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New Concept and Buzzwords in Information �Age Warfare and Adapting to Its Challenges �by Mech Forces�� Maj Gen P K Mallick,VSM (Retd)

Jhansi

26 Apr 2023

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https://www.strategicstudyindia.com/

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https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/

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In a speech to the U.S. Military Academy in 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said,

“When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.”

Robert Gates, “Speech to the United States Military Academy,” speech at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., February 25, 2011.

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USE OF TERMINOLOGIES

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COIN

Counter insurgency
Low Intensity Conflict Operation (LICO)
Asymmetric Warfare
Irregular Warfare
Stability and Support Operation (SASO)
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Long War
Small War
Unrestricted Warfare

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THEORIES OF WARFARE IN LAST 25 YEARS

Military Technology Revolution (MTR)
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
Toffler Wave Theory
System of Systems
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Effect Based Operations (EBO), Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)
Mvre Warfare
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)
Hybrid Warfare
Grey Zone Warfare
Non Contact Warfare
Non Kinetic Warfare

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The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments(CSBA) published a paper on Mosaic Warfare in last year.

DARPA, decision centric warfare, AI

Even the US has stopped talking about NCW. Only some US vendors sponsor talks on NCW in India to sell their wares.

Even after 30 years we still talk about NCW. Where is NCW in Indian Armed Forces?

Where are the information, sensor, shooter grids and CEC.

Pentagon has abandoned the concept of NCW for the simple reason, even US cannot ensure that type of fail proof communications with near peer competitors, that NCW requires.

That is why they are now talking about Decision centric warfare, Mosaic Warfare.

We cannot afford to have resources like USA. How do you give power to the edge when resources are at a premium.

There was the famous photograph where a black special force soldier riding a khota asking for air support and an aircraft flying from Tampa Bay bombs in the initial stages of US intervention in Afghanistan. Can we do it?

Please look at your archaic second world war procedure of asking for close air support by the army. Nowadays IAF follows USAF jargon, CSFO.

I would rather prefer to resolve these mundane issues than talk in statosphere level.

If at all you want to use American jargon s, at least use the latest ones.

For a long time USAF is pushing the concept of All Domain Ops in place of MDO.

For valid reasons.

Now through Pentagon they have pushed through the concept of joint all-domain command and control JADC2. JADC2 as envisioned integrates the planning, tasking, and assessments of operations across the domains of space, information, cyber, air, land, and sea. The Air Operations Center AOC is the primary operational-level central command and control C2 node for the U.S. Air Force today.

Jointness, CAS, EXAMPLE OF Gen General Anthony Zinni from 1997 to 2000

commanded US CENTCOM.

The rapid and creative combination of small, cheap, flexible systems described above represents a new theory of victory: mosaic warfare. The idea emerged in the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), parallel to service concepts like Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, Multi-Domain Operations, and Multi-Domain Battle. the central idea is to be cheap, fast, lethal, flexible, and scalable.

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Mvre Warfare in Hindi

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JOINTNESS

Multi Domain Battle
All Domain Operations
Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)

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A Recent U.S. NDU study says

The United States, and the West, struggle to understand and respond to irregular warfare, whether by states or non-state actors. Attempts to master the art have generated much new jargon, ranging from “hybrid war” to “the gray zone,” and most recently “integrated deterrence.” The terminology belies a struggle to overcome entrenched presumptions about war—a confusion that generates cognitive friction with implications for strategy.

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TERMINOLOGY

New Generation Warfare
New Type Warfare
6^th Generation Warfare
Non Linear Warfare
Unconventional Warfare
Contactless War
Strategy of Limited Actions
Non Kinetic Warfare
Economic or Financial Warfare
Hyper Warfare
Limited Warfare
Sub Conventional Warfare
Tolerance Warfare
Algorithmic Warfare
Digital Warfare
Virtual Warfare
Multi-Reality Warfare
Quantum Warfare
Culture or Social Warfare

Virtual Warfare, Cognitive Warfare, Information Warfare, Psychological Warfare, Cyber Warfare, China’s “Lawfare,” Irregular Warfare, Political Warfare, Economic Warfare, Financial Warfare, Culture Warfare, Social Warfare, Digital Warfare, Space Warfare, Systems Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Hyper Warfare, Gray Zone Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Multi-Reality Warfare, and Quantum Warfare

General Gerasimov’s newly coined “strategy of limited actions” for the defence and advancement of national interests beyond Russian territory also is a re-labeling of

long-standing policy and practice and has also caught media attention.

