INTRO — THE SILENT EMPIRE

For years, millions of Telugu viewers typed a single word into their browsers: iBomma.

To the public, it was convenience.
To filmmakers, it was bleeding-out revenue.
To cybercrime investigators, it was a ghost — fast, evasive, impossible to pin down.

Behind the screens, according to remand records and digital forensic findings, stood one man:

Immadi Ravi — a withdrawn, technically gifted figure who engineered the most efficient piracy operation South India had ever faced.

This report reconstructs:

• His personal transformation
  
• The technology he built
  
• The network he interacted with
  
• The global infrastructure behind iBomma
  
• And the investigative trail that finally led to his arrest
  

It also contextualizes iBomma within the larger Indian piracy ecosystem — an ecosystem that cannot be shut down by arresting individuals, because its foundations are decentralized, crowdsourced, and globally distributed.

CHAPTER 1 — THE MAN BEFORE THE MYTH

Before becoming synonymous with Telugu piracy, Ravi’s life was shaped by instability and rejection.

1. Marriage, Conflict & Psychological Shift

• Married in 2016
  
• Relationship soured within a year
  
• Wife allegedly belittled his income and background
  
• Marriage collapsed
  
• Wife left with their daughter
  

Close associates later told police that this period radically changed him.
He became:

• Withdrawn
  
• Obsessively private
  
• Relentlessly independent
  
• Distrustful of people
  

2. Inside His Apartment (Rainbow Vistas, Kukatpally)

Police reported:

• Dust, disorder everywhere
  
• No domestic help
  
• Smart-door lock
  
• Hidden cameras at entry
  
• Only food-delivery numbers on his phone
  
• No social circle
  
• No family contact
  

During the arrest, he:

• Watched officers through a secret camera
  
• Stalled for over 2 hours
  
• Used that time to wipe devices and delete seed phrases
  

This was a man who trusted only technology — and only technology he built himself.

CHAPTER 2 — HOW iBOMMA BEGAN: A TECH-ENGINEERED PIRACY MACHINE

iBomma was not a random pirate website.
It operated like a miniature OTT platform, delivering clean UI, ad-free pages, HD prints, adaptive streaming, and lightning-speed mirror switching.

Key Differences from Normal Piracy Sites

Backend Capabilities (Based on forensic deductions + remand)

• CDN masking
  
• Cloudflare reverse-proxy shielding
  
• Video encoded into small chunks
  
• Tokenized expiring playback URLs
  
• Workers rewriting URL signatures
  
• Origin servers hidden behind three layers of proxy
  
• Hosting spread across NL, Luxembourg, Switzerland, US
  
• 65+ mirror domains operating simultaneously
  

This was not a single website.
It was a clustered global delivery network, funded through cryptocurrency and protected via bulletproof hosting.

Important Clarification

Ravi did NOT record movies himself, nor did he employ recording teams.
He purchased leaks from piracy networks — the same networks police busted earlier.

CHAPTER 3 — THE LEAK SUPPLIERS (THE OTHER PIRACY RACKET)

In Sep–Oct 2025, Hyderabad Cyber Crime dismantled a separate piracy gang supplying content to multiple websites, including iBomma clones.

Arrested Individuals & Roles (TOI Case)

**These suppliers sold leaks to multiple entities.

iBomma was one of the top buyers.**

Ravi purchased pre-recorded or pre-ripped content:

• Cam prints
  
• Server-leaked HD prints
  
• Early OTT rips
  
• Watermark-removed files
  

This clarified why:

• iBomma had extremely fast updates (often within hours)
  
• He did not need to run his own recording teams
  

CHAPTER 4 — THE TAUNT: THE NOTE THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING

.

This note — allegedly written by Ravi — contained:

• Claims that no one could catch him
  
• Statements that leaks come from “inside the film industry”
  
• Assertions that Indian police had “no jurisdiction” over him
  
• A declaration: “Nothing more dangerous than a man with nothing to lose.”
  

This note escalated the case.

Film bodies immediately pressured cybercrime units.
Officers accelerated tracking.
Crypto trails and foreign server activities were re-examined.

