THE TRIPARTITE PACT 1940
Through the Tripartite Pact, Japan was the key to Hitler’s efforts to keep America out of the war until Germany was ready to take her on. Initially, the Germans counseled Japan to avoid provoking the United States to abandon her neutrality. However, “by the beginning of 1941 Germany was extremely anxious to draw Japan into the war, not against America, not even against Russia, which they were shortly to attack, but against Britain, which had refused to give in, even when apparently beaten.” Pressure was increased on Japan to attack Singapore, the key British position in the Far East, and seize Britain’s empire in Asia. “Quickly forcing Britain to her knees would keep the U.S. out of the war.” Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop wrote to the Japanese Ambassador, advising them to be tough in their current negotiations with the Americans: “… the people in the U.S. … were not willing to sacrifice their sons, and therefore were against any entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were being drawn into war for no reason by Roosevelt… Therefore our policies with the U.S. should be firm.” [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.871]
Actually, the title “Tripartite” (defined as, relating to or executed by three parties) became an acute misnomer. By June, 1941 the Pact had been joined by eight additional minor Axis powers: Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Thailand, Manchukuo, and Yugoslavia. (Note: The count quickly became seven. Two days after signing on, the pro-German Yugoslavian regime was overthrown by a group of military officers, who reneged on the terms of the agreement. Hitler, furious about this “treachery”, immediately launched an impromptu but brutal attack against Yugoslavia, forcing it to surrender and dismembering the country into a patchwork of ethnic territories to be occupied by Germany and other Axis partners. This impulsive act interrupted the final mobilization of Operation Barbarossa, resulting in a delay in the invasion of the Soviet Union that later had dire consequences.)
The Tripartite Pact was one of the most important of a series of treaty agreements signed during the 1930’s and early 1940’s that formed a complex and often shifting web of international political deals, commitments and expectations in an environment where subterfuge, intimidation, and intrigue were commonplace. Making matters worse, such pacts often contained secret codicils and protocols never made public. On a superficial level, one might be reminded of a gang of tough athletes in a brutal contact sport maneuvering to choose up the best possible team for a high stakes game where winner takes all. But these political treaties were deadly serious arrangements that literally determined when, with whom, and against whom a nation might go to war, and what it stood to gain in territory and booty – but only if that nation ended up on the victorious team. Such treaties had been a commonplace practice over generations in Europe in which various political spheres of influence, often great empires, would align themselves by means of treaties – essentially choosing up sides for the next war.
The Tripartite Pact had numerous antecedents, and its context is best understood by reviewing a few of these other key pacts that influenced the shifting international balance of power during the late 1930’s and early 1940’s.
1935 - Franco-Soviet Treaty Of Mutual Assistance
This was a bilateral pact between France and the Soviet Union, ratified in Moscow on March 27, 1936 with the aim of containing Nazi Germany’s aggression. It provided that military assistance could be rendered by one signatory to the other only after an allegation of unprovoked aggression had been submitted to the League of Nations and only after prior approval of the other signatories of the 1925 post-WWI Locarno pact (Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium) had been attained. The treaty was generally acknowledged to be weak, but acted as a hollow diplomatic threat of war on two fronts for Germany, should Germany pursue an aggressive foreign policy.
1936 - Rome-Berlin Axis
Treaties of friendship between Germany and Italy, and Germany and Japan were signed on October 26, 1936. The year of 1936 had been a busy one for Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini. By May, Mussolini’s Italian armed forces (in an act of naked colonial greed) had defeated and occupied the virtually defenseless African nation of Ethiopia (a.k.a. Abyssinia), provoking the condemnation of his British and French allies. Mussolini then repudiated Italy’s long-term alliance with those nations and intervened in the Spanish civil war on the side of the anti-government fascist rebels led by General Franco. Earlier, in March, Hitler formally renounced the Versailles Treaty, remilitarized the Rhineland, and began planning to draw fascist Italy into an alliance with Nazi Germany. The Spanish war provided the opportunity when Hitler also intervened in support of Franco to demonstrate Germany’s solidarity with Italy. Hitler followed up (considerable) German military support of the Franco forces with a warm invitation to the Italian foreign minister to come to Berlin, where on 21 October 1936, Germany and Italy signed a formal alliance which came to be known as the Rome-Berlin Axis. This alliance contained a protocol committing Germany and Italy to follow a common foreign policy. In November 1936, the term "axis" was first officially used when Mussolini spoke of a Rome-German axis arising out of Italy’s treaty of friendship with Germany. Thereafter, Mussolini would come increasingly under Hitler's influence, and their growing number of coalition partners in military aggression would be known as the Axis Powers. [The Pacific War Web site]
“For Italy, the alliance promised support in case of a major war, and an end to her then political isolation. For Germany, it meant that her south boundary was protected, thereby releasing its armed forces for use in other theaters of operation.” [Global Security web site] In May 1939, this relationship transformed into an updated alliance, which Mussolini named the “Pact of Steel.”
