1 of 13

Returns to Homeownership and Inequality: Evidence from the First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit��Maria Gindelsky, Jeremy Moulton, Kelly Wentland and Scott Wentland

Discussion by:

Sanket Korgaonkar

University of Virginia

UNC Kenan Flagler Institute�Conference on Market-based Solutions for Reducing Wealth Inequality�April 25th 2024

2 of 13

Summary

  • Motivation:
    • Long literature on homeownership and wealth gaps between minorities and non-minorities.
    • Kermani and Wong (2024 WP): Minorities earn lower returns on their homeownership spells.

  • Research question:
    • Why do minority households earn lower gross returns on their homeownership spells?

  • Approach:
    • Experiment: Introduction of FHTC (Berger et al. (2020 JF))
    • Empirical Method: Difference-in-difference (DD)
    • Data: American Community Survey merged with ZTRAX Assessments and Transactions Data.

3 of 13

Empirical approach: Main results

Result 1: Effect of FHTC

Result 2: Effect of FHTC by Minority Status

Implication: Wealth inequality begets wealth inequality

4 of 13

Comment 1: Empirical approach

5 of 13

Empirical approach: Difference-in-differences

Homebuyer Income

t = Pre-period

No FHTC, all home buyers effectively ineligible

Homebuyer Income

t = Post period

[ Eligible home buyers ] [ Ineligible home buyers ...

$150,000

Layered onto this are differences in home buyer minority status

6 of 13

Empirical approach: Difference-in-differences

  • Concern: Post x Eligible positive coefficient driven by Eligible Non Takers?

Homebuyer Income

t = Post period

[ Eligible home buyers ] [ Ineligible home buyers ...

$150,000

Compliers:

Eligible + Take up FHTC + Buy Home

Eligible Non Takers:

Eligible + Don’t take up FHTC + Buy Home

Ineligible Non Takers:

Inligible + Can’t take up FHTC + Buy Home

  • Layered on to this is the race of the homeowner.
    • Does ratio of Eligible Compliers to Non-takers vary by race? Perhaps.
      • Minority population more likely to have Compliers (Charles and Hurst (2002) among others).

7 of 13

Empirical approach: Location choice and returns

  •  

8 of 13

Comment 2: Mechanism

9 of 13

Mechanism

  • Why do up-front capital requirements reduce homeownership returns? Two hypotheses that first come to mind:
    • Homebuyers have less to reinvest into the home conditional on completing home purchase.
    • Homebuyers are more likely to experience distressed sales.
      • Both hypotheses are inconsistent with finding that FHTC had no effect on sale price.

  • Explanation in paper:
    • FHTC enabled minority buyers to acquire homes where standard quality properties were purchased for fire-sale prices. Observe distressed purchase price, non-distressed sale price.
      • Why is up-front capital pivotal to this? Is this a story about relaxing search and bargaining frictions?

  • Suggestion: Provide a simple conceptual framework (in words) to focus the reader on the specific constraints and frictions that you have in mind.

10 of 13

�Comment 3:�Comparison to FHA low down-payment loans

11 of 13

FHTC vs. high-LTV loans

  • High LTV loans imperfectly substitute for tax credit / grants.
    • Relax short-term liquidity constraint but do not improve wealth position.

  • Informed welfare comparison depends on how tax credit recipients use additional wealth.
    • Reinvest in home? Or expend on non-durable consumption?

FHTC:

$100 Home Purchased

$80 Debt

$20 Equity

$8 Grant

Cash flow at purchase = -$12�∆ Assets = $88

∆ Wealth = $8

High LTV loan:

$100 Home Purchased

$88 Debt

$12 Equity

No credit/grant

Cash flow at purchase = $-12�∆ Assets = $88

∆ Wealth = $0

12 of 13

Conclusion

  • A paper on an important and urgent topic. Thank you for the opportunity to think through it!

  • Concerning finding: Wealth inequality begets wealth inequality.
    • Wealth constrained borrowers experience up-front liquidity constraints that reduce returns conditional on entering homeownership.

  • To translate findings into policy and market-based solutions, understanding the nature of potential homebuyer constraints and frictions is crucial.
    • For example, the optimal mortgage renegotiation strategies towards delinquent borrowers depends on whether they face liquidity or wealth constraints.
      • Ganong and Noel (2020), Korgaonkar (2024)

13 of 13

Minor comments / suggestions

  • Show the pre-trend analysis in the paper, or at least in the Appendix.
  • Show the buy price and sell price result in the equivalent specification of Table 4.
  • In the triple difference specification, show all the interaction terms.
  • Summary stats table might also distinguish between pre and post sample for Treatment and control group since credit standards were changing dramatically at around the same time.