TCPE Questions/Summaries: Grandstanding

Questions for Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk

William Jade Langley

The Center for Practical Ethics

Chapter 1:

Summary:

The first chapter is concerned with defining the terms and ideas used throughout the book. The authors initially describe the current landscape of moral talk, and compare it to a grade-school playground. The nastiness employed by children (who generally can be excused as not knowing any better) is then employed by adults, especially on social media. Tosi and Warmke then go into a discussion of what is meant by “moral talk”. After providing a list of different kinds, the authors explain why moral talk is vital in how we as people and our society progress in a positive way. Moral language and discourse points out to individuals how they can improve their behavior, praises positivity, and condemns bad behavior. The danger can arise when moral talk is corrupted, or is utilized from the beginning for other purposes. Grandstanding is an easily recognizable way to abuse moral talk. The middle of the chapter provides examples of moral grandstanding, specifically the two given by Harvey Weinstein and Roy Moore. Grandstanding is moral talk that is not aimed at the good, but instead aims to make the speaker look good. The final section of the chapter addresses potential criticisms for the book, and continues to explain why these surface level criticisms are insufficient in undermining the motivation for the book.

Questions:

In the opening section, a few different online comments are looked at as examples of unacceptable moral grandstanding that when analyzed objectively are advocating appalling behavior. The examples listed are filled with hyperbolic notions and clearly jarring conclusions, but hyperbole often lends itself to attempts at comedy and shedding light on a ridiculous problem. Would a defense of “it was meant as a joke” soften the blow of some of these unacceptable claims, or make it even worse, considering the severity of the topic?
The authors provide a list of types of moral talk. Is this list exhaustive? Can you think of any others to add?
The final item on the list directly references the implementation or blocking of social policies. Is political discussion such as this separable from moral discussion? Or, is it the case that once you engage in moral or political discussion, you are necessarily engaging in the other?
On pg. 5 at the end of the first paragraph, it is stated “When people use moral talk this way, they turn a protective instrument against the very people it is meant to help.” Based upon the context, would you say the “people it is meant to help” would include everyone? Or is it everyone who does not use moral discussion as grandstanding? Is there a balance between the two, where you unknowingly moral grandstand by repeating what someone else stated, genuinely thinking it was virtuous and trying to spread the truth?
Pg. 6, first sentence of first complete paragraph. “Moral talk…has a point: to help us become better people, treat others with the respect they deserve, and make our world a better place.” Do you agree that this is the point of moral discussion? Is this missing something, or does it effectively cover the goal of moral discourse?
Between the two examples of grandstanding committed by Harvery Weinstein and Roy Moore, what are the most obvious shared elements? They are both clearly pathological statements (appealing to emotion primarily), but is this the only tool being used here?
Throughout the section, various examples of people (primarily politicians) accusing others of grandstanding are employed. Is this, in its own right, another form of moral grandstanding? To accuse others in an attempt to place yourself at the forefront of stopping other people from doing just what you are engaging in?
In the final section, the authors do a wonderful job of preemptively addressing potential objections. Were any of these potential objections particularly powerful to you? Are there any others you can think of based upon the brief summary given in the first chapter?
Final sentence, “So, if you’re the kind of person who cares deeply about justice, read on.” Is this statement an example of moral grandstanding? The use of the word justice seems to place the book on a moral pedestal, and is justice somewhat unrelated to morality? The final objection was an attempt to separate the moral discussion from a political one, but does relying on justice here bring it back into the legislative sphere?

Chapter 2:

Summary:

The second chapter starts out with a general explanation of grandstanding, including its potential origins. After addressing various forms of grandstanding, moral grandstanding is presented as a formula: Grandstanding = Recognition Desire + Grandstanding Expression. The first element, recognition desire, is the desire to be viewed as morally respectable. The moral respectability of a person is expressed through either prestige (some sort of transcendent knowledge or skill above the general population) or domination (forceful coercion). The second element, the grandstanding expression, is the actual content being uttered, with recognition desire being among its stronger motivators. Utilizing indirect language, the grandstanding expression demonstrates the moral respectability of the speaker while maintaining a plausible deniability by not directly asserting their moral superiority. Though believing you are morally respectable/superior is not necessary to engage in moral grandstanding, it can be among the powerful motivating factors. Moral self-enhancement manifests itself in the illusion of moral superiority; referencing empirical studies in psychology, these ideas explain how we view ourselves. We tend to think of ourselves as better than we are, through comparisons of others and self-delusion, and our actions reflect this. This leads into addressing the blatant objection of unknowingly committing grandstanding. The difference between witting and unwitting is whether or not the motive is to impact public opinion of the speaker or not.

