This survey is part of a research effort by Pavlos Sermpezis at ICS-FORTH and Alberto Dainotti at CAIDA, UC San Diego, to study (a) the operators’ awareness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks, (b) presently used defenses (if any) against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses.
We expect the findings of this survey to increase the understanding of existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, as well as help us design new defense mechanisms.
Research records will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law. All data will be anonymous and collected and published in a manner that would not allow identification of your personal identity. A summary of the aggregate results will be published as a part of an article/conference paper.
The questionnaire should be filled out by professionals working as network operators (at networks with an AS number), whose daily job relates to BGP operations. It has a total of 21 questions, which should take no longer than 10 minutes to answer. If you agree to participate in this study, please answer the questions of this survey (do NOT include in your answers information that may help to identify you or your organization).
Participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to not participate at all or to leave the study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. If you have any feedback on the survey, or would like to be notified when we publish a summary of results, or you want additional information, please write us at
sermpezis@ics.forth.gr and
alberto@caida.org.
Contact information:
Dr. Pavlos Sermpezis,
Researcher, ICS-FORTH, Greece,
N. Plastira 100, Heraklion 70013, Greece
+30 2810 391 657,
sermpezis@ics.forth.grDr. Alberto Dainotti,
Research Scientist,
CAIDA, San Diego Supercomputer Center
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0505
La Jolla, CA 92093-0505
+1-858-534-9249
alberto@caida.org