Page 1 of 50

Self-Knowledge and the KK Principle

1

Self-Knowledge and the KK Principle

1 Introduction

The first aim of this paper is to defend the following thesis:

(KK) For any subject S and proposition p, if S knows p, and S grasps the proposition

that she knows p, and the normal conditions for psychological self-knowledge

are in place, then S is in a position to know that she knows p; and this is true for

principled reasons having to do with the nature of knowledge.

(KK) states that a version of the so-called KK principle is true, not in virtue of

contingencies such as, say, that we happen to be reliable about whether we know things,

but in virtue of facts about the nature of knowledge and related epistemic phenomena.

The facts I will appeal to are, in my view, good candidates for being a priori facts. If

that's right, then my first aim amounts to defending the thesis that the KK principle is an

a priori truth. However, those who are sceptical of the a priori can take my first aim to

be merely that of arguing that the KK principle is, so to speak, a principled truth.

These days the KK principle is widely rejected, at least partly because, in its 'principled'

version, it is associated with a controversial internalist conception of knowledge. The

second aim of this paper is to show that the significance of the KK principle has been

misconceived: regardless of whether the principle is (as I claim) true, its principled truth

is compatible with a broad spectrum of epistemological views.

Page 2 of 50

Self-Knowledge and the KK Principle

2

The KK principle is sometimes formulated as a conditional from knowing p (given

normal conditions) to in fact knowing that you know p, rather than to being in a position

to know that you know p. Such a formulation seems to me to place too much emphasis

on psychological facts about thinkers. The interest of the KK principle resides in what it

says about the nature of the knower’s epistemic circumstances with respect to the

proposition that she knows p. You can always fail to take advantage of good epistemic

circumstances—for example, you can have every reason to believe a proposition, and

yet fail to believe it, or believe it for the wrong reasons. Formulating the principle in

terms of being in a position to know that you know p, seems to me to capture what is

important about it without immediately rendering it implausible.

Shortly I will say a few things to clarify (KK). First I want to set the claims I will be

making against the context of prevailing philosophical opinion on the KK principle.

Prevailing opinion can be characterised in part by the following theses, (a), (b) and (c).

I will argue that each of these theses is mistaken.

(a) (KK) implies that to know p, you must first have positive grounds to believe that

you have a warrant1

to believe p, besides having grounds to believe p.

(b) Only on strongly internalist epistemological views is (KK) true.

(c) (KK) is false.

Why do philosophers typically endorse these theses? Let me take them in turn.

It is a necessary condition on knowing p, rather than merely believing it, that you have a