1936 - Anti-Comintern Pact
Japan's imperial government viewed the Soviet Union as the main threat to her conquests on the mainland of Asia. With further territorial expansion on the Asian mainland in mind, Japan began looking for allies who were comfortable with military aggression and likely to support Japan in the event of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Hitler was pleased to accommodate Japan, and on 25 November 1936, Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. The treaty actually targeted Soviet Russia, but for diplomatic purposes referred only to the Communist International (and its acronym, Comintern).
The ostensible purpose of the Anti-Comintern Pact was to contain the spread of communism, but it contained a secret protocol which required both parties to consult with a view to safeguarding their common interests if either Germany or Japan was attacked by the Soviet Union. The Japanese viewed the pact as a way to safeguard its conquest in Manchuria against the Soviets seeking to seize access to an ice-free Pacific port. Hitler, with a secret dream to invade and conquer the Soviet Union, saw this pact as a means to tie up sizeable Russian military resources in East Asia when he considered the time was ripe to attack the Russians from the west. One year later Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, which, in effect, extended the already-established Rome-Berlin Axis to Tokyo, signaled the alliance of the three totalitarian powers, and cemented the unity of Fascist and Nazi ideologies against the spread of communism.
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/axis.htm]
1939 - Pact Of Steel
The Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, more commonly known as the Pact of Steel, was implemented on May 22, 1939. Essentially a continuation of the 1936 Rome-Berlin Axis, the Pact consisted of two parts: the first section was an open declaration of continuing trust and cooperation between Germany and Italy. The second, a “Secret Supplementary Protocol”, encouraged a union of policies, including a commitment to promote the power and image of the fascist axis. The world saw the Pact as an alliance bent on dominating its neighbors, and on world conquest.
1939 British and French Treaties with Poland
In May, 1939 a pre-existing alliance between France and Poland was updated and enhanced, obliging both countries to provide military help to each other in case of a war with Nazi Germany. Despite all the obligations of the treaty, France provided only token help to Poland during the Poles’ short-lived struggle to repel the Nazi (and Soviet) invaders, which started on the first day of World War II – September 1, 1939. This is often considered an act of Western betrayal. However, the political context of the pact formed the basis for reorganizing a Polish army in exile to continue fighting the Nazis – first with the French, and subsequently in conjunction with the British armed forces.
The British provided Poland with similar commitments of military support, first informally in March 1939 (following the British complicity in handing over Czechoslovakia to Hitler), and then by signing the Polish-British Common Defense Pact on August 25, two days after the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed. Regardless of whether British (and French) promises of assistance were made in good faith, or intended solely to dissuade Hitler from invading Poland, neither country was ready for war or otherwise able to provide effective military support. And in fact, little or no meaningful assistance was provided to the Poles on either their western front against the Germans or their eastern front against the Soviets.
1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact,
In 1939, as Hitler was preparing for war against Poland (and its allies, France and England), he was determined to neutralize the Soviet Union and thereby preclude the possibility of a two-front war. However the Anti-Comintern Pact belligerently squared off Germany (and Italy) against the Soviets. So Hitler, never troubled by any code of ethics or sense of honesty, simply ripped up the Anti-Comintern Pact, reached out to the Russians, and on August 23, 1939 concluded a surprise treaty: the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which re-aligned Germany with Soviet Russia. Publicly, this agreement stated that the two countries - Germany and the Soviet Union - would not attack each other. If there were ever a problem between the two countries, it was to be handled amicably. And specifically: if Germany attacked Poland, the Soviet Union would not come to Poland’s aid; if Germany went to war against the West (especially France and Great Britain) over Poland, the Soviets were guaranteeing that they would not enter the war; thus not open a second front for Germany. The pact was supposed to last for ten years – it lasted for less than two!
[http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/nonaggression.]
