Maximilian Klube

Terrorism in the Modern World

Dr. Peterson/Dr. Kubyshkin

12/15/2010

Annals of the Birth and Evolution of a Terrorist Organization:

Harakat al Shabaab al-Mujahideen

Almost immediately after the turn of the millennium, the United States (U.S.) entered into an international conflict that was like no other.  A Global War on Terrorism was declared by former President George W. Bush in response to the September 11 attacks of 2001 (9/11).  This Global War on Terrorism branded international terrorism and its supporters as enemies of the U.S. and initiated a military campaign that was to destroy the now most infamous terrorist organization Al-Qaeda.  9/11 marked the date on which international terrorism first entered the everyday life of many Americans and Europeans, but it did not mark the day on which international terrorism was first born.  As a matter of fact, many terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, pre-date the events of 9/11 by several decades.  Since 9/11, Al-Qaeda has gained many affiliate groups throughout the Islamic world that have decided to join its global jihad, some of which include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  One of the most recent additions to the Al-Qaeda network has been Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, also known as Al-Shabaab or “The Youth”.  This Somali terrorist organization has its roots in the state collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1991 and serves as Al-Qaeda’s representative in eastern Africa.  Despite its almost two decade long history, the group has only in recent years gained substantial support and strength in the southern and central parts of Somalia.  What are the roots of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, how did it become a part of the Al-Qaeda network, why has it been so successful in Somalia, and what can be done to contain its threat?  To give a detailed answer, the origins of Al-Shabaab will be explored first. Then Al-Shabaab’s ties with Al-Qaeda will be analyzed, followed by an investigation into the terrorist acts committed by Al-Shabaab, and lastly a number of recommendations to counter the increasing threat posed by this dominant terrorist organization of the Horn of Africa.

I. Somalia’s Road to State Collapse and the Role of Islam in the Horn of Africa

The collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic in 1991 set the stage for the ascension of today’s Al-Shabaab.  The lawless environment present in a territory that lacks a hegemonic state government is ideal for militant groups (like Al-Shabaab) to flourish.  In order to solve the problems that plague Somalia today, a remedy needs to be found for the issues that caused state collapse and ultimately fed into the anarchistic society of today.  The question that comes to mind is: What caused state collapse in Somalia?  Ironically, the one symbol that is supposed to rally a nation behind its state, the flag of a state, is the one symbol that best represents the causes that led to the state collapse in Somalia.  The Somali flag is a white five-pointed star centered on a light blue background.  The blue surface represents the sky and the Indian Ocean that is nearby, while the five-pointed star represents the five areas in the horn of Africa that are inhabited by the Somali people: former British and Italian Somaliland, Djibouti, the Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya.[1]  One could however also reason, that the five pointed star stands for the five major clans that inhabit Somalia: Dir, Isaq, Darod, Hawiye, and Mirifle.[2]  The star therefore represents two major factors that led to the destabilization of Somalia by 1991.  The first factor, also known as irredentism, was the desire to reunite all five Somali territories under one flag on the grounds of common ethnicity, despite the fact that three of the five formally belong to other states.[3]  The second factor is the violent power struggle between the Somali clans that has become an essential part of Somali society which is now second nature to the inhabitants of the Somali territory.[4]  Both irredentism and inter-clan struggles created a very unstable political environment that by itself could barely exist as a state per se.  The deciding factor that exacerbated the troubles of irredentism and inter-clan struggles and finally led to state collapse was the leader of the Somali Democratic Republic from 1969 to 1991, Muhammad Siyaad Barre.  Barre seized power in 1969 through a military coup d’état.  During his 22 years of rule, Barre successfully managed to strain relations between Somalia and its neighbors in the Horn of Africa by pursuing his irredentist agenda either through threats or even war like in the case of Ethiopia in the year 1977-78.[5]  He also managed to further polarize the divisions already existent between clans by practicing nepotism and giving most of the important position of his military dictatorship to members of the Darod clan.[6] [7] [8]  By the beginning of 1991 widespread insurrection had grasped Somalia and the country found itself in a civil war over the little resources that were left after Barre was exiled from Somalia to Lagos, Nigeria.[9]  Out of this civil war was to emerge a system of courts based on the religion of the land, Islam.  These Islamist courts that practiced Shari’ah law eventually gave birth to al-Shabaab.