Unwitting grandstanding usually stems from a lack of clarity of our own motivations, causing us to fill in these gaps with our preconceived moral respectability. Another point in this chapter is that it is absolutely possible to employ truthful statements and claims in the grandstanding expression; which can make it difficult to point out blatant grandstanding attempts. Two factors in determining the efficacy of your grandstanding are your audience's preconceived notions of you prior to the grandstanding expression, as well as their own predispositions towards the moral issues you are using as your stage to make the expression. If they like and agree with you, they will likely applaud your expression; if they disagree, they will likely condemn it. Moral grandstanding is a problem general to society, not particular to any one demographic or political affiliation, though a pattern can be seen that the more extremist members of political groups tend to grandstand through prestige as opposed to dominance. The authors defend against accusations posed against them of grandstanding by saying even if they are, then it does not take away from the truth or power of the arguments. As stated before, falsity is not necessary for grandstanding. The final section discusses the reason the authors chose grandstanding as opposed to virtue signaling; they show why virtue signaling would be misleading in this context for a variety of reasons.

Questions:

The first recorded use of “grandstanding” in a sense of showing off, according to the book, is in reference to baseball. This seems to imply something unsportsmanlike, much in the same way the NFL will crack down on endzone celebrations. How similar is this to the way it is used today, in the sense of moral talk? Should there be a sort of social “penalty” for blatant attempts at grandstanding?
The book puts prestige and dominance as the primary tools for establishing a morally respectable personality. Though these two are very powerful tools, are there any others that may be employed to demonstrate moral superiority?
When describing the grandstanding expression, the authors acknowledge at least three different authors who have offered explanations for why grandstanders implement indirect language. The one discussed in the book is the desire to maintain a plausible deniability of the statement; the ability to side-step criticism by denying any literal attachment to the statement. What other motivating factors could also be relevant?
When discussing various reasons we may have for committing unexplained actions, we tend to put ourselves on a moral pedestal. A background concern is that we are not as moral as we portray, causing us to double down on our own illusion of ourselves as well as our actions. How powerful of a factor would self-doubt be? Could this be a motivator for creating the illusion?
The authors explain a psychological concept of confabulation: the tendency to fill in the motivational blindspots in our action with self-enhancing reasoning. The example of parents establishing a bedtime for the general well-being of the children and people justifying pirating media by saying they are denying large corporations the profit they themselves are robbing from artists. Besides the example of grandstanding provided by the book, are there any other examples of confabulation in everyday life? And is there something that is different about the self-serving motivations of the former case referring to parents and their children, as opposed to the blatant theft of the latter case?
An interesting objection is addressed, whether or not it can be called grandstanding if it is unwitting. The book offers defense of its position that is compelling, but there is a looming concern. Can we untrain some of the mechanisms that produce unwitting grandstanding? And is it even fair to charge someone with grandstanding if it is unwitting?
The authors point out that being incorrect (or even worse, lying) is not necessary in grandstanding. Is there some level of sympathy extended to grandstanders when you agree with them? And what can be effective ways to try and acknowledge grandstanding in a healthy way, while still nurturing truly compassionate and true beliefs?
The authors state that whether or not they are grandstanding is irrelevant to the goal of the book. Do you agree with this sentiment? The robot example employed is useful, but would a robot not be able to properly understand context, and not be able to properly point out grandstanding? Or does adopting the role of “grandstand judger” necessarily carry with it the weight of grandstanding?
The authors address another commonly used term that is related to grandstanding and it is that of virtue signaling. One of the ways in which virtue signaling is misleading is that signals, in biology, are often entirely detached from the direct motives and interests of the organism doing the signaling (such as toxic bugs adopting bright colors). Can we engage in similarly, entirely unconscious methods of grandstanding? And if so, how close is this sort of unconscious signaling related to unwitting grandstanding?