The Pact also contained another surprise: Hitler and Stalin had added a secret addendum, the existence of which was denied by the Soviets until 1989. The secret protocol outlined respective future spheres of influence for the two states. For example, in exchange for the Soviet agreement to not join the possible future war, Germany was giving them a free hand in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Poland was also to be divided between the two - along a predetermined line. The new territories gave the Soviet Union the buffer (in land) that it wanted to feel safe from an invasion from the West. And it certainly would need that buffer after June 22, 1941, when Hitler ripped up yet another treaty and launched a massive surprise invasion of the Soviet Union. [http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/nonaggression.]
1941 Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact
The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had been a severe diplomatic blow to the Japanese (Shirer referred to it as a “kick in the teeth”), in that it virtually erased any safeguards against the Soviets the Japanese had gained through the Anti-Comintern Pact. Joining the Tripartite Pact did not help Japan much in this regard, since that agreement merely affirmed a political status quo between the Axis partners and Soviet Russia. Japan's chief fear then was that if Russia were relieved of anxiety in Europe, she would become a new and greater threat to Japan in the Orient. Consequently, in April 1941 the two powers signed the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, a non-aggression treaty – with the acquiescence of Germany. Now Japan could proceed with its planned aggressions in Southeast Asia without fear of a Soviet attack in Mongolia and Manchuria. “This was one treaty which Japan honored to the very last despite subsequent exhortations that she disregard it. Shortly, the Nazis would be begging the Japanese to attack not Singapore or Manila, but Vladivostok.” [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.876]
It was obvious to seasoned diplomats that the Tripartite Pact, having targeted the United States without actually naming her, was also aimed at the Soviets. Shirer noted that the Pact was and meant to be, a warning to the Soviet Union. [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.802] This was obvious to the Russians, and they were not pleased.
By resurrecting and strengthening earlier treaties that defined the hegemony of the Axis powers, the Tripartite Pact smelled to the suspicious Russians a lot like the Anti-Comintern Pact, and a contradiction of the spirit, if not the terms, of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact they signed a year earlier. Berlin, not yet ready for hostilities with Soviet Russia needed to mollify Stalin. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop did his best to persuade Moscow that Tripartite was not directed against the Soviet Union, and that there were no secret protocols nor any other secret agreements. Meetings were conducted with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in Berlin during which Ribbentrop and Hitler attempted to persuade the chilly and skeptical diplomat that Russia was welcome to sign the Tripartite Pact and transform it into a four-power pact. Russia would benefit by “glittering world-wide perspectives” such as the acquisition of new lands and resources (including warm-weather ports) and a share in the plunder of the (shortly-to-be) defunct British colonial empire. Naturally, there would be a secret protocol that … “defined each country’s ‘territorial aspirations”, meaning the portions of the world exclusively allocated to each of them. Molotov was unmoved by the salesmanship, and (in what Ribbentrop protested as being “interrogated too closely”) forcefully demanded detailed information about the Reich’s current activities and future plans in the Baltic states, the Balkan region, Turkey, Arabia, Persia (and more). As the discussions dragged on Hitler, unaccustomed to such probing and incise questioning, was alternately evasive and argumentative – but clearly exasperated. As Hitler seethed, Molotov left for Moscow to consult with his boss, Stalin. [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.801-809]
Shirer described what happened next:
“On November 26, scarcely two weeks after Molotov returned from Germany, he informed the German ambassador in Moscow that Russia was prepared to join the four-power pact, subject to [numerous conditions and secret protocols, which Hitler immediately rejected]. Moscow’s proposals constituted a price higher than Hitler was willing even to consider. He had tried to keep Russia out of Europe, but now Stalin was demanding Finland, Bulgaria, control of the Straits, and, in effect, the Arabian and Persian oil fields, which normally supplied Europe with most of its oil. The great cold-blooded Nazi blackmailer had met his match, and the realization infuriated him. At the beginning of December he [requested] the Army General Staff’s plan for the onslaught on the Soviet Union. On December 5 … he approved it.”
The operation was to be named “Otto”, but two weeks later it was changed to the code name by which it went down in history. When Hitler issued directive No. 21, it was headed “Operation Barbarossa”. [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.803-810] Although it would take another four years of ghastly death and destruction, this titanic struggle with the Soviets was the beginning of the end of Hitler and his Nazi regime.
In addition to the historical facts outlined above, I thought it appropriate to point out what I believe to be some interesting implications and unintended consequences of the Tripartite Pact.