Tolerance warfare can be defined as the persistent effort to test the tolerances for different forms of aggression against settled states. It is the effort to push back lines of resistance, probe weaknesses, assert rights unilaterally, break rules, establish new facts on the ground, and gain systematic tactical advantage over hesitant opponents. It tests the ability of the target to deter and defeat these efforts. It wins advantage by either diverting the target’s resources away from a central strategic purpose, or by creating new conditions that cannot be reversed except by disproportionate effort.

Sometimes tolerance warfare is conducted overtly and is in effect ‘declared’; often it is conducted through proxies or partners, especially in the most immediate theatres of operations.

Iran conducts tolerance warfare in the Gulf and Levant, using partners and proxies to affect political agendas in the target states, gain a foothold for information operations and insinuate its style of warfare in neighbouring geographies. These activities pose a more immediate challenge than Iran’s nuclear programme. An Iranian nuclear arsenal would naturally pose a huge danger, including the prospect of further proliferation, but it is the political- and military-influence operations of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that create daily pressures across the region.

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Power

Hard Power
Soft Power
Smart Power
Sharp Power
Discourse Power

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Logistics

Focused Logistics
Factory to Foxhole Logistic
Sense and Respond Logistic
Contested Logistics

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IBG

battalion tactical groups (BTGs) proved that the new Russian Army was innovative. Yet even the BTGs were the product of experiments conducted in the 1980s. Observers failed to note that the BTG commander was burdened with the control of eleven organic units and up to fifteen additional attached direct support.

Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice

Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts.

“Our study and analysis of recent conflicts, exercises, simulation, and training, tells us that brigade commanders must focus fully on winning the close fight. To allow frontline leaders to concentrate on the close fight, division and corps commanders will have the responsibility and capability to visualize the larger picture,” Wormuth said. “To ensure they can do this, our theater armies, corps, and divisions will gain the personnel, organizations, and equipment they need to disrupt and defeat peer adversaries on the future battlefield.”

That means bringing artillery, engineers, and intelligence together at the division level, she said.

Rainey said division commanders will be able to provide these capabilities to the brigades when they need it.

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“What's in a name? That which we call a rose/ By any other name would smell as sweet.”

---- William Shakespeare

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War Below Threshold Level or NWNP

Hybrid Warfare
Grey Zone Warfare
Non Contact Warfare
Non Kinetic Warfare

Basic Components

Information Warfare
Proxy War
Economic warfare

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INFORMATION WARFARE

Electronic Warfare
Cyber Warfare
Psychological Warfare

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Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare

Porche, et al., “Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World,” p.51

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Russia is ack leader in EW, having some of the most experienced and best-equipped EW units in the world. Own the airwaves in Syria, Eastern Ukraine.
EW was not decisive when Russia went to war in February.
At least three of Russia’s five electronic warfare brigades are engaged in Ukraine
Using counter-drone systems provided by the USA before the invasion, Ukrainian troops have downed hundreds of Russian drones by jamming their GPS signals or possibly by damaging their electronics with high-powered microwave beams.
EW is useful but might accidentally bring down friendly drones.
Pakistan. Niche tech not given. China, Turkey. Not tested in warfare, give the devil its due.

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CYBER WARFARE

Ukraine, assisted by both Western governments and commercial firms, has demonstrated that collective cyber defense has “proven stronger than offensive cyber capabilities.”
Future conflicts will certainly involve cyber operations. National defence requires sustained cyber defense. Cyber offence has not been a game changer so far

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SO WHAT?

Estonia, Georgia, Stuxnet, Gaza, now Ukraine.

