Failure of Cleanup Oversight at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard

Presented to

Carlton Waterhouse

Deputy Assistant Administrator

Office of Land & Emergency Management

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

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by Daniel Hirsch

President, Committee to Bridge the Gap

and former Director, Program on Environmental and Nuclear Policy, UC Santa Cruz

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24 August 2021

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76 YEARS: Hunters Point & the Dawn of Nuclear Era

On July 16, 1945, the USS Indianapolis departed Hunters Point Naval Shipyard carrying components of a bomb code-named “Little Boy,” including half of the highly enriched uranium then in existence in the world. It was headed to Tinian Island in the Pacific. On August 6, the Enola Gay left Tinian and dropped the assembled atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

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Hiroshima

August 6, 1945

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One year later: the OPERATION

CROSSROADS

atomic tests in the Bikini Atoll

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The tests went awry, & badly contaminated hundreds of ships

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Aerial view of Shot Baker, OPERATION CROSSROADS, July 25, 1946, ships in foreground; US Army Photographic Signal Corps

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USS Independence wreckage after the Able Shot blast, still smoking (NARA)

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Radioactively contaminated

USS Independence after A-bomb blast damage.

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Note: Two sailors at far right. (NARA)

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Radioactivity from the

Pacific nuclear tests included:

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• unfissioned plutonium and uranium

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• scores of fission products

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• activation products from neutron irradiation of materials like sand and sediment

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Group of sailors wash down the highly contaminated deck of the captured German battleship USS Prinz Eugene (IX 300). The ship was so radioactive that it was later sunk. (NARA, Still Pictures Unit, Record Group 80-G, box 2228)

Crude efforts at decontaminating the radioactive fleet at sea proved futile

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Navy decided to take

79 irradiated Crossroads ships

to Hunters Point for “decontamination”

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Aerial View of Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, 1940s, NARA

Bayview Hunters Point,

was then, and remains today,

a low-income community of color

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Redlining practices have resulted in BayView Hunters Point (BVHP) concentrating the highest density of Black people in San Francisco

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←BVHP

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Life expectancy at birth by census tract (San Francisco 2020)

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Age-adjusted lung cancer incidence (San Francisco, 2013-2017 Source: Greater Bay Area Cancer Registry)

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Drydock 4 at Hunters Point, 1950s (Todd Lappin)

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A worker sandblasts a radioactively contaminated vessel in one of the drydocks at HPNS. (Fritz Goro/Life Magazine Collection/Getty Images)

Radioactive ships were brought into drydocks and sandblasted in the open air, with the potential to spread the contamination throughout Hunters Point

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A sign in front of the Ex-USS Independence anchored at HPNS, reading "Personnel for Radioactive Ships Only" (NARA)

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610,000 gallons of contaminated fuel oil from Navy ships exposed to nuclear weapons tests were burned in boilers on land at HPNS, where the contamination could be widely dispersed by air releases.

>600,000 Gallons of Radioactive Fuel Burned at HPNS

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Navy workers crossing the boundary line. Credit: Fritz Goro / Life Magazine Collection / Getty Images

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Sailors – and their clothing – contaminated by nuclear work at HPNS were washed at the site, with the contaminated rinse water going down the drains and leaking into the soil through breaks in the lines.

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Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory

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In addition to the decontamination of ships from the Pacific nuclear tests, the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory was established at HPNS.

It participated in all Pacific nuclear tests from 1950-1958 as well as doing extensive research at HPNS with large quantities of radionuclides, including nuclear weapons debris brought back for analysis.

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An array of animals were irradiated and injected with radioactivity at HPNS, potentially contaminating portions of the site by releases from excrement and incineration of carcases.

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Goats confined to USS Niagara before the Baker Shot. They were left on board, in the detonation zone, for a number of days following the blast, the effects of which were later observed and documented. (NARA)

In addition, NRDL was allowed to possess extremely high amounts of radionuclides under its licenses

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• 60,000 curies of strontium-90/yttrium-90
• 15,000 curies of cobalt-60
• 3,000 curies of cesium-137
• 2,426 pounds of depleted uranium
• 94 pounds of natural uranium
• 12 pounds of natural thorium
• 2 pounds of U-235
• 2,000 grams of plutonium-239

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• 60,000 curies of strontium-90/yttrium-90

could contaminate more than ten trillion tons of soil at EPA’s default Superfund preliminary remediation goal (PRG)

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• 2,426 pounds of depleted uranium

could contaminate more than 200 million metric tons of soil above EPAs default Superfund preliminary remediation goal

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• 2,000 grams of plutonium-239:

a millionth of an ounce if inhaled will cause cancer with a

virtual 100% statistical certainty

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To put these large amounts into perspective

HPNS was declared a Superfund site in 1989

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The subsequent botched cleanup has been riddled with scandal and failure of oversight

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The present crisis regarding the botched HPNS cleanup

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1. EPA found evidence of falsification of radioactivity measurements made by Navy contractor Tetra Tech

at 90-97% of HPNS survey units.

