Impact investing 2
Some analogies between fiscal and monetary policy, humanitarian aid and development finance, and charity and impact investing
We use both fiscal and monetary policy to improve domestic welfare:
The government can spend money on public goods like health or education with higher sROI, but this is more difficult: subsidizing education is also subsidizing childcare, which increases labor force participation rate. And subsidizing health might be really good, because suffering/pain differs fundamentally from other goods in economic models, where severe pain triggers near-complete price insensitivity and willingness to sacrifice enormous portions of wealth for relief- far exceeding what logarithmic utility models would predict. Or the government can subsidize R&D. The drawback is that it's less scalable and there are steeper diminishing returns. But some economists have argued that spending on health, education and R&D in rich countries is not very cost-effective any longer on the current margin, because we already spend so much and are hitting diminishing returns. For instance, only 20% of labor productivity growth in the US since 1988 has been driven by R&D spending
And so, both redistribution via transfer payments or spending on public goods have a large and robust short-term welfare effect but lower long-run growth as the money is taken away from the private sector, which is better at stimulating long-run growth. Trickle down economics has a bad reputation, but it works (e.g. the 2017 US tax cuts increased long-run GDP by 0.6%, which is pretty good). And growth causes a lot of welfare, it’s just that the effects are very delayed and by the time the trickle down effects help the poorest in society, they are no longer as poor as the poorest people now. So it can make sense to give people a lot of short-term relief now.
Why would the state make concessional loans and lose money? Why not loan at market rates? For this would have no additionality, the state would just be another lender. These concessional loans pay for the service that banks provide to the state. What is the service? Banks find firms that perform well, so that the state is not in the business of 'picking winners'.
This gets at a central tension between left wing and right wing economics: robust short-term welfare effects of redistribution (which the left favors) vs. larger, but slower long-run effects of growth via trickle down economics (but that only benefit richer future people). In the end it boils down to discount rates and the eta parameter in diminishing returns (is a dollar really only 10x more valuable to someone on $10k/y than $100k/y, or is it maybe more?).
Analogously, we use both aid and development finance to improve foreign welfare:
These concessional, below market rate loans have the benefit of creating more growth, but the drawback is that, unlike cash-transfers, you cannot target the poorest of the poor. These loans also create strategic alliances, and are probably better for global growth because it gets countries trading with richer countries. There is also a trade-off between financial returns and social impact. If you're getting market rate returns over the long-term, there's likely no 'additionality.'[9] If there's additionality, returns will likely be below market rate. I think some development banks have not really understood this (e.g. from 2012-2018, one UK development bank had average returns 10.3% between 2012-2016, and likely no additionality).[10]
Analogously, we use both charity and impact investing to improve welfare:
Concessionary investments are on a spectrum from slight financial sacrifice at one end, to a grant to a company at the other. The lower financial returns an investor accepts for the sake of social impact, the higher the opportunity cost of impact investing. The opportunity cost of an investment is what the investor could otherwise have done with the money, which could be donating straight away, or investing to give: socially neutral investing and donating the profits later.
Tab 2
“3.2. Low-cost but high-benefit changes
Within the bounds of what market forces allow, and what companies and the public see as acceptable, there could be minor design changes that yield large social benefits at negligible cost to competitiveness or user satisfaction.
This is especially true for rare situations. Constitutional crises don’t happen often, so market pressures won’t directly shape how an AI behaves during one. But that AI behaviour could be hugely consequential.
It would also be true in situations where users don’t care all that much about the behaviour. Perhaps they find some AI’s encouragement to reflect on their values mildly annoying, but not nearly enough to switch to a different AI.”
https://x.com/NunoSempere/status/1998366827152650636
https://www.anthropic.com/news/anthropic-rwanda-mou
[6] Use of subsidies by Development Finance Institutions in the infrastructure sector | ODI: Think change
[12] General Equilibrium Effects of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence From Kenya - Egger - 2022 - Econometrica - Wiley Online Library
[13] There seems to be an allure to policy coherence and optimizing for several objectives at once, finding an intervention that has the best of both worlds, but it would be a suspicious convergence if the best poverty reduction methods happened to be effective at creating growth and entrepreneurship as well, i.e. giving directly to the poorest at scale AND having a high fiscal multiplier i.e. making people productive to create growth. The Tinbergen Rule is a basic principle of effective policy, which states that to achieve n independent policy targets you need at least n independent policy instruments. For similar reasons people want microfinance to work at scale for poor people in poor countries or argue that UBI will create many entrepreneurs and you get massive productivity at scale and a massive fiscal multiplier, yet some EU welfare states have de facto UBI, and while being good to improve the welfare of the poorest in society, this has not contributed very much to frontier growth.
[15] “Many impact investors try to affect the stock price of companies in public stock markets, either by boosting the stock price of beneficial companies or by damaging the stock price of harmful companies. These efforts are complicated by socially neutral investors (who only seek profit), who can potentially offset any effects on the stock price. For example, if impact investors divest from an industry, socially neutral investors can move in to buy up the underpriced stock. There is clear evidence of short-term market inefficiency such that impact investors can affect stock prices on the timescale of around 3 months. There is expert disagreement about whether socially responsible investing is likely to have an effect after 6 months and beyond: some economists hold that the effect will be completely offset, some that more than half will be offset, and some that a substantial fraction of the effect might persist beyond 6 months.
Given the size of the market cap of firms targeted by socially responsible investing, it will also be difficult for most investors to have any substantial effect on stock prices in the first place. Moreover, if you invest in a socially beneficial company offering market-rate returns, then you will likely merely displace a socially neutral investor. This means the counterfactual impact of your investment is merely to provide additional capital to the stock market as a whole. For all of these reasons, the direct impact of any single socially responsible investor in large public stock markets is likely to be modest at best.” Donating effectively is usually better than Impact Investing | Let's Fund