2015 and 2016 Ukraine power failure.

On December 23, 2015, the power grid of Ukraine was hacked, resulted in power outages for roughly 230,000 consumers in Ukraine for 1-6 hours.

December 2016 cyberattack on the Ukrainian power grid automated lackout across a broad swath of Ukraine’s capital. An hour later, Ukraine’s operators were able to simply switch the power back on again.

Overhyped.

Loses importance once battle is joined.

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Psychological Warfare

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Terminology

Information operation
Psychological operation
Strategic communications
Influence operations
Perception management
Sentiment Analysis
Cyber-enable Influence/information warfare and manipulation (IIWAM)
Cognitive operation
Political Warfare
Public information operations
Public field diplomacy
Or other similar terms

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Source: https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/121206_brooksmemo.pdf

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Joint Doctrine for Perception Management and Psychological Operations

Joint Doctrine for Perception Management And Psychological Operations, JP-9 was published by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff in March 2010.

It was brought out earlier how U.S. has a lot of confusion regarding various terms used for information operations, psychological operations, influence operations and other terms. e same observations are applicable for this doctrinal publication.

Perception Management. The Doctrine says Perception Management comprise the following operations:

Public Diplomacy.
Public Information.
Information Operations.
Psy Ops.

Perception Management is basically undertaken against the foreign audience.

Psy Ops are conducted against friendly forces and civil population as well as adversary’s forces and hostile people. Psy Ops are public presentation of the truth (not mis-information or propaganda).

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Professional Skillsets Required for Psychological Operations

Communications technologists
Behavioral scientists
Educators
Historians
Economists
Religious scholars
Linguists and translators
Political scientists
Librarians and researchers
Corporate business managers and entrepreneurs
Marketing managers
Market researchers
Advertising copywriters, art directors, and media planners
Producers and directors
Artists, authors, and musicians
Retired government officials

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Who is Responsible?

Who are the stakeholders?

The most important issue is, who is in charge of Information/Psychological/Influence operations? In UK it is the foreign ministry. In U.S. the DoD takes the lead for the simple reason that they have got the funds. In recent times, the state department is being given importance, and funds are being transferred from DoD to the state department to carry out psychological operations. However, the cyber part for the delivery of content is still with DoD.

In the case of India, it is not clear who is overall responsible. For the allotment of budget and ability to prevail over the home ministry, foreign ministry and intelligence agencies, MoD definitely cannot be considered as the lead agency. At the most, MoD can lead in influence activities in CI/CT Ops within the country. The army in operational and tactical levels do a good job. However, there is no formalised mechanism. It is the personality of the commander on the ground which drives this operation.

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How do you influence the mind of

opposing commander

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SPACE WARFARE

Space has become an arena of contestation. Private firms such as Maxar have provided access to satellite imagery, aiding not only Ukrainian forces but also those NGOs, journalists and others.

A contemporary U.S. Army maneuver Brigade Combat Team (BCT) has over 2,500 pieces of equipment dependent on space-based assets for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). This number of dependent systems will only increase.

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EMERGING DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY

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“I’ve got no time for new technology – I’ve got a battle to fight.”

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AI

Now-ubiquitous employment of drones and loitering munitions by both sides offers AI-enhanced autonomous capabilities in flight, targeting and firing.
AI is used to analyze satellite images, also to geolocate and analyse open-source data such as social media photos in geopolitically sensitive locations.
Neural networks are use to combine ground-level photos, drone video footage and satellite imagery to enhance intelligence to produce strategic and tactical intelligence advantages.
Use of AI for data analytics on the battlefield. Increasingly and structurally used in the conflict to analyse vast amounts of data to produce battlefield intelligence.
Enhanced by the convergence of other developments, including the growing availability of low-Earth orbit satellites and the unprecedented availability of big data from open sources.
Willingness of foreign geospatial intelligence companies to assist Ukraine by using AI-enhanced systems to convert satellite imagery into intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance advantages.
U.S. companies like Palantir Technologies has provided its AI software to analyse how the war has been unfolding, to understand troop movements and conduct battlefield damage assessments.
AI is playing an important role in electronic warfare and encryption.
U.S. company Primer has deployed its AI tools to analyse unencrypted Russian radio communications.
AI in cyber warfare. Advances in AI-enhanced threat intelligence and the quick distribution of protective software to cloud services and other computer networks.
Most AI will be deployed in systems far removed from the battlefield, in cloud computing and data analysis systems related to planning, logistics and preventive maintenance.
AI-enhanced facial recognition software has been used on a substantial scale.
The flip side is the spread of misinformation and the use of deepfakes as part of information warfare. AI systems that can autonomously create and spread messages are becoming more sophisticated.

