Ballot Images -- Essential or Worthless?
2021-04-13 V1.3
Raymond Lutz, MSEE and creator of AuditEngine, a ballot image auditing system.
raylutz@citizensoversight.org 619-820-5321
What are "Ballot Images"?
Modern ballot scanners create a full digital image of both sides of each ballot as they are scanned, either at the polling place or central election office. After they are scanned, the voter intent is read from the image, and not directly from the paper. Today, 97% of the nation’s most populous counties (representing more than 80% of the electorate) use equipment that creates ballot images.
Are they difficult to produce or save?
Voting machines that include ballot scanners meet design criteria that includes the ability to scan and save all ballot images during the voting period. Precinct scanners save ballot images to USB "thumb drive" memory sticks[1]. Central count scanners have an internal hard drive. At the end of the election, the images and results are transferred to the election management system software program and can later be exported and easily stored. Unlike paper ballots that consume a warehouse, a one terabyte USB thumb drive costs only about $30 and can store about 2 to 5 million ballot images -- far more than most counties produce in an election.
Ballot images are valuable public records that must be preserved
Of the four major voting machine makers, only one allows ballot images to be deleted as a configuration option. Sometimes, election workers reuse memory sticks and overwrite the data, while never uploading it. Ballot images should be preserved at least as well as paper ballots are. Some claim ballot images are unnecessary and redundant, only existing briefly, "one nanosecond"[2] was a recent quote. We can note that Wall Street operates with trades taking only microseconds, and they record them all. Our votes are no less important than financial transactions.
Ballot images are an important public asset, as follows:
Can Ballot Images be "hacked"?
Some claim ballot images are a waste of time because they are not absolutely trustable, but unfortunately, that can be said about anything these days. It is true that voting machines that include scanners could be manipulated through sophisticated imaging software hacks to alter the ballot images as they are being produced. In such a scenario, the ballot images would then differ from the paper, and then audits performed based on the ballot images alone could not detect such alteration.
However, almost all hacking and alteration opportunities exist after the ballot images are created and thus could be caught by a ballot image audit. Steps can be taken to limit the possibility of an image-altering hack, but right now, there are so many other ways to modify the results that are easier, it is hard to imagine someone going to such lengths, particularly since ballot image audits are relatively new.
As we get better at securing ballot images the risk of such hacks will diminish to nearly zero. We have proposed improved cyber-security measures so the ballot images would be secured immediately as they are produced, thus making ballot image audits even more trusted. Yet, we agree that checking that the paper matches the ballot images is an important practice, and can be implemented as a statistical audit that directly samples paper or compares with independently scanned batches. Of course, if the ballot image audit does expose potential fraud, a full hand count or new election will likely result rather than conducting a statistical audit.
Ballot Images should be published for anyone to review
There is no longer any doubt that ballot images are public records. We believe these records should be made public for anyone to review, with no cost burden to the public. It is not possible to link any properly completed ballot with any voter without additional information. Distinctive marks like signatures, initials, etc. are illegal. But to be on the safe side, these marks can be redacted. A good model for transparency is San Francisco County, where they have been routinely posting all ballot images and providing an interface for the public to review them[4]. In the 2020 General Election, they posted all 1.5 million ballot images.
Misinterpretation by voting machines
It is useful to look at several actual examples of ballot marking which were improperly interpreted by the installed voting machines compared with the interpretation by a ballot image auditing platform, AuditEngine. These examples are from Collier County, FL in the 2020 General election, using ES&S (Election Systems & Software) equipment. In ballot images that are not stretched or corrupted, AuditEngine correctly interprets voter intent 97% of the time when there is a disagreement with the official result. Here are some typical cases where the voting system interpreted voter intent incorrectly while AuditEngine was successful.
Stretched ballot image
An example of a "stretched" ballot image, which results when the paper is briefly delayed and is not fed evenly. If such stretching occurs where voter completed ovals exist, it might cause the vote to be interpreted incorrectly. By keeping the ballot images for evidence, it is possible to improve procedures to clean and maintain the machines, particularly the rollers, and perhaps take machines out of service that have serious problems.
Bottomline
Ballot images are essential. They must be created, preserved, and made public. The benefits clearly outweigh any additional costs or considerations.
Respectfully submitted,
/Raymond Lutz/
Executive Director, CitizensOversight.org
Lutz, MSEE, has over 34 years of experience in high technology fields including document imaging technology, and is the creator of AuditEngine, an independent ballot image auditing system. For more information, visit: https://copswiki.org/Common/AuditEngine
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[1] Ballot images from ES&S or Dominion consume an average of less than 300KB for two-sided ballots, and if designed to compress well, 200KB. Thus, on a 4GB or thumb drive no fewer than 13,000 or up to 20,000 two-sided ballot sheets can be stored, and double that on an 8GB drive. During one 12-hour election day, if ballot sheets are fed continuously at 1 sheet per 15 sec, a total of 2,880 sheets can be scanned, thus able to operate continuously for nearly 14 days on one 8GB thumb drive. If early voting periods persist for longer than 14 days, then additional machines can be deployed, or a single machine can be restarted with a second thumb drive.
[2] "One nanosecond" as stated by David E. Ramba, representing the position of the supervisors of elections on 3/22/2021 at the Florida House Committee Hearing (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTzyNydQRkA) of course is not to be taken literally. Flashing an image on the screen requires at least one frame, and could be typically no less than 1/30 sec, and human perception requires several frames, usually at least 0.1 sec. In reality, the voting machines may not flash the image at all, but it still exists in memory as an important record. Contrary to his testimony, the machines are designed to save images and many districts do so on a routine basis.
[3] Citizens' Oversight has developed AuditEngine which can perform such an audit quickly using the vast resources of cloud computing, expert systems, and deep learning technologies. https://copswiki.org/Common/AuditEngine