Tulane University
Mandel-Palagye Program for Middle East Peace
A New Age of Control: The Role of Cyber Tools in the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories
Anya Sastry
Conflict Management (POLI-3550) and Israeli/Palestinian Culture (JWST-3100)
Professor Kiel & Professor Horowitz
July 15, 2022
Introduction
On the early morning Zoom conference call, Cathrine Abuamsha, a local advocacy manager at 7amleh (the Arab Center for Social Media Advancement), spoke intently and clearly to my colleague and I, vividly recounting her recent experience with the Israel Defense Force’s Blue Wolf surveillance technology. As she described her transit through a newly established checkpoint, she remarked, “...they stopped me, they told me “Give me your ID, your driving license,” and I had to give them because you basically can’t say anything…it’s an occupation, they are fully armed, and there are three of them while I am in my car, so it’s horrifying” (Abuamsha). She continued on to say, “So I gave them my driving license and then easily, with her cellphone, the soldier took a picture of all my information. I saw her pointing the mobile phone into my face outside the car…I didn’t know if she’s taking a picture of me, I can’t even ask her, and she wouldn’t let me know” (Abuamsha).
This encounter is simply one of many invasive cyber experiences that Palestinians must face in the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Through a myriad of cyber tools, cyber strategy is now a significant facet of the daily operations that the Israeli government and military carry out, and this paper responds to the question of how these cyber tactics specifically play a factor in the perpetuation of the Israeli military occupation of Palestine. Examining the Israeli use of cyber tools in its relationship with Palestinians through interviews, academic reports, news articles, first-hand testimonies, and visual evidence, this paper arrives at the following conclusion: through the significant use of cyber tools, such as surveillance technology, hacking software, and social media algorithmic censorship, the Israeli government and military perpetuate their current-day occupation of the Palestinian Territories by taking advantage of a poorly structured governmental system and actively creating an environment that disregards basic rights to privacy and suppresses the Palestinian voice.
Literature Review
This specific research focus fits into a broader field of cyber tools as a new element of warfare and military strategy in statecraft. Existing academic literature on this topic considers the norms surrounding the use of cyber tools and possible actions that states will take with access to these new tools. Mazanec (2015) posits that “In the absence of firmly established norms governing cyber warfare, states may also be exhibiting an abundance of caution as they slowly test the limits of what the international community deems acceptable behavior in cyberspace.” With regards to the uncertainties of this new space, Mussington (2019) asserts that “This ambiguity…has been voraciously exploited by an assortment of state, non-state and suspected proxy actors…The result has been a near constant drizzle of activity in cyberspace calculated to fall into a “grey zone”.” I argue that in this new iteration of warfare, where complex cyber tools are readily available for use, there is an increased potential for governments to abuse their cyber power in their desire to establish dominance over another state or group.
Overview of Israeli Military Cyber System
It is important to begin with an overview of the core structure, goals, and strategies of Israel’s cyber system and more specifically, how these fundamental characteristics create a system that inherently encourages cyber exploitation and suppression of Palestinians. Within the governmental system, cyber policy is driven first and foremost by the Israeli National Cyber Directorate, also known as the INCD. In 2012, the Israel National Cyber Bureau (INCB) was established with a more policy-centered focus, and in 2016, the National Cyber Security Authority was founded with a more operations-centered focus. These two entities merged in 2018 under an Amendment Law to make up what is known today as the INCD. This cybersecurity organ, as one of the main bodies within Israel’s cyber system, maintains a myriad of responsibilities and tasks. INCD not only deals with cyber policy and operational implementation, but also works in coordination with other existing governmental and military groups, such as Mossad, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Ministry of Justice, Israeli Police, and Shin Bet.