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3D PRINTING

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3D PRINTING

Automated factories, robotics and AI can be combined to dramatically reduce the cost of these emerging autonomous systems.
In 2014, an aeronautics professor designed and 3D-printed a drone. By adding a small electric motor, two batteries, and a cell phone, he created a hand-launched, autonomous drone with a range of 50 km.
Once the design was refined, the production process took about 28 hours. Today’s 3D printers are over 100 times faster. A plant with 100 modern 3D printers could produce 10,000 of these drones per day. By incorporating AI and robotics, the final assembly could be automated. Thus, drone swarms of thousands of autonomous hunters are possible today.
Useful in field manufacturing spare parts of immediate requirement.

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LESSONS FROM RECENT CONFLICTS �SPECIALLY UKRAINE

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Future of Tank�

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Future of Tank

Tanks hit by anti-tank missiles are more likely to be caught on video than those struck by mines. Yet a big chunk of Ukrainian tank losses are from mines.
12 Western countries, known as the “tank coalition,” have promised UKRAINE of Leopards, Abrams and Challengers, amounting to more than 200 of them, almost an entire armored division. The Ukrainians want even more.
Russian T-72 series tanks were no match for the NLAWs and Javelins and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Drones. The top attacks exposed serious design defects of T-72 series tanks.
Indian Tank Forces have largely Russian made T series tanks mostly for use against our western neighbours. They will have Bayraktar Drones for sure. Don’t get surprised if they get the NLAWs and Javelins as they are getting F-16s for anti-terrorist activities.
India has 3740 MBTs including 122 Arjun, 2418 T-72 M1, 1200 T-90 as per latest Military Balance Reports. India has placed orders to OFB for 118 Arjun Mk-1A tanks worth ₹7,523 crore in September 2021, 156 BMP 2 worth Rs. 1094 crore in June 2020, 464 T-90S worth Rs 20,000 crore in November 2019, Russian OEM were to be paid $1.2 billion for technology transfer.
These tanks will come into service over a period of time of 5 to 10 years. We are investing such huge amounts for a tank which has shown its vulnerability and shortcoming in the ongoing Ukraine war. These tanks will be in service for at least next 30 to 50 years.
Do we have the tod for the anti-tank weapons presently available for the tanks which we are investing in.
Should we go ahead with this procurement or wait for some technology or concept of operation development?

Tanks hit by anti-tank missiles are more likely to be caught on video than those struck by mines. Yet a big chunk of Ukrainian tank losses are from mines.

Technology is creating a transparent battlefield, enabling militaries to source information from individual civilians and private commercial entities, then target and strike high value targets.

12 Western countries, known as the “tank coalition,” have promised UKRAINE of Leopards, Abrams and Challengers, amounting to more than 200 of them, almost an entire armored division. The Ukrainians want even more. They don’t think tanks are obsolete

Now it is other way round. Russian T-72 series tanks were no match for the NLAWs and Javelins and Turkish Bayraktar Drones. The top attacks exposed serious design defects of T-72 series tanks. The way the turrets were sheared off and flew high in the sky was a sight no tank man will enjoy. The western tanks are much better protected. Does Russia have the quality of the NLAWs, Javelins and Bayraktar Drones? We will see.