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EPA did not publicly disclose this; PEER had to obtain the EPA findings under FOIA and make them public.

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Tetra Tech Falsifications

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97% of measurements were found to be suspect

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EPA Found Only 3% of Samples to Be Free of Falsification

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Unprecedented Falsification

“The vast scope of the signs of falsification found is unprecedented nationally.”

• EPA Region IX� Navy 5-Year Review: Appendix B1. Regulatory Agency Interview Records,�Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, 2019

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Tetra Tech Scandal is just

the Tip of the Iceberg

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How did the Navy and EPA Fail to Catch Such Monumental Falsification for So Many Years?

These failures of oversight were not limited to the Tetra Tech matter, but extend to the whole cleanup.

II. EPA Repeatedly Approved Navy HPNS Cleanup Goals That Were Even at the Time Extremely Outdated, Non-protective & Inconsistent with EPA CERCLA Guidance,

and Thus Violated CERCLA 120(a)(2)

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Under Section 120(a)(2) of CERCLA, the Navy Is Required to Use Standards

Consistent with EPA’s Superfund Guidance, But EPA Failed to Require it to Do So

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“No department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States may adopt or utilize any such guidelines, rules, regulations, or criteria which are inconsistent with the guidelines, rules, regulations, and criteria established by the [EPA] Administrator under this chapter.”

EPA Has Historically Required Federal Agencies Comply with CERCLA 120(a)(2) and Employ Standards Consistent with EPA Guidance

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Example:

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“CERCLA section 120(a)(2) prohibits Federal Facilities from adopting or utilizing any rule, guidance or criteria applicable to CERCLA remedial actions that are inconsistent with EPA CERCLA remedial action requirements. This section makes clear that Federal Facilities are held to the same standards and requirements as non-federal facilities.”

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December 12, 1997, letter from Woolford and Luftig, EPA OSWER (OLEM predecessor) to DOE’s Berube.

OLEM CERCLA Radiation Guidance Makes Clear That Cleanup Approaches from Other Agencies Should Not Be Used; Approaches That Do Not Follow OLEM Policies & Guidance Should Not Be Used

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Q10. For CERCLA risk assessments at remedial sites, is it appropriate to use guidance or

approaches developed by other Federal, State or Tribal Agencies or by International

or National Organizations?

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A. EPA has made the policy decision that risks from radionuclide exposures at remedial sites

should be estimated in the same manner as chemical contaminants, which is consistent

with EPA’s remedial program implementing guidance (e.g., EPA 1997g, 1999d, 2000f). Consequently, approaches that do not follow the remedial program’s policies and

guidance should not be used at CERCLA remedial sites. Should regional staff have

questions, they should consult with the Superfund remedial program’s National Radiation

Expert (Stuart Walker of OSRTI at the time this fact sheet was issued, at (703) 603-8748

or walker.stuart@epa.gov), before using guidance from other organizations that is not

already incorporated into this and other EPA Superfund remedial program guidance.

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OSWER 9285.6-20 “Radiation Risk Assessment at CERCLA Sites: Q&A,” June 13, 2014

Q16. What calculation methods or multimedia radionuclide transport and exposure models are recommended by EPA for Superfund risk assessments?

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A. The PRG calculators (U.S. EPA 2002a, 2007, 2009a), which are used to develop risk-based PRGs for radionuclides, are recommended by EPA for Superfund remedial radiation risk assessments.

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OSWER 9285.6-20 “Radiation Risk Assessment at CERCLA Sites: Q&A,” June 13, 2014

Despite the Requirements that Cleanup Standards be Consistent with EPA’s CERCLA Guidance, the Navy is Using Standards that are Inconsistent with that Guidance.