Islam is a crucial factor when attempting to understand such an Islamist militant group like Al-Shabaab.  Islam has more than fourteen hundred centuries of history in Somalia.  The first recorded Muslim immigrants are said to have arrived in the early seventh century.[10]  By the 15th century Muslims compromised the majority of the population of Somalia and due to its close proximity to the homeland of Islam, the Arabic Peninsula, Islam remained a strong ideology until the 21st centuries despite the colonization of Somalia during the imperialistic scramble for Africa.[11]  As mentioned earlier, Somali society is much divided between its many clans and sub-clans.  A Bedouin adage probably explains this best: “I against my brothers; my brothers and I against our cousins; brothers, cousins and I against the world.”[12]  The connection between the adage and the Somali clan system is easily made.  Depending on what kind of intruder or enemy the different clans are facing, a different kind of alliance is made, with the size of the external threat being proportional to the size of the pool of relatives from which allies are drawn.  The adage also points out though, that even during times of relative peace there was a constant conflict even between “brothers.”  The “awe and respect” that was felt towards Islam by the Somali people should therefore not come as a surprise since so far only Islam has had the ability to unite the divided culture of Somalia under one government.[13]  Religion acts as the glue that ties together Somali society since it is the one major characteristic that all Somalis share.  It should not be a revelation that Somali society (specifically in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital) rallied behind the Islamic courts as a medium for basic services once the government collapsed.

II. The Fall of the Union of Islamic Courts and the Rise of Al-Shabaab

Almost immediately after the collapse of the government in Somalia, the precursor to what would later be known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) formed out of the ruins of the former Somali Democratic Republic with the help of a small Somali chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood.[14]  As mentioned above, Islam has been the only ideology that has been able to unite the divided culture of Somalia.  Thus unsurprisingly in 1994, the first official, fully functioning Shari’ah court was established in northern Mogadishu by members of the Hawiye clan which is currently the largest and most powerful clan in Somalia.[15]  Interestingly enough, Afghanistan, another country in very similar turmoil at the time, saw the rise of a regime with similar aspirations.  More about Somalia’s and Afghanistan’s similarities will be discussed later.  What is important to know about the UIC is that during the courts 12 year existence between 1994 and 2006, the courts were forced by several different factors to take an ever increasing political role in Somalia.[16]  In its initial years, the UIC was only a judicial institution that catered some resemblance of justice to the population of Mogadishu and in its later years the areas South and West of the capital (at the time of its greatest extend in 2006).  The goal of the courts was to “act as local police by preventing robberies and drug-dealing” and to “offer other services such as education and health care.”[17]  The Shari’ah law enacted by these courts had in fact little to do with the oppressive laws of other Shari’ah courts. For example, the Shari’ah courts of the UIC did not include “prohibition of employment and healthcare for women, enforcement of burqa-wearing for women, and violent and grotesque punishment for law-breakers.”[18]  However, the creation of the Transnational National Government (TNG) in 2000, and the increasing influence (and violence) of Mogadishu’s warlords (mostly members of the same clan that the leaders of the UIC came from, the Hawiye), pushed the Somali public to support the Islamic courts as a political organization.[19] [20]  Somali’s did not have the desire to be ruled by a government that was established by foreigners or by warlords that only had their own interests in mind.  This held especially true in light of the fact that the UIC had such a positive record of restoring peace and security to Mogadishu and its immediate surrounding area.  The best prove of this is that the UIC was the only authority able to bring peace to Mogadishu in 16 years, when it held the entirety of the capital for a few months before being ousted by Ethiopian-U.S. military intervention in December 2006.[21]  The violent removal of the UIC from Mogadishu to strengthen the Transitional Federal Government (TFG; a successor to the TNG) and to destroy the “Islamist” influence of the Islamic courts was a pivotal event that would move Al-Shabaab to the prominent role it occupies today.

