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�PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PULSE

A Joint Poll

24 January 2023

Dr. Khalil Shikaki

Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin

Dr. Nimrod Rosler

Dr. Alon Yakter

Funded by the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP

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�Methodology

Palestinian sample:

  • N=1270 Face-to-face interviews
  • West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip , 127 randomly selected locations
  • Dates of interviews: 1-4 December, 2022
  • Margin of error: +/-3%.

Israeli sample:

  • N=900 adult Israelis interviewed by internet
  • Languages of interviews: Hebrew, Arabic
  • Dates of interviews: 6– 12 December, 2022
  • Jews inside Green Line (n=500), West Bank settlers (n=200), Israeli Arabs (n=200); data weighted to reflect actual proportions in society.
  • Margin of error: +/-3.3%, Data collection by New Wave Research.

The analysis has been prepared by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, and Dr. Nimrod Rosler & Dr. Alon Yakter of Tel Aviv University,

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�The state of the two-state solution

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“Do you support or oppose a solution based on establishment of a Palestinian state, the two-state solution?” (%, time series)

Declining support for two-state solution

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“Do you support/oppose solution based on establishment of Palestinian state, the two-state solution?” (%, time series)

Support for two-state principle:

Decline among Israeli Jews and Palestinians

West bank

Gaza Strip

28

40

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Frameworks over time: erosion for two states – declining support for other approaches

Levels of support for different frameworks for solving the conflict (%, All Israelis, Palestinians)

*July 2018 – 1 democratic state=“elimination” analysis; TSS – modified package, 7/2018, 9/2020; Confederation question modified over time

Palestinians

Israelis

West bank

Gaza Strip

28

40

TSS

18

38

Specific TSS Package

18

28

One state

15

34

Confederation

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Unequal one state: Rising among Israeli Jews, close second among Palestinians

Levels of support for different frameworks (%, Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians)

Palestinians

Israeli Jews

*July 2018 – 1 democratic state asked only of those who did not support two state solution; 1 unequal state asked only of those who did not support another option

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“And now after we went over the main proposed terms of the two-state solution of the Israeli Palestinian permanent settlement please tell me the extent to which you support or oppose such a permanent settlement in general as one combined package?” (%, All Israelis)

Support for SPECIFIC TSS PACKAGE:

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Confederation Items

Support for confederation elements (%, Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians)

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Decline in support for confederation among Israeli Jews and Palestinians

2022: Each item asked separately, then support/opposition to total package

(6/17-2020): “Two states, Pal/Isrl, enter a confederation - citizens of one country allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of other, each national group votes only in its state for elections. Freedom of movement, Jerusalem is not divided, serves as the capital of two states; cooperation on security and economy.” (% “support” *12/16, minimal explanation)

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Confederation support decline among Jewish center-Right and rise among Jewish Left and Arab Israelis

2022: Each item asked separately, then support/opposition to total package

(6/17-2020): “Two states, Pal/Isrl, enter a confederation - citizens of one country allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of other, each national group votes only in its state for elections. Freedom of movement, Jerusalem is not divided, serves as the capital of two states; cooperation on security and economy.” (% “support” *12/16, minimal explanation)

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“What in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years?” (%)

Chances of a Palestinian State:

Low, all populations

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Viability of two states: �Decline, minority “viable”

“Some believe that the TSS an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel, is no longer possible, since political changes and developments on the ground, such as settlement expansion, make it impossible to implement. What do you think?” (%, Palestinians and Israelis)

Palestinians

Israeli Jews

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�National priorities

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“Which of these values is most important to you? (%, Jews only, time series – change since June 2016)

Values: Jews – “Jewish Majority” rise, “Greater Israel” decline

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“Which is the most important vital national goal?” (%, Palestinians)

Palestinian goals : Right of return rise, top value alongside Israel withdrawal/67

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�Current conflict directions

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Israeli Jews: Rise for decisive war, decline for peace Palestinians: rise for unarmed struggle

Which of the following list…should happen now between Israelis & Palestinians? (Israeli Jews & Palestinians)

Palestinians

Israeli Jews

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“Given the wave of attacks by Palestinians on Israeli targets on both sides of the Green Line, do you think this is the beginning of a new organized Palestinian Intifada?

Possible new intifada: Both sides

West bank

Gaza Strip

68

51

Probably yes

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After Mahmoud Abbas: Armed factions fight

If Mahmoud Abbas is no longer President, what do you expect to happen? (Israeli Jews & Palestinians)

West bank

Gaza Strip

49%

41%

Armed factions fight violently

22%

32%

Fatah & Hamas hold elections

19%

26%

No violence & no agreement

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Within group, no clear, leading aspiration. �Perception of “other” = extreme.

