Conversing in the Dark�Off-Off Record Speech Acts �and the Cooperative Creation of Uncertainty
Sam Berstler (MIT)
Presented at Institute of Philosophy on 28 March 2025
www.samberstler.com
prologue
To do informal talk is to walk a very narrow line, often with no appreciation of how carefully one is walking…
Erving Goffman (1981: 296)
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Philosophers and linguistics tend to assume that in any conversation…
Publicity
Interlocutors work together to coordinate on what’s happening within the conversation.
Philosophers and linguistics tend to assume that in any conversation…
Publicity
Cooperative interlocutors work together to coordinate on what’s happening within the conversation.
Philosophers and linguistics tend to assume that in any conversation…
Publicity
Cooperative interlocutors work together to make what’s happening in the conversation common knowledge / common ground.
Philosophers and linguistics tend to assume that in any conversation…
Publicity
Cooperative interlocutors work together to make what’s happening in the conversation common knowledge / common ground.
S and A commonly know that p iff
(i) S and A know that p,
(ii) S and A know (i),
(iii) S and A know (ii),
AND ON AND ON AND ON.
Philosophers and linguistics tend to assume that in any conversation…
Publicity
If a cooperative speaker makes a speech act G, she should (rationally? morally? constitutively?) intend to make it common knowledge among all conversational participants that she has made the speech act G.
Philosophers and linguistics tend to assume that in any conversation…
Publicity
If a cooperative speaker makes a speech act G, she should (rationally? morally? constitutively?) intend to make it common knowledge among all conversational participants that she has made the speech act G.
Work together! If a cooperative speaker makes a speech act G, all cooperative participants should work together to make it common knowledge that the speaker has made speech act G
Philosophers and linguistics tend to assume that in any conversation…
Publicity
If a cooperative speaker makes a speech act G, she should (rationally? morally? constitutively?) intend to make it common knowledge among all conversational participants that she has made the speech act G.
Work together! If a cooperative speaker makes a speech act G, all cooperative participants should work together to make it common knowledge that the speaker has made speech act G
Low conversational light is flattering
Creating uncertainty about what’s happening in the conversation is a way to manage the tension between two sets of interests: our interest in coordinating and our interest in saving each other’s face.
Low conversational light is flattering
Falsifying publicity:
Sometimes, if a cooperative speaker makes a speech act G, she and her interlocutors should work together to prevent it from becoming common knowledge that the speaker made the speech act G
Does it matter?
My analysis sheds new light on the function of indirect speech acts in cooperative contexts.
And it puts serious pressure on some orthodox theories of discourse and speech acts.
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In order to protect our relationships and preserve cohesion within the groups to which we belong:
1. We conceal much of what we know
2. We avoid acting in ways that we otherwise would have acted.
3. We decline to acknowledge what we already jointly know.
A Special Case
Sometimes, we conceal information or avoid acting in certain ways in order to protect our own or our interlocutor’s face.
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A face is an image of the self, one that is often better, more coherent, simpler than our actual self. We are often emotionally attached to our face.
But we need to distinguish amongst three different notions of face.
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A face is an image of the self, one that is often better, more coherent, simpler than our actual self. We are often emotionally attached to our face.
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We need to distinguish amongst three different notions of face:
Face as reputation
Face as self-conception
Face as the interactional self
A Special Case
Sometimes, we conceal information or avoid acting in certain ways in order to protect our own or our interlocutor’s face.
Reputational face
Reputational image: A’s beliefs about me and how they are organized
I claim a reputational face as G with respect to A when I intend for A to believe that I am G.
I lose reputational face with A iff A gains evidence that I am not what I intend for A to believe that I am.
Face as self-conception
Self-conception: my beliefs about myself and how they are organized.
Sometimes, in order to protect my self- conception (save my face), you decline to provide me with evidence that risks damaging my self-conception.
Face as the interactional self
Interactional self: What the interaction’s working consensus entails about me
The working consensus is the framework for the interaction. It is a shared set of presuppositions about who we each are and how we view each other. The working consensus norm requires us to construct and conform to it.
Going off-record
By using the interactional back channel (by, for example, hinting or insinuating) we can communicate about face-threatening information without risking damage to our interactional self. This is because we are not communicating “within” the social situation and so our communication doesn’t threaten the working consensus.
Speech acts that are back-channel in this respect are off-record.