Problem in Indian Tank Forces is we have largely Russian made T series tanks mostly for use against our western neighbours. They will have Bayraktar Drones for sure. Don’t get surprised if they get the NLAWs and Javelins as they are getting F-16s for anti-terrorist activities, if you believe.

India has 3740 MBTs including 122 Arjun, 2418 T-72 M1, 1200 T-90 as per latest Military Balance Reports. India has placed orders to OFB for 118 Arjun Mk-1A tanks worth ₹7,523 crore in September 2021, 156 BMP 2 worth Rs. 1094 crore in June 2020, 464 T-90S worth Rs 20,000 crore in November 2019, Russian OEM were to be paid $1.2 billion for technology transfer.

These tanks will come into service over a period of time of 5 to 10 years. We are investing such huge amounts for a tank which has shown its vulnerability and shortcoming in the ongoing Ukraine war. These tanks will be in service for at least next 30 to 50 years.

Do we have the tod for the anti-tank weapons presently available for the tanks which we are investing in.

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Open Source Intelligence(OSINT)

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OSINT

Tiktok provided direct evidence of the nature of troop and equipment movements.
Commercial imagery showed field deployment locations, field hospitals, proof of movement for invasion.
During the Kherson offensive, synthetic-aperture radar (sar) satellites, which can see at night and through clouds, showed Russia building pontoon bridges over the Dnieper river before its retreat from Kherson, boats appearing and disappearing as troops escaped east and Russia’s army building new defensive positions along the m14 highway on the river’s left bank.
When Ukrainian drones struck two air bases deep inside Russia on December 5th, high-resolution satellite images showed the extent of the damage.
In December a Russian volunteer posted photos on of forces encamped in a country club in Sahy, an occupied part of Kherson province. His post included a geo-tag of the exact location. Ukrainian missiles later struck it, after which the volunteer posted yet again. This time he uploaded a video showing the extent of the destruction, in effect giving Ukraine a damage assessment from on the ground.
Twitter gave a platform for highly skilled deeply experienced open source analysts to provide insights.
Open source analysts are listening into and translating military communications.
Movement of every unit from hinter land to OP Area will be tracked as social media used by troops and families would give out details.
OSINT should be integrated into holistic efforts of all source intelligence.

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During the Kherson offensive, synthetic-aperture radar (sar) satellites, which can see at night and through clouds, showed Russia building pontoon bridges over the Dnieper river before its retreat from Kherson, boats appearing and disappearing as troops escaped east and, later, Russia’s army building new defensive positions along the m14 highway on the river’s left bank. And when Ukrainian drones struck two air bases deep inside Russia on December 5th, high-resolution satellite images showed the extent of the damage.

December a Russian volunteer posted photos on of forces encamped in a country club in Sahy, an occupied part of Kherson province. His post included a geo-tag of the exact location. Ukrainian missiles later struck it, after which the volunteer posted yet again. This time he uploaded a video showing the extent of the destruction, in effect giving Ukraine a damage assessment from on the ground

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Battlefield Transparency

Technology is creating a transparent battlefield, enabling militaries to source information from individual civilians and private commercial entities, then target and strike high value targets.

12 Western countries, known as the “tank coalition,” have promised UKRAINE of Leopards, Abrams and Challengers, amounting to more than 200 of them, almost an entire armored division. The Ukrainians want even more. They don’t think tanks are obsolete

Now it is other way round. Russian T-72 series tanks were no match for the NLAWs and Javelins and Turkish Bayraktar Drones. The top attacks exposed serious design defects of T-72 series tanks. The way the turrets were sheared off and flew high in the sky was a sight no tank man will enjoy. The western tanks are much better protected. Does Russia have the quality of the NLAWs, Javelins and Bayraktar Drones? We will see.

Problem in Indian Tank Forces is we have largely Russian made T series tanks mostly for use against our western neighbours. They will have Bayraktar Drones for sure. Don’t get surprised if they get the NLAWs and Javelins as they are getting F-16s for anti-terrorist activities, if you believe.