Chapter 3:

Summary:

In the third chapter, Grandstanding: A Field Guide, Tosi and Warmke describe the 5 forms grandstanding expressions are uttered in the world: piling on, ramping up, trumping up, displays of strong emotion, and dismissiveness. The chapter uses various empirical psychological data in order to support these conclusions. Piling on, in general, are statements that do not add substantially to the general conversation being had, but instead merely affirms or offers emphatic support for something that has already been said. Ramping up occurs when people want to show their moral superiority out of a group by “ramping up” the severity of the conviction. Someone makes a moral claim, and it triggers a sense of “social comparison” of moral superiority, causing a decision to be made: do you keep your conviction as severe as everyone else, or ramp it up and maintain the moral paragon status? Trumping up is different in that it forces moral discourse and talk into a situation that may not call for it, or where it doesn’t fit at all. This type of grandstanding looks for any opportunity to place themselves above everyone else as being vigilant against injustice, so much so that they see injustices everyone else is blind to. Displays of strong emotions most commonly take the form of outrage, though it is not limited to this. Grandstanding in this way makes it impossible to determine genuine reactions of strong emotion from false ones.

The final form, dismissiveness, is a different kind of grandstanding. It does not necessarily draw attention in the way the others do. By dismissing certain points of view or people, we are communicating to other people that our moral values and radar is so finely tuned, that we can detect when someone's opinion is not even worth considering. These 5 types are not meant to be absolute and foolproof ways to point out and test if a statement is an example of grandstanding or if people are grandstanding in the wild. Instead, this chapter, accordion to the authors, is simply meant to shed light on some of the ways we might be grandstanding without realizing it. This way, we can minimize our own transgressions of grandstanding.

Questions:

The first paragraph provides a few humorous examples of intellectual showing-off through side-comments or other displays. Would you categorize these as examples of grandstanding? Perhaps not directly moral, but gaining knowledge is often viewed as a good, sometimes described similarly to moral values. Would this be another indirect corrupted use of moral talk?
The book lists and discusses 5 common forms grandstanding takes. Is this list exhaustive? Can you think of any others? And are the lines between these categories clearly defined, or is overlap to be expected upon investigation?
Going against the grain and avoiding piling on can be difficult, especially in a world where having different views can seemingly pit you against people you have never met. Were the conclusions to Solomon Asch’s experiment (the one with identical lines being drawn and the group lying about believing they were different) surprising to you? That people would not only keep their real beliefs hidden, but also engage in criticizing others that they secretly agreed with?
In academia, one feature is the free sharing of ideas. Generally, this can come at the cost of some outlandish beliefs and views being thrown around. Having your own beliefs is important, even if you want to express solidarity with a particular group. This can be confusing, which can lead to what the book calls The Black Sheep effect. What are some ways we can make sure that people feel comfortable to speak up about views, even if they may go against the majority within one's overall group?
It seems like ramping up is a part of moral talk that has been greatly exaggerated by the anonymity of the internet. Do you think this has begun to bleed into everyday moral discussion as well? Or in your experience, do in person moral talks generally stay respectable and tame?
The authors have mentioned the alleviation of guilt (an internal motivator), and the desire of recognition from others (an external desire) as motivators for grandstanding. Specifically in regards to ramping up, though this can be asked for any of the examples, do you think the fear of our own moral guilt or the desire to be viewed as moral by others is stronger?
The authors discuss moralism, the illicit use of moral considerations. This, according to the book, can lead to overly demanding obligations. By forcing moral consideration into every decision, you carry an incredible burden on yourself. What are some ways to balance this type of over-consideration? Is it a consequence of attempting to be attentive to injustice?
When discussing strong emotions, the obvious culprit of outrage is focused on. Towards the end, a few others are mentioned (praise, disgust, etc). Are there any others that are often worn to show others the moral beacon we can be?
The author also points out an interesting phenomenon, that moral outrage actually makes us feel good. Better about ourselves. What sorts of things, besides what is mentioned in the book, can you think of that may cause that?
Dismissiveness is one of the most complicated forms, since there are clearly some views that are blatantly worthy of dismissal. Related to the previous question regarding piling on, how do we balance the need for open communication, with an appropriately dismissive attitude towards self-evidently bad views?
Of the 5 views listed, are there any that you find particularly annoying or hard to hear? And is there one that you find particularly attractive and difficult not to commit?