You believe that you’re an excellent host with a discerning palette. You take me to a restaurant. I hate it, but I decline to openly say that. Still, you can tell by my vibes that I don’t like it.
You lose reputational face but not interactional face.
I am motivated to protect your interactional face because I want to protect your self-conception, my reputational face, and my interactional face.
An example
Balancing our interest in coordinating our activity with our in saving each other’s face is often a technical challenge.
Good interactants must be effective and subtle information titrators.
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If a speaker S makes some speech act G to A in a context c, then her speech act socially squeezes A iff in G-ing, S makes it the case that A’s only easily available options are:
If a speaker S makes some speech act G to A in a context c, then her speech act socially squeezes A iff in G-ing, S makes it the case that A’s only easily available options are:
If a speaker S makes some speech act G to A in a context c, then her speech act socially squeezes A iff in G-ing, S makes it the case that A’s only easily available options are:
Yuki is discussing how excited she is that she has nothing to do this Friday night. Because he’s incorrectly interpreted her as complaining, Jacob asks Yuki if she wants to hang out.
Yuki’s options…
…Reveal that she doesn’t want to spend time with Jacob and that Jacob has
misinterpreted her
…Hang out with Jacob
If a speaker S makes some speech act G to A in a context c, then her speech act socially squeezes A iff in G-ing, S makes it the case that A’s only easily available options are:
Yuki has introduced herself to her new neighbor, Arthur. ”Literally, anything I can do for you, just let me know!” she says. Arthur replies, “Well, I do need $10,000 for a new roof.” He is dead serious.
Yuki’s options…
…violate the working consensus that she is endlessly generous towards him
…give him $10,000.
When we socially squeeze others, we can express insufficient concern for the other person’s face or reveal a lack of social competency.
We sometimes say that someone who social squeezes us is someone who…
…was presumptuous
…put us on the spot
…was cringe, awkward, tactless
…was a manipulative bastard
What constitutes face-threatening information and what constitutes an “easily available” alternative option is culturally mediated.
So what constitutes a social squeeze is also culturally mediated.
one strategy:�a case study
A speaker S’s goes off-off-record with her speech act G (with respect to an interlocutor I and a context c) iff in G-ing, S intends that:
(i) I knows in c that S made G;
(ii) S doesn’t know in c whether (i); and
(iii) I knows in c that (iii).
Going off-off record
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Melanie suspects but doesn’t know that Arthur has been flirting with her and wants to date. She wants to avoid socially squeezing him. You’re Melanie. What should you do?
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Option 1:
Be more aggressive about flirting and hope he asks you.
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Option 1:
Be more aggressive about flirting and hope he asks you.
Avoids the social squeeze.
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Option 1:
Be more aggressive about flirting and hope he asks you.
Avoids the social squeeze.
Inefficient! Arthur probably wants to avoid socially squeezing her, so this could take forever.
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Option 2:
Use the backchannel. Go off-record.
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
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Preserves interactional face
and so mitigates some squeeze.
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
Option 2:
Use the backchannel. Go off-record.
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Wanna…uhhh…have dinner sometime
She is asking me on a date.
Common knowledge: Melanie is asking Arthur on a date.
Suppose that you’re Arthur, and you don’t want to date Melanie. What are your options?
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Wanna…uhhh…have dinner sometime
She is asking me on a date.
Common knowledge: Melanie is asking Arthur on a date.
Suppose that you’re Arthur, and you don’t want to date Melanie. What are your options?
1. Decline: “I’m just not that into you.”
2. Play dumb: “Can I bring my friend Bob?”
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Wanna…uhhh…have dinner sometime
She is asking me on a date.
Common knowledge: Melanie is asking Arthur on a date.
Suppose that you’re Arthur, and you don’t want to date Melanie. What are your options?
1. Decline: “I’m just not that into you.”
2. Play dumb: “Can I bring my friend Bob?”
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Preserves interactional face
and so mitigates some squeeze.
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
Option 2:
Use the backchannel. Go off-record.
Risks damaging Melanie’s self-conception and Arthur’s reputation.
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Option 3:
Go off-off-record.
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
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Option 3:
Go off-off-record.
If Arthur is conversationally
competent, this should avoid the
risk of a social squeeze.
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
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(iii) Arthur knows (i).
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
(i) Melanie asked Arthur on a date.
(ii) Melanie knows (i).
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(iv) Melanie doesn’t know (iii).
(iii) Arthur knows (i).