This was the turning point.

CHAPTER 5 — THE GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE

iBomma’s backend wasn’t a simple website — it was a distributed, anonymous, bullet-proofed digital organism. The infrastructure was intentionally fragmented across jurisdictions, CDNs, crypto rails, and automated mirror systems to evade takedowns.

1. Bulletproof Hosting

Ravi relied on data centers located in countries known for weak IP enforcement and DMCA-non-compliance. These regions also allow offshore anonymous hosting, often paid through crypto or intermediaries.

Used Countries:

• Netherlands
   Offshore-friendly, VPS providers allow privacy-first setups, fast bandwidth.
  
• Switzerland
   Strong privacy laws, slow response to foreign copyright requests.
  
• Luxembourg
   Popular with warez networks; cooperative only through MLAT procedures.
  
• Russia / CIS Region
   Zero DMCA compliance, extremely resistant to foreign takedowns.
  
• Panama
   Known for anonymous hosting providers accepting crypto and VPN routing.
  

Why these nations were chosen:

• Ignore or delay DMCA notices
  
• Do not respond to Indian legal requests unless routed through MLAT
  
• Allow crypto-based anonymous hosting accounts
  
• Permit forged IDs (Ravi used fake PAN “Prahlad Kumar”)
  

This hosting strategy created a jurisdictional shield, ensuring that even if domains were seized, content servers remained alive.

2. Cloudflare Shield Routing

Cloudflare acted as the front-end armor for the entire network.

Used for:

• DDoS protection
   Prevented takedowns through traffic floods.
  
• Identity masking
   Cloudflare hides origin server IPs, exposing only Cloudflare edges.
  
• Worker-based URL rewriting
   Enabled dynamic domain redirects and .m3u8 link concealment.
  
• IP hiding through chained proxies
   Some servers were routed through multiple reverse proxies before content delivery.
  

Result:
Even if authorities detected a mirror domain, the actual server was never revealed.

3. Domain Rotation (Hydra System)

Investigators documented 65+ mirror domains, but internal logs show even more rotating behind automation scripts.

This “Hydra System” worked as follows:

• Python scripts monitored domain health
  
• When blocked by ISPs, auto-generated new domains within minutes
  
• Users were silently redirected using Cloudflare workers
  
• WHOIS privacy + offshore registrars ensured anonymity
  

This made iBomma nearly impossible to eliminate through domain blocks alone.

4. Crypto Funding Layer

The financial backbone was entirely crypto-driven.

Used Currencies:

• BTC (Bitcoin) – long-term storage & payouts
  
• USDT (TRC-20) – preferred for offshore hosting payments
  
• Monero (XMR) – untraceable, used for sensitive transactions
  

What police recovered:

• Bank transactions
  
• Benami account inflows/outflows
  
• Payments to crypto on-ramps
  

What police could not recover:

• Private keys
  
• Crypto wallets
  
• Transaction trails
  

Reason:
 Ravi factory-reset devices, wiped seed phrases, and used non-MLAT foreign exchanges.
TRON and Monero add additional layers of anonymity.

5. Domain Purchases — Porkbun

Investigators strongly suspect that several iBomma mirrors were registered through Porkbun, one of the most pirate-friendly registrars worldwide.

Why Porkbun Was Likely Used:

• Allows privacy-by-default WHOIS masking
  
• Accepts crypto payments directly
  
• Supports fast API-based bulk domain registration
  
• Frequently used by piracy networks (TamilBlasters, Movierulz clones, HDHub4u, etc.)
  

Patterns matching Porkbun:

• Similar TLD usage: .com, .co, .io, .net, .to, .bz
  
• WHOIS privacy via “Redacted for Privacy” (Porkbun signature)
  
• DNS configured immediately for Cloudflare integration
  
• Cheap recurring pricing for mass rotations (important for Hydra mirrors)
  

Although the remand report doesn’t publicly list registrars, technical fingerprints make Porkbun a high-confidence match for the iBomma mirror ecosystem.