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Despite CERCLA 120(a)(2), EPA Region IX

Rubber-Stamped These Improper Standards

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The Navy’s Hunters Point Release Criteria

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The HPNS remedial goals were put forward in an Action Memorandum and then repeatedly used in Records of Decision (RODs) that were approved by EPA. The soil goals, however, came from EPA 1991 PRGs and the building standards from a 1974 AEC guidance (Reg. Guide 1.86) and 25 mrem/yr based on RESRAD. None of these were consistent with EPA guidance. As the Navy stated:

Soil Cleanup Goals Are Extremely Outdated

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The cancer risk from the Navy Soil Cleanup Standards is, according to the EPA’s PRG Calculator, 2.12 x 10^-3, meaning

1 in every 473 people would get a cancer from the radioactive contamination.

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This is 2,120 times higher than EPA’s risk goal and 21 times higher than the upper end of the risk range.

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The Navy’s Soil Cleanup Standards Would Allow 332 millirem per year, the Equivalent of ~166 Chest X-rays Annually, Year After Year

The Navy soil standards, approved by EPA, would allow the public to receive essentially a chest X-ray every other day for decades, with no medical benefit, and no informed consent.

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[Note that OLEM guidance declares any ARAR (Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements) over 12 millirem/year presumptively non-protective.]

(Radiation Q&A Q35)

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The Navy’s release criteria were supposedly based on 10^-6 risk

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But the criteria the Navy used--soil PRGs from 1991 and the Atomic Energy Commission’s 1974 Reg. Guide 1.86 values for buildings--were wrong and inconsistent with EPA CERCLA guidance, in violation of CERCLA 120(a)(2) and greatly exceed 10^-6, indeed exceed the upper limit of the risk range.

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The errors need to be corrected and current 10 ^-6 PRGs used

10^-6 is the CERCLA Point of Departure

“The 10^-6 risk level shall be used as the point of departure for determining remediation goals for alternatives when ARARs are not available or are not sufficiently protective because of the presence of multiple contaminants at a site or multiple pathways of exposure” 40 CFR 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2)

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To Fall Back From 10^-6 Requires Consideration of the 9 Balancing & Other CERCLA Criteria--

Which Has Never Been Done at HPNS

“Nine criteria for evaluation. The analysis of alternatives under review shall reflect the scope and complexity of site problems and alternatives being evaluated and consider the relative significance of the factors within each criteria.”

40 CFR 300.430(e)(9)(iii)

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The Nine CERCLA Threshold, Balancing, & Modifying Criteria

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1. Overall protection of human health and the environment

2. Compliance with ARARs (applicable or relevant and appropriate standards)

3. Long-term effectiveness and permanence

4. Reduction of toxicity, mobility or volume

5. Short-term effectiveness

6. Implementability

7. Cost

8. State acceptance

9. Community acceptance

Current Time Urgent Matter

Despite CERCLA 120(a)(2) requiring the use of cleanup guidance consistent with EPA’s, the Navy is refusing to use EPA’s Building PRG Calculator for setting cleanup standards for contaminated buildings at HPNS. We have reason to believe--in part because of EPA strenuous resistance to providing in a timely fashion documents under FOIA related to the Navy-EPA disagreement--that the Region may be intending to cave in to Navy demands on the matter, and to do so without informing and getting approval from OLEM top leadership.

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Adverse National Impacts Were This to Happen

This could not only place people in the Hunters Point area at risk but could impact cleanup of large numbers of other contaminated sites across the country, where Responsible Parties have been pushing to use less protective standards not consistent with EPA’s guidance. This pending action could undermine EPA authority nationally.

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Two Main Pathways for Exposure to Radioactivity in Contaminated Buildings

Navy Cleanup Goals for Fixed External Radiation Inside Buildings Are Extremely Outdated, Inconsistent with EPA Guidance, & Non-protective

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The Navy’s Building Remedial Goals for External Contamination Are Vastly Less Protective than Those Specified by EPA Guidance

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The Navy cleanup levels for external contamination would produce cancer risks, according to EPA’s BPRG calculator, of

~1 x 10^⁻2 -- ~1 in every 100 people exposed would get a cancer from the contamination.

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That is about 10,000 times higher than the EPA risk goal and about 100 times higher than the upper limit of the risk range.

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Navy Cleanup Goals for Removable Contamination (Settled Dust) in Buildings Are Extremely Outdated, Inconsistent with EPA Guidance, & Non-protective

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The Navy’s Building Remedial Goals for Removable Contamination Are Vastly Less Protective than Those Specified by EPA Guidance

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The Navy cleanup levels for settled dust would produce cancer risks, according to EPA’s BPRG calculator, of 1.6 x 10⁻² -- 1 in every 62 people exposed would get a cancer from the contamination.