The core issue with the INCD, however, especially when taking into account the considerable reach this organ has within Israel’s cyber system, is the centralization of its power and capabilities into the Office of the Prime Minister. In his report titled “Israel’s National Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense Posture,” Jasper Frei highlights that “The most challenging issue the INCD will face in the future is [its] vague legal framework…Unchanged, it allows the Prime Minister to order exhaustive investigation and surveillance on whomever he wants–even political adversaries–with little to no oversight mechanisms” (Frei 15). The “Cybersecurity and the National Cyber Directorate” bill, which was introduced in 2018 and was later reintroduced with revisions in 2021, provides this legal framework for the INCD, which many have deemed problematic due to how it allows the Prime Minister complete access to the INCD as a cyber tool without any oversight or system of checks and balances. Following the initial release of the bill under the name “Cyber Protection and the National Cyber Directorate Memorandum,” the Israeli Internet Association (IIA) issued a document criticizing the bill. One such critique was on the lack of sufficient transparency and as the Library of Congress reports, “According to the IIA, the Memorandum is conspicuously lacking in transparency mechanisms, as well as parliamentary and public oversight of its activities. According to the proposed bill, the INCD’s activity focuses on the relationship between the prime minister, the INCD’s director, the privacy supervisor and the Supervisory Committee. There is no reporting to the Knesset or to the general public. The duty of extreme secrecy that is imposed on INCD’s employees and on the Supervisory Committee…prevents the publication of any information to the public” (Library of Congress 2019). This centralization of power and complete lack of oversight for one of the major bodies within the cyber system impart the Israeli government with the capabilities to order cyber operations that are potential human rights violations and fundamental obstructions of democratic values.
Focusing on the strategy behind Israeli cyber operations and policy, Frei mentions two aspects of strategy worth noting. Firstly, he observes that “the military develops its cyberdefense and intelligence capabilities in response to explicitly mentioned enemies (Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, ISIS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, etc),” and that “the security community increasingly embraces cyber tools as ways to achieve their goals” (Frei 12). Constructing strategy by developing operations with specific groups in mind opens up a route through which Israeli government and military can justify tailored operations and use of cyber tools that unjustly target a specific group of people. Secondly, Frei states that “the civilian cybersecurity strategy actively engages and supports the private sector to leverage its expertise while simultaneously strengthening the expanding Israeli high-tech industry” (Frei 12). There is nothing inherently alarming regarding this relationship between the government and the private sector; however, when factoring in the structures and other goals previously mentioned, there is now an opportunity for potentially exploitative cyber operations to be empowered even further through both the resources of the public and private sector. Relating these foundational aspects of Israel’s cybersystem to Palestine, there is now a clear path established for both government and military, in coordination with private sector firms, to take advantage of centralized governing bodies and core offensive strategy in order to continually suppress the Palestinian people through the use of cyber tools.
Cyber Surveillance
“...our military service has taught us that intelligence is an integral part of Israel’s military occupation over the territories. The Palestinian population under military rule is completely exposed to espionage and surveillance by Israeli intelligence…There’s no distinction between Palestinians who are, and are not, involved in violence. Information that is collected and stored harms innocent people…Intelligence allows for the continued control over millions of people through thorough and intrusive supervision and invasion of most areas of life” (Unit 8200 Reserve Officers 2014). These lines can be found in the 2014 open letter from forty-three Unit 8200 reserve officers to Prime Minister Netanyahu and leadership within the military intelligence units. This letter, as well as a myriad of other testimonies from former 8200 soldiers, all point to one technology in particular that has played a significant role in the surveillance that the unit has conducted on Palestinians: Blue Wolf. Through this technology, which is programmed into a provided phone, soldiers can take photos of an individual and run it through a database filled with thousands of stored photos, as well as highly private information, in order to identify the individual before them. Different colors pop up on the app depending on whether this individual has been assigned an arrest, detain, or release order. Cathrine from 7amleh provided additional information on Blue Wolf, stating that “[Blue Wolf] is connected to a very wide biometric data bank or database…they take pictures that connect with our faces or with our ID numbers…if they take a picture that is connected to this Blue Wolf and it shows that, for example, I am a threat to the army or to the state of Israel based on my opinions and my expressions or whatever activism I do, they will stop you or they could detain you or they could do whatever they do. So, imagine, this is a violation of privacy, a violation of your freedom of opinion and expression, also your dignity. All your information is exposed and your face is exposed and you are basically not controlling any of your movement” (Abuamsha).