The roots of Al-Shabaab lie within the increased pressure that was exerted on the UIC in 2005, before its fall a year later.  Facing attacks and assassinations by alleged covert U.S. operations, the UIC decided to form a military force out of the militia’s it had previously contracted to enforce court jurisdictions.  This military force was known as Al-Shabaab, or the Youth, and was compromised of the most radical militia members that went on to kill members of the TFG and “secular” politicians that stood contrary to the ideals of the UIC. [22]  When Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 to replace the UIC in Mogadishu they did so for very specific reasons.  The regime in Addis Ababa saw itself threatened by an Eritrean backed UIC that was about to overpower the TFG which was the main supporter of Ethiopian interests in Somalia.  With the help of the U.S., that felt threatened by Al-Qaeda operatives sheltered by the UIC, Ethiopia replaced the UIC in late 2006 and allowed to the TNG to rule from Mogadishu for the first time since its creation in 2000.[23]  Yet, while the political power of the courts might have been broken, the presence of their leaders and members was not.  Despite the repeated attempts of TFG, Ethiopian, and U.S. strikes the leaders of the UIC are still active, and Al-Shabaab has retained its presence in the capital.[24]  Ever since the fall of the UIC in 2006, Al-Shabaab draws its legitimacy from attempting to restore the UIC or some resemblance of an Islamist government that can fulfill the desire of many Somali people for a state that ties all clans together with the help of Islam.  Through violent struggle and the support of the Hawiye clan (the most powerful Somali clan), Al-Shabaab has been able to claim much of southern and central Somalia and most of Mogadishu, which has been as unsafe as it was before the UIC took power there in 2006.[25] [26] Today, Al-Shabaab finds itself on the U.S. government list for foreign terrorist organizations for its continued attacks on TFG representatives, African Union (AU) peacekeepers (deployed in 2006 concurrently with the fall of the UIC), non-governmental organization (NGO) aid workers, and journalists.[27] [28]  Unfortunately, Al-Shabaab’s attempts to expel such “foreign” invaders like the TFG, the AU, and NGO’s have been far too successful and the terrorist group still poses a considerable threat to the religiously moderate people of Somalia that may not agree with Al-Shabaab’s hard-line agenda and to Western governments that accuse Al-Shabaab of harboring non-Somali terrorist operatives.

III. Connections to Al-Qaeda and Terrorist Acts Committed

One cannot avoid talking about Al-Qaeda when the two words terrorism and Islam come to mind.  One similarly should not avoid talking about Al-Qaeda when covering Al-Shabaab.  Even though Al-Shabaab does not have its roots directly with Al-Qaeda, it has in recent years affiliated itself with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the two top officials of Al-Qaeda.  Direct contact between the two groups is unconfirmed thus far.  What is known however is that both groups exchanged communiqués in 2009 in which a senior leader of Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his cause and in which Ayman al-Zawahiri encouraged Al-Shabaab’s violent jihad against the TFG and other “American-made” institutions.[29]  It is known that sometime in the early 1990s, while Osama bin Laden took refuge in nearby Sudan, Al-Qaeda first entered Somalia with veterans of the Soviet War in Afghanistan and has ever since had a stake in training and equipping fighters and militants with similar goals to Al-Qaeda.[30]  Today, the most prominent group to reside in the Horn of Africa with similar goals to that of Al-Qaeda is Al-Shabaab.  Therefore it is safe to assume that Al-Shabaab has in recent years received some kind of support either through money, weapons, training, or actual Al-Qaeda insurgents fighting alongside Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia.  In addition to the monetary support of Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab can also count on the support of its Diasporas, especially the ones of the U.S. which are among the wealthiest.  Through the hawala system these Diasporas transfer funds around the world from cities like Minneapolis; a city that also exports many recruits for Al-Shabaab in Somalia.[31]  The terrorist organization Al-Shabaab draws sources from all over the globe and not just from within its borders.  Among the main contributors are Al-Qaeda and the Somali Diasporas around the world which sometimes (in the case of the Diasporas) unknowingly fund acts of terrorism.  