CHAPTER 6 — WHY PIRACY SURVIVES EVEN IF iBOMMA IS SHUT DOWN

The public often misunderstands one thing:

👉 iBomma was NOT the backbone of piracy.
It was only the front-end.
The real backbone is a massive decentralized ecosystem that existed long before iBomma and will continue long after.

Below is a clear, technically accurate breakdown with examples.

A. TORRENTS — The Oldest & Most Resilient Backbone

(Examples: MovieRulz, TamilMV, TamilBlasters, 1337x, YTS, etc.)

Why torrents cannot be shut down:

1. No Central Server

A torrent file does NOT contain the movie.
It only contains metadata.

The actual movie is stored here:

• Thousands of seeders
  
• Across hundreds of countries
  
• On personal laptops, not servers
  

Even if one seeder goes down, hundreds remain.

2. Hydra-style Domain Rotation

Example: MovieRulz

• movierulz.ms
  
• movierulz.pe
  
• movierulz.info
  
• movierulz.ph
  
• movierulz.af
  

As soon as one is blocked in India → another appears in 5 minutes.

3. Magnet Links

Modern torrents only need a magnet link, not a website.

Even if ALL torrent websites vanish:

• Magnet links can be shared on WhatsApp
  
• Torrent clients can search the Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
  

4. Peer-to-Peer Encryption

Authorities cannot see:

• Who is downloading
  
• Where the original file is hosted
  
• Which seeder is the source
  

Result:
Torrents are practically impossible to eradicate.

B. STREMIO ADD-ONS — Modern Streaming for the Masses

Stremio is legal, like VLC or Kodi.
What makes it powerful is its addons.

Piracy Addons fetch from:

1. Torrent networks (instant streaming of torrent swarms)
   
2. Direct download links from:
   

• pixeldrain
  
• uptobox
  
• 1fichier
  
• gdrive clones
  

3. Debrid caches (ultra-fast European servers)
   

Why unstoppable?

• Add-ons are small JavaScript files hosted anywhere, often on GitHub, anonfile, or private repos.
  
• Even if one addon is banned, 5 new ones appear.
  

Example pirate add-ons:
✔️ Torrentio
✔️ Crew
✔️ Cine
✔️ Balandro

Stremio has become the Netflix of piracy, but decentralized.

C. DEBRID SERVICES — The Invisible European Powerhouses

Examples:

• Real-Debrid (France)
  
• AllDebrid (EU)
  
• Premiumize (Germany)
  
• TorBox (Netherlands)
  
• LinkSnappy (Europe)
  

How Debrid Works

These companies act as:

• European CDN cache
  
• Legally protected intermediaries
  
• Mega-servers storing cached movies
  

When a torrent is popular, Debrid servers already have the movie in full HD or 4K.

A user in India streams like:

user → RealDebrid EU server → cached movie

Why India cannot touch them

• They operate under EU copyright protection, not Indian law
  
• They do NOT respond to:
  

• Indian police requests
  
• Indian court orders
  
• MEITY website blocks
  

• Their servers are in countries like:
  

• Netherlands
  
• Germany
  
• Luxembourg
  
• Romania
  

These nations do not cooperate for Indian piracy cases.

D. TELEGRAM — The New Hub for OTT Piracy

Telegram channels now run full-scale piracy distribution networks.

They share:

• New OTT releases within 5 minutes
  
• All movies in:
  

• 480p
  
• 720p
  
• 1080p
  
• 4K HDR
  

• Zip files
  
• Google Drive links
  
• Streamable playable links
  

Example behavior:

A popular Telugu piracy group posts:

• OG 1080p → 22,000 downloads
  
• Pushpa Hindi → 17,000 downloads
  
• Game Changer cam print → 35,000 views
  

Why Telegram wins

• End-to-end encryption
  
• Cloud storage
  
• 2GB+ uploads
  
• Automatic mirroring across channels
  
• Bot-based reuploads
  

Even if a group is banned, users switch to:

• Backup channels
  
• Mirror channels
  
• Bot-driven groups
  
• Private invite-only clusters
  

WHY ALL OF THIS MATTERS

Even if:

✔️ iBomma shuts down
✔️ Ravi is arrested
✔️ 65 mirror domains are seized
✔️ Servers in Switzerland, NL, Luxembourg are taken down

Piracy does NOT stop, because:

The supply chain survives in decentralized systems

• Torrents
  
• Megacloud file hosts
  
• Debrid caches
  
• Telegram
  
• Stremio addons
  

iBomma was just the front-end website.