Blue Wolf has been tested extensively in Hebron, a city in the West Bank that is partly controlled by the Israeli military, and Palestinians find themselves under constant video surveillance (Dwoskin 2021). This consistent monitoring captures the sensitive and private information that soldiers then use to plan operations in the West Bank. Testimony provided to The Guardian by former soldiers in these military intelligence units reports, “Contrary to my expectations, our database included not only security-related intelligence but also personal and political information. That is to say, on a personal level, there is no respect for Palestinian privacy…Some [orders] were political objectives that did not even fall within the Israeli consensus…such objectives do not serve the security system but rather agendas of certain politicians…Any Palestinian is exposed to non-stop monitoring by the Israeli Big Brother, without legal protection, and with no way of knowing when they too would become an objective – targeted for harassment, extortion, or physical injury” (Anonymous 2014). While there is the problem of the extent to which the Palestinians are being surveilled, there is also the problem of Palestinians as the sole group that is being surveilled to this level. Israeli citizens do not experience any surveillance program remotely similar to this, especially due to the fact that governmental legislation prevents that violation of privacy for Israelis.
Hacking Operations
Beyond surveillance, the Israeli military has actively targeted specific Palestinian individuals and groups in order to gain more information. In 2021, the Israeli government utilized the Pegasus spyware created by the NSO Group to hack into the personal cellular devices of leaders of various human rights groups and NGOs. These prominent and internationally-renowned groups include Al-Haq Rights Group, Bisan Center for Research and Development, and Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association. A technical investigation run by Frontline Defenders and confirmed by Citizen Lab and Amnesty International discovered this hacking operation and released its findings for the public. Much of the time I spent with Cathrine was dedicated to discussing the Pegasus hacking. She described the spyware as a zero-click hacking operation, meaning that the user of the device does not have to click anything in order for the spyware to infect the device. Once Pegasus is installed, the device becomes a “portable surveillance tool by gaining access to the phone’s camera, microphone, and text messages, enabling surveillance of the person targeted and their contacts” (Human Rights Watch 2021). The Pegasus spyware, the same technology used to surveille French President Emmanuel Macron, is dangerous and invasive to the point where many countries around the world have blacklisted it. Despite these international standards, the Israeli government continues to utilize it on Palestinians.
Following the condemnation of the Israeli government for utilizing NSO’s spyware in such a manner, the government made the decision to designate the human rights groups of those who were hacked as terrorist organizations. On the Israeli government’s response to accusations, Cathrine said, “...the Israeli government issued a resolution…stating that these six organizations are terrorist organizations because they are linked to political affiliations on secret evidence. They never shared what the evidence was…it was clearly noticed, due to the international investigations from Amnesty, that workers from these organizations were spied on…so [the Israeli government] has to hide their hacking through declaring that these organizations are terrorists” (Abuamsha). Cathrine’s story was not over yet, however. She continued on to say “After that, one of the people who got his cell phone implanted with Pegasus was arrested and detained. He is a French Palestinian lawyer. He is called Salah Hamouri and now he is in arrested detention by Israeli government and without telling him what was happening and on what basis is he detained” (Abuamsha). Through assigning arrested detention, the Israeli military can detain an individual for however long they desire based on the grounds of possessing secret evidence of their misbehavior.
