues |
Least Conflict: | Implementation guarantees Democratic Palestine Regional peace Multinational force |
Mutual Contention: | Old City Two capitals in Jerusalem Sov/Early warning Green Line/equal exchange Combined package |
Polarization | Demilitarized state (PAL) Mutual recognition (PAL) Refugees (ISR) |
Support for the peace package by selected Israeli Jewish indicators, 2022
Support for the peace package by selected Palestinian indicators, 2022
6 paired incentives offered to both sides, 2022
1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence: ongoing security cooperation with Israeli security forces, and Israel in return will agree to end its military presence in Palestine 2. Combat incitement: Palestine and Israel will agree to combat incitement against the other/ make changes in school textbooks 3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories: agreed number of Palestinian laborers to work in Israel, and Palestine will allow Israeli factories to continue operating in its territory 4. Historic links, character, and equal rights: Israel acknowledges Palestinian historic and religious links, Palestine recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people; affirming equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel 5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees: Jews from Arab countries will receive monetary compensation; Palestinian refugees will receive monetary compensation as well as homes and land in their country of residence 6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force: Israel will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners, and Palestinians will consolidating all armed factions into one 7. Settlers and refugees: Jewish settlers will be allowed to stay in their homes with dual Israeli-Palestinian citizenship, while the same number of Palestinian refugees will be allowed to receive dual citizenship and live in Israel |
Peace Package: Israeli Jewish support/opposition after incentive pairs, 2022
“Does this make you more or less likely to support the agreement?” (% total support or opposition after defections & switchers, Israeli Jews, for new comprehensive package)
Package Plan: Palestinian support/opposition after incentive pairs, 2022
“Does this make you more or less likely to support the agreement?” (% total support or opposition after defections & switchers, Palestinians, for new comprehensive package)
Policy Conclusions and Implications
End of historic compromise? Attitudes of both sides continue to harden; past four years show this process accelerating. Why? the impact of:
While public opinion is clearly not a force for peace, survey research show that there is room for improvement (although currently improbable)
|
Consequences of Occupation
“In your opinion, to what extent does the continuation of Israeli control over the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria harm or not harm Israel?” (% Israeli Jews )
“And to what extent does the continuation of Israeli control over the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria harm or not harm the Palestinians” (% Israeli Jews )
Israeli Jews: Largest portion believe occupation slightly/does not harm Israel or the Palestinians
Does the occupation harm Israel?
Does the occupation harm the Palestinians?
“To what extent does the continuation of armed attacks against Israel harm or not harm Israel?” (% Palestinians)
“To what extent does the continuation of armed attacks against Israel harm or not harm the Palestinians and their interests?” (% Palestinians)
Palestinians: ¾ = Armed attacks against Israel harms Israel, most think do not harm Palestinians
Do armed attacks
harm Israel?
Do armed attacks harm the Palestinians?
West bank | Gaza Strip | |
43 | 32 | Harms |
55 | 68 | Not harms |
No variation Gaza/WB
Psychological aspects of the conflict
No consensus regarding start of conflict among�Palestinians and Israeli Jews; Israeli Arabs mark 1948
“People differ in their assessment of when the Arab-Israeli or Arab-Jewish conflict originated or started? What do you think? Did it start with:” (Israeli Jews & Palestinians, closed list)
“How much does this land belong to the following groups?” (% Israeli Jews & Palestinians)
Mirror image: each group = exclusive ownership of land
Does the land belong to Jews?
Does the land belong to Palestinians?
Strong victimization on both sides, higher moral entitlement among Palestinians
To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements regarding the experiences of Jews /Palestinians
generally? (% Agree - Israeli Jews & Palestinians)
West bank | Gaza Strip |
95 | 84 |
West bank | Gaza Strip |
90 | 76 |