Chapter 4:

In chapter 4, the social costs of moral grandstanding are discussed. These moral costs include polarization, cynicism, and the inflation of moral and political outrage. Polarization is a term that we have heard increasingly recently, and social and political scientists are finding this is because people are getting more radicalized and extreme. This kind of consequence of grandstanding happens both within the same group (intra-group polarization) and between two differing opinions (inter-group polarization). Both of these types can manifest themselves into overconfidence, and often regarding false beliefs. Cynicism is possibly one of the most apparent social costs. This cynicism is the sincerity of other people's moral talk, cynicism in the state of affairs, cynicism in the ability to convince others of truth if they are so misguided.

The third discussed social costs of moral grandstanding are those of grandstanding–driven outrage. As discussed in Ch. 3, strong emotions are a prominent form of grandstanding, and outrage is chief among the displayed emotions. Devaluing displays (or internal experiences) of moral outrage leads to people not taking truly outrageous displays or events seriously. The problem dubbed The Crying Wolf problem after Aesop’s famous fable is a clear example of this: if people are constantly screaming outrage (especially when engaging in the “trumping up” variant of grandstanding), then when it comes time for everyone else to truly and productively share in the outrage, no one will come since every other time people screamed outrage, it was over something unworthy of such an emotive response. This problem can also manifest itself in outrage exhaustion.

The final section discusses possible upsides to grandstanding. Among these are a sense of community, and a clear way to display your allegiance and cooperative nature with that community. Another is that it can lead to people paying attention to injustices, or to act when otherwise they may not have contributed positively to charity or something of that nature. In order to display these as potential defenses of grandstanding, it would be necessary to either deny the costs, or prove that the benefits without question outweigh the costs.

Questions:

The book mentions Polarization first amongst its list of social costs of grandstanding. With the current political landscape, polarization may be seen as apparent, though what precisely is the cause may be more difficult to pin down. Among the examples of grandstanding given in ch.3 (piling on, ramping up, trumping up, strong emotions, and dismissiveness), which do you think is contributing most to polarization?
On pg. 70, the end of the second paragraph reads “The use of moral talk for self-promotion causes people to say and believe things that push people further apart.” I think it is safe to say that things are definitely said, but does this stand in contradiction to what was established previously that people will often and reliably say things they do not believe to maintain in-group status?
A distinction is drawn between inter-group and intra-group polarization. Do you think one of these problems lends itself more to this divide that is being pointed at? Is it between group hostility, or the pressure of conformity and escalation to be found within groups?
There are a few metaphors that are used to illustrate concepts in the book, such as a grade-school playground and the nuclear arms race in The Cold War, which is referenced again in the case of polarization and false beliefs. Were either of these analogies, or any other examples/analogies used throughout the book/chapter, particularly insightful? Or do you think any of them are possibly misrepresenting the nature of moral talk these days?
Cynicism is mentioned as a social cost of grandstanding, and I am sure many people have had to go through some form of cynicism regarding moral talk (especially upon reading some of the earlier chapters of the book). Later in the chapter, concepts such as outrage exhaustion and moderates checking out. Do you think cynicism is the symptom, or the sickness in regards to some of these other social costs?
Naive cynicism is defined as “a bias that leads us to expect that others are more egocentrically motivated than they actually are.” This sounds like everyone may believe they are living in a society that is Hobbesian in nature, every person for themselves. Is there any utility in viewing the world like this? Is it necessary to balance this type of world view with something more open-minded, or is it better to not have any sort of “every person for themselves” mentality?
The second to last section dives into the social costs of grandstanding driven outrage specifically. It seems to me like these can be read in a chronological manner as one leading to the other (“Crying wolf problem” leads to outrage exhaustion leads to moderates checking out). Would you place “clickbait” headlines and misleading language as a form of the “crying wolf” problem? At what point is hyperbole for the press acceptable to make the news more interesting, and at what point does it sacrifice its right to be credible?
The comparison of moral talk with current swear words is interesting. Traditionally, discussions of strong moral feelings have been limited to extreme situations, with certain words being used sparingly to maintain the impact of their usage. Historically, slang has cycled with generations, with words rising and falling as far as overall social acceptability. Is it possible that this effect has bled into our moral language? Are there going to have to be alternative ways to alert people to danger and injustice, since our previous expressions of moral outrage and exclamations of impending doom have had their currency inflated beyond alarm?
A lot of this book has pointed to things like ramping up, piling on, and moral outrage, and has rightly pointed out that these sentiments are easily found in current discussions. A consequence of this is moderates checking out. Some reasons are discussed, such as fear of social isolation and outrage exhaustion. Since the conversation is dominated by people with very strong opinions and who view the world through a moral lens, is it better to try and de-radicalize the extremists, or to give the moderates their confidence back to speak up?
The final section discusses the possible benefits of social grandstanding. Do you think this section provides any real defense of grandstanding by establishing potentially powerful benefits, or do you agree with the authors that this is a difficult undertaking considering the costs listed?

