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Evidence of Other-Regarding Preferences

Roman Sheremeta, Ph.D.

Professor, Weatherhead School of Management

Case Western Reserve University

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Foundation of the utility function�

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Homo economicus�

  • How would you characterize a homo economicus individual?
    • Perfectly rational
    • Maximizes expected utility
    • Cares only about monetary incentives
    • Selfish (self-regarding preferences)

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The “standard” model�

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Problems with the “standard” model�

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Evidence of Other-Regarding Preferences

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Looking for homo economicus

  • Let’s test if you are a homo economicus

  • When you pay for food in a restaurant, do you leave a tip?
    • Living a tip is not legally required

  • Does your tipping percentage change? (Yes/No)
    • When you visit other countries
    • When the bill is very expensive
    • When you are on a road trip eating at a restaurant that you will probably never go to again
    • When the service is bad

  • Homo economicus would answer No to all of the above

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Other-regarding preferences�

  • Other-regarding preferences: the degree and nature of how people care about the well-being of others

  • There are many reasons why people leave a tip:
    • Altruism
    • Warm glow (enjoy giving)
    • Reciprocity
    • Fairness
    • Inequity aversion
    • Face-saving concerns

  • Next, we look at the evidence of other-regarding preferences from different experiments

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The Ultimatum game�

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The Ultimatum game�

  • What are the typical results in the ultimatum game?
    • The average offer is around $3-$5
    • Low offers are often rejected
    • Results hold when the stakes are high (three months’ wages)
    • Results hold across cultures and societies

  • Why do Proposers make generous offers?
    • Proposers care about fairness and equity
    • Proposers fear that the Responder will reject the offer

  • Why do Responders reject low offers?
    • Responders dislike being treated unfairly
    • Responders dislike inequity

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The Dictator game�

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The Dictator game�

  • What are the typical results in the dictator game?
    • Most Proposers offer a positive amount
    • The average offer is around $1-$3
    • Lower than the average offer in the ultimatum game

  • Why do Proposers make positive offers?
    • Proposers care about fairness and equity
    • Proposers do not want to be seen as selfish

  • These findings point out that most individuals are not homo economicus and have other-regarding preferences

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Experiment #1 results�

  • Class experiment:
    • Ultimatum and Dictator game

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The Dictator game�

  • Baby lab
    • “Born good? Babies help unlock the origins of morality” (10:20-11:50)
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRvVFW85IcU

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The Trust game�

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The Trust game�

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Experiment #2 results�

  • Class experiment:
    • Trust game

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The Public Goods game�

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The Public Goods game�

  • The findings of Fehr and Gachter (2000):
    • The opportunity to punish increases contributions
    • Partners have higher rates of cooperation than strangers

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The Public Goods game�

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Experiment #3 results�

  • Class experiment:
    • Public Goods game

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Summary�

  • The existing experimental evidence points out:
    • Responders in the ultimatum game reject small positive offers
    • Proposers in the dictator game make positive offers
    • Trustees in the trust game return significant amounts
    • Contributions in the public good game are higher than 0

  • These findings point out that most individuals have other-regarding preferences

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References�

  • Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142.
  • Dhami, S. (2016). The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis. Oxford University Press.
  • Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.
  • Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367-388.
  • Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001) Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 383-451.

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