“What in your opinion are the long run aspirations of Israel/the Palestinian Authority and the PLO? “ (Israeli Jews & Palestinians)

The Palestinian Authority and the PLO aspiration

The Israel aspiration

West bank

Gaza Strip

20%

30%

Conquer Israel and destroy the Jewish population

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Confidence-building measures

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Israel Jews: reforms in Palestinian education and disarm. �Palestinians: Prisoner release top measure

“…confidence building measures that Palestinian and Israeli sides can jointly take to improve Palestinian-Israeli environment & promote conditions to resume viable peace negotiations. Support/oppose the following measures? (% Support - Israeli Jews & Palestinians)

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Gaza Strip Palestinians are more open

“…confidence building measures that Palestinian and Israeli sides can jointly take to improve Palestinian-Israeli environment & promote conditions to resume viable peace negotiations. Support/oppose the following measures? (% Support – Palestinians, WB and Gaza)

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Low willingness to participate �in reconciliation activities

To what extent do you disagree or agree with following statements? (% Agree - Israeli Jews & Palestinians)

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Annexation and voting rights

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“Do you support or oppose the annexation of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria without granting the Palestinians there full citizen rights? (%, Jews only)

Annexation, no full rights for Palestinians: More Jews oppose, settlers support

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“If Israel establishes full formal control over the entire West Bank, do you think Palestinians should demand the right to vote in elections for Israeli Knesset and to form its own political parties that compete with Israeli parties?

Minority think Palestinians should demand the right to vote (symmetrical)

West bank

Gaza Strip

24

37

Probably yes

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Israeli Jews: “Do you think Palestinians would actually vote if given the right to vote in national elections? “

Palestinians: “In the scenario in which the West Bank comes under Israel's political control and the Palestinians have equal rights with Israeli Jews including in voting for the Knesset and party competition, Would you vote in the elections?“

Palestinians say they will not vote. Israeli Jews think they will.

West bank

Gaza Strip

12

29

Probably yes

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Policy Conclusions and Implications

A time of no solutions:

    • Historic low support for traditional two-state concept: one-third total on each side—similar to pre-Oslo era
    • Context: Remote, no peace process, regular escalations, hardline domestic politics
    • Low commitment to political resolution through equality or democratic foundation—both sides
    • Increasing legitimacy for permanent non-democratic regime (37%) in Israeli public discourse, compared to two states (34%)
    • Preference for force rather than democratic solutions on Palestinian side—twice as many prefer armed struggle (40%) to voting in Israeli elections (19%)

What can be done?

    • Leadership, top-down driven shift in public discourse; which requires:
    • Legitimate leadership on Palestinian side, incentive or pressure on Israeli leadership
    • Urgent needs: (1) Convey how policies harm “our” side (2) Reduce exclusive ownership of conflict narrative (3) Re-establish need for political resolution, incompatibility of conflict and democratic society

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Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, December 2022Dahlia Scheindlin, �Nimrod Rosler and Alon Yakter (TAU), �Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa (PSR)�Palestinian and Israeli Attitudes�Toward A Permanent Peace Agreement: Issues, constituencies, and paired incentives��Khalil Shikaki�24 January 2023�Funded by the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP

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Peace Plan Package: �11-point Permanent Status

1) Mutual recognition/End of conflict

2) Demilitarized PAL state

3) PAL sov / ISR early warning

4) Multinational Force

5) Border: Green Line / with qual territorial exchange

6) Two capitals in Jerusalem

7) Divided sovereignty in Old City of Jerusalem

8) Family unification in ISR of 100,000 PAL refugees

9) Future Palestinian state will be democratic

10) Guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on implementation

11) Part of regional peace, according to the Arab Peace Initiative

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Palestinian and Israeli support for peace package, 2022

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Palestinian/Israeli support for peace package, �2016-2022

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Israeli Jewish and Palestinian support for components of peace plan, 2022

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Degree of support/opposition by public/issue

Degree of support/opposition

Israeli Jewish public

2022

Palestinian public

2022

Majority support

Mutual recognition

Democratic Palestine/Israel

Regional peace

Multinational force

50/50

Large minority

Implementation guarantees

Demilitarization

Refugees

A third, more or less

Sov/ early warning

Combined package

Borders: Green Line/ equal exchange

Regional peace

Implementation guarantees

Democratic Palestine

Borders: Green Line/ equal exchange

Multinational force

A quarter, more or less

Capital Jerusalem

Old City

Refugees

Mutual recognition

Combined package

Sov/ early warning

Capital Jerusalem

Old City

Demilitarization

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Palestinians and Israeli Jews: �How far apart on the issues, 2022?