Social Media Censorship
The significant relationship between the Israeli government and private sector firms has proven to be problematic, and is one of the central avenues through which the government establishes cyber control over Palestinians. More specifically, the Israeli government maintains a strong relationship with Meta, the owner of apps such as Facebook and Instagram, two apps that are widely used among Palestinians. While in Jerusalem, I met with a Palestinian by the name of Ahmad Barakat who explained the intricacies of this relationship. Ahmad, a digital media manager by profession, also engages in digital advocacy work related to his past and ongoing experiences with the Israeli government and Meta. He began our conversation by sharing that in 2016, the Ministry of Affairs of Israel met with Meta regarding Palestinian content. Following this meeting, Palestinians began to experience significant censorship on Facebook and Instagram, whether it was through content removals, account restrictions, or shadow-banning, leading many to believe that the Israeli government tasked Meta with altering their algorithms to censor Palestinians (see figures below). Ahmad took it upon himself to test his theory and he related his findings, stating that “I try to test by myself, to write several words in Arabic about something related to Palestine and to the cause of Palestine, to terrorism and everything, okay? And I did the same thing with the Hebrew language…I got my account closed because of the Arabic content…there is two standards for the content related to Arabs or to Jewish…When you see the Israeli pages, you will see that, for example, Death to Arabs, Kill Arabs…no one tell them anything” (Barakat).
Additionally, Ahmad discussed the shadow-banning that many influencers, both in the Middle East and abroad, experience when posting advocacy-related content regarding Palestine, saying that reach goes down by as little as fifty percent. Many creators and influencers who post about Palestine fail to show up in search results until their full usernames are typed into the search function of Instagram. Furthermore, they are barred from going live on their accounts (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. @shaymaalshiri and @snake for @muslim on Instagram, This Is What Social Media Censorship Of Palestine Looks Like, 2021.
He also mentioned restrictions on specific words, sharing that “We have started seeing the new restrictions from the content for some words like, for example, shaheed. Shaheed in English is martyr…when someone is killed from Palestine, we call him shaheed…on Facebook, you can’t write this” (Barakat). One of Ahmad’s clients is a Fatah-centered student group at Birzeit University in the West Bank. Referring to his work with the group, Ahmad said “...I worked with them as a consultant…Before, about two months, they published some photos from their activities in university and one of the photos contained name of [group similar to Hamas]. It contained only the words. They give them a warning message that they will close the account, just because of some words inside a picture for a student activity” (Barakat). Ahmad, having posted about the activities himself, faced account restrictions himself after he posted about these student activities and referred to former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman, Yasser Arafat, as a shaheed or “martyr” (see Figs. 2 and 3).
Fig. 2. Ahmad Barakat, Screenshot of Account Restrictions & Translation, 2022.
Fig. 3. Ahmad Barakat, Screenshot 2 of Account Restrictions, 2022.
What he kept repeating throughout our conversation, however, was the impact this censorship has on Palestinians. It appears that at the heart of the Palestinian liberation movement is a deep desire to communicate to the rest of the world the stories, experiences, and emotions of the Palestinian people. Their advocacy work is grounded in outreach and in connecting with the international community by speaking out against any injustices they may face. Ahmad ended our conversation with this straightforward yet profound comment: “We need to speak of course. If we cannot speak, what can we do?” (Barakat).
Conclusion
This examination of the Israeli government’s use of cyber tools toward the Palestinian people finds that a complete lack of oversight and accountability allows for the exploitation of cyber tools, such as surveillance technology, spyware, and media algorithms, for the purpose of maintaining the occupation of the Palestinian Territories. In this new and emerging space of cyber warfare, the Israeli government and military have taken complete advantage of poorly-constructed legal frameworks and norms in order to further their own power ambitions. The first and most important step to combating such actions is to rework the legislative framework upon which the INCD is built. Decentralize the responsibilities within this organ and incorporate a system of checks and balances so that full power is not placed in the hands of one individual with a political agenda. Implement a system that factors in consequences and methods of accountability, a system that demands Unit 8200 to think twice before maintaining total and invasive surveillance of Palestinians. If this foundational component is not fixed, the Israeli government and corresponding military intelligence units will continue to exploit their access to powerful cyber tools and partnerships in the greater plan of occupying the Palestinian Territories.
Bibliography
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