Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995)

514 U.S.476

Summary of Facts: Displaying alcohol content (ABV%) on beer labels had been prohibited following the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 (this applied only to beer, not wine or spirits). Coors applied for an application to display ABV% but was rejected by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. A petition was circulated by Coors for a declaratory judgment, calling the ban and subsequent rejection unconstitutional.

Procedural History: Coors Brewing Co. filed suit on the basis that the Federal Alcohol Administration Act violated the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech. The government argued that allowing breweries to label their ABV% could ignite a “strength war” between producers.

Issue: Does restricting a brewery’s ability to label their ABV% limit their free speech as protected by the First Amendment? Conversely, is there substantial reasoning to uphold the prohibition of breweries labeling ABV% out of respect for public safety? Is there another method the government could use to regulate the alcohol content in beer (avoiding a “strength war”) which would not impede on First Amendment guarantees? Was the government’s interest in protecting public safety “substantial” enough to warrant restricting speech in this case? Did this regulation uphold the interest the government has in public safety?

Rules: A test developed during the 1980 case Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission was implemented to determine if the restriction of commercial speech with regard to lawful speech was necessary. The test stipulates that any regulation of commercial speech must 1. Promote a substantial government interest. 2. It must directly advance that interest and 3. It must be narrowly tailored.

Application: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Coors Brewing Co. and found that while the government had reason to be concerned for public safety, there were other avenues the government could utilize to regulate ABV% and prevent a “strength war.” Rather than regulating commercial speech, the government could just regulate ABV% directly or prevent its use in advertising and promotional materials.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court agreed that the government had a substantial interest in preventing a “strength war.” Justice Clarence Thomas wrote [advertising and labeling which represented the strength of beer] “could lead to greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs.” However, the court did not agree that this restriction of commercial speech furthered the government’s interests in public safety. Justice Thomas noted that the same act preventing ABV% labeling on beer, required it on wine. The government also failed to substantiate the claim that labeling ABV% on beer would ignite a strength war. Justice Thomas argued that even if the government had been able to establish a correlation between ABV% labels and competition via ABV%, it still would not have been sufficient as the government has other means of relating ABV% without restricting free speech (such as directly regulating ABV% or prohibiting ABV% to be used in promotional material).