India has 3740 MBTs including 122 Arjun, 2418 T-72 M1, 1200 T-90 as per latest Military Balance Reports. India has placed orders to OFB for 118 Arjun Mk-1A tanks worth ₹7,523 crore in September 2021, 156 BMP 2 worth Rs. 1094 crore in June 2020, 464 T-90S worth Rs 20,000 crore in November 2019, Russian OEM were to be paid $1.2 billion for technology transfer.

These tanks will come into service over a period of time of 5 to 10 years. We are investing such huge amounts for a tank which has shown its vulnerability and shortcoming in the ongoing Ukraine war. These tanks will be in service for at least next 30 to 50 years.

Do we have the tod for the anti-tank weapons presently available for the tanks which we are investing in.

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Pervasive Surveillance

By December, Ukraine could tap into the roughly 40 commercial satellites a day that pass over the area in a 24-hour period.

Ukraine and other countries can tap into more than a dozen companies which are competing to provide ever faster, more precise multispectral products to commercial customers and real-time transparency to a global audience.

To see through darkness, cloud cover and light foliage, several companies now offer interpreted Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery of any point on Earth, on demand at least every six hours.

By mid-2023, a satellite formation will be able to locate a specific radio frequency signature with an accuracy of three kilometers every twenty minutes.

Earth observation from space-based visual, infrared, radar, and electromagnetic sensors is available virtually continuously. Companies also have developed change detection software.

Due primarily to their employment of commercial satellites and drones. By December, Ukraine could tap into the “roughly 40 commercial satellites a day [that] pass over the area in a 24-hour period. Ukraine—and other national governments—can tap into more than a dozen companies which are competing to provide ever faster, more precise multispectral products to commercial customers and real-time transparency to a global audience.

To see through darkness, cloud cover, and light foliage, several companies now offer interpreted synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery of any point on Earth, on demand at least every six hours.

By mid-2023, a satellite formation will be able to locate a specific radio frequency signature with an accuracy of 3 kilometers every twenty minutes.

Earth observation from space-based visual, infrared, radar, and electromagnetic sensors is available virtually continuously. , the companies also have developed change detection software to facilitate the provision of finished intelligence products.

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DRONES

Like their satellite complements, companies also have developed multispectral, SAR, and electro-magnetic sensors (EMS) for every size of drone.

Ukraine has as many as “500 drones in the air for a relatively standard military operation.” Their most important function has been to provide critical intelligence and artillery spotting for tactical units in contact with enemy forces.

Vast majority of Ukraine’s drones are open-market commercial products that have been purchased and assembled by volunteers.

New drones outrange many, if not most, crewed fighter/bombers. Orders of magnitude cheaper than crewed aircraft, these missiles and drones provide even small states with the ability to strike airbases and parked aircraft.

These drones cost as little as $20,000 dollars, yet have an Iranian-claimed range of 1,500 kilometers, gives an indication that large numbers of cheap drones will attack targets deep inside enemy territory in future conflicts.

Quadcopters survive an average of only three missions, and fixed-wing drones survive for only six missions.

Large numbers of “semiautonomous” loitering munitions will not be vulnerable to jamming. Advanced manufacturing has the potential to produce these systems in the thousands. While most current drones still rely on GPS signals and thus have the potential to be jammed, commercial firms and defense departments are pursuing multiple technologies that will provide GPS-independent navigation.

Like their satellite complements, these companies also have developed multispectral, SAR, and electro-magnetic sensors (EMS) for every size of drone.

Ukraine has as many as “500 drones in the air for a relatively standard military operation.”

their most important function has been to provide critical intelligence and artillery spotting for tactical units in contact with enemy forces.

The increasing capabilities of commercial drones are changing the game of how militaries will use this technology. vast majority of Ukraine’s drones are open-market commercial products that have been purchased and assembled by volunteers.