• Axis Overconfidence
Certainly the Pact contributed to the overconfidence exhibited by the leaders of all three major Axis countries, feeding their delusional ambitions to conquer and divide the world among themselves. In the case of Italy, it encouraged Mussolini to bite off more than his armed forces could chew, resulting in successive military failures, from which he had to be rescued by Hitler. The Pact gave Japan free reign in the Pacific, with little opposition to worry about besides Russia (see Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, above) – and eventually – the United States. Certainly the absence of interference guaranteed by the Pact enabled their powerful military to achieve monumental success in a relatively short period, that is, until America re-built its armed forces and arsenal much faster and stronger than the Japanese imagined possible. One of Hitler’s fatal flaws was overconfidence, to a point of delusion, so it’s pure speculation whether Tripartite made any difference there. Clearly he viewed the Pact as a tool for his visions of conquest. Italy would protect his southern border, assist in taking over the Balkans, and expand into Africa. This would enable him to concentrate on the destruction of the Russians. Japan would defeat the British command in Asia, seize her colonies, and force the Americans to split their resources across two oceans – or intimidate them into staying out of the war altogether. The Japanese also might be persuaded, when the time came, to attack the Soviet bear in his rear end – Siberia– and share in the resulting spoils. I believe the Pact, In effect, encouraged the leaders of all three countries to overestimate their military and industrial capabilities, underestimate those of their enemies, and over-reach in their ambitions of conquest.
• An Indirect But Devastating Affect on Operation Barbarossa
Although Tripartite was designed to threaten the Soviets, it may have inadvertently worked to their advantage after Hitler invaded Russia. The coup in Belgrade which followed Yugoslavia’s signing of the Pact (referenced above), …”threw Adolph Hitler into one of the wildest rages of his entire life. He took it as a personal affront and in his fury made sudden decisions which would prove utterly disastrous to the fortunes of the Third Reich.” While raging to his generals about the revenge he would take and planning an immediate invasion, he called upon forces and resources earmarked for Barbarossa. Over the protests of his top military leaders he then pushed back the schedule of Barbarossa “up to four weeks”. “This postponement of the attack on Russia in order that the Nazi warlord might vent his personal spite against a small Balkan country which had dared to defy him was probably the most catastrophic single decision in Hitler’s career.” In doing so, …”he tossed away his last golden opportunity to win the war… His army chiefs were to recall it with deep bitterness … when later the deep snow and subzero temperatures of Russia hit them three or four weeks short of what they thought they needed for final victory.” [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.824]
• The Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941
Japan’s attack on Peal Harbor was certainly encouraged, if not driven by the Tripartite treaty and its partners. The main purpose of the Pact had originally been to frighten the Americans into staying out of the war. But the U.S., alarmed at Japanese expansion in Asia, had crashed the Axis party by slapping Japan with economic and trade sanctions. Throughout most of 1941 negotiations between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Japanese Ambassador Nomura dragged on in Washington without progress. It never dawned on Hitler and Ribbentrop that the failure of the Washington negotiations, which they so greatly desired, would bring the very result they had been trying to avoid until the time was right: America’s entry into the war. They continued to pressure Japan to take a more active military role in support of the Axis. In October, when the Japanese government was replaced by a military cabinet headed by the belligerent General Hideki Tojo, their Ambassador in Berlin told the Germans that his new government was “determined to go to war with the United States unless the Washington negotiations swiftly ended with President Roosevelt accepting the Japanese terms for a free hand … to occupy Southeast Asia.” On November 25, a Japanese carrier force sailed for Pearl Harbor, home of the U.S. Pacific fleet, on a mission secret to all, including the Nazis. Meanwhile, Ribbentrop began to urge the Japanese to go to war against the United States, as well as Britain, and promised the backing of the Third Reich. It was now increasingly more likely that Japan might take the lead against America for the Axis. As the aircraft carriers approached Pearl, their admirals awaited a final decision to launch the strike. The Hull-Nomura talks in Washington had been going nowhere, and hit a wall after delivery on November 26 to the Japanese of the “Hull note”, which contained additional proposed U.S. conditions they interpreted as an ultimatum. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor … “caught Berlin as completely by surprise as it did Washington.” [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.885-893] Would the Japanese have decided to attack if not for their membership in the Tripartite Pact, Nazi badgering for military action, and the treaty support promised by Germany?
• Entangling Alliances
In his farewell address, George Washington warned us to “steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world.” Thomas Jefferson’s inaugural pledge was more precise: “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations – entangling alliances with none.” Jefferson qualified the type of alliance that should be avoided – “entangling”. Obviously, these 18th century leaders had seen their share of diplomatic entanglements, read in their history books of others – and wanted no part of them. By the 1930’s and 40’s little had been learned from the history of failed foreign policies and wars repeatedly precipitated by opposing cabals of sovereign states knitted together by international pacts. World War I, fought between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance and resulting in 16.5 million deaths, should have been a reminder. Then only 20 years later, the Axis alliance, promising the world a “New Order”, helped to set the record as the deadliest military conflict in the history of the world – with over 60 million human losses throughout 60 different countries. And it took only a few psychotic dictators emboldened by an entangling alliance – the Tripartite Pact.