Chapter 5:

Summary:

Chapter 5 focuses on the importance of respect to a society's ability to communicate properly; the problem with grandstanding is that it does not recognize the intrinsic dignity held within each human, and therefore almost necessarily is disrespectful in nature. Whether this is by showcasing through shaming or blaming others, deceiving (intentionally or not), or taking advantage of the benefits of society, grandstanding undermines the fundamental presuppositions we all act under. Moral talk can be used either as a weapon of disrespect, or as a tool to help protect mutual respect. If the presupposed respect and honesty is undermined, then our very notion of communication will break down and moral talk will lose all of its already diminished meaning.

Questions:

The opening line in the chapter asserts an axiomatic truth that most people have and the rest of the chapter relies upon: “Everyone deserves to be treated with respect.” I don’t think this is a controversial statement, there is a certain level of respect most people would come to agree with that should be applied to every person you encounter, online or in person. However, is this in contrast with the concept of “earning respect”? Is there a line to be drawn, and a clear respect threshold that all humans have? What about animals? Plants?
In the introduction to the chapter, an example is given of moral talk being like a hammer, it can be used as a tool to build but also a weapon to harm. What do you think of this analogy? Would others (such as a shield or a sword) that may be more explicitly applicable to defending peoples respect? Or is the building respect from the ground up using moral talk the proper way to conceptualize the use of moral talk?
The “Dirty Harry Defense” is an interesting case for not limiting the use of moral talk: so long as it functions to properly point out wrongdoers. As the authors note, this relies on an infallible ability to point out moral wrongdoing. Putting aside the limits of human reason and conflicting motivations, is morality the sort of thing we can ever truly reach an answer on? Or is it the kind of subject that relies on the constant discussion, and constant adjustment, and the unknowable nature of morality is why we must constantly be on guard?
There is an underlying emphasis on motivations throughout ch. 5. In your opinion, regarding grandstanding, are the motivations more important, or the outcome of the grandstanding expression? Related, can you ever truly remove your recognition desire from a situation?
There is an interesting study where people were asked to evaluate themselves across 26 different traits people relate to moral traits, such as trustworthiness and politeness, and then they were asked to do so again some time later. They tended to rate themselves much higher the second time. Do you think there is also an issue of going the other way? People thinking they are worse than they are, and are therefore nnot confident enough to rank themselves higher? Would these people even be willing to contribute to a survey such as this?
The book asserts that grandstanding can be deceptive without being intentionally so. Do you agree with this? Or do you think it is necessary to deceiving that you are intentionally doing so? Is there a difference between intentional deception and lying?
As far as showcasing and deceit go, which do you think is more pernicious? And is grandstanding that makes use of other people in self-serving ways (by blaming, shaming, or deceiving) particularly worse? What about disrespect that is so dangerous?
The idea of placing “conversational maxims” on our communication is interesting. Do you think people do this in some way each time they speak? Or do you think people follow other, less civil maxims? Or, do most people not follow maxims at all when they speak, and instead just spout ideas?
The end of the chapter establishes an important distinction: “...a person’s actions functioning as a signal and, on the other, a person acting in order to signal.” Basically, another acknowledgement of intent is important here. Do you agree with this distinction? Does it seem plausible that people would ever act entirely virtuous, and simply have the recognition of morality be a byproduct?

Chapter 6:

Summary:

Chapter 6 focuses more directly on different philosophical theories of morality and ethics in order to determine whether or not a morally virtuous person would grandstand. Specifically, three theories were considered: virtue ethics, consequentialism, and Neitzschian critiques and predictions of moral development. First, the authors explain virtue ethics, and why motivations are very important when considering the moral worth of an action. Due to the egoistic motivations for grandstanding, a morally virtuous person would not grandstand. Then, consequentialism is considered, asking whether or not vanity could be a virtue due to the good consequences grandstanding can bring about. This is ruled out based upon previous demonstrations of the social costs of grandstanding. Finally the harshest critique of moral talk, Neitzsche, is considered: would the morally virtuous person in this system (the person who only pursues the most excellent of the virtues) grandstand? No, since the truly morally excellent person would not be concerned with such petty ways to establish a moral reputation. So, this chapter establishes that under a variety of philosophical structures, a virtuous person would not engage in grandstanding.