In regards to domestic terrorism, Al-Shabaab has accumulated a long a gruesome record since the beginning of its violent jihad in 2006.  Targets are any person or organization that stands against the political domination of Somalia by Al-Shabaab which aims to establish an Islamic Emirate in Somalia that follows strict Shari’ah law.[32]  Targets in the past have therefore been representatives of the TFG, AU peacekeepers, NGO aid workers, journalists of Western descent, and representatives of any government that is from or supports the governments of Ethiopia and the U.S as well as the moderate Somali population that opposes an implementation of strict Shari’ah law in Somalia.  Attacks by Al-Shabaab have in the past included strikes by mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), firearms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs, vehicle borne and as roadside booby traps), and suicide-bombings by vehicle and by foot.[33]  Most symbolic for the violence committed by Al-Shabaab is the recent execution of two girls in a small town in Somalia.  The girls, 14 and 18, were executed publicly after being accused of spying for the Ethiopian government near Beledweyne by the Somali-Ethiopian border.[34]  Other acts of terrorism include: an attack on Donald Payne, a U.S. congressman, by mortar on April 13th, 2009; a suicide-bombing against Burundian soldiers who were part of the AU peacekeeping mission killing 11 and injuring 15 on February 22nd, 2009; a triple suicide-bombing against the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Office, the Ethiopian Consulate Office and the President’s palace in Hargeysa, capital of the northern autonomous region Somaliland, on October 29th, 2008, killing approx. 30 people;  and, a missile attack against a supply plane for the AU peacekeeping mission that killed all 11 on board the plane at Mogadishu airport on March 23rd, 2007.[35]  The selection of targets and the timing of the attacks are impressively well planned and carried out, which granted is made much easier by the lack of central government preventing acts of terrorism.  However, these attacks serve as a reminder that Al-Shabaab has gained significant strength in recent years and should not be underestimated.

On the international stage, Al-Shabaab has had less of an impact as compared to its achievements within the borders of Somalia.  Since the organizations immediate goal is to gain complete control of Somalia to establish an Islamist state, its efforts beyond its borders have been mediocre at best.  Most notably was the coordinated dual suicide-bombing of two screening locations of the World Cup Final on July 11th, 2010, in Kampala, Uganda, that killed at least 70 people.[36]  Uganda was selected as a target by Al-Shabaab due to its involvement in the AU peacekeeping force which is mainly compromised of soldiers from the Ugandan army.[37]  This international act of terrorism was more aimed towards achieving the domestic goal of taking power in Somalia, which makes this attack quite different from attacks committed by other international terrorist organizations (i.e. Al-Qaeda) as it is not aimed at destroying Western influence in the Middle East.  Nonetheless, many state actors like the U.S. fear that this first flirt with international operations by Al-Shabaab will expand into more and more attack which eventually will threaten the interests of the U.S. and American lives directly.[38]  This concern may become more pressing if Al-Shabaab ever manages to gain control of Somalia, which would make Somalia a safe haven for terrorists similar to Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