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That is 16,000 times higher than the EPA risk goal and 160 times higher than the upper limit of the risk range.

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The Navy building cleanup goals, for external contamination and settled dust combined, would produce 1,861 millirem/year, the equivalent of 930 chest X-rays annually, according to EPA’s Building Dose Compliance Calculator.

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The combined cancer risk from the external and removable contamination allowed under the Navy’s building cleanup standards, according to the EPA BPRG calculator

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The Nonprotective HPNS Cleanup Standards Also Have Contributed to Radioactive Waste Being Shipped to Disposal Sites Not Licensed for LLRW

This is part of a larger national issue involving troubling efforts within EPA to allow radioactive waste to be disposed of in Subtitle C, and perhaps even Subtitle D, landfills.

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EPA Refusal to Admit & Fix the Cleanup Standards Errors

Rather than admit it made an error in approving the Navy’s woefully non-protective cleanup standards for soil and buildings, and committing to fixing them, EPA is instead misusing the 5-Year Review process to allow contamination levels 100 times higher.

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III. Navy & EPA Quietly Shifted Remedy from Cleanup to Coverup

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Navy shifts from remediating to covering up contamination

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The 1997 Record of Decision (ROD) for Parcel B called for excavation and off-site disposal of contaminated soil. (1997 Parcel B ROD, p. 49, 65)

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Work at Parcel B found far more contamination than the Navy had anticipated. (Amended Parcel B ROD, p. 1-5)

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In the 2009 Amended ROD for Parcel B, the Navy changed its remedy to rely on covering rather than removing contamination:

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“...the consideration of parcel-wide covers to address soil contamination instead of excavation represents a fundamental change in the scope of the remedy for soil.” (Amended Parcel B ROD, p. 1-4)

Remedy now relies primarily on “durable covers,” which are defined in the RODs as 2 feet (or in some cases 3) of “clean soil”

or 4 inches of asphalt.

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Among the Key 9 Criteria are Community Acceptance

“Community acceptance. This assessment includes determining which components of the alternatives interested persons in the community support, have reservations about, or oppose. This assessment may not be completed until comments on the proposed plan are received.”

40 CFR 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(I)

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Violation of Community Acceptance�(one of the 9 CERCLA Criteria)

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Rather than clean up HPNS to the most protective standards to allow for unrestricted use, much of the contamination will now be left in place and unenforceable restrictions will be placed on the future uses of the site, contrary to official San Francisco policy.

Proposition P: Public Overwhelmingly Supports Highest Cleanup Standards, Unrestricted Use

Passed in 2000 with 86.4% in favor

“While the federal government is required by law to clean up the Shipyard, the Navy says it will cost too much to do a thorough job. Instead, the Navy plans to leave behind so much contamination that it will increase the risk for cancer resulting from exposure to the property, requiring the construction of barriers and the restriction of future land uses.”

“Hunters Point Shipyard [must] be cleaned to a level which would enable the unrestricted use of the property - the highest standard for cleanup established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.”

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SF Board of Supervisors Adopts Prop P as Official City and County Policy

“WHEREAS, Although the federal government is required by law to clean up the Shipyard, the Navy says it will cost too much money to do a thorough job. Instead, the Navy plans to leave behind so much contamination that the property may expose occupants and visitors to an unacceptable risk of cancer unless the Navy imposes legal restrictions on land use and constructs physical barriers; and

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WHEREAS, The United States government should be held to the highest standards of accountability for its actions; and

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WHEREAS, The United States Navy has demonstrated that it is not committed to responsible site management or cleanup and many in the Bayview Hunters Point community believe the department's disdain for its duties in this neighborhood stems from the racial make-up of its residents; and

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WHEREAS The Hunters Point Bayview community wishes the Hunters Point Shipyard to be cleaned to a level which would enable the unrestricted use of the property - the highest standard for cleanup established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency; and

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RESOLVED, That the Board hereby declares that Proposition P ... shall be the official policy of the City regarding the remediation of the Shipyard and sets forth a standard of remediation acceptable to the community;

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Thin Covers Are Ineffective at Preventing Exposure to Contaminants

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Much of HPNS will be dirt with vegetation growing on it.