, new drones outrange many, if not most, crewed fighter/bombers. Orders of magnitude cheaper than crewed aircraft, these missiles and drones provide even small states with the ability to strike airbases and parked aircraft.

these drones cost as little as $20,000 dollars, yet have an Iranian-claimed range of 1,500 kilometers, gives an indication that large numbers of cheap drones will attack targets deep inside enemy territory in future conflicts. Ukrainian intelligence reports the Kremlin has ordered an additional twenty-four hundred Iranian drones

demonstrating the value of drones but also the requirement for very large numbers of them. Quadcopters survive an average of only three missions, and fixed-wing drones survive for only six missions.

large numbers of “semiautonomous” loitering munitions are battle royalty.

autonomous, they will not be vulnerable to jamming the operator’s signal. And, as noted, advanced manufacturing has the potential to produce these systems in the thousands. While most current drones still rely on GPS signals and thus have the potential to be jammed, commercial firms and defense departments are pursuing multiple technologies that will provide GPS-independent navigation.

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Democratised Intelligence is transforming the twenty-first century battlespace, making it increasingly transparent and enabling everyone to be a potential sensor and intelligence asset while also blurring the distinction between combatant and noncombatant.

Individuals’ capacity to informally volunteer their services to influence the conflict indicate that in future conflicts such civilian capabilities could complicate Service members’ ability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Geneva convention?

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Precision Fire

MANPADS, artillery, strike drones and widely deployed precision weapons have allowed small units to inflict heavy damage on their opponents while reducing the logistics burden of moving large quantities of ammunition forward.

Rapid, sustained improvements in the range, payload and speed of drones opens an entirely new field of massed, precision attack. The density of such attacks will be further enhanced by the evolving cruise missiles that can be launched from air, sea and ground platforms.

Precision munitions are costly.

US-produced Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb’s 250-pound warhead can be delivered by rocket to a range of almost one hundred miles. With a warhead costing only $40,000 mated to an M26 standard rocket motor, this brings affordable long-range precision to the battlefield.

. From man portable anti-tank weapons to artillery to strike drones, widely deployed precision weapons have allowed small units to inflict heavy damage on their opponents while actually reducing the logistics burden of moving large quantities of ammunition forward.

those employed represent only a small selection of the precision munitions being developed worldwide.

US-produced Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb’s 250-pound warhead can be delivered by rocket to a range of almost one hundred miles. With a warhead costing only $40,000 mated to an M26 standard rocket motor, this brings affordable long-range precision to the battlefield

rapid, sustained improvements in the range, payload, and speed of drones opens an entirely new field of massed, precision attack. The density of such attacks will be further enhanced by the evolving cruise missiles that can be launched from air, sea, and ground platforms to include transport aircraft, commercial ships, and ground vehicles.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

Ukraine developed truly connected, high-speed command and control system.
Dramatic improvement in its combat capabilities is its integration of diverse civilian systems into a coherent and highly effective command-and-control system. Has access to near-persistent surveillance of the battlespace.
Skilled use of precision artillery, drones and loitering munitions demonstrated how its smaller, lighter forces could defeat Russia’s offensive.
In the first weeks of the war, Ministry of Digital team created the chatbot eVerog. Everyone with a smartphone can share photos of enemy equipment, report collaborators or mines. Almost half a million Ukrainians have used the chatbot.
Refined its system with the creation of Delta. Delta provides a comprehensive understanding of the battle space in real time, integrates information about the enemy from various sensors and sources, including intelligence on a digital map, does not require additional settings and can work on any device—laptop, tablet or even on a mobile phone. Delta is a modern real-time command map and troop control center.
Delta has ties into the NATO system, which draws data from both commercial and classified government systems. Delta uses AI developed by Palantir to analyse and send the data to the user speedily.
Ukrainian coders have created for ground commanders a field-expedient, inexpensive version of the Pentagon’s ambitious Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system.