IV. The Similarities between Afghanistan and Somalia and International Interference

The similarities between Afghanistan between 1988 and 1996 and Somalia from 1991 until today are truly striking.  The lawlessness and violence that reigned in Afghanistan during the civil war following the Soviet invasion in the 1980s and the rise of the Taliban as the ruling organization can be seen as a mirror image of what might happen in Somalia if there is no intervention from the international community.  The death toll due to indiscriminate killing between warlords, non-Pashto, and Pashto clans approached 25,000 people in 1994 in the capital, Kabul, alone.[39]  The death toll of Somalia in its civil war since 1991 as of November 2010 is estimated to be 400,000 due to famine, war, and disease.[40]  By the end of the Afghan Civil War in 1996, Mullah Omar and his Taliban had taken over Afghanistan and were harboring such terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda which was about to have its debut with the attacks on the embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi.[41]  Al-Shabaab has claimed much of southern and central Somalia and has made attacks on the autonomous government in the northern part of Somaliland (i.e. the attacks on January 22nd, 2009 mentioned above) in hopes to overthrow it and control all of Somalia.  Both Afghanistan and Somalia have been witness to high fatality civil wars and both have witnessed the rise of an Islamist group out of that civil war.  The main and most interesting difference between the two is that the Taliban were a regime that was harboring a terrorist organization, while Al-Shabaab would be a hybrid of regime and terrorist organization if it was to take over Somalia.  A terrorist organization in full control of an internationally recognized territory would be unprecedented and should be prevented by international actors under any circumstance.

International actors such as the United Nations (UN), the AU, and individual states (i.e. Ethiopia, the U.S.) have attempted to stabilize the situation in Somalia through direct and indirect intervention.  The two most dominant organizations that have been supported by states opposing Al-Shabaab are the TFG and the AU and its peacekeeping mission also known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The TFG was formed in 2004 after the conclusion of a two year reconciliation conference with the members of its predecessor the Transitional National Government (TNG) and would not be formally instated in Mogadishu until the Ethiopian invasion to defeat the UIC in late 2006.[42]  Almost simultaneously, the UN Security Council authorized the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in the area with resolution S/RES/1725 (2006) called AMISOM to ensure the safety of the TFG and to encourage negotiations between the two contending sides at the time, the TFG and the UIC.[43] [44]  With the fall of the UIC shortly after the resolution was passed, the main objective of AMISOM became to protect members of the TFG and to provide humanitarian aid to their areas of influence in Somalia.  Unfortunately, the AU peacekeepers which are made up of approximately 2000 personnel from Uganda and Burundi have had extreme difficulty holding even Mogadishu and much of the city is currently in the hands of the Al-Shabaab organization.[45]  The forces of the AU deployed in Somalia are severely undermanned and underfunded to fully ensure the supremacy of the TFG against the Al-Shabaab.  AMISON has this far only been able to ensure the survival of the TFG and it has only been able to hold the airport of Mogadishu including some blocks of the city directly adjacent.  Given the fact that Al-Shabaab’s military forces include several thousand fighters and are supported by many warlords (particularly of southern Somalia), AMISOM’s failure up to this point only proves expectations.[46] 

V. Policy Recommendations

If the TFG, the UN, the AU, and its mission AMISOM really want to establish a legitimate Somali state, they need to either increase the funding for AMISOM, or change their approach on how to achieve a stable government and a long lasting peace.  Since the most legitimate government would emerge out of a process that enjoys general consensus by all main players it is important to approach this issue through negotiations and not through battles.  This might prove difficult since Al-Shabaab is known to have never entered into peaceful negotiations, but with the right approach even the most radical Islamist can be brought to the table.[47]  The goal of the negotiations should be to give the three main powers within Somalia, the TFG, Al-Shabaab, and the northern autonomous region of Somaliland, a stake in the future of a united Somali state.  Since the TFG and Somaliland will be much likelier to agree to negotiations, attention must be paid on how to get the extremist leaders of Al-Shabaab to agree to sit down with the TFG and Somaliland.  The key lies within the past of Al-Shabaab.  As mentioned above, many of the leaders of the UIC who are more moderate than the leaders of Al-Shabaab managed to escape the death and violence that took place in Mogadishu in late 2006.  With the help of these moderate leaders who took part in the creation of Al-Shabaab in 2005 before it became radical, it might be possible to convince the current leaders of Al-Shabaab that a peaceful solution to the conflict is in fact very possible.  Understandably, all of this sounds very idealistic, but since this approach seems to have not gained much attention and will cost considerably less lives and money it should definitely be attempted.