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Large Portions of HPNS are Soil With Vegetation

March 2017, Google Earth

August 2017, Google Earth

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March 2017, Google Earth

Vegetation growing at HPNS

March 2017, google earth

Source: Indy Media

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HPNS Development Plans have always included large areas of soil with vegetation

Source: April 26, 2018 San Francisco Planning Commision presentation on Candlestick Point and Hunters Point Shipyard

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And that remains true to this day

Source: April 2 & 9, 2018 presentation on Full CAC Candlestick Point and Hunters Point Shipyard Project Update

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There are numerous mechanisms by which contaminants can be brought back to the surface

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There Are Numerous Other Mechanisms Which Render Soil Covers Useless

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In the short time since soil covers have been installed at IR 07/18 (2011), instances of barrier breach by burrowing animals have already occurred

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Photos taken on March 1st, 2013

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Source: Navy Third Five-Year Review, HPNS

Growing fruits and vegetables

is common in

the Bayview/Hunters Point area.

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Source: Quesada Gardens

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Corn and other produce grown at Quesada Community Gardens in Bayview/Hunters Point neighborhood

Source: Quesada Gardens

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Children growing produce in the soil of a Bayview/Hunters Point street median

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2 foot soil cover

contaminated soil

Roots of Vegetables Penetrate Depths Beyond 2 Feet, and Thus Can Absorb Contaminants

Raised bed

EPA Tries to Get Around This by Claiming That All Gardens Will Be Raised Beds With Impermeable Bottoms

Completely unenforceable; nothing can grow under such circumstances; a regulatory fiction designed to allow vastly higher concentrations of contaminants than permitted for unrestricted residential use.

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Even With the Garden Pathway Turned Off in the PRG Calculator, the Cancer Risks from the Navy Soil Cleanup Levels Exceed the CERCLA Risk Goal by 350 Times and Also Exceed the Normal EPA Upper Limit of the Risk Range.

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With the Garden Pathway Included, the Risk Associated with the Navy Remediation Goals is Far, Far Outside the Acceptable Risk Range

When the garden pathway is included, as it should be, the PRG-based risk is 2 x 10^-3, far, far above the upper end of acceptable risk levels.

When chemicals are included, as they must be, the risk is even further into the the 10^-3 range, vastly exceeding acceptable risk.

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EPA’s National Chemical Regional Screening Levels Need to Include the Garden Pathway, as the Radionuclide PRGs Do

For years there has been internal recognition at EPA that it needs to include the garden pathway in its Regional Screening Levels (RSLs) for chemicals, paralleling what the Radionuclide PRGs have long done. Direction should be given to initiate a scientifically thorough process of doing so. This is particularly important because communities of color disproportionately rely on homegrown fruits and vegetables.

[Adding the homegrown produce pathway for toxic chemicals will require, as the Rad PRGs have done, use of extensive actual measured values for root uptake of the various contaminants into different types of edible plants (Bv-wet values), and not instead resorting to a simple, non-empirical formula based on K_ow, that has been shown to be highly inaccurate.]

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Coverup, not Cleanup of Contamination

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Original cleanup promise: removal of contaminated soil

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Contamination was found to be ubiquitous and cleanup costs higher than anticipated, so Navy modified cleanup plan to rely on covering contamination with 2 feet of “clean” soil or 4 inches of asphalt

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Now, majority of contamination will be left in place on site, beneath a thin soil or asphalt cover

Development of the site will require tearing up the thin soil or asphalt covers and the contaminated soil beneath in order to build residences, shops, utility infrastructure, etc.

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The years or decades of intense construction, involving tearing up the soil and asphalt covers and existing building foundations and digging deep into the contaminated soil beneath will produce potential for widespread dispersal of contamination and exposures to people.

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The planned redevelopment project would be the largest in San Francisco since the 1906 earthquake

ASK #1: Fix the Soil Cleanup Standards

Direct that the soil cleanup standards for Hunters Point be corrected so they are set at 10⁻⁶ for unrestricted residential use, based on the EPA PRG calculator using the EPA defaults and consistent with Prop P.

Commence a scientifically rigorous process to include the garden pathway in EPA’s national Regional Screening Levels for toxic chemicals, parallel to how it has been done in its radionuclide PRGs.

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ASK #6: Top-to-Bottom Review of Oversight Failures

Undertake a top-to-bottom review of EPA oversight failures that contributed to the unprecedented environmental scandal at HPNS and the breakdown of the HPNS cleanup more broadly.

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