How Far Apart?

Issues

Least Conflict:

Implementation guarantees

Democratic Palestine

Regional peace

Multinational force

Mutual Contention:

Old City

Two capitals in Jerusalem

Sov/Early warning

Green Line/equal exchange

Combined package

Polarization

Demilitarized state (PAL)

Mutual recognition (PAL)

Refugees (ISR)

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Support for the peace package by selected Israeli Jewish indicators, 2022

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Support for the peace package by selected Palestinian indicators, 2022

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6 paired incentives offered to both sides, 2022

1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence: ongoing security cooperation with Israeli security forces, and Israel in return will agree to end its military presence in Palestine

2. Combat incitement: Palestine and Israel will agree to combat incitement against the other/ make changes in school textbooks

3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories: agreed number of Palestinian laborers to work in Israel, and Palestine will allow Israeli factories to continue operating in its territory

4. Historic links, character, and equal rights: Israel acknowledges Palestinian historic and religious links, Palestine recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people; affirming equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel

5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees: Jews from Arab countries will receive monetary compensation; Palestinian refugees will receive monetary compensation as well as homes and land in their country of residence 

6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force: Israel will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners, and Palestinians will consolidating all armed factions into one 

7. Settlers and refugees: Jewish settlers will be allowed to stay in their homes with dual Israeli-Palestinian citizenship, while the same number of Palestinian refugees will be allowed to receive dual citizenship and live in Israel

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Peace Package: Israeli Jewish support/opposition after incentive pairs, 2022

“Does this make you more or less likely to support the agreement?” (% total support or opposition after defections & switchers, Israeli Jews, for new comprehensive package)

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Package Plan: Palestinian support/opposition after incentive pairs, 2022

“Does this make you more or less likely to support the agreement?” (% total support or opposition after defections & switchers, Palestinians, for new comprehensive package)

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Policy Conclusions and Implications

End of historic compromise? Attitudes of both sides continue to harden; past four years show this process accelerating. Why? the impact of:

    • Rising tension between the PA and Israel (Jerusalem and holy places, settlements, confiscation of PA funds, Palestinian UN campaign: ICC, ICJ)
    • The damage of the Trump era policies, on Jerusalem, peace plan, PA-US relations
    • Arab normalization with Israel: Palestinian anger; Israeli neglect of the Palestinian issue; peace benefits without need to compromise: no need to offer concessions
    • Significant rise in armed confrontations in 2021 (Hamas-Israel war) and 2022 (armed clashes in northern West Bank– impact of the rise of the “Lions’ Den”)
    • Rise of extreme right wing in Israel in the Nov 2022 elections

While public opinion is clearly not a force for peace, survey research show that there is room for improvement (although currently improbable)

    • Restore feasibility; make peace central to Arab normalization, make it regional
    • Incentives and confidence building measures can help restore some willingness to compromise

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Consequences of Occupation

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“In your opinion, to what extent does the continuation of Israeli control over the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria harm or not harm Israel?” (% Israeli Jews )

“And to what extent does the continuation of Israeli control over the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria harm or not harm the Palestinians” (% Israeli Jews )

Israeli Jews: Largest portion believe occupation slightly/does not harm Israel or the Palestinians

Does the occupation harm Israel?

Does the occupation harm the Palestinians?

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“To what extent does the continuation of armed attacks against Israel harm or not harm Israel?” (% Palestinians)

“To what extent does the continuation of armed attacks against Israel harm or not harm the Palestinians and their interests?” (% Palestinians)

Palestinians: ¾ = Armed attacks against Israel harms Israel, most think do not harm Palestinians

Do armed attacks

harm Israel?

Do armed attacks harm the Palestinians?

West bank

Gaza Strip

43

32

Harms

55

68

Not harms

No variation Gaza/WB

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Psychological aspects of the conflict

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No consensus regarding start of conflict among�Palestinians and Israeli Jews; Israeli Arabs mark 1948

“People differ in their assessment of when the Arab-Israeli or Arab-Jewish conflict originated or started? What do you think? Did it start with:” (Israeli Jews & Palestinians, closed list)

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“How much does this land belong to the following groups?” (% Israeli Jews & Palestinians)

Mirror image: each group = exclusive ownership of land

Does the land belong to Jews?

Does the land belong to Palestinians?

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Strong victimization on both sides, higher moral entitlement among Palestinians

To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements regarding the experiences of Jews /Palestinians

generally? (% Agree - Israeli Jews & Palestinians)

West bank

Gaza Strip

95

84

West bank

Gaza Strip

90

76