If Al-Shabaab is convinced to join into negotiations, the U.S. will have to support the negotiations.  Drawing on Afghanistan as an example once more, this would be similar to the negotiations that President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan had with the Taliban under Mullah Omar.  Even though the Taliban are known to harbor many terrorist organizations, the Obama administration was willing to go along with the talks.  Negotiations between Al-Shabaab and other parties in Somalia should be a prime objective of U.S. foreign policy and should therefore be supported under any circumstance.

If negotiations were to happen what would be the favorable outcome?   Al-Shabaab would most likely support the implementation of Shari’ah law under any circumstance.  In the past this has been the breaking point for western governments which under no circumstance would allow an Islamist regime to take control if it lies within their power to prevent it. (The political situation in Algeria in the early 1990s serves as the best example here.)  The time has come for western governments to allow a certain degree of Shari’ah law to be introduced into states that rule over a predominantly Muslim population, especially given the fact that political Islam is so deeply engrained in Somali culture.  As Micheal Shank puts it, a regime in Somalia can chose to “attempt to fuse the traditional values of the Shari’ah law with modern principles of democracy and human rights through a comprehensive reform methodology.”[48]  Negotiations should conclude with exactly this interpretation of Shari’ah law, if Al-Shabaab insists on having some form of Shari’ah implemented in a future Somali state.  This is the most liberal interpretation of Shari’ah law and it should therefore be supported by the TFG, Somaliland, and the U.S. as a passive player in the negotiations.

VI. Conclusion

Finding a solution to a state of anarchy that has prevailed for so long is by no means easy.  Far from it, all actors included need to show a sense of understanding for each others positions in order to find a solution that can be agreed upon by all major players.  Clan-based rivalries are a dominant divisive factor in Somali politics, but at the same time politics in Somalia are glued together by the common believe of the people that Islam can and will ultimately bring together all Somali clans to form a great, thriving nation-state.  The UIC seemed as close as any other organization has been to achieve that goal of a united Somalia, but the dream was short-lived when Ethiopian forces destroyed the relative peace that existed in southern and central Somalia in late 2006.  Al-Shabaab has taken on the struggle to expel such foreign forces by all means necessary, and the terrorist acts committed by them have been gruesome and effective at the same time.  Their leaders have sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the two top men of Al-Qaeda, but little direct, known interaction between the two has existed besides that.  This leads to the believe that there might be a chance to convince more moderate members of Al-Shabaab and former members of the UIC that their organization, Al-Shabaab, needs to enter negotiations to form a united Somali state.  Hopefully these negotiations will lead to a state that in the worst case scenario supports a set of liberal Shari’ah laws that can be accepted by western governments as legitimate and just.  This trade off, accepting Shari’ah law for a stable terrorist free Somalia, is symbiotic for both the interests of western governments (i.e. the War on Terrorism) and the people of Somalia.  The fatigue that comes with almost 20 years of continued violence, hunger, and disease will surely serve as a motivation for local forces in Somalia, but will it be enough of a motivation for those international players that are far removed from the hot deserts of the Horn of Africa?  The people of Somalia certainly hope so.

VII. Bibliography Summary

[1] "CIA - The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. 16 Nov. 2010. Web. 05 Dec. 2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>.

[2] Gardner, Judith, and Judy El-Bushra. Somalia--the Untold Story the War through the Eyes of Somali Women. London: CIIR and Pluto, 2004. Print.  153-154.

[3] Thomson, Alex. An Introduction to African Politics. London: Routledge, 2004. Print.  16.

[4] Putman, Diana B., and Mohamood C. Noor. "The Somalis: Their History and Culture." Somaliland Cyberspace. Center for Applied Linguistics. Web. 14 Nov. 2010. <http://www.mbali.info/doc415.htm>.   This report was created in corporation with the Bureau  of Population, Refugees, and Migration of the U.S. Department of State.