Historians provide no clear cut explanation why Hitler declared war on the United States when he did. Particularly since he had not heretofore actually declared war on any of the countries he invaded. But they do agree that it was not required by the Tripartite Pact. The text of the agreement required the Axis partners to assist and cooperate with each other if attacked by another power, but did not obligate any of them to go to war with an outside nation if one of the Axis members was the aggressor. (Of course, someone could always quibble about the interpretation of the words, “assist” or “cooperate”.) Nevertheless, three days after the Japanese sneak attack, with Germany under no explicit treaty obligation to go to war with America, Hitler did so. He thereby reversed his long held policy that he would go to war against the United States only after he was done bringing England and Russia to their knees.
There were many factors which may have influenced Hitler’s decision: For one, we know that at this time, he was fully occupied and under intense pressure trying to rally his faltering generals and retreating troops in frozen Russia. It may have finally dawned on him that it might take a long time to defeat Britain and the Soviets, if at all. Further, on the eve of Pearl Harbor his Japanese partners were forcefully demanding that verbal assurances of support by the Nazis (for new Japanese military actions they had been urging) be confirmed in writing. Egomania is another possible reason: Hitler’s interpreter, Dr. Paul Schmidt, later wrote, “that with his inveterate desire for prestige, Hitler, who was expecting an American declaration of war, wanted to get his declaration in first. The Nazi warlord confirmed this in his speech to the Reichstag on December 11. ‘We will always strike first,’ he told the cheering deputies. ‘We will always deal the first blow!’” Also, while Hitler’s ethics were beneath even the “honor among thieves” adage, he may have declared war to make up for what he realized was a weakness in the Tripartite treaty, and to do the right thing on behalf of his Axis ally. He said at the time, “If we don’t stand on the side of Japan, the [Tripartite] Pact is politically dead,” and added, “the chief reason [to declare war] is that the United States already is shooting against our ships… and through their actions have already created a situation of war.” [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.894-896]
Or, maybe the decision was simply driven by what Shirer wrote was…”a growing hatred for America, and Americans – and what was worse for him in the long run, a growing tendency to disastrously underestimate the potential strength of the United States.” [Shirer, Rise and Fall… p.895] Whatever the reason for his declaration of war, Hitler’s gross overestimation of Japan’s military power, along with his misunderstandings and miscalculations about the United States, caused him to unwittingly unleash America’s determination and industrial power – focused first and primarily on him. And as we know, this resulted in the complete, unequivocal destruction of Hitler's corrupt Nazi regime and that of his Axis partners – putting an end to the conspiratorial dreams of world conquest legitimized (they believed) by the Tripartite Pact of 1940.
Appendix: Text of the Pact
The Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, 1940
The Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy consider it the prerequisite of a lasting peace that every nation in the world shall receive the space to which it is entitled. They have, therefore, decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in their efforts in the regions of Europe and Greater East Asia respectively. In doing this it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things, calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. It is, furthermore, the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to nations in other spheres of the world that are inclined to direct their efforts along lines similar to their own for the purpose of realizing their ultimate object, world peace.
Accordingly, the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.
ARTICLE 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.
ARTICLE 3. Japan, Germany, and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European War or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict.
ARTICLE 4. With a view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet without delay.
ARTICLE 5. Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the above agreement affects in no way the political status existing at present between each of the three Contracting Powers and Soviet Russia.
ARTICLE 6. The present pact shall become valid immediately upon signature and shall remain in force ten years from the date on which it becomes effective. In due time, before the expiration of said term, the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.
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Bibliography
Shirer, William L. The Rise And Fall Of the Third Reich, A History of Nazi Germany, New York: Simon And Schuster, 1960
Shirer, William L. Berlin Diary, The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941
Willmont, H.P.; Messenger, Charles; Cross, Robin. World War II. New York:
DK Publishing, Inc., 2009
The Pacific War Web site: The Rome Berlin Axis (established May 2001 and last updated October 5, 2009)
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/historicalbackground/HitlerfindsAlly.html
About.com web site:20thCentury History: The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/nonaggression
Global Security web site: Military Menu/Axis
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/axis.htm