Questions:

The book distinguishes between 3 different motivations for doing action (specifically actions with some level of moral worth): egoistic, altruistic, and dutiful motivations. Do you think these motivations have clear lines between them, with varying weights held? Or do the different motivations meld into one another? Could someone act out of a concern for other people's well being (altruistic) because of a moral duty to do so?
The authors try to derive whether or not a virtuous person would grandstand. They draw a comparison between a good citizen who is productive in public moral discourse, and someone who is morally virtuous in general. Do you think someone could be one and not the other? Is there the true potential for a Robin-Hood-esque figure, who perhaps acts partly out of a virtuous nature but also completely goes against what the society commands?
A distinction between two very popular moral theories is examined: virtue theory and consequentialism. The authors arrive at the conclusion, based upon previous demonstrations of the social costs of grandstanding, that in neither view would a virtuous person grandstand. Do you agree with their conclusion? Or, is there still room for a consequentialist answer?
There is a detailed discussion of Neitzsche and his critiques of contemporary moral philosophy. This relies on a deeply pessimistic view of human nature, which develops into a brutal and unsettling critique of morals that, as the authors point out, does not at all recognize the great leaps forward in human rights and equality. But, do you think there is something to be said about this view of human nature? Is our “will to power” truly what motivates and orients us through life?
The discussion of excellent persons in Neitzsche’s moral framework ends with the authors saying the excellent person would not grandstand to impress others, instead others would just be impressed by them without the need for abuse of moral talk. Is it possible to completely remove recognition desire from consideration?
There are a couple lists of candidates for excellent qualities. Are there any character traits or qualities that you did not see in the book that surprised you? Also, are there any traits that would be “most excellent”?
The last critique is the strongest one, claiming that grandstanding abuses moral talk just to establish moral dominance over other people, even at their expense. Do you agree with such a harsh critique? Or, have some of the potential defenses of grandstanding been powerful enough to warrant a softening of this claim?

Chapter 7:

Summary:

The authors in chapter 7 look specifically at political grandstanding and its effect on society; specifically, how political grandstanding produces a “morality pageant” which the public loves. People support it because it is easier to cast judgement on a politician's values and character than their policies. Also, policies that are properly effective are long and tedious; grandstanding opens the door for explosive short sighted policies that express the values of the political actor. Another concern of political grandstanding is a general paradox that social activists face: if they solve the problems, their status as activists will be rendered meaningless. Also, if the scope of activism is not narrowed, then it can become self-consuming. The end considers the potential benefits of political grandstanding, but ultimately says that these benefits far from outweigh the problems.

Questions:

The term “political actor” is tied to activists and politicians. The politicians I totally understand, however, is it fair to group all activists in this group? We have discussed the implausibility of removing recognition desire entirely, but is it fair to say someone is merely “acting” when they are being socially active in trying to bring about what they see as necessary changes?
“Like many others, politicians have narcissistic tendencies.” Can we replace “many others” with “everyone”? There are places throughout the book that seems to paint a fairly dim picture of human nature. Do you think there are, or could be, people who do not have “narcissistic tendencies”?
I am interested in everyone thoughts about the statement regarding “firing” politicians. It got me thinking: is campaigning just an elaborate employment ritual with debates being interview stages? I am not sure how far this metaphor runs, but thought it may be an interesting point of discussion.
On pg. 141, there is a change in gendered pronoun usage. Probably not intentional, but interesting that when a grandstander succeeds, feminine pronouns are used, and later in the same paragraph, it switches to masculine pronouns when discussing a failed grandstander. I have no question for this but just thought it was an interesting thing to note.
There is a mention of a “morally suspect but smart, capable, well-educated person” is interesting. Do you think someone could exist that is not just morally suspect, but morally deficient, but knowledgeable enough to be politically virtuous? And if so, is this someone you would want in charge?
The book points out an assumption that good moral status of politicians necessarily translates to good policies. Putting aside the potential for deceit, is this a fair assumption to make? Is hiring our leaders based upon their moral character in some part beneficial?
Is grandstanding necessary to politics?
On pg. 147, last full sentence: “...politicians might need to change courses to do the right thing, and yet be prevented from doing so because they took a hardline moral stance to display their ideological purity.” Should we hold politicians to the standards of their campaigning? Or is everyone's assumption that most of what gets said won't come to pass a good enough compromise?
Alienation grandstanding is mentioned, and when comparing it with the Barret Wilson case about taking jokes too seriously and having it transform into the parody of cancel culture that some people feared, seems to display the dangers of social justice. Are there any methods of conducting activism that may avoid these dangers?
When discussing “rotten compromise”, I couldn’t stop getting held up on the potential for relativity that is implicit here: to what standard are compromises held to be “rotten”? There are clearly some bad ones, such as legal slavery, but this line gets blurred rather quickly when other, more nuanced issues come up.
The authors discuss that political grandstanding can take the form of “expressive policies”. These policies are explosive in content, generally attempting to abolish some perceived injustice, but do so in a shortsighted way. Is it possible to have policies that do not contain any expression of value?
Should activism have clear, defined goals or is the paradox discussed enough of a case to keep the aims vague, such as “general progress”?