The real backbone is global, distributed, and beyond the reach of any single country — including India.

CHAPTER 7 — THE ARREST: HOW THE WALL FINALLY CLOSED IN

For nearly three years, Immadi Ravi had been a ghost — shielded by:

• foreign servers
  
• bulletproof hosting
  
• crypto laundering
  
• cloud-routed identities
  
• mirror domains that regenerated endlessly
  

But while his international infrastructure stayed hidden, his Indian footprints did not.

The path to his arrest was not a single breakthrough — it was the cumulative pressure of three parallel investigations, each closing a different door.

🔶 1. The Early Crack: Arrests of Camcorder Teams (2024–2025)

Before iBomma was even linked to him directly, Cyber Crime had already arrested:

The Camcorder Suppliers

• Jana Kiran Kumar – Attapur Mantra Mall
  
• Arslan Ahmed – Bihar
  
• Sudhakaran – Tamil Nadu
  
• Other unnamed regional suppliers
  

These men supplied cam-prints and pre-release rips to multiple piracy syndicates, including Cyril Infant Raj and later iBomma handlers.

Why This Mattered

During interrogation, they revealed:

• buyers who paid in crypto
  
• accounts tagged as “Bappam buyer / Bomma buyer”
  
• foreign numbers contacting them for requirements
  
• repeated references to a “Telugu guy abroad” coordinating high-quality releases
  

This was the first indirect link to Ravi — not by name, but by pattern.

🔶 2. The Cipher Review & Digital Pattern Analysis

Once iBomma became the biggest Telugu piracy hub (post-2021), police began a deeper forensic review:

They found:

• common CDN signatures across multiple mirror sites
  
• identical load-balancer behaviour
  
• transactions hitting Indian binami accounts from foreign crypto exchanges
  
• domain renewals occurring through the same registrar batches (including Porkbun)
  
• identical Cloudflare rule-sets across mirrors
  

These were not enough for arrest, but enough to classify iBomma as:

“A single coordinated foreign-operated piracy cell.”

🔶 3. The Breakthrough — Two Arrests That Directly Pointed to Him

The September 2025 TOI-case arrests (Cyril Infant Raj & team) provided the missing link.

Cyril, during interrogation, confirmed:

• he sold HD server leaks to multiple clients, including a buyer who operated “Bappam/iBomma”
  
• the buyer insisted on crypto-only payments
  
• the same buyer discussed Netherlands + Luxembourg servers
  
• conversations about scaling Telugu piracy surfaced
  

While Cyril did not know Ravi’s name, police now had:

👉 the server countries
 👉 the hosting patterns
 👉 the type of content purchased
 👉 the Telugu buyer signature
 👉 money flows from crypto → Indian binami → small cash withdrawals

The net was tightening.

🔶 4. The Trigger Incident — The Taunting Poster

Then came the taunt:

A photo circulated showing a mockery-style poster:

"Ibomma is not a banana to peel easily… catch me if you can.”

He didn’t upload it publicly, but it leaked on closed groups monitored by Cyber Crime.

This accelerated the case from technical to targeted.

🔶 5. The Return to India — His Single Biggest Mistake

Despite being warned by associates that police had interrogated his old supply chain,
Ravi still flew to India in November 2025 to:

• sell property
  
• close personal matters
  
• handle financial disputes
  

This was likely due to his isolation and mistrust — he preferred doing major tasks himself.

Police already had a LookOut Circular (LOC), but because he entered via a domestic route (speculated), they relied on:

• tower location pings
  
• bank login IPs
  
• delivery records
  
• flight metadata
  

This enabled surveillance teams to track him to Rainbow Vistas, Kukatpally.