[5] Shay, Shaul, and Rachel Liberman. Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2007. Print.  65.

[6] Shay, Shaul, and Rachel Liberman. 67-68.

[7] Leeson, P. "Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after Government Collapse." Journal of Comparative Economics 35.4 (2007): 689-710. Print.  694.

[8] Samatar, Abdi Ismail. "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention." The Journal of Modern African Studies 30.04 (1992): 625-41. Print.  637.

[9] Shay, Shaul, and Rachel Liberman. 69-70.

[10] Shank, Michael. "Understanding Political Islam in Somalia." Contemporary Islam 1.1 (2007): 89-103. Print.  91.

[11] Shank, Michael.  92.

[12] Shank, Michael.  95.

[13] Shank, Michael.  94.

[14] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan. "The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts." Journal of Eastern African Studies 1.2 (2007): 151-60. Print.  152.

[15] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan.  152.

[16] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan.  153-157.

[17] Shank, Michael.  91.

[18] Shank, Michael.  91.

[19] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan.  153.  

[20] Shank, Michael.  97.

[21] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan.  154, 157.

[22] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan.  153-154.

[23] Hoehne, Markus V. "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped to Produce Militant Islamism." (2009). Print.  20-21.

[24] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan.  157.

[25] Hanson, Stephanie. "Al-Shabaab." Council on Foreign Relations. 28 July 2010. Web. 11 Dec. 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html>.

[26] Zimmerman, Katherine. "Mogadishu Map: Al Shabaab's Ramadan Offensive." Critical Threats. 23 Sept. 2010. Web. 11 Dec. 2010. <http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/mogadishu-map-al-shabaabs-ramadan-offensive>.

[27] NCTC. "Al-Shabaab." National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Web. 11 Dec. 2010. <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html>.

[28] The African Union Commission. "African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)." Www.africa-union.org. African Union (AU), 2008. Web. 11 Dec. 2010. <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_Background.htm>.

[29] Hanson, Stephanie.

[30] Shay, Shaul, and Rachel Liberman. 79.

[31] Ali, Aman, and Bassam Tariq. "30 Mosques in 30 Days." 30 Mosques in 30 Days. Ramapo College of New Jersey, Mahwah, NJ. 18 Nov. 2010. Speech.

[32] Hanson, Stephanie.

[33] "Australian National Security - Al-Shabaab." Australian Government Attorney-General's Department. 8 Nov. 2010. Web. 12 Dec. 2010. <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Al-Shabaab>.

[34] Ibrahim, Mohammed. "Somali Islamists Kill Two Girls Branded Spies." The New York Times. The New York Times Company, 28 Oct. 2010. Web. 17 Nov. 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/world/africa/29somalia.html?_r=1&scp=6&sq=somalia&st=cse>.

[35] "Australian National Security - Al-Shabaab."

[36] Landler, Mark. "After Attacks in Uganda, Worry Grows Over Group." The New York Times. The New York Times Company, 12 July 2010. Web. 12 Dec. 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/world/africa/13policy.html>.

[37] The African Union Commission.

[38] Landler, Mark.

[39] "Backgrounder on Afghanistan: History of the War (Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, October 2001)." Human Rights Watch. Oct. 2001. Web. 12 Dec. 2010. <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1023.htm>.

[40] White, Matthew. "Secondary Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century." Twentieth Century Atlas. Nov. 2010. Web. 12 Dec. 2010. <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm#Somalia>.

[41] Riedel, Bruce O. The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2010. Print.

[42] Bureau of African Affairs. "Somalia." U.S. Department of State. 8 Nov. 2010. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm>.

[43] Barnes, Cedric, and Harun Hassan.  156.  

[44] United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1725." UN Security Council. 6 Dec. 2006. Web. 14 Dec. 2010. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/646/11/PDF/N0664611.pdf?OpenElement>.

[45] The African Union Commission.

[46] Hanson, Stephanie.

[47] "Australian National Security - Al-Shabaab."

[48] Shank, Michael.  91.