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ARTY

Precision artillery demonstrated the ability to destroy targets from individual vehicles to ammunition storage sites with a single round. This capability minimizes the exposure of the firing unit to counterbattery fire and exponentially reduces the logistics burden of ammunition resupply.
USA shipped over one million rounds of 155 millimeter artillery, only five thousand were precision Excalibur rounds, which have a circular error probable of four meters.
Outsized impact of these rounds when directed by surveillance drones provides a glimpse into how the proliferation of precision weapons and drones will alter the battlespace.
Need for transformational artillery systems to exhibit high rates of fire, cross-country mobility, reduced or simplified maintenance and long tube life. Long range allows artillery to be physically dispersed and still mass fires when needed.
Need for artillery to be mobile and capable of lone-gun or section operations to minimize the effects of counterbattery fire.
Ukraine needed to coordinate all weapon system solution involving these NATO weapons, their remaining conventional artillery, mortars, AT crews and aerial strikes from medium-range drones.
Lightweight American-made M142 multiple rocket launcher, or HIMARS, has been critical to Ukraine’s success.
M777 howitzer has been a critical part of Ukraine’s battlefield power. But the barrels of the howitzers lose their rifling if too many shells are fired in a short time frame making the artillery less accurate and less effective.
Towed artillery like the M777 howitzer system may be a thing of the past. Those systems are harder to move quickly to avoid return fire. In a world of ubiquitous drones and overhead surveillance, “it’s very hard to hide nowadays,”
Russian artillery units use UAV reconnaissance, EW direction finding, acoustic reconnaissance or counterbattery artillery radar to find Ukrainian positions

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GIS Arta, shorthand for Geographic Information System of Artillery

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AD SYSTEM

To establish air superiority, Russia engaged 75 percent of Ukraine’s fixed air defence sites during the first forty-eight hours of the war. Unable to defeat Ukraine’s mobile air defence systems.
Russia’s failure led some analysts to state that modern air defense systems can create an area of air denial where crewed aircraft cannot operate. Russian and Ukrainian crewed aircraft rarely attempt to penetrate the multilayered air defense of the other side.
To prosecute its air campaign, Russia shifted to drones and missiles. Russia has caused significant damage to the Ukrainian electrical grid but has failed to disable it.
Ukraine integrated a variety of missile and gun systems and claims it is shooting down 80 percent of the attacking drones and missiles.
The ability to deny airspace to crewed aircraft while destroying most penetrating drones and missiles is shifting the balance in the air domain also to the defence.
Long-range drones and missiles will further degrade the capabilities of crewed aircraft by attacking those aircraft at their home bases. This development will require militaries to invest heavily in air defense systems to protect their airbases.

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AIR�

Introduction by NATO of Stinger shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles have largely grounded Russian jets and helicopters.
In Ukraine, airpower’s role is being executed by a mix of crewed aircraft, drones, missiles, long-range rockets and integrated air defenses.
Future conflicts will impose heavy costs on those nations that continue to see crewed aircraft as the primary source of airpower. To be affordable and succeed, offensive air may have to rely very heavily on land-based drones and cruise missiles.

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JUGAD

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Key Takeaways

Terrain still matters. Ukrainians flooded rivers and destroyed bridges to canalise Russian invaders into chokepoints and kill zones.
Importance of civilians in urban conflict, volunteers collaborated to establish defenses in depth, targeting and ambushing attackers.
These game-changing capabilities are giving new and powerful advantages to defenders in ground combat. Long-range weapons enable the defender to concentrate fires without concentrating forces and remain dispersed. Attacker must move, will generate multiple signatures.
Force will have to blend in, seek overhead cover or move quickly and frequently to avoid being targeted by the expanding variety of drones, missiles and smart artillery/mortar ammunition. The force must be designed to operate without big bases.
Must be trained to operate in a disaggregated manner. Making the transition will require a large-scale, honest effort to develop the concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment for such a force.
Urban warfare strategies. ATGMs and MANPADS have been very effective.
Many of the lessons of the past — using combined arms in urban warfare, the dangers of emitting large EW signatures and the importance of Command and Control are all still relevant on the battlefield today.
In this era of persistent surveillance, ground forces must “disperse, dig deep, or move fast.”
Man-portable anti-tank weapons. While the Javelin received most of the publicity, it was augmented by Stugna-P anti-tank guided missiles, Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapons (NLAWs), Carl Gustav recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

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