Chapter 8:

Summary:

The final chapter of the book focuses on the ways we can minimize grandstanding and save moral discourse. The currently accepted moral pageantry must be overhauled in order to solve such a fundamental problem, and this starts at the place of the individual. By focusing on your own desire for recognition, you can be an example to others, and also it will help you achieve goals outside of the moral realm. This will also keep the moral realm of discourse more pure. When encountering grandstanding, it is important not to fall victim to the desire to correct people, as this can be interpreted as hostile and you may even be committing grandstanding. Do not call out grandstanding, stick to the genuine moral status of the situation in question. The final section encourages people not to get cynical about social change. Though generally a slow process, the differences between today and the past are notable, and there is reason to believe our own culture will go through similar periods of change.

Questions:

The comparison of lying with grandstanding was enlightening. Our mechanism for detecting lying is fallible (54% accurate according to the book), but we are confident that lying occurs in the world. Would you say the mechanism to detect grandstanding is more or less fallible than lying? And do you think grandstanding is more prevalent than lying?
The comparison to corny jokes was also helpful. I was interested in the social phenomenon of a collective, shared sigh or groan at the joke in question. The rest of the chapter suggests some ways in which to avoid calling people out for grandstanding, since morality is tied so closely to our core convictions that it is taken as hostile. Can there be a different sort of atmosphere of subtle public acknowledgement that does not necessarily demonize the other person, but is a shared expression of exasperation at the statement being made?
The book argues that accusing people of grandstanding produces bad consequences, and these consequences are similar to the consequences of grandstanding discussed previously. Is it possible to call out someone for grandstanding and not be grandstanding as well?
I was very interested in the discussion of “conceptual drift”, and the comparison to mansplaining was very interesting. As time goes on, the definitions of terms change and adapt to the social atmosphere. Is this true of all moral language? Will there be a new set of moral terms with which we will employ?
The emphasis on grandstanding less causes one to wonder if we can ever truly not grandstand. Is this an attainable goal, to be entirely free of grandstanding?
The lists of advice in the last chapter are wonderful suggestions about ways to improve your own life in general, and also specifically with regards to grandstanding. Since starting this book, are there any methods you have adopted in your own life that have been particularly helpful?
The authors present a guide to moral discourse from the book Why We Argue (and How We Should), and offer a final step of their own, “When you engage in moral talk, be harder on yourself than you are on others.” This is wonderful advice and taken as a general rule would greatly improve public moral discourse, But, is there a danger of going to far into self-criticization, where you become almost a tyrant over yourself, living in fear of engaging in moral discourse at all?
There are two claims when addressing grandstanding, one regarding the self and one regarding others. When introspecting and conducting yourself, then you should act in a certain way. When seeing grandstanding out in public, you should refrain from certain action, namely that of accusing people. Based on your experiences, are either of these more important to focus on? Or, for the most part, are they equal?
The final section presents the case that we should remain optimistic about positive social change, considering the amazing progress that we have gone through as a culture. However, there were a lot of empirical claims about human nature and behavior throughout the book that painted a not so positive picture of humans at their core when engaging in public discourse. Are these two points in contention? Or is growth as a society deeply linked with growth and development of human nature across time?