Here are six common commitments of the description theories of name:
(DN1) If “O” is a name which is meaningful for a speaker, S, there is a family of
conditions, C1,...,Cn, which S believes to be true of O.
(DN2) If 'O' is a name which is meaningful for S, S must believe that some of
the conditions C1,...,Cn, which she believes to be true of O, are true of at
least one and at most one object.
(DN3) If 'O' is a name which is meaningful for S, then if most of C1,...,Cn,
which S believes to be true of O, are in fact true of at least one and
at most one object, then that particular thing is the referent of the name
'O' as S understands it.
(DN4) If “O” is a name which is meaningful for S, then if there is not exactly
one object to which most of C1,...,Cn, which S believes to be true of O,
in fact apply, then “O”, as S understands it, does not refer.
(DN5) If 'O' is a name which is meaningful for S, then S knows a priori that, if O
exists, most of what in fact she believes to be true of O, are in fact true
of O (as S understands '0').
(DN6) If “O” is a meaningful name for S, then it is necessarily true that, if 0
exists, most of C1,...,Cn, which S believes to be true of O, are indeed true
of O (as S understands 'O').