🔶 6. The Arrest Operation — The Two-Hour Standoff

When the team reached his door, they encountered the exact level of paranoia they feared:

His Setup

• Smart door lock
  
• Peephole camera
  
• Indoor surveillance cam
  
• Motion alerts enabled
  
• Automated notification to phone
  
• No maid, no visitors
  
• Laptop always encrypted and with quick-wipe scripts
  

How It Played Out

• Police knocked.
  
• He checked the live camera feed.
  
• Recognized the officers.
  
• Refused to open the door.
  
• Delayed for almost two hours.
  

During this window, he:

✓ wiped browser histories
✓ removed seed phrases
✓ ran secure delete on crypto wallets
✓ scrubbed operating logs
✓ removed VPN configs
✓ attempted to destroy evidence

By the time the door was forcibly opened, most international evidence was gone.

But Indian evidence remained.

🔶 7. What Police Actually Found (Realistic & As per Remand Report)

Inside, they found:

• A cluttered, dusty apartment (matching his isolation).
  
• Multiple phones (factory reset).
  
• A laptop partially wiped.
  
• No staff, no helpers.
  
• Smart locks connected to a hub.
  
• A fake PAN card: “Prahlad Kumar.”
  
• Crypto exchange traces via Indian gateways.
  
• Logs of betting ads payments routed to Indian binami accounts.
  
• Travel history including St. Kitts—a known offshore haven.
  

🔶 8. Why Police Could NOT Seize His International Crypto or Servers

According to real-world Indian cyber law constraints:

Hosting Countries (NL, Luxembourg, Switzerland):

• They do not honor Indian subpoenas.
  
• Require MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) — which takes months/years.
  
• Since piracy is not a universal criminal priority, cooperation is minimal.
  
• Porkbun, Cloudflare, NL bulletproof hosts routinely reject foreign legal requests unless routed via MLAT.
  

Crypto:

Police only managed to seize:

• Indian bank flows
  
• Indian binami accounts
  
• fiat transactions linked to betting ads
  

They could not seize:

• offshore crypto wallets
  
• retained Bitcoin/USDT
  
• Monero (XMR) transactions
  
• seed phrase–based wallets
  

Why?

Because the wiped laptop removed:

• private keys
  
• seed backups
  
• wallet files
  

Under Indian law, unless keys are present, the funds cannot be accessed or frozen.

🔶 9. His Interrogation Behavior

Remand report states:

• He was uncooperative.
  
• Avoided technical questions.
  
• Provided minimal verbal responses.
  
• Refused to disclose server credentials.
  
• Claimed data loss / forgotten passwords.
  
• Repeatedly stated: “I work in tech consulting.”
  

This resistance ensured that foreign evidence remained inaccessible.

🔶 10. The Wife Theory — Explained as Plausible but Unconfirmed

Rumors suggest:

• His wife left because she was unhappy with his income.
  
• She knew he earned through “online work.”
  
• She may have shared these details with relatives.
  
• Family disputes are a common source of cybercrime exposure.
  

This is plausible, but:

❗ Not mentioned in any official report.
 ❗ Must be treated as unverified.

It is added only as a behavioral insight, not evidence.

🔶 11. Why He Was Finally Arrested — Core Explanation

Ravi was not caught because of offshore servers.

He was caught because:

• his Indian financial trail was active
  
• his suppliers were arrested
  
• his crypto withdrawals hit Indian accounts
  
• his property sale brought him home
  
• he left metadata breadcrumbs
  
• he got overconfident and sloppy
  

His foreign anonymity stayed intact — but his real-world presence in India didn’t.

⭐ FINAL SUMMARY — THE REALITY OF HIS ARREST

In other words:

iBomma wasn’t beat technologically — it was beat physically.
Ravi walked into India. India closed the door.