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
(i) Melanie asked Arthur on a date.
(ii) Melanie knows (i).
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(iv) Melanie doesn’t know (iii).
(iii) Arthur knows (i).
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
(i) Melanie asked Arthur on a date.
(ii) Melanie knows (i).
Arthur knows (iv).
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(iv) Melanie doesn’t know (iii).
(iii) Arthur knows (i).
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
(i) Melanie asked Arthur on a date.
(ii) Melanie knows (i).
Arthur knows (iv).
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Wanna…uhhh…have dinner sometime
Suppose that you’re Arthur, and you don’t want to date Melanie. What are your options?
1. Decline: “I’m just not that into you.”
2. Play dumb: “Can I bring my friend Bob?”
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Wanna…uhhh…have dinner sometime
Suppose that you’re Arthur, and you don’t want to date Melanie. What are your options?
1. Decline: “I’m just not that into you.”
2. Play dumb: “Can I bring my friend Bob?”
In this version of the story, when Arthur plays dumb, Melanie won’t know whether he is dumb or whether he is playing dumb.
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Wanna…uhhh…have dinner sometime
Suppose that you’re Arthur, and you don’t want to date Melanie. What are your options?
1. Decline: “I’m just not that into you.”
2. Play dumb: “Can I bring my friend Bob?”
In this version of the story, when Arthur plays dumb, Melanie won’t know whether he is dumb or whether he is playing dumb.
“Playing dumb” is a collaborative strategy. Melanie can’t directly follow up or “press the point” without undermining the point of going off-off record.
Melanie meaningfully risks the possibility that Arthur won’t receive her message but, if he had, would want to go on a date with her. Nonetheless, we often judge that speakers who intentionally go off-off-record are…
…gracious
…tactful
…avoided putting us on the spot
We sometimes go off-off record for straightforwardly strategic reasons.
Going off-off record
Larry wants to bribe his dissertation advisor, Professor Smith, to write him in a good letter of recommendation. Larry is pretty sure that Smith is corrupt and that Smith trusts Larry. Still, Larry might choose to go off-record. Why?
Suppose that Smith is not corrupt but that he doesn’t like the paperwork associated with reporting students. However, Smith will overlook Larry’s discretion only if he can do so without harming his own reputation. By going off-off record, Larry enables Smith to do this.
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Sociolinguists have argued that implicatures are polite in virtue of what Fricker calls their “dodgy epistemics.” But they think that implicatures are polite because they are deniable.
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(iii) Arthur doesn’t know whether (i).
Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
(i) Melanie asked Arthur on a date.
(ii) Melanie knows (i).
I’m just not that into you.
Urgh, gross, I didn’t mean like THAT.
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Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
I’m just not that into you.
Urgh, gross, I didn’t mean like THAT.
This is strategically beneficial for Melanie. But why is it beneficial for Arthur? Since we’re looking for an explanation of tact, aren’t we looking for an explanation that appeals to the latter sorts of facts?
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Wanna….uhhhh….have dinner sometime
I’m just not that into you.
Urgh, gross, I didn’t mean like THAT.
This is strategically beneficial for Melanie. But why is it beneficial for Arthur? Since we’re looking for an explanation of tact, aren’t we looking for an explanation that appeals to the latter sorts of facts?
My appeal to off-off-recordness is a better explanation of the same data point.
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(How) Is Meaning Constitutively Transparent?
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Schiffer-style claim
A speaker S means that p to an addressee A only if S intends for all of S’s communicative intentions to become common knowledge between S and A.
Stalnaker-style claim
A speaker S asserts that p to an addressee A iff S intends to update some intersubjectively shared body of information with p.
(How) Is Meaning Constitutively Transparent?
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Problem:
In some situations, S knows that it’s impossible for S to make any new information common knowledge / intersubjectively shared with p. But S can still assert that p.
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Reply on behalf of orthodoxy:
Stalnaker-style models rely on an idealization. They assume that speakers are communicating within a common knowledge-conducive environment. But most face-to-face conversations seem to be common knowledge-conducive.
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My reply &
THE MORAL OF THE STORY:
But these views/models are relying on a further idealization still, which is much more worrisome. They are assuming that speakers lack a desire to perform facework. We should predict that facework strategies are pervasive within conversation. If we want to study real-world pragmatic strategies, we need to drop the assumption that whenever a speaker makes a speech act, she is proposing to update the context.c
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Thanks for listening!
Q&A
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