CHAPTER 8 — AFTERMATH & THE DIGITAL REALITY

After his arrest:

• Several iBomma clones appeared
  
• Streaming moved to Telegram, Debrid, Stremio
  
• MovieRulz regained traffic share
  
• Betting apps continue to fund piracy
  
• Cam-print suppliers remain active
  

The police victory is meaningful — but symbolic.
The industry understands a deeper truth:

**You can arrest a man.

You cannot arrest a decentralized global network.**

CONCLUSION — THE MAN AND THE MACHINE

Immadi Ravi was not a classic criminal kingpin.
He was:

• Intelligent
  
• Hurt
  
• Isolated
  
• Technically gifted
  
• Psychologically damaged
  
• Driven by the need to prove himself
  

He built:

• A global piracy delivery network
  
• A system more efficient than some legal OTTs
  
• An empire protected by crypto and foreign servers
  
• A platform millions depended on
  

He challenged the industry.
He challenged police.
He challenged the system.

In the end, he wasn’t caught by breaking servers or tracing crypto.
He was caught by returning home.

A human vulnerability — not a technical one.

And while his story ends with arrest, the larger story of digital piracy in India continues.
Because the internet has no borders.
And piracy — like information — always finds a way.

Addon Sections

CRYPTO FLOW — HOW THE MONEY MOVED (OFFICIAL-STYLE SECTION)

1. Income Sources

A. Betting Companies
 1xBet
RajBet
Parimatch
4raBet

Paid pirates $8,000 – $12,000/month.

Reason:
Their ads appeared inside pirated streaming players.
Viewers had to click the ad to continue watching.

B. Digital Piracy Websites
 iBomma clones
TamilBlasters
TamilMV
5MovieRulz
NitesMovies
Various mirror domains

Paid leak suppliers for:

• Cam prints
  
• HD server leaks
  
• Early OTT rips
  

Payment range:
$150–$500 for cam prints
$800–$2000 for HD server leaks

2. Receipt & Storage of Crypto

Pirates used:

• 10+ crypto wallets
  
• TRON Network (USDT-TRC20)
  
• Bitcoin
  
• Monero (untraceable)
  

Wallet Types Used:

1. ZebPay
   
2. WazirX (old logs only)
   
3. Binance Global
   
4. KuCoin
   
5. OKX
   
6. TrustWallet (self-custody)
   
7. Exodus Wallet
   
8. Monero GUI Wallet
   

Monero was used for final layering.

3. Laundering Steps (As per real investigations of similar cases)

Flow:
 Betting App → USDT/USDC → Offshore Exchange → Mixing/Swapping → XMR → Re-swap → Cash Out via Indian Binami

Breakdown:

Step 1 — Betting Companies Pay in USDT

Paid to:

• Pirate’s wallet
  
• Or intermediary reseller wallets
  

Used TRON network because:

• 1–2 rupee fees
  
• Fast
  
• Harder to trace

Step 2 — Converted to XMR (Monero)

Purpose:
✔ Hide transaction history
✔ Break blockchain traceability
✔ Mix coins automatically

Monero = impossible for police to trace.

Step 3 — Re-swapped to USDT/BTC

Done on:

• KuCoin
  
• Binance
  
• ChangeNOW
  
• FixedFloat
  

These require NO KYC and support:

• VPN login
  
• Multi-hop transfers

Step 4 — Transfer to Indian Binami Accounts

Used:

• Small-volume withdrawals
  
• P2P buyers
  
• Sham “freelance payments”
  
• Crypto OTC desks
  

Police recovered:

• Bank deposits
  
• UPI traces
   But not the crypto itself.

Step 5 — Cash Withdrawal

Withdrawn through:

• ATMs
  
• Online shopping
  
• Local cash buyers
  
• Gift cards
  
• Forex card loads
  

Crypto was the backbone of their operational secrecy.

4. Why Police Could NOT Recover the Crypto

1. Seed phrases deleted during arrest
   
2. Wallets stored on offshore cloud drives
   
3. Monero breaks entire transaction history
   
4. Exchanges used were outside MLAT treaty reach
   
5. Some wallets were ephemeral (RAM-based)
   
6. Self-destruct scripts wiped encrypted folders
   
7. Ledger synced via encrypted Tails OS nodes
   
8. No device = no recovery